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BOOK    909.82. M349   c.  1 
MARRIOTT    #    EUROPE    AND    BEYOND 


3  T153  DOEObObO  fl 


EUROPE    AND    BEYOND 


WORKS   BY  THE   SAME   AUTHOR 

The  Makers  of  Modern  Italy 

George  Canning  and  his  Times 

Lord  Falkland  and  his  Times 

The  Remaking  of  Modern  Europe 

Second  Chambers 

English  Political  Institutions 

England    since  Waterloo  (being  Vol. 
vii.  of  Oman's  History  of  England) 

The  English  Land  System 

The    Evolution  of    Prussia    (with   C. 
Grant  Robertson) 

The  Eastern  Question 

English  History  in  Shakspeare 

The  European  Commonwealth 

The  Right  to  Work 

Syndicalism  :  Political  and  Economic 


EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

A    PRELIMINARY    SURVEY    OF    WORLD-  2' 

POLITICS  IN  THE  LAST  HALF-CENTURY 

1870-1920  1  (t  -s 


BY 

J,     A.     R.     MARRIOTT 

HONORARY    FELLOW,   FORMERLY    FELLOW  AND  LECTURER, 
OF    WORCESTER    COLLEGE,    OXFORD  ;     M.P.    FOR    OXFORD 


WITH    EIGHT   MAPS 


NEW  YORK 

E.  P.  BUTTON  AND  COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 


PREFACE 

THIS  book  is  intended  as  a  sequel  to   my  earlier 
volume  on  The  RemaJcing  of  Modem  Europe  (1789- 
;:so  1871),  first  published  in  1909/  and  has  been  written  in 
^  response  to  requests  for  a  continuation  of  that  narrative. 
fr    I  must,  however,  beg  my  readers  to  remember  that  I  offer 
it  only  as  a  preliminary  survey  of  a  large  tract  of  country. 
S^  The  last  half-century  has  not  yet  fallen  into  perspective, 
^  and  the  time  for  writing  the  history  of  it  has  not,  therefore, 
in  my  judgment  arrived.    But  as  those  who  control  our 
s,.    educational  destinies  appear  to  think  otherwise,  and  as 
^  there  is  a  natural  and  legitimate  curiosity  among  many 
^     students  of  foreign  affairs  to  know  something  of  the  days 
immediately  preceding  our  own — a  knowledge  not  always 
easily  attainable — I  have  reduced  to  a  reasonably  brief 
^"    and  mainly  (though  not  strictly)  consecutive  narrative 
V    the  substance  of  studies  on  which  I  have  long  been  engaged. 
^       In  various  chapters  of  this  book  I  have  not  scrupled  to 
J^^"  Hft  "  whole  paragraphs  from  previously  pubUshed  works 
g^   of  my  own :   notably  from  The  Evolution  of  Prussia — 
^  written  in  conjunction  with  my  friend  and  former  col- 
league. Principal  C.  Grant   Robertson   (Clarendon   Press, 
1915) ;    The   Eastern    Questi(m    (Clarendon   Press,   1917), 
^  The  European   Commonwealth  (Clarendon  Press,  1919), — 
J^  all  these   by  kind  permission   of  the   Delegates  of    the 

r-4  1  Methuen  &  Co.     TweHth  Edition,  1920. 

'^  V 


vi  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Clarendon  Press ;  and  England  since  Waterloo  (Methuen 
&  Co.,  1913;  Fourth  Edition,  1920).  The  substance  of 
Chapter  VII.  appeared  as  an  article  in  The  Edinburgh 
Review  for  April  1919,  and  some  paragraphs  of  Chapter 
XIV.  originally  appeared  in  articles  contributed  by  me  to 
The  Fortnightly  Review.  For  permission  to  reprint  them 
I  have  to  thank  the  proprietors  and  editors  of  these 
Reviews. 

My  indebtedness  to  other  writers,  and  particularly  to 
the  accomplished  historians  and  publicists  of  France,  is, 
I  think,  sufficiently  indicated  and  acknowledged  in  the 
short  bibliographies  which  I  have  suffixed  to  each  chapter. 
These  bibliographies  will,  I  hope,  be  found  useful  alike  by 
teachers  in  universities  and  schools,  and  by  those  general 
readers  whose  wants  I  have  tried  to  keep  in  mind,  not  less 
than  those  of  professed  students  of  history.  The  work  has 
been  written  amid  many  distractions  unfavourable  to 
literary  concentration,  and  probably  contains  some  errors, 
despite  all  efforts  to  eliminate  them.  Should  my  readers 
discover  them  I  shall  be  grateful  for  corrections. 

J.  A.  R.  MARRIOTT 

House  of  Commons  Library 
25^/i  May  1921 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  I 

PAGK 

Introductory  :  The  New  Era      .....        1 


CHAPTER  II 

The  New  Germany  and  the  New  France  (1871-75)  .  .      24 

CHAPTER  III 
The  Eastern  Question  (1875-98) .  .  .  .  .46 

CHAPTER  IV 

The  Ascendancy  of  Germany  (1879-90).     The  Triple  Alliance. 
The  German  Empire  in  Africa       .  .  .  .69 

CHAPTER  V 
The  Egyptian  Problem  (1875-99)  .  .  .  .91 

CHAPTER  VI 

The  Expansion  of  Russia  :    The    Franco-Russian   Alliance 

(1890-98)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .103 

CHAPTER  VII 
The  United  States  of  America  as  a  Would-Power  (1898-1916)    124 

CHAPTER  VIII 
The  English  in  South  Africa  (1871-1902)         .  .  .143 


viii  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


CHAPTER  IX 

PAOB 

West  and  East  (1839-1907)  .  .  .  .  .164 


CHAPTER  X 

The  Diplomatic  Revolution  (1890-1911)  .  .  .189 

CHAPTER  XI 

The  Problem  of  the  Near  East  (1888-1911)     .  .  .215 

CHAPTER  XII 
The  Balkan  League  and  the  Balkan  Wars  (1912-13)  .     280 

CHAPTER  XIII 
The  World-War  (1914-18) 257 

CHAPTER  XIV 
The  World  Settlement  (1919-20)  .  .  .  .300 

Index  ........     327 


LIST     OF     MAPS 

FACING   PAGE 

Central  and  South-Eastern  Europe,  1871        .  .  .1 

The  Nile      ........      91 

From  England  since  Waterloo,  by  J.  A.  R.  Marriott. 
Methuen  &  Co.  Ltd. 

Africa.    Political  Divisions,  1893         ....     143 

The    Far    East.      Political    Divisions   after    the    Russo- 
Japanese  War  .  .  .  .  .  .  .164 

Central  and  South-Eastern  Europe,  1921       .  .  .     300 

The  Adriatic  and  the  Balkans  .....     310 

From  European  Commonwealth,  by  J.  A.  R.  Marriott. 
Clarendon  Press,  Oxford 

Africa.     Political  Divisions,  1921         ....     314 

The  Pacific  Islands  ......     317 


CHRONOLOGICAL   TABLE   OF 
LEADING  EVENTS 


1870.  Franco -German  War. 
The  Vatican  Council. 

1871.  Establishment  of  new  Geiman  Empire^William  I.  proclaimed 

German  Emperor  at  Versailles  (Jan.  18). 
Italian  capital  transferred  to  Rome  :  completion  of  Italian  unity. 
Paris  Commune  (Mar.  18  to  May  2). 
Treaty  of  Frankfort  (May  10). 
Basutoland  annexed  to  Cape  Colony. 
Gricpialand  West,  British  Dependency. 

1872.  Geneva  Court  of  Arbitration. 
The  Dreikaiserhund  (Sept.). 
The  KuUurka)iipf  in  Prussia. 

1873.  Russian  conquest  of  lOiiva. 
Ashanti  War  begins. 

Death  of  Napoleon  III.  (.Jan.  9). 

German  occupation  of  France  ends  (Sept.). 

1875.  Establishment  of  the  Third  Republic  in  France. 
Franco-German  crisis  (April  to  May). 
England  purchases  Suez  Canal  shares. 
Proclamation  of  Queen  Victoria  as  Empress  of  India. 
Balkan  risings. 

1876.  Berlin  Memorandum. 

Serbia  and  Montenegro  declare  war  on  Turkey  (July). 
Revolution  at  Constantinople. 
Bulgarian  atrocities. 
Annexation  of  the  Transvaal. 

1877.  Russo-Turkish  War. 

1878.  Pope  Leo  XIII.  succeeds  Pius  IX. 
Treaty  of  San  Stephano  (Mar.  3). 

Congress  and  Treaty  of  Berlin  (June  and  July). 
Cyprus  Convention. 
Afghan  War. 

1879.  Dual  Alliance  (Germany  and  Austria-Hungary)  (Oct.  7). 
Zulu  War. 

1880.  Boer  War. 

Russian  Nihilism — Assassination  of  Alexander  II.  (Mar.  13). 

1881.  Restoration  of  Transvaal  Republic. 
French  Protectorate  in  Tunis. 

FaU  of  Gambetta  Ministry  in  France. 

1882.  British  occupation  of  Egypt. 


xii  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

1882.  Triple  Alliance  (renewed  1887,  1891,  1902,  1912). 
Foundation  of  Die  Deutsche  Kolonial-Oesellschaft. 

1883.  Revolt  of  the  Soudan. 

1884.  Grordon  at  Khartoum  :  his  death  (1885). 
FaU  of  Ferry  Ministry  (April). 
Germans  in  Africa. 

Conference  of  Berlin  :  partition  of  Africa. 

Battle  of  Omdurman  (Oct.  13). 

Germany  in  the  Pacific. 

Treaty  of  Skiernewice  (Reinsurance  Treaty). 

1885.  Italian  colony  at  Massowah. 

England  and  Russia  in  Central  Asia  :   Penjdeh  incident. 
Annexation  of  Burmah. 
Fall  of  Gladstone  Ministry  (June). 

Eastern  Roumelia  joins  Bulgaria — War  between  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia. 

1886.  Boulanger,  Minister  of  War  (Jan.  7). 
Royal  Niger  Company. 
Transvaal  goldfields. 

Alexander  of  Battenberg  kidnapped  in  Bulgaria. 

1887.  Italian  defeat  at  Massowah. 
Renewal  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 

Ferdinand  of  Saxe-Coburg  elected  Prince  of  Bulgaria. 
The  "  Schnaebele  Incident"  (April  20). 
Boulanger  plot  fails  (Oct.). 

1888.  British  East  Africa  Company. 

Death  of  Emperor  William  I.  (Mar.  9). 

Reign  of  Frederick  (Mar.  9  to  June  15). 

Accession  of  William  II.  (June  15). 

British  Protectorate  over  North  Borneo  and  Sarawak. 

1890.  Fall  of  Bismarck  (Mar.  20). 
Anglo-Grerman  agreement  (July  1). 
Heligoland  ceded  to  Grermany. 

French  Protectorate  over  Madagascar  recognised. 
British  Protectorate  over  Zanzibar  recognised. 
Anglo -French  treaty  about  Central  Africa. 

1891.  Franco -Russian  rapprochement 
French  fleet  at  Kronstadt. 

Anglo-Portuguese  Agreement  about  Zambesi  territories. 

1892.  Meeting  of  Czar  Alexander  III.  and  the  Kaiser  at  Kiel. 

1893.  Matabele  War. 

Russian  squadron  visits  Toulon. 

1894.  Death  of  Alexander  III. — Accession  of  Nicholas  II. 
Armenian  atrocities  (and  1896). 

Uganda  Protectorate. 
Chino -Japanese  War. 

1895.  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki. 
Japan  acquires  Port  Arthur. 

..^^^^  Opening  of  Kiel  Canal. 
Franco-Russian  AUiance. 
Cecil  Rhodes,  Premier  of  Cape  Colony. 
Venezuela  boundary  difficulty. 


CHRONOLOGICAL   TABLE   OF   LEADING   EVENTS      xiii 

1895.   Jameson  raid  into  the  Transvaal  (Dec.  28). 
•4896.    Kaiser's  telegram  to  Kruger. 
Defeat  of  Italians  at  Adowa. 
Czar  and  Czarina  visit  Paris  and  London. 

1897.  Kitchener  begins  reconquest  of  the  Soudan. 
Crete  proclaims  union  with  Greece. 
Graeco -Turkish  War. 

1898.  The  Fashoda  crisis. 

The  Kaiser  visits  Constantinople  and  Jerusalem. 

Spanish-American  War. 

The  Philippines  and  Hawaii  annexed  by  U.S.A. 

Delcasse,  Foreign  Minister  of  France. 

Germany  occupies  Kiaochow. 

Russia  occupies  Port  Arthur. 

England  occupies  Wei-Hai-Wei. 

Death  of  Bismarck  (July  30). 

First  Hague  Conference. 

1899.  Anglo -French  agreement  about  Africa. 
Outbreak  of  South  African  War. 
British  reverses  in  South  Africa. 
Boxer  rising  in  China. 

1900.  European  intervention  in  China. 

Lord  Roberts  and  Lord  Kitchener  in  South  Africa. 
British  victories  against  the  Boers. 

1901.  Death  of  Queen  Victoria  (Jan.  22). 

1902.  Anglo-Italian  agreement  about  North  Africa. 
Opening  of  Trans-Siberian  Railway  (begun  1891). 
Russo -Persian  Convention. 

Anglo -Japanese  Treaty  (renewed  1905). 
Peace  of  Vereeniging. 

1903.  Miirsteg  agreement  about  Macedonia. 

1904.  Anglo-French  Entente. 
Russo-Japanese  War. 

1905.  Surrender  of  Port  Arthur  (Jan.  1). 
Treaty  of  Portsmouth. 

The  Kaiser  at  Tangier. 
Dismissal  of  M.  Delcasse. 
Separation  of  Norway  from  Sweden. 

Revolutionary  movement  in  Russia — "  Bloody  Sunday  "  (Jan. 
22)  in  St.  Petersjburg. 

1906.  The  First  Duma  (May  10). 
France  and  Morocco. 

Algeciras  Conference  (Jan.  15  to  April  7). 

Macedonian  "  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress  "  (transferred 
to  Salonika  from  Greneva). 

1907.  Second  Hague  Conference. 
Anglo-Russian  Convention — Triple  Entente. 
The  Second  Duma  in  Russia  (Mar.  5). 
Third  Duma  (Nov.  14). 

1908.  Portuguese  Revolution. 

Young  Turk  Revolution  at  Constantinople  (July). 
Policy  of  Baron  von  Aerenthal  (1906-12). 


XIV  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

1908.  Tsar  Ferdinand  proclaims  Bulgaria  independent  (Oct.  6). 
Annexation  of  Bosnia  and  tlie  Herzegovina  (Oct.  7). 
Crete  declares  itself  united  with  Greece  (Oct.  12). 

1909.  Counter-revolution  at  Constantinople  (April). 
Deposition  of  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  (April). 
Armenian  massacres  (April.) 

1910.  Union  of  South  Africa. 

Venizelos,  Prime  Minister  of  Greece  (Oct.). 

1911.  Morocco  troubles — The  Panther  at  Agadir. 
Agadir  crisis, 

Italy  declares  war  on  Turkey  (Sept.  29). 

1912.  Rising  in  Albania. 

Treaty  between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  (Mar.  1.3). 

Treaty  between  Greece  and  Bulgaria  (May  10). 

Montenegro  declares  war  on  Turkey  (Oct.  8). 

Treaty  of  Lausanne  (Italy  and  Turkey)  (Oct.  18). 

War  between  Turkey  and  the  Balkan  League  (Oct.  to  Dec). 

Armistice  (Dec.  3). 

London  Conferences  (Dec). 

1913.  Enver  Bey's  cowp  d'^t  at  Constantinople  (Jan.  23). 
Balkan  War  renewed  (Feb.). 

Albanian  autonomy. 

Treaty  of  London  (May  30)  ends  War  of  Balkan  League. 

Balkan  War  of  Partition  (June  to  July). 

Intervention  of  Roumania  (July). 

Treaty  of  Bucharest  (Aug.  10). 

1914.  June    12.    Visit  of  Kaiser  and  Von  Tirpitz  to  Archduke  Franz 

Ferdinand  at  Konopisht. 
23.    Kiel  Canal  reopened. 
28.    Franz  Ferdinand  shot  at  Serajevo. 
July    23.    Austro-Hungarian  note  to  Serbia. 

28.    Austria  declares  war  on  Serbia. 
Aug.      1.    Germany  declares  war  on  Russia;  on  France  (Aug. 
3) ;  on  Belgium  (Aug.  4). 

4.  Great  Britain  declares  war  on  Grermany  ;  on  Turkey 

(Nov.  5). 

5.  Austria-Hungary  declares  war  on  Russia. 

12.    Great  Britain  and  France  declare  war  on  Austria- 
Hungary. 

15.  FaU  of  Liege. 

16.  British  Army  landed  in  France. 
23.  Japan  declares  war  on  Germany. 

Sept.     5  First  Battle  of  the  Marne  begins. 

Oct.       9.  Fall  of  Antwerp. 

20.  First  Battle  of  Ypres  begins. 

Nov.      5.  Great  Britain  declares  war  on  Turkey. 

Dec.       8.  Sir  D.  Sturdee's  victory  off  the  Falklands 

1915.  Feb.     18.  U-boat  blockade  of  England. 

25.  Naval  attack  on  Dardanelles. 

April  25.  Allies  land  in  Gallipoli. 

May      7.  Lusitania  torpedoed. 

23.  Italy  declares  war  on  Austria. 


CHRONOLOGICAL   TABLE   OF   LEADING  EVENTS        xv 

1915.  July      9.    Botha  conquers  South- West  Africa. 
Landing  at  Suvla  Bay. 
AUied  landing  at  Salonika. 
Austro-Germans  occupy  Belgrade. 
Bulgaria  at  war  with  Serbia. 
Withdrawal  from  GaUipoH. 

1916.  Feb.     18.    Cameroons  conquered. 
Battle  of  Verdun  begins. 
Rebellion  in  Ireland. 
Fall  of  Kut-el-Amara. 
Battle  of  Jutland. 
Lord  Kitchener  lost  at  sea. 

1.    Somme  battle  begins. 
Roumania  enters  the  war. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  succeeds  Mr.  Asquith  as  Premier. 
French  victory  at  Verdun. 
President  Wilson's  Peace  Note. 
1917    Feb.       1.    Unrestricted  U-boat  war  begins. 
Revolution  in  Russia. 
America  declares  war  on  Germany. 
Bolshevist  regime  in  Russia. 
1918.    Feb.       9.    Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk. 

German  offensive  in  the  West  begun  ;    renewed  May 

27  ;   re-begun  June  15. 
General  Foch  allied  Generalissimo. 
Allied  counter-attack. 
Hindenburg  line  broken. 
Bulgaria     surrenders ;     King    Ferdinand    abdicates 

(Oct.  4). 
Versailles  Conference  opens. 
Austria  surrenders. 
Bavarian  Republic  proclaimed. 
Berlin  Revolution  ;  the  Kaiser  abdicates. 
Armistice  terms  accepted. 
15.   Masaryk  elected  President  of  Czecho-Slovak  Republic. 
17.    Hungary  proclaims  a  republic. 
[919.    Jan.     12.    Meeting  of  Peace  Conference  at  Paris  (First  Plenary 
Session,  Jan.  18). 
12.    Independence  of  Poland  and  Czecho -Slovakia  recog- 
nised. 
25.    Appointment  of  League  of  Nations  Commission  :  two 
for  each  great  Power,  five  in  all  for  the  small 
Powers. 
Feb.     11.    Ebert  elected  President  of  Germany. 
April   28.    Covenant  of  League  of  Nations  adopted  and  published. 
May       7.    Peace    Treaty    presented    to    German    delegates    at 
Trianon  Palace  Hotel. 
7.    Treaty     between     England,     France,     and     U.S.A. 
announced  :  Mandates  for  ex-German  colonies 
announced. 
June      2.    Ti'iune  Kingdom  of  Jugo-Slavia  recognised  by  England 
and  France  (already  by  Germany). 


July 

9. 

Aug. 

6. 

Oct. 

5. 

9. 

14. 

Dec. 

19. 

Feb. 

18. 

21. 

April 

24. 

29. 

May 

31. 

.June 

5. 

July 

1. 

Aug. 

27. 

Dec. 

7. 

15. 

20. 

Feb. 

1. 

Mar. 

12. 

April 

6. 

Nov. 

8. 

Feb. 

9. 

Mar. 

21. 

April 

14. 

July 

18. 

Sept. 

27. 

29. 

Nov. 

1. 

4. 

7. 

9. 

11. 

xvi  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

1919.  June   28.    Peace  Treaty  with  Germany  signed  at  Versailles. 

28.    Anglo -French- American  Alliance  signed. 
28.    Polish  Treaty  signed. 
July    10.    President  Wilson  lays  Treaty  before  Senate. 
10.    President  Ebert  ratifies  Peace  Treaty. 
31.    New  Grerman  Constitution  adopted. 
Sept.    10.    Austrian  Peace  Treaty  signed  at  Versailles. 

10.   Treaty  with  the  Serb-Croat-Slovene  State  signed  at 

Saint-Germain-en-Laye. 
12.    Union  of  South  Africa  accepts  Mandate  for  German 
South-West  Africa. 
Oct.       7.    Peace  Treaty  ratified  by  Italy ;  by  King  George  V. 

(Oct.  10) ;  by  President  Poincar6  (Oct.  12). 
Nov.    19.    U.S.  Senate  fails  to  ratify  Treaty. 

27.    Peace  Treaty  with  Bulgaria  signed  at  Neuilly. 
Dec.       9.    Anglo-French-American   Memorandum    to    Italy    on 
Adriatic  question. 
10.    Roumania  signs  Austrian  Treaty. 

1920.  Jan.     10.    Protocol  of  Peace  Treaty  signed  at  Paris — War  ended 

between  Allies  and  Germany. 

16.  First  Meeting  of  Council  of  League  of  Nations  at  Paris. 

17.  M.    Paul    Deschanel    elected    President    of    French 

Republic. 
June     4.  Hungarian  Treaty  signed. 
Aug.    16.   Turkish  Treaty  signed  at  Sevres. 
Nov.    12.   Treaty  of  Rapallo  (Italy  and  Jugo-Slavia)  signed. 


Central^  South- Eastern  Europe  1871 


A.  ALsoLce 
L.  Lorraine 

B.  Bes^arcLbLcL 
D,I)obrujijoL 
M.Montenegro 


1^.V.^ajd>isWe 


EUROPE    AND    BEYOND 


CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTORY 
The  New  Era 

Yea  ;  this  is  a  new  age  ;  a  new  world, — Bismarck. 

The  cardinal  fact  of  geography  in  the  twentieth  century  is  the  shorten- 
ing of  distances  and  the  shrinkage  of  the  globe ....  The  result  is  that 
problems  which  a  century  ago  or  even  fifty  years  ago  were  exclusively 
European  now  concern  the  whole  world. — J.  C.  Smuts. 

THE  fashion  of  the  day  demands  that  History  The 
should  be  divided  into  periods  and  studied  as  a  Jj^^fJ^jf^ 
succession  of  epochs ;  and  the  practice  has  a  great  deal  to  History 
recommend  it.  By  this  method,  attention  is  drawn  to  the 
essential  truth,  that  History  is  not  a  mere  aggregation  of 
disconnected  facts  nor  a  series  of  interesting  but  isolated 
dramatic  episodes,  but  that  it  is  an  organic  whole  to  which 
each  great  period  in  world-history  has  made  its  appropriate 
and  indispensable  contribution.  "  All  epochs,"  as  Turgot 
justly  observed,  "  are  fastened  together  by  a  sequence  of 
causes  and  effects  linking  the  present  condition  of  the 
world  to  all  the  conditions  that  have  preceded  it.  The 
human  race,  observed  from  its  beginning,  seems  in  the 
eye  of  the  philosopher  to  be  one  vast  whole,  which,  like 
each  individual  in  it,  has  its  infancy  and  growth.  No 
great  change  comes  without  having  its  causes  in  preceding 
centuries,  and  it  is  the  true  object  of  History  to  observe 
in  coimection  with  each  epoch  those  secret  dispositions 
of  events  which  prepare  the  way  for  great  changes,  as 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


1 


well  as  the  momentous  conjunctions  which  more  especially 
bring  them  to  pass." 

The  words  of  the  philosopher-statesman  of  the  ancien 
regime  would  seem  to  suggest  the  spirit  in  which  the 
study  of  any  particular  period  should  be  approached. 
In  the  larger  movements  of  History  there  is  nothing 
accidental,  nothing  casual,  nothing  which  cannot  be 
distinguished  either  as  cause  or  as  efiect.  "  The  present," 
said  Leibnitz,  "  is  the  creation  of  the  past,  and  is  big  with 
the  future."  These  words  contain  a  profound  truth. 
It  is  the  primary  function  of  tlie  Historian  to  seek  in  the 
myriad  phenomena  of  human  society  the  operation  of 
law,  and  to  endeavour  to  discern  in  the  distracting  multi- 
plicity of  details  the  essential  unities  which  underlie  them. 
Thus,  and  thus  only,  can  the  study  of  History  be  redeemed 
from  the  charges  of  triviality  and  barrenness,  which  are 
sometimes  alleged  against  it,  and  be  brought  into  line 
with  the  scientific  spirit  which  has  infused  and  dominated 
all  the  higher  studies  of  our  time. 
The  Period  Docs  the  histoiy  of  the  last  half -century  afford  a  basis 
1870-1920  fQp  g^(.]^  treatment  ?  Can  this  period  be  truly  described 
as  a  distinct  epoch  in  world-history  ?  If  so,  what  are 
its  essential  and  outstanding  features  ?  What  is  the 
precise  contribution  which  it  lias  made  to  the  sum  of  the 
ages  ?  To  attempt  an  answer  to  these  questions  would 
seem  to  be  the  appropriate  function  of  an  introductory 
study,  and  such  a  study  is  ail  that  can  be  attempted  in 
the  following  pages. 
The  Water-  The  year  1870-71,  with  which  this  narrative  opens. 
Nineteenth  fomis  bcyoud  dispute  One  of  the  great  watersheds  of 
Century  Modern  History.  In  the  'sevcmties  of  the  nineteenth 
century  a  prolonged  process  of  historical  evolution  reached 
its  climax.  Between  1815-71  many  Nation- States  came 
to  the  birth,  and  the  map  of  Europe  was  transfigured. 
This  transfiguration  was,  in  the  main,  the  resultant  of 
two  forces,  seemingly  antagonistic,  but  in  effect  not 
infrequently  convergent :  the  force,  on  the  one  hand,  of 
disintegration  ;  on  the  other,  of  a  fresh  integration.  One 
obvious   illustration   of    this   process  is   afforded   by   the 


INTRODUCTORY  3 

decay  and  disruption  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  That 
Empire  was  itself  a  wholly  artificial  product.  It  repre- 
sented an  alien  mass  superimposed  upon  vital  elements, 
which,  though  submerged  for  centuries,  were  never  wholly 
destroyed.  The  collapse  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  per-  Nation- 
mitted  the  submerged  nationalities  to  re-emerge  and  take  making 
their  place  as  independent  Nation- States  in  the  European 
polity.  In  1821  the  Greeks  raised  the  standard  of  revolt, 
and  after  a  period  of  many  vicissitudes  the  Kingdom  of 
the  Hellenes  was  finally  established  by  the  Treaty  of 
London,  1832,  and  placed  under  the  protection  of  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  Russia.  British  statesmanship  was 
also  responsible,  in  large  measure,  for  the  birth  of  the 
modern  kingdom  of  Belgium.  The  attempt  made  by  the 
diplomatists  of  Vienna  to  set  up  a  powerful  middle  kingdom 
by  the  union  of  the  Spanish  or  Austrian  Netherlands 
and  the  United  Provinces  had  broken  down  ;  the  Belgian 
people  asserted  their  independence,  and  that  independence 
was  guaranteed  by  the  Treaty  of  London,  1839.  A  third 
Nation- State  came  into  being  as  a  result  of  the  Crimean 
War.  By  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  1856,  the  Principalities  of 
Moldavia  and  Walla chia  virtually  obtained  their  inde- 
pendence ;  but  as  separate  States.  So  Europe  decreed;  the 
Roumanian  people,  however,  had  other  views  ;  they  took 
the  matter  into  their  own  hands,  and,  powerfully  aided  by 
the  good  ofiices  of  Napoleon  III.,  they  formally  proclaimed 
the  union  of  the  two  Roumanian  principalities  in  1861, 
and  achieved  final  independence  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 
(1878).  In  the  same  Treaty,  two  other  Balkan  States, 
Serbia  and  Bulgaria,  found  their  formal  charter  of  emanci- 
pation, though  the  independence  of  the  former  had  been 
virtually  achieved  in  1867,  while  the  latter  did  not  finally 
throw  ofi  the  suzerainty  of  the  Sultan  until  1908. 

Meanwhile,  two  of  the  great  powers  had  simultaneously  Unification 
attained  the  goal  of  national  unity.     The  Franco-German  ^^  ?TY"^ 
War,   1870-71,  put  the  coping-stone   upon   the  work  of  ^"'     *^ 
Bismarck  in  Germany,  and  upon  that  of  Mazzini,  Cavour, 
Garibaldi,  and  Victor  Emmanuel  in  Italy.     The  German 
attack  upon  France  compelled  Napoleon  III.  to  withdraw 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


1 


the  French  garrison  from  Rome  and  enabled  Victor 
Emmanuel  to  transfer  his  capital  from  Florence  to  the 
city,  which  was  unmistakably  indicated  as  the  capital  of 
a  united  Italy.  The  German  victories  in  France  enabled 
Bismarck  to  transform  the  North-German  confederation 
into  the  new  German  Empire  and  to  persuade  the  German 
State  south  of  the  Main  (except  German- Austria)  to  come 
into  it.  Thus  was  the  unity  of  Italy  and  of  Germany  at 
last  achieved,  and  the  doctrine  of  Nationalism  triumphantly 
vindicated. 
The  Nor  was  the  triumph  of  the  doctrine  confined  to  Europe. 

British       Nation-States  have  come  into  being  under  the  aegis  of  the 
weSth'of     British  Crown  in  North  America,  in  South  Africa,  and  in 
Nations      the  Pacific.     The  Canadian  Dominion,  the  Commonwealth 
of  Australia,  the  Union  of  South  Africa,  and  New  Zealand, 
are   not  the   less   Nation-States   because   they   are,    and 
ardently  desire  to  remain,  constituent  parts  of  the  British 
Commonwealth.      The    South    American   republics   have 
attained  to  the  dignity  of  statehood  in  independence  of 
the  European  States  to  which  they  owed  their  birth. 
The  The  making  of  Nation-States  may  thus  be  regarded  as 

Advent  of    the  characteristic  work  of  the   nineteenth  century,  and 
state,^*'''''"  more  particularly  of  the  period  between  1815  and  1878. 
Fifteenth    That  work  proceeded  under  the  domination  of  two  forces, 
NineSnth  ^oth  of  which  received  a  decided  impulse  from  the  first 
French  Revolution  and  indirectly  and  undesignedly  from 
the  Napoleonic  Conquests  :  the  idea  of  nationahty  and  the 
principle  of  Hberty.     Yet,  as  regards  nation-building,  the 
nineteenth  century  merely  placed  the  coping-stone  upon 
an  edifice  which  had  been  in  gradual  course  of  erection 
ever  since  the  last  years  of  the  fifteenth  century.     The 
main  process  of  European  history  during  the  four  centuries 
that  closed  in  1870-78  may  be  scientifically  described  as 
the  evolution  of  the  States -system,  or  alternatively  as  the 
triumph  of  Nationahsm.     The  emergence  of  the  Nation- 
State  was  greatly  facihtated,  if  not  actually  caused,  by  the 
The  break  up  of  the  Mediaeval  Empire  and  by  the  decadence  of 

Empire  and  ^^le  oecumenical  authority  of  the  Papacy.     The  old  Roman 
^^^^^       Empire  had  embodied  the  principle  of  unity  and  centralisa- 


INTRODUCTORY  5 

tion.  On  its  fall  in  the  fifth  century  it  bequeathed  to  man- 
kind the  idea  of  a  World-State  and  a  universal  Church, 
but  the  immediate  result  of  the  overthrow  of  the  Roman 
Empire  was  World-anarchy.  From  that  anarchy,  Europe 
was  eventually  rescued  by  two  institutions  both  in  out- 
ward form  majestic  and  imposing,  and  one  in  fact  powerful 
and  pervasive  :  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  and  the  Holy 
Cathohc  Church.  Pope  and  Caesar  occupied,  not  always  to 
their  mutual  comfort,  a  joint  throne  ;  but  as  an  oecumenical 
force  the  Pope  proved  himself  by  far  the  stronger  of  the 
two.  The  revived  Roman  Empire,  itself  the  creature 
of  the  Papacy,  became  inseparably  associated  with  the 
German  kingship,  and  as  Western  Europe  began  to  dispose 
itself  in  more  or  less  homogeneous  States,  the  Empire 
lost  whatever  of  international  or  supranational  position 
it  had  enjoyed.  Still,  throughout  the  greater  part  of  what 
we  loosely  term  the  "  Middle  Ages "  Western  Europe 
maintained  a  quasi-unity  under  the  dual  authority  of 
Empire  and  Papacy. 

These  two  institutions,  which  in  theory  represented  but  The 
two  aspects  of  one  body,  were,  in  practice,  always  rivals  ^aSa^^^ 
and  not  infrequently  foes.  As  their  authority,  gravely  ism 
impaired  by  protracted  conflict,  gradually  dechned,  a  new 
type  of  political  formation  began  to  emerge,  the  Sovereign 
Nation-State.  England  and  Hungary  were  among  the 
first  of  modern  European  nations  to  attain  to  pohtical 
self -consciousness.  France,  thanks  in  the  main  to  the 
centrahsing  poHcy,  steadily  pursued,  of  a  succession  of 
remarkable  kings,  reahsed  her  national  unity  towards  the 
end  of  the  fifteenth  century.  The  Spanish  kingdoms  were 
at  last  united  under  a  single  ruler  in  the  early  years  of  the 
sixteenth  century.  The  United  Provinces  of  the  Nether- 
lands threw  off  their  allegiance  to  the  Spanish  Crown  and 
attained  to  the  dignity  of  independent  statehood  before 
the  same  century  closed,  and  "  Austria,"  as  distinct  from 
the  Empire  to  which  it  gave  an  Emperor,  may  be  said  in 
fact  though  not  in  theory  to  have  emerged  about  the 
same  time.  Portugal  regained  its  independent  national 
existence  in  1640 :   Prussia  entered  the  charmed  circle  of 


6  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

kingdoms  in  1701,  and  was  thereafter  accepted  as  a 
"  Power."  Russia,  as  a  united  nation  and  a  European 
Power,  also  dates  from  the  early  years  of  the  eighteenth 
century. 

This  book  is  concerned  primarily  with  European  history. 
How  difficult,  nay  impossible,  it  is,  during  the  period 
covered  by  this  volume,  to  observe  the  limitation  will 
presently  appear.  It  may  not,  therefore,  be  irrelevant  to 
notice  that  the  eighteenth  century,  infertile  as  regards 
nation-making  in  the  old  world,  gave  birth  to  a  new 
Nation-State  which  sprang  from  the  loins  of  England  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  Having  renounced  their 
allegiance  to  the  Motherland  in  1776,  the  thirteen  colonies 
first  entered  into  a  loose  confederation  between  themselves, 
and  subsequently  attained  to  the  status  of  a  federal  Nation- 
State  by  an  acceptance  of  the  Constitution  of  1788. 

The  catalogic  summary  now  completed  mil  at  least  suffice 
to  estabhsh  the  truth  that  the  'seventies  of  the  last  century 
witnessed  the  consummation  of  a  world  movement  of 
profound  significance  and  form  a  conspicuous  watershed 
in  European  pohtics.  At  last,  after  a  process  which,  as 
we  have  seen,  extended  over  four  centuries,  Europe  was 
exhaustively  parcelled  out  into  some  sixteen  or  seventeen 
Sovereign  States,  broadly  corresponding  to  the  main 
divisions  of  races.  Some  of  these  States  had  in  process  of 
formation  absorbed  various  ahen  nationalities,  and  re- 
tained in  restless  and  reluctant  subjection  peoples  who  had 
no  affinities  to  the  ruhng  race.  Some,  hke  the  Empire 
of  the  Habsburgs,  possessed  no  racial  unity,  and  though 
rightly  designated  States,  had  no  claim  to  be  included  in 
the  catalogue  of  Nations.  Others,  hke  France  and  Great 
Britain,  had  by  union  of  races  evolved  a  new  nationahty. 
But  whatever  the  particular  road  by  which  they  had 
travelled,  the  States  of  Europe  at  length  attained  a  common 
goal,  and  the  European  pohty  came  to  consist  of  a  congeries 
of  Sovereign  Nation- States  nominally  equal  in  status  and 
acknowledging  no  common  superior. 

Neither  the  demarcation  of  Nation-States  nor  the  striv- 
ing for  power  (Macht-streben)  among  these  self-conscious 


INTRODUCTORY  7 

units  has,  however,  completely  exhausted  the  best  energy 
and  thought  of  Europe  during  the  last  four  centuries. 
Hardly  was  the  dominance  of  the  idea  of  the  Sovereign 
State  established  before  men  began  to  perceive  its  incon- 
venient and  indeed  disastrous  consequences.  There  was  no 
longer  in  Europe  any  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal ;  European 
society  was  dissolved  into  its  constituent  atoms.  From 
the  development  of  nationahsm  there  naturally  proceeded 
inter-nationahsm  :  inter-national  trade,  inter-national  intema- 
diplomacy,  above  all,  inter-national  war.  The  cruel  ^j^L"*^ 
persistence  of  inter-national  war  led  in  time  to  a  feehng 
after  the  possibihty  of  inter-national  law.  Where 
was  mankind  to  find  a  path  of  escape  from  conditions 
which  even  in  the  seventeenth  century  seemed  to  the 
finer  minds  to  be  intolerable  ?  Two  paths,  and  two  only, 
appeared  to  open  out.  On  the  one  hand,  the  re-estabhsh- 
ment  of  a  world-sovereignty  ;  on  the  other,  the  common 
acceptance  of  a  system  of  law  equally  binding  on  all 
nations.  From  the  seventeenth  century  to  the  twentieth 
these  tw^o  ideas  have  struggled  for  ascendancy.  The  one 
looking  back  with  regret  to  the  lost  unity  of  the  Middle 
Ages  ;  the  other  looking  forward  to  a  Federation  of  States, 
or  possibly  to  a  League  of  Peoples.  Certain  of  the  finer 
minds  naturally  looked  back.  "  The  thing  which  at 
Miinster  and  Osnabriick  (the  settlement  effected  by  the 
Peace  of  Westphaha  in  1648)  stereotyped  itself  in  the 
w^orld's  history  was,"  writes  Father  William  Barry,  "the 
world's  catastrophe,  the  break  up  of  Christendom."  ^  That 
a  Roman  Cathohc  divine  should  regard  the  Protestant 
Reformation  as  responsible  for  the  dissipation  of  European 
harmony  and  the  inauguration  of  European  anarchy  is 
not  surprising.  More  surprising  is  it  to  find  an  essentially 
modern  philosopher  in  accord  with  the  mediaevaUst  : — 

"  There  w^as  a  time,"  writes  Mr.  Lowes  Dickinson, 
"  when  the  whole  civilised  world  of  the  West  lay  at  peace 
under  a  single  ruler ;  when  the  idea  of  separate  Sovereign 
States  alw^ays  at  war  or  in  armed  peace  would  have 
seemed  as  monstrous  and  absurd  as  it  now  seems  inevit- 

1  The  World's  Debate,  p.  17. 


8  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

able,  and  that  great  achievement  of  the  Roman  Empire 
left,  when  it  sank,  a  sunset  glow  over  the  turmoil  of  the 
Middle  Ages.  Never  would  a  mediaeval  churchman  or 
statesman  have  admitted  that  the  independence  of  States 
was  an  ideal.  It  was  an  obstinate  tendency  strugghng 
into  existence  against  all  the  preconceptions  and  beliefs 
of  the  time.  One  Church,  one  Empire,  was  the  ideal  of 
Charlemagne,  of  Otto,  of  Barbarossa,  of  Hildebrand,  of 
Thomas  Aquinas,  of  Dante.  The  forces  struggling  against 
that  ideal  were  the  enemy  to  be  defeated.  They  won. 
And  thought,  always  parasitic  on  action,  endorsed  the 
victory.  So  that  now  there  is  hardly  a  philosopher  or 
historian  who  does  not  urge  that  the  sovereignty  of  in- 
dependent States  is  the  last  word  of  poHtical  fact,  poHtical 
wisdom."  1 
lutema-  Thomas  Hobbes  of  Malmesbury  sought  escape  from  a 

tionaiLaw  g^^te  of  society  in  which  war  was  perpetual  and  the  Hfe 
of  the  individual  "was  nasty,  brutish,  and  short."  He 
found  it  in  the  conclusion  of  a  social  compact  issuing  in 
the  autocracy  of  the  Sovereign,  the  great  Leviathan. 
While  Hobbes  found  a  way  of  escape  from  intolerable 
domestic  disorder  in  a  social  contract,  others  were  looking 
for  a  means  of  ending  international  anarchy  by  the  accept- 
ance of  a  system  of  international  law.  Hugo  Grotius,  the 
great  Dutch  jurist,  published  his  famous  work,  de  Jure 
Belli  et  Pads,  in  1625.  Oppressed  by  the  recent  memory 
of  the  wars  of  Religion  in  France  and  Germany  ;  of  the 
bloody  contest  between  the  United  Netherlands  and  Spain ; 
confronted  by  the  desolation  wrought  by  the  Thirty  Years 
War  in  Germany,  Grotius  might  well  come  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  break  up  of  the  mediaeval  unities  had  dissolved 
Europe  in  perpetual  anarchy.  Grotius  was  the  real  founder 
of  the  science  of  International  Law,  and  his  work  has  had 
a  profound  influence  upon  the  thought  and  indeed  upon 
the  practice  of  modern  Europe. 
Projects  Some  years  before  Grotius  made  his  famous  attempt 
of  Peace  ^^  establish  a  system  of  International  Law  on  the  basis 
of  the  jus  naturcB,  Henry  IV.  of  France,  or  rather  his 
1  G.  L.  Dickinson  :  After  the  War,  pp.  20,  21. 


INTRODUCTORY  9 

minister,  Sully,  had  drafted  his  Great  Design.  In  this  also 
we  have  striking  evidence  of  the  anxiety  of  thoughtful 
men  to  discover  a  way  of  escape  from  the  prevailing 
anarchy  and  strife.  Henry  IV.  conceived  of  Western 
Europe  as  a  peaceful  confederacy  of  free  States.  The 
affairs  of  this  Federal  Commonwealth  were  to  be  admin- 
istered by  a  perpetual  Senate,  renewable  every  three 
years,  and  presided  over  by  the  Emperor.  This  Senate 
was  to  consist  of  sixty-four  Plenipotentiaries,  representing 
the  component  States,  and  was  to  be  competent  to  decide 
all  disputes  arising  between  the  several  Powers  and  to 
determine  any  questions  of  common  import. 

Neither  Grotius  nor  Henry  IV.  produced  any  immediate 
effect.  There  ensued  a  full  half -century  of  war,  due  mainly 
to  the  aggressions  of  Louis  XIV.  of  France  and  his  ambition 
to  estabhsh  the  ascendancy  of  France  over  continental 
Europe.  The  Treaty  of  Utrecht  (1713)  registered  the 
failure  of  his  attempt,  and  the  year  which  witnessed  the 
conclusion  of  the  Peace  witnessed  also  the  pubHcation 
by  the  Abbe  de  Sainte -Pierre  of  his  famous  Pro  jet  de 
Traits  four  rendre  la  Paix  perpetuelle.  Like  Henry  IV. 
the  Abbe  proposed  to  estabhsh  a  confederation  of  Europe 
based  upon  a  perpetual  and  irrevocable  alHance  between 
the  sovereigns.  Each  sovereign  was  to  send  Pleni- 
potentiaries to  a  Congress  which  was  to  define  the  cases 
which  would  involve  offending  States  being  put  under 
the  ban  of  Europe.  The  Powers  were  to  enter  into  a 
mutual  compact  to  take  common  action  against  any 
State  thus  banned  until  the  offender  should  have  submitted 
to  the  common  will. 

Events  mocked  the  efforts  of  the  Abbe  de  Sainte-Pierre 
as  they  had  mocked  those  of  Sully.  Throughout  all  the 
middle  years  of  the  eighteenth  century  Europe,  not  to 
say  the  world,  was  at  war.  In  Europe,  war  was  due 
mainly  to  the  restless  ambition  of  Frederick  the  Great 
of  Prussia  ;  in  Asia  and  America  to  the  prolonged  contest 
between  England  and  France  for  supremacy  in  the  Far 
East  and  the  Far  West.  After  this  half-century  of  war 
Immanuel  Kant  pubhshed  in  1795  his  Essay  on  Perpetual 


10  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


1 


Alliance 


Peace.  Kant  re[judiatcd  the  idea  of  a  Universal  Empire  : 
"  It  is,"  he  writes,  "  the  desire  of  every  State,  or  of  its 
ruler,  to  attain  to  a  permanent  condition  of  peace  in  this 
very  way  ;  that  is  to  say,  by  subjecting  the  whole  world 
as  far  as  possible  to  its  sway,  but  Nature  wills  it  otherwise  ; 
Nature  brings  about  union  not  by  the  weakening  of  com- 
petitive forces  but  through  the  equilibrium  of  these  forces 
in  their  most  active  rivalry."  Kant  therefore  proposed 
that  there  should  be  a  Law  of  Nations  founded  on  a 
Federation  of  Free  States. 
The  Holy  When  Kant  published  his  Perpetual  Peace  Europe  was 
already  in  the  third  year  of  a  war  destined  to  last  for  another 
twenty  years.  Long  before  it  ended,  the  Czar  Alexander  I. 
was  busy  with  a  scheme  for  the  reconstitution  of  the 
European  Polity  upon  the  lines  of  a  great  Christian  Re- 
public. The  idea  thus  adumbrated  subsequently  took 
shape  in  the  Holy  Alliance  of  1815.  The  Holy  Alliance 
was  a  genuine  attempt,  inspired  by  a  contemplation  of 
the  horrors  and  havoc  of  war,  to  induce  the  rulers  of  the 
w^orld  to  take  "  for  their  sole  guide  the  precepts  of  that 
holy  Religion,  namely,  the  precepts  of  justice,  Christian 
charity,  and  peace,  w^hich  far  from  being  applicable  only 
to  private  concerns  must  have  an  immediate  influence 
upon  the  counsels  of  Princes  and  guide  all  their  steps." 
But  the  Holy  Alliance,  though  genuinely  founded  with 
this  object,  rapidly  degenerated  into  a  League  of  Auto- 
crats for  the  suppression  not  only  of  revolutionary  move- 
ments but  of  all  liberal  progress.  Yet  autocracy  was  not 
of  the  essence  of  the  experiment,  nor  was  it  the  cause  of 
its  failure.  Fundamentally  the  Alliance  foundered  upon 
the  rock  of  intervention.  The  Holy  Allies  laid  it  do\vn 
at  Troppau  (1820)  that^ — "  States  which  have  undergone 
a  change  of  government  due  to  revolution,  the  result  of 
which  threatens  other  States,  ipso  facto  cease  to  be  members 
of  the  European  Alliance,  and  remain  excluded  from  it 
until  their  situation  gives  guarantee  for  legal  order  and 
stability.  ...  If,  owing  to  such  alterations,  immediate 
danger  threatens  other  States,  the  Powers  bind  themselves 
by  peaceful  means,  or,  if  need  be,  by  arms,  to  bring  back 


INTRODUCTORY  1 1 

the  guilty  State  iuto  the  bosom  of  the  Great  Alliance." 
The  principle  thus  laid  down  was  difficult  to  reconcile 
\nth  the  legitimate  claims  of  national  independence. 
How  can  a  State  be  adjudged  guilty  if  there  be  no  tribunal 
before  which  it  may  be  brought  ?  what  is  the  use  of  a 
tribimal  unless  it  possess  a  sanction  ?  but  the  employment 
of  sanctions  involves  intervention,  and  intervention  may 
degenerate  into  interference.  It  is  not  easy  to  draw  the 
line  between  external  afiairs  and  matters  of  purely  domestic 
concern  ;  upon  that  rock  the  Holy  Alliance  foundered. 

The  conflicting  ideals  roughly  adumbrated  above  have  Conflicting 
been  striving  for  supremacy  during  the  last  hundred  years.  ^^^^^ 
On  the  one  hand,  the  idea  of  Dominion  founded  on  Power  ; 
on  the  other,  of  Confederacy  founded  on  Law.  Germany 
has,  during  the  last  half-century,  been  the  leading  exponent 
of  the  former  principle.  The  Hohenzollern  have  regarded 
themselves  as  the  apostolic  successors  of  that  Augustine 
Empire  which  gave  peace  to  a  distracted  world^ — as  the 
legitimate  heirs  of  the  Ghibellines,  and  destined  to  realise, 
as  Hohenstauffen  and  Luxemburgs  failed  to  realise,  the 
sublime  ideal  embodied  by  Dante  in  the  Be  Monarchia. 
The  ultimate  ideal  of  the  modern  German  Empire  was, 
be  it  admitted,  universal  peace.  But  it  was  to  be  a  world- 
peace  achieved  by  the  supremacy  of  the  German  sword. 
In  contrast  and  conflict  with  this  ideal  there  has  gradually 
developed  the  ideal  of  a  peaceful  confederacy  of  Free 
States,  bound  together  by  the  common  acceptance  of 
international  law.  The  latter  idea  has  made  more  progress 
than  is  commonly  recognised.  Paitly  by  the  meeting  of 
periodical  congresses,  partly  by  the  intercourse  of  scholars 
and  men  of  science,  partly  by  an  attempt  to  establish,  as 
in  the  matter  of  copyright  or  the  conduct  of  war,  common 
legislation  and  common  practice,  most  of  all  by  the 
progress  of  international  arbitration,  the  world  has  been 
slowly  advancing  towards  a  realisation  of  the  ideal  embodied 
in  the  schemes  of  Sully  and  of  the  Abbe  de  Sainte-Pierre, 
of  Kant  and  the  Holy  AlUes. 

The  World- War  of  1914  brought  the  two  ideals— World- 
Dominion    and    World-Confederacy — into  sharp  conflict. 


12  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

The  former  has  been  discredited  by  the  broken  sword  of 
Germany ;  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  latter  can  be 
realised  by  the  League  of  Nations. 
The  New         But  to  resume.     Hardly  had  the  era  of  the  Nation-State 
Era  reached  its  climax  before  signs  were  discernible  that  a 

new  era  had  already  opened.  "  Yes,"  said  Bismarck, 
before  his  fall,  "  this  is  a  new  era."  The  half -century 
which  has  elapsed  since  the  Franco-German  War  may,  it 
is  claimed,  be  clearly  differentiated  from  the  centuries 
which  preceded  it.  The  world  has  passed  under  the 
domination  of  new  and  untamed  forces.  Is  it  possible  to 
discern  their  characteristics  and  to  trace  their  operation  ? 
It  is  the  purpose  of  the  following  pages  to  attempt  the 
task,  but  it  is  one  which  at  the  best  can  only  be  at  present 
provisionally  accomplished. 
Welt-  The  outstanding   feature    of  European  history  during 

Poiitik  ^]je  lag-t  ^y  years  is  a  shifting  if  not  in  the  centre  of 
political  gravity,  at  least  in  its  distribution:  European 
history  has  ceased  to  be  exclusively  European.  The 
inventions  of  physical  science  have  completely  revolu- 
tionised the  conditions  of  world-history.  The  develop- 
ment of  the  means  of  transport  and  communication  have 
brought  the  ends  of  the  world  together.  "  The  cardinal  fact 
of  geography  in  the  twentieth  century  is  the  shortening  of 
distances  and  the  shrinkage  of  the  globe.  .  .  .  The  result 
is  that  problems,  which  a  century  ago,  or  even  fifty  years 
ago,  were  exclusively  European,  now  concern  the  whole 
world."  ^  So  obviously  is  this  proposition  true  that  the 
history  of  the  recent  epoch  has  been  summed  up  in  a 
brilliant  formula  as  the  expansion  of  Europe.^  Down  to 
this  latest  period  the  several  continents  were  more  or  less 
self-contained.  It  is  true  that  the  geographical  Renaissance 
of  the  later  fiiteenth  century  led  to  great  discoveries,  and 
in  time  to  the  establishment  of  great  extra-European 
Empires  by  Portugal,  Spain,  Holland,  France,  and  Eng- 
land. It  is  true  that  the  Colonial  struggle  between 
England  and  HoUand  in  the  seventeenth  century,  between 

^  General  Smuts  :  Address  to  the  Royal  Geographical  Society. 
2  Ramsay  Muir  :  The  Expansion  oj  Europe  (Constable). 


INTEODUCTORY  13 

England  and  the  Bourbon  Powers  in  tlie  eighteenth,  re- 
acted upon  European  politics.  Still,  apart  from  England 
and  her  oceanic  Empire,  and  apart  from  Russia,  with  a 
vast  land  Empire,  half-European  and  half- Asiatic,  Europe 
was  in  the  main  self-contained.  During  the  last  half- 
century  all  this  has  been  altered.  During  that  period  there 
was  no  great  European  war.  There  was  no  war  at  all  in 
Europe  beyond  the  limits  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Out- 
side the  Balkans  there  were  hardly  any  changes  in  the 
political  map  of  Europe.  Cyprus  was  virtually  ceded  to 
England  in  1878,  Heligoland  was  handed  over  to  Germany 
in  1890,  Norway  severed  itself  from  Sweden  in  1905.  This 
is  the  sum  of  the  changes  which  took  place  between  1871 
and  1914.  The  real  activities  of  the  European  Powers 
have  been  for  the  most  part  displayed  in  the  extra-European 
sphere.  European  diplomacy  has  been  transformed  into 
Welt-Politik,  and  the  ideal  of  the  Welt-Politik  has  been 
Welt-macht. 

It  is  not  without  significance  that  the  dominating  ideas  The  Rise  of 
of  the  new  era  should  have  to  be  expressed  in  the  German  ^^""^"y 
language.  For  the  peculiar  characteristics  of  the  new  era 
must  in  large  measure  be  ascribed  to  the  astoundingly 
rapid  rise  of  Germany,  and  German  policy  in  the  period  of 
its  domination  has  been  largely  inspired  by  three  motives 
which,  though  most  conspicuously  illustrated  in  Germany, 
have  also  been  in  operation  elsewhere  and  have  driven 
the  great  nations  towards  the  abyss  of  Armageddon.  The 
forces  which  have  thus  moulded  the  history  of  the  most 
recent  era  are  those  of  industrialism,  of  commercialism,  industriai- 
and  imperialism.  Industrially,  the  face  of  Europe  has  ^^^ 
been  transformed  by  the  development  of  productive 
capacity  under  the  domination  of  science.  The  age  of 
coal  and  iron,  of  steam  and  electricity,  to  mention  only 
the  most  obvious  forces,  has  succeeded  to  the  age  of  hand- 
labour,  of  pasturage  and  tillage.  The  country-dwellers 
have  been  brought  together  into  towns  and  factories.  The 
resulting  development  of  productive  capacity  has  con- 
tributed to  an  overmastering  desire  on  the  one  hand  for 
the   command    of    those   raw    materials    without    which 


14  EUKOPE   AND   BEYOND 

modern  productive  processes  are  impotent,  and  on  the 
other  for  markets  in  which  to  dispose  of  the  surplus 
commodities  produced  in  profusion  by  modern  industrial 
processes.  "  Formerly,"  says  General  Smuts,  "  we  did 
not  fully  appreciate  the  Tropics  as  in  the  economy  of 
civihsation.  It  is  only  quite  recently  that  people  have 
come  to  realise  that  without  an  abundance  of  the  raw 
materials  which  the  Tropics  alone  can  supply,  the  highly 
developed  industries  of  to-day  would  be  impossible. 
Vegetable  and  mineral  oils,  cotton,  sisal,  rubber,  jute,  and  ■ 
similar  products  in  vast  quantities  are  essential  require- 
ments of  the  industrial  world." 

But  the  modern  world  looks  to  the  Tropics  not  merely 
for  the  supply  of  the  raw  material  but  as  a  market  for  the 
disposal  of  their  manufactured  products.  Thus  we  have 
had  in  recent  days  a  re\aval  of  the  old  idea  of  "  planta- 
tions," of  oversea  estates  to  be  worked  for  the  benefit  of 
the  home-proprietors.  In  a  word,  the  old  colonial  system 
denounced  by  Burke  and  Adam  Smith  as  unworthy  of  any 
nation  save  a  nation  of  shopkeepers  and  unworthy  even 
of  them. 

Thus  the  new  Industrialism  has  largely  contributed  to 
a  revival  of  commercial-nationalism,  the  neo-protectionism 
first  popularised  in  Germany  by  Friedrich  List.  In  this 
way  the  dream  of  the  statesmen  and  economists  of  the 
Manchester  School  has  been  dismally  dissipated.  The 
early  triumphs  of  Cobdenite  Free  Trade  were  hailed  in 
England  and  to  some  extent  elsewhere  as  the  inaugura- 
tion of  a  new  area  in  international  relations.  Free  Trade 
would  render  v/ar  if  not  impossible  at  least  ridiculous. 
International  commerce  if  not  international  law  would 
silence  arms.  The  demolition  of  commercial  barriers  was 
to  be  the  prelude  to  a  universal  peace.  Such  was  the 
dream  which  inspired  the  most  characteristic  of  the  mid- 
Victorian  poets,  when  he  addressed  to  the  cosmopolitan 
patrons  of  the  great  Exhibition  of  1862  the  famous 
adjuration  : — 

O  ye,  the  wise  who  think,  the  wise  who  reign, 
From  growing  commerce  loose  lier  latest  chain, 


INTRODUCTORY  15 

And  let  the  fair  white-wing'd  peacemaker  fly 
To  happy  havens  under  all  the  sky, 
And  mix  the  seasons  and  the  golden  hours, 
Till  each  man  find  his  own  in  all  men's  good. 
And  all  men  work  in  noble  brotherhood, 
Breaking  their  mailed  fleets  and  armed  towers, 
And  rulmg  by  obeying  Nature's  powers, 
And  gathering  all  the  fruits  of  earth. 
And  crowned  with  all  her  flowers. 

But  the  dream  faded.  The  fiscal  policy  of  England  found 
few  imitators.  So  far  from  "  breaking  their  mailed  fleets 
and  armed  towers,"  the  wise  who  reigned  (to  say  nothing 
of  the  wise  who  thought)  piled  armaments  on  armaments. 
So  far  from  loosing  from  commerce  her  latest  chain,  they 
raised  higher  and  higher  their  protective  tariffs.  States- 
men of  the  ''  realistic  "  school  turned  not  to  Adam  Smith 
but  to  Friedrich  List  for  inspiration.  Not  cosmopolitanism 
but  economic  nationalism  became  the  fashionable 
philosophy. 

Under  the  conditions  of  the  modem  world  a  further  imperial- 
consequence  almost  necessarily  ensued.  To  the  forces  of  ^^"^ 
industrialism  and  commercialism  was  added  that  of 
Imperialism— a  desire  for  the  extension  of  territory.  The 
British  Empire  is  largely  the  product  less  of  actual  con- 
quest than  of  simple  settlement — ^the  occupation  and 
colonisation  of  the  waste  places  of  the  earth.  But  by 
the  time  that  the  European  States  system  was  completed, 
by  the  time  that  Germany  and  Italy  had  attained  to 
nationhood,  these  waste  places  had  been  largely  occupied. 
Consequently  the  desire  for  territorial  expansion  could  be 
satisfied  on  the  part  of  the  late-comers  only  by  war  and 
conquest.  Welt-Politik  thus  came  to  involve  Welt-macht. 
Germany  it  seemed  could  satisfy  her  desire  for  Colonial 
Empire  only  by  successfully  asserting  her  hegemony  in 
Europe. 

Not  content  with  the  favourable  position  accorded  to  German 
her  by  the  partition  of  Africa,  Germany  was  bent  upon  ^f^f^' 
the  establishment  of   a  great  empire  in  tropical  Africa, 
extending  from  the  Atlantic  right  across  the  continent 
to  the  Indian  Ocean,  and  involving  the  annexation  of  a 
large  portion  of  French  equatorial  Africa,  of_Portuguese 


16  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

West  Africa,  of  Uganda  and  British  East  Africa,  not  to 
mention  the  great  central  mass  of  the  Belgian  Congo. 
The  German  Empire  of  Central  Africa  was  demanded  by 
the  Colonial  School  on  various  grounds,  of  which  the  most 
conspicuous  were  commercial,  military,  and  strategical. 
The  Germans  coveted  that  Empire,  primarily  in  order 
to  have  a  supply  of  raw  materials  for  their  industries 
independent  of  foreign  competitors,  partly  in  order  to 
obtain  naval  outposts,  and  partly  as  a  reserve  of  man- 
power. "  The  first  and  most  important  of  all  the  national 
demands,"  wiites  Dr.  Hans  Delbriick,  "  which  we  must 
raise  at  the  future  Peace  Congress  must  be  for  a  really 
big  colonial  empire,  a  German  India.  The  Empire  must 
be  large  enough  to  be  capable  of  conducting  its  own  de- 
fence in  the  event  of  war.  A  really  big  territory  feeds  its 
own  troops  and  contains  abundant  man-power  for  reserves 
and  militia.  A  really  big  territory  can  have  its  harbours 
and  coaling-stations."  "  We  are  fighting,"  wrote  Hermann 
Oncken,  "  for  an  Empire  in  Central  Africa."  "  Many 
colonial  politicians,"  writes  Dr.  Leutwein,  "have  come 
more  and  more  to  the  conviction  that  an  extensive  terri- 
tory in  Central  Africa,  bordering  both  on  the  Indian  Ocean 
and  on  the  Atlantic,  would  afford  the  most  favourable 
conditions  for  our  future  colonial  activity.  This  domain 
would  have  to  include  our  most  important  possessions, 
the  Cameroons,  East  Africa,  and  the  northern  half  of  South- 
West  Africa,  and  be  Amalgamated  into  a  single  whole  by 
the  addition  of  the  Belgian  Congo,  together  with  strips 
of  territory  from  the  British,  French,  and  Portuguese 
possessions  and  from  British  South  Africa."  Such  an 
Empire  would  have  satisfied  most  of  the  aims  of  the 
German  Colonial  School.  Without  a  Mittel-Afrika  the 
dream  of  Mittel-Europa  could  hardly  have  been  safely 
realised.  "  German  East  Africa,"  writes  Emil  Zimmer- 
mann,  "  has  shown  itself  to  be  the  real  rampart  of  nearer 
Asia.  Without  adequate  flank  protection  in  Africa, 
Asiatic  Turkey  cannot  survive.  Without  this  protection 
all  the  money  which  we  have  advanced  to  Turkey  during 
the  War  will  be  lost."     Other  considerations  presented 


INTRODUCTORY  17 

themselves  to  the  same  writer.  "  For  our  present  un- 
favourable position  in  the  Far  East,  England,  apart  from 
Japan,  is  chiefly  responsible.  The  principal  opponent  of 
our  expansion  in  the  Pacific  is  Australia,  but  we  shall  never 
be  able  to  exercise  pressure  to  Australia  from  a  base  in 
the  South  Seas.  We  might  very  well  do  so  from  East 
Africa.  ...  If  we  have  a  position  of  strength  in  Mittel- 
Afrika  mth  which  India  and  Australia  must  reckon,  then 
we  can  compel  both  of  them  to  respect  our  wishes  in  the 
South  Seas  and  in  Eastern  Asia,  and  we  thereby  drive  the 
first  wedge  into  the  compact  front  of  our  opponents  in 
Eastern  Asia."  Nor  does  the  advantage  end  there. 
"  German  Africa  will  be  a  valuable  ally  for  South  America 
against  North  American  aggression.  .  .  .  The  United 
States  could  not  permanently  thwart  our  interests  in 
Eastern  Asia  and  the  South  Seas  if  a  strong  German 
Mittel-Afnka  made  its  influence  felt  upon  developments 
in  South  Amorica." 

The  above  quotations,  though  tedious  in  iteration, 
suggest  some  at  least  of  the  motive  forces  which  have 
impelled  Germany  to  the  struggle  for  Welt-macht  and  thus 
exercised  a  powerful  if  not  a  dominating  influence  upon 
world-politics  during  the  last  haH-century. 

In  the  policy  which  such  doctrines  have  inspired,  we  The 
have  the  clearest  possible  demonstration  of  the  modern  J^|°po^^j 
German  spirit,  the  spirit  not  of  Service  but  of  Power,  the 
doctrine  of  the  State  in  excelsis.  That  policy  rested 
fundamentally  upon  the  adoption  and  exaltation  of  the 
ideas  of  materialism  and  militarism,  or  in  old-fashioned 
language  upon  the  deification  of  Mammon.  Mirabeau 
and  Voltaire  perceived  and  proclaimed,  as  far  back  as  the 
eighteenth  century,  that  the  national  industry  of  Prussia 
was  War  ;  since  1870  war  has  become  the  State-religion 
of  Germany.  "  War,"  said  Treitschke,  "  is  political 
science  par  excellence"  Worship  of  the  majesty  of  the 
State  has  in  recent  years  superseded  in  Germany  the 
service  both  of  God  and  of  man.  "  The  State  organised 
as  absolute  power  responsible  to  no  one,  with  no  duties 
to  its  neighbour  and  mth  only  nominal  duties  to  a  slightly 


18  EUROPE    AND   BEYOND 

subordinate  God,  has  challenged  the  soul  of  man  in  its 
dearest  possessions."  Such,  as  Sir  Walter  Raleigh  has 
observed,  is  the  suj^reme  delusion  in  which  Germany 
entangled  herself,  and  from  which  escape  was  impossible 
save  through  the  arbitrament  of  the  sword  in  which  she 
placed — and  vainly  placed — her  trust. 

Democracy  This  book  must  uecessarily  be  concerned  in  the  main  with 
the  relations  of  State  with  State.  We  must  not,  however, 
neglect  to  notice  briefly  the  principles  which  have  dominated 
the  domestic  affairs  of  the  great  nations  during  the  period 
under  review.  In  this  sphere,  also,  it  is  possible  to  discern 
a  striking  uniformity  of  development.  Domestic  poHtics 
have  been  largely  moulded,  during  the  last  half-century, 
by  the  oncoming  of  the  principle  of  democracy.  The 
principle  has  manifested  itself  mainly  in  two  directions  : 
political,  and  social  or  economic.  Politically,  power  has 
passed  in  almost  every  State  from  the  one  or  the  few 
to  the  many ;  and  the  many  have  naturally  attempted 
to  use  the  power  recently  acquired  for  the  amelioration  of 
the  lives  of  the  most  numerous  class.  Unfortunately,  the 
extension  of  political  power  has  in  most  cases  outstripped 
the  diffusion  of  education.  Consequently,  the  many 
have  not  always  perceived  the  direction  in  which  their  own 
interests  would  really  guide  them.  Looking,  not  unnatur- 
ally, mth  envious  eyes  upon  the  wealth  which  to  the 
superficial  observer  seems  to  be  concentrated  in  the  hands 
of  the  few,  the  many  have  sought  to  use  the  power  now 
vested  in  them  to  secure  greater  equahty  of  economic  and 
social  conditions.  The  weapon  has  often  broken  in  their 
hands,  and  the  disappointment  ensuing  upon  disillusion- 
ment has  powerfully  contributed  to  the  unrest  which  in 
almost  all  the  countries  of  the  world  has  been  a  marked 
feature  of  social  hfe. 

Socialism  Other  causes  have  contributed  to  a  Hke  result ;  and  of 
these  some  brief  account  must,  later  on,  be  given.  Sum- 
marily, however,  it  may  be  said  that  the  doctrine  of  Macht 
in  international  affairs — the  exaltation  of  the  majesty 
of  the  State — has,  in  domestic  politics,  translated  itself 
into  the  doctrine  of  State  sociaUsm.     In  this  sphere,  also, 


INTRODUCTORY  19 

mainly  through  the  influence  of  Karl  Marx,  German  theory 
has  largely  dominated  contemporary  thought. 

Having  thus  analysed,  in  summary  fashion,  the  main  Outline  of 
principles  and  forces  which  seem  to  have  determined  the  157(^920 
current  of  political  affairs  during  the  last  half-century, 
it  now  remains  to  make  a  rough  preliminary  survey  of 
the  country  through  which  we  shall  have  to  travel  before 
we  reach  the  goal  of  the  Great  War  and  the  subsequent 
Peace. 

The  first  twenty  years  of  our  period,  extending  from  (i)  The 
1870  to  1890,  may  be  fitly  described  as  the  age  of  Bismarck,  ^y^^  of 
Not  only  in  Germany  but  in  Europe,  and  even  beyond  the  maSc  ' 
confines  of  Europe,  Bismarck's  influence  was  dominant. 
The  supreme  object  of  his  pohcy  was  to  conserve  and  to 
consolidate  the  position  which  he  had  won  for  Germany. 
To  this  end  he  sincerely  desired  the  maintenance  of  peace 
in  Europe  ;  and  peace  in  his  view  was  most  Kkely  to  be 
attained  by  a  close  accord  between  the  autocratic  rulers 
of  the  three  great  States  of  central  and  eastern  Europe. 
Hence  the  Dreikaiserbmid  (the  league  of  the  three 
Emperors)  formed  by  him  in  1872.  The  League  between 
the  sovereign  rulers  of  Germany,  Austria,  and  Russia 
rested,  however,  on  no  very  stable  foundation.  Between 
Russia  and  Austria  there  was  a  real  antagonism  of  interests, 
and  between  Russia  and  Germany  there  was  considerable 
pohtical  tension  despite  the  personal  affection  with  which 
the  Czar  Alexander  II.  regarded  his  venerable  uncle,  the 
German  Emperor.  Even  in  1872,  at  the  moment  when 
Bismarck  was  forming  his  League  of  Emperors,  the  Czar 
assured  President  Thiers  that  France  had  nothing  to  fear 
from  such  a  League.  Gortchakoff,  the  Russian  Chancellor, 
was  even  more  specific  in  his  language  :  "  We  are  not 
indifierent  to  your  army  or  to  your  reconstruction.  On 
this  point  Germany  has  not  the  right  to  address  any 
criticism  to  you.  I  have  said,  and  I  repeat  with  pleasure, 
that  we  need  a  strong  France."  Nor,  as  we  shall  see, 
did  Russia  fail  to  honour  her  word  to  France  when  the 
crisis  of    1875  arose.     If,  however,  Russia  was  ahenated 


20  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

from  Germany  by  Bismarck's  treatment  of  France,  she 
was  outraged  by  Bismarck's  partiality  for  Austria  as 
manifested  in  tbe  Treaty  of  Berlin.  Essentially  it  was 
tbe  clash  of  Russian  and  Austrian  interests  in  the  Balkans 
which  broke  up  the  Dreikaiserhund.  Bismarck  had  to 
choose  between  his  two  Allies.  The  result  was  the  forma- 
tion in  1879  of  the  dual  alliance  (Germany  and  Austria), 
to  which  Italy  was  admitted  in  1882  as  the  third  partner, 
(ii)  The  A  secoud  period  dates  from  the  fall  of  Bismarck  in  1890, 

Franco-       ^j^^j  o^^y  perhaps  be  conveniently  ended  by  the  meeting 
Alliance,      of  the   first  Haguc   Conference  in   1898.     The  Emperor 
1890-98      WilUam  II.  was,  during  the  first  ten  years  of  his  reign, 
hardly  less  anxious  for  peace  than  Bismarck ;    but  he 
desired  it  less  for  the  purpose  of  conservation  than  for  that 
of  preparation.     The  domination  attained  by  Germany  in 
Europe  was  to  be  extended  to  other  continents.     The 
alarm,  inspired  by  the  young  Emperor's  pohcy,  brought 
his  two  neighbours,  Russia  and  France,  into  close  alliance, 
and  the  gradual  consohdation  of  that  alHance  gives  its 
special  character  to  the  years  between  1890  and  1898. 
1898  1898  was  one  of  the  most  critical  years  of  the  whole 

period.  It  witnessed,  on  the  one  hand,  the  culmination 
of  England's  forward  pohcy  in  Egypt  and  the  Sudan  ; 
it  brought  England  and  France  to  the  brink  of  war  over 
the  Fashoda  crisis  ;  it  witnessed  the  outbreak  of  war 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain — a  war  which  for  the 
first  time  involved  the  United  States  in  world  pohtics, 
and  which  on  that  account  may  be  said  to  have  inaugurated 
a  new  era  in  international  affairs.  Events  seemed  also  to 
indicate  the  impending  break  up  of  the  Chinese  Empire, 
and  the  beginning  of  a  scramble  among  the  Powers  of 
Western  Europe  for  territorial  ascendancy  in  the  Far 
East.  In  1898,  Germany  occupied  Kiaochow ;  Russia 
occupied  Port  Arthur  ;  and  England,  Wei-Hai-Wei. 
(iii)  The  A  year  later  (1899)  England,  after  pursuing  for  more  than 
Entente  twenty  years  a  shifting  and  vacillating  pohcy  in  South 
1899-1908  Africa,  became  involved  in  a  war  destined  to  be  decisive 
against  the  Dutch  Repubhcs.  In  the  same  year  the  rising 
of  the  Boxers  in  China  led  to  the  intervention  ahke  of  the 


INTRODUCTORY  21 

great  European  Powers  and  of  the  United  States,  in  the 
domestic  affairs  of  China.  In  1902,  Russia  signed  an  im- 
portant Convention  with  Persia,  and  Great  Britain  con- 
cluded her  Treaty  with  Japan.  Two  years  later  (1904) 
Russia  embarked  on  a  disastrous  war  with  Japan,  and  was 
compelled  to  accept  in  1905  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth. 
Meanwhile,  in  Europe,  the  attitude  of  Germany  became 
ever  more  menacing.  France  became  convinced  that 
her  old  enemy  was  bent  upon  her  destruction,  not  merely 
as  a  European,  but  as  a  Colonial  Power.  England  was 
reluctantly  forced  to  the  adoption  of  a  similar  view  as 
regards  the  attitude  of  Germany  towards  herself.  France, 
as  we  have  seen,  had  already  concluded  a  defensive  alhance 
with  Russia,  and  in  1904  an  understanding  was  arrived  at 
between  France  and  Great  Britain.  The  intrigues  of  the 
German  Emperor  in  North  Africa  ;  the  dismissal  of  M. 
Delcasse,  and  the  proceedings  at  the  Algeciras  Conference 
convinced  the  least  suspicious  that  trouble  was  brewing, 
and  in  1907  England  concluded  the  Convention  with  Russia 
which  inaugurated  the  Tri'ple  Entente. 

The  year  1908  inaugurated  the  last  period  of  the  armed  (iv)  The 
peace.     The  significance  of  successive  events  could  hardly  p^^^ 
be  mistaken,  least  of  all  by  so  close  an  observer  of  conti-  1908-12 
nental  poKtics  as  King  Edward  VII.,  who  in  the  autumn 
of  that  year  foresaw  and  foretold  the  eruption  that  was 
to   ensue.  1     The   storm-centre   was   in   the   Balkans.     In 
July,   the  Young  Turk  revolution  was  effected  at  Con- 
stantinople ;  on  5th  October,  the  Czar  Ferdinand  renounced 
the  suzerainty  of  the  Porte  and  proclaimed  Bulgarian  in- 
dependence ;   on  7th  October,  Austria  tore  into  fragments 
the  Treaty  of  Berlin  by  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  the 
Herzegovina ;     on    12th    October,    Crete    declared    itself 
united  with  Greece. 

During  the  next  four  years,  Europe  awaited  the  bursting  (v)  The 
of  the  storm.     The  first  ominous  rumble  was  heard  when,  ^/^e"^ 
in  September,  1911,  Italy  declared  war  on  Turkey  and  storm, 
invaded  Tripoli.     The  Tripoli  War  was  brought  formally  1912-14 

^  Cf.  Lord  Redesdale  :  Memories,  i.  178-179  ;  see  also  interview  with 
M.  Cambon  {Times,  22nd  December,  1920). 


22  EUROPE   ANT)   BEYOND 


1 


to  an  end  by  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne  (18th  October,  1912). 
Ten  days  before  that  Treaty  was  signed,  Montenegro  had 
declared  war  on  Turkey,  and  before  October  was  out 
Turkey  was  involved  in  war,  not  only  with  Montenegro, 
but  with  the  leagued  Balkan  States  of  Serbia,  Bulgaria, 
and  Greece.  Before  this  combination,  the  Ottoman 
Empire  collapsed.  An  armistice  was  arranged  in  De- 
cember, and  during  the  next  four  months  Diplomacy — 
in  particular  British  Diplomacy — did  its  utmost  to  isolate 
Balkan  politics  ;  to  arrange  a  compromise  between  Turkey 
and  her  enemies,  and,  above  all,  to  prevent  the  conflagra- 
tion first  lighted  in  the  Balkans  from  spreading  to  Western 
Europe.  In  February,  1913,  however,  the  war  of  the 
Balkan  League  was  renewed,  and  was  brought  to  an  end 
(30th  May,  1913)  by  the  Treaty  of  London.  The  success 
of  the  Balkan  States  against  their  traditional  enemy  had 
been,  however,  too  rapid  and  too  complete.  In  June,  the 
Bulgarians  made  a  sudden  and  most  treacherous  attack 
upon  their  Serbian  Allies,  and  the  second  Balkan  War — 
the  War  of  Partition— had  begun.  The  Bulgarians  went 
down  before  the  combined  attack  of  Serbs  and  Greeks. 
Roumania  also  threw  in  her  weight  against  Bulgaria  ; 
the  Turks  took  the  opportunity  of  recapturing  Adrianople, 
and  on  10th  August,  1913,  Peace  was  signed  at  Bucharest. 
Had  Italy  been  mlling  to  join  Austria  and  Germany  in 
an  offensive  against  Serbia,  the  great  European  War 
would  have  been  antedated  by  nearly  twelve  months. 
Italy,  however,  refused  to  recognise  the  proposed  aggres- 
sion of  Austria-Hungary  against  Serbia  as  a  casus  foederis. 
Consequently,  Armageddon  was  postponed.  On  28th 
June,  1914,  however,  the  Archduke  Ferdinand,  the  heir 
to  the  Dual  Monarchy,  was  with  his  wife  assassinated  in 
the  Bosnian  capital  Serajevo.  Austria's  ultimatum  was 
presented  to  Serbia  on  23rd  July,  and  on  28th  July, 
Austria  declared  war  upon  Serbia.  Russia  had  been 
intimidated  by  Germany  into  acquiescence  in  the  Habs- 
burg  aggressions  in  the  Balkans  in  1908.  It  was  recog- 
nised that  she  could  not  afiord  a  second  humiliation. 
Germany    consequently    declared    war    upon    Russia    on 


INTRODUCTORY  23 

1st  August,  and  upon  France  on  3rd  August ;  she  invaded 
Belgium  on  4th  August,  and  on  the  same  day  Great  Britain 
declared  war  on  Germany.  The  spark  which  lighted  the 
great  conflagration  had  come,  not  without  significance, 
from  the  Balkans. 

With  the  Great  War  and  the  ensuing  Peace,  this  narrative 
will  end.  The  Treaty  of  Versailles  (1919)  closed  an  epoch 
of  European,  indeed,  of  world  history.  It  will  be  for  the 
historian  of  the  future  to  say  whether  it  opened  another. 
The  half-century  which  opened  with  the  German  victory 
over  France  closed  with  the  decisive  victory  of  France 
and  her  Allies  over  Germany.  The  German  victory 
inaugurated  a  period  of  perpetual  and  profound  unrest 
in  international  affairs  ;  the  victory  of  the  Allies  was 
signalised  by  the  formation  of  a  League  among  the  nations 
designed  to  inaugurate  a  period  of  peace.  The  issue  of 
that  great  experiment  is  on  the  knees  of  the  gods. 

SOME  GENERAL  BOOKS  ON  THE  PERIOD 

(Lists  of  Special  Authorities  will  be  appended  to  the  Chapters  on 
which  they  bear.) 

The  Annual  Register,  1870-1919.     (London,  annual.) 

P.  Albin  :  Les  Grands  Traitts  Poliiiques.     Texts.     (Paris.) 

DifeBiDouR  :  Histoire  Diplomatique  de  V Europe,  vols.  iii.  and  iv..  La 

Paix  Armee.     (Paris,  1917.) 
Lavisse  et  Rambaud  :  Histoire  Gmerale,  vol.  xii.     (Paris.) 
J.    Holland    Rose  :     The    Development    of   the    European    Nations. 

(London.) 
J.  Holland  Rose:  The  Origins  of  the  War.     (Cambridge,  1915.) 
R.  MuiR  :  Nationalism  and  Internationalism.     (London,  1910.) 
R.  Mum:  The  Expansion  of  Europe.     (London,  1917.) 
J.  A.  R.  Marriott:  The  European  Co  mmomvealth.     (Oxford,  1918.) 
C.  Seymour:  Diplomatic  Background  of  the  War.     (Yale,  1916.) 
C.  D.  Hazen  :  Fifty  Years  of  Europe,  1870-1919.     (London,  1919.) 

ATLAS 

Robertson  and  Bartholomew  :   Historical  Atlas  of  Modern  Europe. 
(Oxford,  1915.) 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  NEW  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEW  FRANCE 

(1871-75) 

Political  questions  are  questions  of  power. — Bismarck. 
Germany  must  remain  armed  to  the  teeth  for  fifty  years  in  order  to 
keep  what  took  her  six  months  to  win. — Moltke  in  1875. 

La   Republique  est  le  Gouvemement  qui  nous  divise  le  moins. — 
Thiers. 

The  ^  I  ^HE  Franco-German  War  produced  results  of  immense 

Franco-         J     significance    not    merely    to    the    combatants     im- 

Warandits  mediately  engaged  in  it,  but  to  Europe  at  large.     It  set 

Results      the  seal  upon  the  accomplishment  of  German  unity  under 

the  hegemony  of  Prussia  ;    it  facilitated  the  final  act  in 

the  romantic  drama  of  Italian  unity  ;    it  inflicted  upon 

France  humiliation  and  mutilation  ;   it  gave  Russia   the 

opportunity  of  denouncing  some  of  the  most  important 

clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  (1856)  and  thus  at  once 

to   cancel  the  neutralisation   of  the  Black   Sea   and   to 

impose  upon  England  a  serious  diplomatic  rebuff ;   at  the 

same  time   it   gave   England   a   chance,   which   was   not 

neglected,   of  establishing,   on  a  basis  more  secure  than 

ever,   her  supremacy  in  the   domain   of   commerce   and 

finance. 

It  is,  however,  with  the  sequelae  of  the  war  in  Germany 

and  France  that  this  chapter  is  primarily  concerned. 

The  The  Germany  which  emerged  from  the  Franco-German 

German       War  Was  in  literal  truth  a  New  Germany.     The  Napoleonic 

'^P^^^       Wars  had  dissolved  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  and  with 

it  disappeared  the   older  Germany  which  had  subsisted 

for  nearly  a  thousand  years.     The  new  Germany  was  not 

24 


THE  NEW  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEW  FRANCE   25 

yet  born.  In  1815,  Germany  was  reconstitued  as  a  loose 
Confederation  of  thirty-nine  States  under  the  Presidency  of 
the  Emperor  of  Austria.  The  spirit  of  nationalism  and  the 
spirit  of  liberalism  were,  however,  beginning  to  operate  in 
many  of  the  German  States.  Liberalism  made  an  effort  to 
assert  itself  in  1830,  and  in  1848  it  co-operated  wdth  national- 
ism to  secure  the  meeting  of  a  constituent  national  assembly 
at  Frankfort,  from  which  there  issued  the  abortive  con- 
stitution of  1849.  Frederick  William  IV.  of  Prussia 
dechned  an  Imperial  Crown  at  the  hands  of  a  democratic 
Assembly,  he  refused  to  proclaim  himseK  "  The  Serf  of 
the  Revolution,"  or,  least  of  all,  "  to  dissolve  Prussia  in 
Germany." 

Where  the  votes  and  parchments  of  the  Frankfort 
Parliament  had  failed,  Bismarck  by  blood  and  iron 
succeeded.  By  his  statecraft,  aided  by  the  military 
genius  of  Roon  and  Moltke,  Germany  was  merged  into 
Prussia.  The  annexation  of  the  Danish  Ducliies ;  the 
attack  upon  Austria ;  the  dissolution  of  the  Bund  of  1815, 
and  the  formation  of  the  North  German  Confederation 
under  the  Presidency  of  the  King  of  Prussia  —  these 
were  the  preliminary  steps  towards  the  achievement  of 
Bismarck's  ultimate  purpose.  Napoleon  III.  was  then 
lured  into  a  series  of  diplomatic  indiscretions,  which 
effectually  isolated  France  and  alienated  from  her  the 
sympathies  of  Belgium,  of  England,  and,  above  all,  of  the 
South  German  States. 

In  1870,  France  was  provoked  into  a  declaration  of  war  The 
upon  Prussia  ;    Russia's  benevolent  neutrality  had  been  q^^^^ 
secured  ;  Austria  stood  aloof  ;  the  South  Germans  enlisted  War 
under  the  banners  of  Prussia  ;   after  a  month's  decisive 
campaign  Napoleon   III.   was  forced  to  surrender  with 
80,000  Frenchmen  at  Sedan ;  the  Second  Empire  fell,  and 
the  Third  Republic  was  proclaimed  in  Paris  (4th  Septem- 
ber).    The  surrender  of  Napoleon  did  not,  however,  end 
the  war.     France  rallied  to  the  call  of  the  Provisional 
Government ;    Favre  declared  that  he  would  not  "  yield 
an  inch  of  French  soil,  nor  a  stone  of  French  fortresses," 
but   on   28th    September,    Strassburg   was  compelled   to 


26  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


I 


surrender  ;  a  month  later  Bazaine  delivered  the  great 
fortress  of  Metz,  together  with  150,000  men  and  immense 
war  stores,  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans  ;  and  on  28th 
January,  Paris  itself,  which  had  been  besieged  since 
20th  September,  was  compelled  to  capitulate.  Thiers, 
called  to  supreme  power  in  France,  made  a  desperate 
effort  to  mitigate  the  harshness  of  the  terms  which  the 
enemy  sought  to  impose  upon  his  country,  but  Bismarck 
and  Moltke  were  inexorable,  and  preliminaries  of  peace 
were  signed  on  26th  February,  and  were  ratified  at  Frank- 
fort on  10th  May,  1871.  By  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort, 
France  agreed  to  cede  the  whole  of  Alsace  except  Belfort 
and  eastern  Lorraine,  together  with  the  fortresses  of  Metz 
and  Strassburg.  The  indemnity  was  fixed  at  five  milliards 
of  francs,  and  was  to  be  paid  within  three  years.  German 
troops  were  to  remain  in  occupation  of  defined  French 
districts  until  the  indemnity  was  paid. 

Bismarck  had  not  gone  to  war  in  1870  for  the  purpose 
of  acquiring  or  recovering  Alsace-Lorraine.  He  went  to 
war  to  complete  the  unification  of  Germany,  to  humihate 
France  as  he  had  already  humbled  Austria,  and  by  France's 
humiliation  to  put  the  new  German  Empire  in  a  position 
of  indisputable  primacy  in  continental  Europe.  The 
acquisition  of  Alsace-Lorraine  was  at  once  the  symbol  of 
France's  humiliation  and  the  guarantee  of  German  security. 
If  Metz  in  German  hands  meant  an  open  road  into  France, 
Strassburg  in  French  hands  meant  an  open  door  into 
Germany,  and  that  door  France  had  frequently  used. 
Bismarck  was  determined  to  lock  the  Strassburg  door 
against  France  ;  Moltke  was  equally  determined  to  keep  in 
German  pockets  the  key  of  Metz.  One  great  concession 
Thiers  had,  however,  obtained  :  the  retention  by  France 
of  the  great  and  commanding  fortress  of  Belfort.  He  had 
also  got  the  indemnity  reduced  from  6,000,000,000  francs 
to  5,000,000,000,  and  had  induced  Bismarck  to  accept  some 
part  of  it  in  securities  instead  of  cash. 

Bismarck,  however,  had  his  eyes  from  the  first  fixed 
on  one  supreme  object,  and  before  the  peace  with  France 
was  signed  that  object  had  been  achieved. 


THE  NEW  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEW  FRANCE   2/ 

In  the  autumn  of  1870  tlie  staff  of  the  Willielmstrasse 
was  transferred  to  Versailles,  and  there,  in  the  great 
palace  of  Louis  XIV.,  the  final  stages  in  the  building  of 
a  stupendous  pohtical  edifice  were  completed.  Baden 
was  only  too  anxious  to  join  the  North  German  Con- 
federation. Bavaria  was  much  more  tenacious  of  its 
independence,  and  ultimately  came  in  only  on  the  under- 
standing that  certain  rights  (Sonderrechte)  were  to  be  The  Son- 
strictly  reserved  to  it.  The  King  of  Bavaria  was  still  to  ^^''''^^^^^^ 
command  his  army  in  time  of  peace  ;  Bavaria  was  to  have 
a  permanent  place  upon  those  standing  committees  of  the 
Bundesrat  which  deal  with  foreign  affairs  and  the  army 
respectively ;  to  control  its  own  railway,  post,  and  tele- 
graphic systems  ;  to  retain  its  own  laws  in  regard  to 
marriage  and  citizenship  ;  and  to  be  exempt  from  Imperial 
excise  on  brandy  and  beer.  Wiirtemberg  came  in  on 
similar  terms,  and  by  November,  1870,  the  difficult  diplo- 
matic work  was  done.  "  The  unity  of  Germany,"  said 
Bismarck,  "  is  completed,  and  with  iint  Kaiser  und 
Reich."! 

As  to  the  title  of  Kaiser  there  was  considerable  difference  The  im- 
of  opinion.     Bismarck  laid  great  stress  upon  the  assumption  ^VJ^^ 
of  the  Imperial  title  ;  he  regarded  it,  indeed,  as  "  a  political 
necessity."     Still  more  did  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia, 
whose  views  were  even  more  unitary  than  those  of  the 
Chancellor.     The  older  Prussian  nobiUty  and  the^King 
himself  were,  on  the  contrary,  averse  from  the  change. 
The  southern  kings  would,  however,  brook  no  superior. 
It  was  agreed,  therefore,  that  the  Prussian  King  should 
become,  not  Emperor  of  Germany  or  of  the  Germans,  l)ut 
Kaiser  in  Deutschland—GeTman  Emperor. 
h.  This  title  King  William  agreed  to  accept  from  his  brother 
sovereigns  in  Germany,^  and  by  this  title  he  was  acclaimed 
in  the  Hall  of  Mirrors  in  the  Palace  of  Versailles  on  18tli 
January,  1871.     That  the  final  act  in  the  evolution  of  a 

1  Cf.  Junon  :  "  La  Baviere  et  I'Empire  allemand"  {Annalesde  VEcole 
Libre  des  Sciences  politiques,  1892). 

2  The  offer  was  actually  conveyed  in  a  letter  (drafted  by  Bismarck) 
from  King  Ludwig  of  Bavaria. 


Kaiser 


28  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

long  drama  should  have  been  played  at  Versailles  is  a  fact 
not  lacking  in  dramatic  irony. 

The  Instrument  of  the  new  Constitution  was  laid  before 
the  Reichstag  on  14th  April,  1871,  and  was  formally  pro- 
mulgated on  16th  April.  It  was  based  upon  (i)  the  Con- 
stitution, as  amended,  of  the  North  German  Confedera- 
tion, and  (ii)  the  Treaties  of  15th,  23rd,  and  25th  November 
between  that  confederation  and  the  vSouthern  States. 

The  Constitution  of  the  North  German  Confederation 
was  adapted,  without  difficulty,  to  the  new  conditions. 

The  The  Kaiser's  position  was  constitutionally  a  pecuhar 

one.  He  was  not  strictly  an  hereditary  sovereign.  He 
was  not  indeed  "  sovereign  "  at  all.  Article  xi.  stated  : 
"  The  presidency  of  the  union  belongs  to  the  King  of 
Prussia  who,  in  this  capacity,  shall  be  entitled  German 
Emperor."  There  was,  therefore,  no  German  crown,  no 
German  civil-list ;  the  "  sovereignty  "  was  vested  in  the 
aggregate  of  the  German  governments  as  represented  in 
the  Bundesrat.  In  the  Bundesrat  Prussia  was  all-powerful, 
and  it  was  through  the  Bundesrat  that  the  King  of  Prussia 
technically  exercised  his  rights  as  German  Emperor.  The 
Emperor  enjoyed  the  threefold  position  which  attached 
to  the  President  of  the  North  German  Confederation  : 
Bundesprasidium,  Bundesfeldherr,  and  King  of  Prussia  ; 
he  represented  the  Empire  in  relation  to  foreign  powers 
and  to  the  constituent  States  ;  he  controlled,  with  the  aid 
of  a  committee  of  the  Bundesrat,  foreign  affairs,  con- 
cluded alHances,  received  foreign  envoys,  declared  war, 
and  made  peace  ;  but  for  every  declaration  of  an  offensive 
war  the  consent  of  the  Bundesrat  was  essential.  To  him 
it  belonged  to  summon  and  adjourn  the  Legislature  and, 
with  the  consent  of  the  Bundesrat,  to  dissolve  the  Reich- 
stag, to  levy  federal  execution  upon  any  recalcitrant 
State,  and  to  promulgate  and  execute  the  laws  of  the 
Empire . 

The  Exec-  The  executive  was  vested  in  the  Emperor  and  the 
Chancellor  (Reichskanzler)  was  appointed  by  him.  The 
Chancellor,  though  he  was  the  only  federal  Minister,  was 
assisted  in  his  work  by  a  number  of  subordinate  officials, 


utive 


THE  NEW  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEW  FRANCE   29 

such  as  the  Foreign  and  Colonial  Secretaries.  Bismarck 
always  refused  to  have  a  Cabinet.  The  Chancellor  was 
the  sole  responsible  official  of  the  Empire ;  but  neither  the 
Bundesrat  nor  any  one  else  except  the  Kaiser  could  get 
rid  [of  him.^  As  Imperial  Chancellor  he  presided  in 
the  Bundesrat,  but  if  he  voted  it  was  as  the  Prussian 
delegate  ;  as  Chancellor  he  had  no  vote.  In  the  Keichstag 
also  he  had  no  seat ;  he  sat  and  spoke  there  as  Prussian 
delegate  to  the  Bundesrat. 

On  its  administrative  side  the  Empire,  as  equipped 
by  the  Constitution,  was  extraorcjinarily  weak.  For 
the  execution  of  federal  laws  it  had  to  depend  upon  State 
officials.  Only  in  foreign  affairs  and  in  military  and  naval 
matters  did  it  exercise  efiective  control.  In  legislation, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  Empire  was  all-powerful. 

The  Legislature  consisted  of  (i)  the  Bundesrat  or  Imperial  The  Legis- 
Council,  and  (ii)  the  Reichstag.^  The  latter  had  very  ^^^"""'^ 
little  real  power.  It  was  elected  for  five  years  by  universal 
manhood  suffrage.  It  had  a  veto  on  legislation  and, 
constitutionally,  the  right  of  initiative.  But,  as  a  fact, 
legislation,  including  the  annual  budget,  originated  as  a 
rule  in  the  Bundesrat. 

Far  more  extensive,  at  any  rate  on  paper,  were  the  The  Bund- 
powers  of  the  Bundesrat.  An  American  commentator 
described  the  Bundesrat  as  '*  the  central  and  characteristic 
organ  of  the  Empire."  ^  Like  the  American  Senate,  it 
represented  not  the  people  of  the  Empire,  but  the  States. 
Unhke  the  American  Senate,  however,  it  represented 
them  unequally.  Prussia  claimed  seventeen  votes  in  her 
own  right ;  Bavaria  six ;  Saxony  and  Wiirtemberg  four 
each  ;  Baden  and  Hesse  three  ;  and  the  rest  of  the  States 
one  apiece.  Its  functions  were  legislative,  executive,  and 
judicial.  It  fixed  the  Imperial  Budget,  audited  the  accounts 
between  the  Empire  and  the  States,  and  supervised  the 

^  The  position  of  the  executive  was  not  legally  affected  by  the  Biilow 
incident  of  1908. 

^  Whether  the  Imperial  Legislature  is  technically  bi-cameral  or 
uni-cameral  is  a  moot  point,  for  discussion  of  which  cp.  Marriott :  Second 
Chambers,  pp.  116  seg. 

*  President  Woodrow  Wilson. 


30  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

collection  of  customs  and  revenue  generally.  It  had  the 
power,  with  the  Emperor,  of  declaring  war,  of  dissolving 
the  Reichstag,  and  had  a  voice  in  the  conclusion  of  treaties 
and  the  appointment  of  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  and 
other  officials. 

In  many  respects  it  acted  as  an  administrative  court ; 
it  had  the  right,  by  issuing  ordinances,  to  remedy  defects 
in  legislation ;  it  acted  as  Supreme  Court  of  Appeal  from 
the  State  Courts,  and  decided  points  of  controversy  between 
State  and  State,  and  between  the  Imperial  Government  and 
an  individual  State.  No  revision  of  the  Constitution  could 
take  place,  if  fourteen  negative  votes  were  cast  against 
the  amendment  in  the  Bundesrat.  Thus  any  coiLstitu- 
tional  amendment  could  be  defeated  by  Prussia  alone  ; 
or  by  the  combined  vote  of  the  middle  States  ;  or  by  the 
vote  of  the  single-member  States,  acting  with  tolerable 
unanimity. 

The  nominal  powers  of  the  Bundesrat  were,  then, 
enormous  :  but  it  was  always  a  debatable  point  how  far 
the  practice  corresponded  with  the  theory. 
The  Judi-  In  the  Imperial  Judiciary  the  Bundesrat  had  an  important 
place.  Apart  from  it  there  was  one  great  Federal  Supreme 
Court,  which  was  not  created  until  1877^ — ^the  Reichs- 
gericht.  This  Court  exercised  original  jurisdiction  in 
cases  of  treason,  and  acted  as  a  court  of  appeal  on  points 
of  Imperial  law  from  the  State  Courts.  It  lacked,  however, 
the  supremely  important  fmiction  assigned  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States — the  power  to  decide  whether 
an  Act  of  the  Legislature  is  or  is  not  "  constitutional." 

Such  a  court  is  an  essential  attribute  of  true  federahsm. 
The  German  Constitution  fell,  therefore,  in  this  and  other 
respects  very  far  short  of  the  genuine  federal  type.  In 
legislation  the  power  of  the  Central  Government  was 
almost  unitarian ;  in  administration  it  was  conspicuously 
weak.  Again,  German  federahsm  was  not  based  upon 
the  equahty  of  the  component  States,  but  presupposed 
marked  inequahty.  Finally,  no  provision  was  made  for 
an  authoritative  interpretation  of  the  constitution  ex- 
ternal to  and  independent  of  the  Legislature. 


Clary 


THE  NEW  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEW  FRANCE   31 

The  truth  is,  and  the  events  of  the  next  twenty  years 
were  to  prove  it,  that  Prussia,  instead  of  being,  as  in  1849 
she  well  might  have  been,  lost  in  Germany,  contrived  to 
absorb  all  Germany,  save  the  Teutonic  portions  of  the 
x\ustrian  Empire.  That  in  the  process  much  was  lost 
that  the  world  would  fain  have  preserved  must  be  obvious 
to  any  one  who  recalls  the  characteristic  products  of  the 
German  particularism  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Yet 
the  Germany  of  that  day  lacked  something.  It  possessed 
no  guarantee  for  permanent  pohtical  independence. 
Where  was  that  guarantee  to  be  found  ?  "  The  Gordian 
knot  of  German  circumstance,"  wTote  Bismarck,  "  could 
only  be  cut  by  the  sword.  .  .  .  The  German's  love  of 
Fatherland  has  need  of  a  prince  on  whom  it  can  concen- 
trate its  attachment.  .  .  .  Dynastic  interests  are  justified 
in  Germany  so  far  as  they  fit  in  mth  the  common  national 
Imperial  interests." 

That  final  identification  was  the  work  of  Bismarck, 
aided  by  the  technical  genius  of  Roon  and  Moltkc,  and 
supported,  though  not  without  wavering,  by  his  honest 
and  simple-minded  sovereign.  The  Constitution  of  1871, 
the  main  features  of  which  have  been  summarised  in  the 
preceding  paragraphs,  embodied  Bismarck's  constructive 
work. 

For  the  next  twenty  years  Bismarck  was  the  foremost  Bismarck's 
figure  in  the  politics  not  merely  of  Germany  but  of  Europe,  ^^^y"^ 
That  the  Emperor  William  I.  chafed  at  times  against  the  i87i-yo 
domineering  temper  of  his  imperious  Chancellor  is  not  to 
be  questioned,  but  it  is  equally  clear  that  although  he 
recoiled  from  the  diplomatic  methods  employed  by  the 
Minister,   he   supported   him   throughout   his   reign   with 
unvarying    loyalty.     And    there    were    moments    when 
Bismarck    needed    all   the    support    the    Emperor    could 
afiord  him.     Over  the  army,  its  chiefs  and  its  administra- 
tion, he  had  no  control,  and  even  in  the  Reichstag  he 
encountered  from  time  to  time  considerable  opposition. 
Not  that  the  government  of   Germany  was  in  any  real 
sense  "  parliamentary  "  ;  in  Prussia,  as  Bismarck  had  said 
in  1862,  the  King  not  only  reigns  but  governs,  and  after 


32  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

1871  the  aphorism  was  equally  true  as  applied  to  Germany. 
Only  to  the  Emperor  was  the  Chancellor  responsible  ;  and 
only  to  the  Chancellor  were  the  Mnisters  responsible. 
Cabinet  there  was  none  ;  the  Imperial  Secretaries  and  other 
departmental  "  Ministers  "  were  the  Chancellor's  servants, 
not  his  colleagues.  This  system,  considerably  modified 
after  1890,  was  maintained  until  Bismarck's  fall.  But  the 
Mihtary  Cabinet,  the  General  Staff,  and  the  War  Ministry 
were  wholly  independent  not  only  of  the  Reichstag  but 
of  the  Chancellor,  and  many  of  his  legislative  projects 
were  largely  modified  and  even  defeated  by  the  Reichstag. 
The  Kuiiur-  Qf  all  the  domestic  difficulties  which  Bismarck  had  to 
""*^'  face,  the  most  obstinate  were  those  which  centred  round 
the  agelong  problem  of  "  Church  and  State."  If  it  had 
been  found  difficult  in  the  Middle  Ages  to  reconcile  the 
claims  of  the  Empire  and  the  Papacy,  it  was  hardly  more 
easy  to  adjust  those  of  the  New  German  Empire  and  the 
New  Papacy.  The  "  syllabus  "  of  1864,  followed  by  the 
Vatican  Council  of  1870  and  the  Decree  of  Papal  infalli- 
bility, seemed  to  indicate,  on  the  part  of  the  Roman 
Church,  a  renewal  of  propagandist  activity.  PoHtical 
Ultramontanism  had  lately  been  gaining  ground  notably 
in  Austria  and  in  France.  The  relations  between  the 
French  Empress  and  Rome  were  notoriously  close,  and  the 
hostihty  of  the  Papacy  to  the  unification  of  Germany  was 
as  intelhgible  as  it  was  undoubted.  Equally  distasteful 
to  Bismarck  was  the  activity  of  the  Roman  Church  among 
the  Poles  of  Prussian  Poland.  Most  of  all  was  he  incensed 
by  the  demand  put  forward  by  the  ultramontane  Bishops 
in  Germany  that  the  dogma  of  Papal  infalhbihty  should  be 
taught  in  the  universities  and  schools.  This  was  to  touch  to 
the  quick  the  traditional  pohcy  of  Prussia.  The  schools  were 
the  nurseries  of/patriotism ;  the  higher  studies  of  the  uni- 
versities had  long  been  devoted  to  the  cult  of  HohenzoUem 
hegemony.  Nor  was  the  contest  simply  one  between 
Csesarism  and  Cathohcism.  The  "  Old  Cathohcs,"  led 
by  Dr.  Dollinger,  one  of  the  greatest  of  German  scholars, 
were  not  less  reluctant  than  the  Imperialists  to  accept  the 
Vatican  Decrees,  or  to  put  liberal  education  in  Germany 


THE  NEW  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEW  FRANCE   33 

under  the  heel  of  the  hierarchy.  Bismarck  was  no  icono- 
clast, but  his  poHtical  creed  excluded  the  idea  of  a  divided 
supremacy.  "  There  is,"  he  said,  "  only  one  standpoint 
for  Prussia,  constitutionally  as  well  as  pohtically  ;  that  of 
the  Church's  absolute  hberty  in  matters  ecclesiastical,  and 
of  determined  resistance  to  her  every  encroachment  upon 
State-rights."  In  this  spirit  the  legislation  known  as  the 
"  May  Laws  "  was  conceived. 

Between  1872  and  1876  the  Jesuits  were  expelled ; 
civil  marriage  was  made  compulsory  ;  the  Pulpit  Paragraph 
was  added  to  the  Imperial  Penal  Code  by  which  priests 
were  forbidden  to  interfere  officially  in  political  matters  ; 
the  Cathohc  Bureau  in  the  Ministry  of  Education  was 
suppressed,  and  the  inspection  of  schools  was  withdrawn 
from  the  clergy  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  State  inspectors  ; 
priests  were  forbidden  to  abuse  ecclesiastical  punishments, 
e.g.,  excommunication  :  all  ecclesiastical  seminaries  were 
placed  under  State  control ;  no  priest  was  to  hold  office 
in  the  Church  unless  he  were  a  German,  educated  in  a 
German  university,  and  had  passed  a  university  examina- 
tion in  history,  philosophy,  hterature,  and  classics  ;  exer- 
cise of  office  by  unauthorised  persons  was  made  punishable 
by  loss  of  civic  rights,  and  power  was  given  to  suspend  in 
any  diocese  where  the  bishop  was  recalcitrant  the  payment 
to  the  Koman  Church  authorised  since  1817. 

Bismarck  announced  in  a  famous  phrase  that  "  we  will 
not  go  to  Canossa  either  in  the  flesh  or  in  the  spirit."  But 
he  had  miscalculated  the  strength  and  determination  of 
his  opponents.  The  Empress  and  the  Court  were  against 
him ;  the  Emperor  viewed  with  dismay  the  schism  which 
clove  Germany  into  two  camps  of  embittered  opponents  ; 
many  Protestants  resented  and  disliked  the  extreme  claims 
for  the  secular  power  embodied  in  "  the  May  Laws  " ; 
the  old  Conservatives  broke  away  and  reproached  Bismarck 
with  deserting  the  principle  of  a  Christian  State,  and  the 
power  of  the  National  Liberals  drove  many  Bismarckians 
who  hated  Liberalism  and  all  its  works  into  the  arms  of 
the  opposition.  Most  formidable  of  aU  was  the  stubborn 
refusal  of  Roman  Catholics  to  obey  the  law.     They  defied 


34  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

the  executive,  with  the  result  that  in  1876  six  bishops 
(including  the  Cardinal- Archbishop  of  Posen,  Ledochowski, 
the  Archbishop  of  Cologne,  and  the  Bishop  of  Trier,  were 
in  prison,  and  1,300  parishes  had  no  public  worship.  The 
Koman  CathoHc  population,  in  fact,  was  in  open  revolt, 
and  the  most  drastic  pohce  measures  and  the  penalties  of 
the  Courts  failed  either  to  diminish  its  spirit  or  to 
break  down  its  refusal  to  accept  the  law  as  vahd.  In  the 
Reichstag  the  Centre  Party,  led  by  Windthorst,  the  ablest 
Parliamentarian  whom  Germany  has  produced,  attacked 
and  opposed  the  Chancellor,  his  Ministers,  and  their 
measures.  In  the  general  election  of  1874  the  Clericals 
increased  their  members  in  the  Reichstag  from  sixty-three 
to  ninety-one,  and  polled  1,500,000  votes. 
A  Change  Thus  by  1878  Bismarck  was  confronted  with  a  dangerous 
iSTS^^*^^"^'  and  a  difficult  situation.  The  Conservatives,  after  a 
spUt  in  1876,  had  reunited.  Bismarck's  heart  was  with 
them.  He  was  sick  of  the  KulturJcampf  which  he  chose 
to  regard  as  hopelessly  mismanaged  by  Falk  and  the 
National  Liberals,  and  with  the  intuition  which  was  one 
of  his  greatest  gifts  he  divined  truly  that  Liberalism  was 
a  spent  force.  The  death  of  Pio  Nono  (1878)  and  the 
election  of  Leo  XIII.  inaugurated  a  new  era  at  the  Vatican. 
Negotiations  were  commenced.  Bismarck  went  to  Canossa 
by  a  devious  and  slow  route,  and  called  it  a  compromise. 
Falk  resigned,  and  Puttkamer,  a  Conservative,  took  his 
place.  In  1881  the  Government  was  granted  a  discre- 
tionary power  in  the  enforcement  of  the  penal  legisla- 
tion ;  in  1886  the  State  examination  of  priests  was  given 
up,  as  was  also  the  State  control  of  seminaries,  while  from 
1881  onwards  a  series  of  arrangements  with  the  Vatican, 
by  which  appointments  were  to  be  made  by  agreement 
between  Pope  and  King-Emperor,  brought  the  struggle 
to  an  end.  In  return,  Bismarck  obtained  a  general  though 
not  an  unvarying  support  from  the  Centre  Party. 
Protection  Meanwhile  Bismarck,  having  broken  with  the  National 
SociSism  Liberals,  had  entered  on  a  comprehensive  policy  of  pro- 
tection and  State  sociaHsm.  The  main  reasons  for  this 
change  of  policy  were  three.     With  1877  began  the  epoch 


THE  NEW  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEW  FRANCE   35 

of  agricultural  depression  which  hit  the  agricultural 
interest,  led  by  Prussian  Conservatism,  very  hard.  Pro- 
tection against  the  competition  of  the  New  World  was 
demanded,  and  protection  of  agriculture  involved 
protection  of  industry.  Imperial  finance  was  in  sore 
straits,  and  three  remedies  only  seemed  possible  :  direct 
Imperial  taxation,  which  would  have  met  with  strenuous 
resistance ;  an  increased  matricular  contribution  from  the 
federated  States,  which  would  have  been  very  unpopular  ; 
and  indirect  taxation  through  an  Imperial  tariff  imposed 
both  for  revenue  and  for  protection.  Bismarck  chose  the 
third  because  it  combined,  in  his  judgment,  every  advan- 
tage— ^the  line  of  least  resistance,  a  large  and  elastic 
revenue,  the  alliance  of  the  protected  interests,  and  ample 
material  for  political  bargains.  The  growth  of  Social 
Democracy  inspired  the  elaborate  social  legislation  which 
after  years  of  strenuous  discussion  and  criticism  resulted 
in  the  Acts  which  provided  for  compulsory  insurance 
against  sickness  (1883),  insurance  against  accident  in 
employment  (1884),  and  insurance  against  old  age  (1889) 
in  the  shape  of  old-age  pensions.  By  these  measures 
Bismarck  intended  to  fight  Social  Democracy  with  its  own 
weapons,  and  prove  that  the  Empire  could  do  more  for  the 
working  classes  than  their  parliamentary  representatives. 

By  1890  Social  Democracy  had  become  a  very  formid-  Social 
able  political  and  economic  force.  ^^"^^^ 

Bismarck  did  his  best  to  stamp  the  movement  out  in 
its  infancy,  but  repression  served  only  to  stimulate  its 
growth.  In  1872  Bebel  and  Liebknecht — its  two  repre- 
sentatives in  the  Keichstag— were  sent  to  prison  for  two 
years.  But  in  1874  nine  Social  Democrats  were  returned ; 
in  1877  twelve.  The  attempt  on  the  Emperor's  life  by 
Nobiling  in  1878  was  unjustly  attributed  to  the  Socialists, 
and  a  ferocious  law  was  passed  prohibiting  Socialist  books, 
meetings,  or  unions,  and  empowering  the  Bundesrat  to 
proclaim  a  state  of  siege  in  any  town,  and  this  law  was 
thrice  renewed  in  1881,  1886,  and  1888.  It  was  rigorously 
applied ;  the  whole  Socialist  organisation  was  broken 
up  and  its  members  punished,  harassed,  and  ruined  by 


36  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

the  police — but  with  the  result  that  in  1881  the  Socialist 
Democrats  secured  twelve,  in   1887  thirty-five,  in   1893 
forty-four,  in  1898  fifty-six,  in  1903  eighty-one,  and  in 
1913  one  hundred  and   sixteen   seats   in  the  Reichstag. 
But  as  long  as  Bismarck  remained  in  office  his  supremacy, 
though  spasmodically  attacked,  was  unshaken. 
Bismarck's      Master  of  the  Imperial  machine  in  Germany,  Bismarck 
Ascend-      exercised   upon   European   politics    an    influence   greater 
Europe       than  that  of  any  ruler  since  Napoleon  I.,  perhaps  since 
Louis  XIV.     The  principle  of  his  policy  during  the  period 
before  us  was  simplicity  itself  :  Divide  et  impera.     France, 
despite  the   disastrous  defeat  of   1870-71,   was  still  the 
enemy  ;  France,  therefore,  was  to  be  kept  weak  at  home 
and  isolated  in   Europe.     To   attain  the   former   object 
Bismarck  favoured  the  republican  party  in  France,  think- 
ing, unlike  Thiers,  that  the  Republic  would  divide  France 
most.     As  for  her  position  in  European  society  the  utmost 
vigilance  must  be  exercised  to  prevent  any  rapprochement 
between   France   and  England   (Egypt   came   handy  for 
this  purpose),  between   France   and   Italy  (Tunis  would 
serve  here),  most  of  all  between  France  and  Russia. 
The  Drei-        A  Secondary  object  of  his  policy  was  to  prevent  any 
kcnserhund,  uudue  Cordiality  between  Vieima  and  Petersburg,  while 
himself  maintaining  intimate  relations  with  both.     It  was 
an  accepted  aphorism  of  Prussian  policy  that  "  the  wire 
between  Berlin  and  Petersburg  must  always  be  kept  open," 
but  to  do  this  without  sacrificing  the  friendship  of  Austria 
was  a  task  which  demanded  all  Bismarck's  vigilance  and 
skill.     The  task  was,  however,  facilitated  on  the  one  hand 
by  the   prudent  generosity   with   which,   ever   since   the 
Prussian  victory  at  Sadowa,  Bismarck  had  treated  Austria  ; 
on  the  other  by  the  excellent  personal  relations  which  the 
Emperor  William  had  always  maintained  with  the  Czar 
Alexander  II.,   and  which  he  succeeded,   after  1871,  in 
establishing  with  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  of  Austria. 
In  August,  1871,  the  German  Emperor  made  a  ceremonial 
visit  to  his  brother  of  Austria  at  Ischl,  which  the  latter 
returned  in  the  following  year  in  the  Prussian  capital. 
At  Berlin,  the  Czar  was  also  present,  with  his  Chancellor 


THE  NEW  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEW  FRANCE   37 

Gortschcikoff,  and  there  the  "  league  of  the  three  Emperors  " 
was  arranged.  Bismarck  always  maintained  that  "the 
liaison  of  the  three  Emperors,  though  habitually  termed 
an  alliance,  rested  on  no  written  agreement,"  and  involved 
no  mutual  obligations.  That  there  was  no  written  docu- 
ment is  likely  enough ;  nevertheless  the  understanding 
was  complete,  and  it  formed  the  soHd  bed-rock  of  German 
diplomacy,  until  it  was  dissipated  by  the  clash  of  Russian 
and  Austrian  interests  in  the  Balkans.  The  three 
Emperors  cordially  agreed  to  maintain  the  territorial 
status  quo  as  established  in  1871  ;  to  find  if  possible  a 
solution  of  the  Near  Eastern  problem  mutually  acceptable 
to  the  three  Empires,  and  above  all  to  suppress  in  their 
respective  countries  the  growing  power  of  revolutionary 
sociaUsm.  Such  were  the  terms  of  the  new  Holy  AUiance, 
confirmed  by  annual  meetings,  between  the  august  Allies 
at  Vienna  and  Petersburg  (1873),  at  Ischl  (1874),  and  at 
Berlin  in  1875. 

In  the  meantime  the  friendship  between  Germany  and 
Russia  was  severely  tested  by  the  attitude  assumed  by  the 
Czar  during  the  "  scare  "  which  threatened  a  renewal  of 
war  between  France  and  Germany  in  the  spring  of  1875. 

Before  proceeding  to  examine  this  significant  episode  it 
will  be  convenient  to  recapitulate  events  in  France  since 
the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort. 

The  debacle  at  Sedan  (2nd  September)  was  immedi-  France 
ately  followed  by  the  outbreak  of  revolution  in  Paris  ;  ^^^  -^^^^ 
the  Empire  collapsed  like  a  pack  of  cards ;  the  Empress- 
Regent  appealed  to  M.  Thiers  to  save  the  dynasty,  but 
Thiers  was  more  intent  on  saving  France,  and  promptly 
set  ofi  on  a  tour  to  the  neutral  courts  in  a  vain  effort  to 
obtain  succour  for  his  unhappy  country  ;  the  Empress 
fled  with  the  Prince  Imperial  to  England,  and  the  Re- 
public was  again  proclaimed  in  France  (4th  September). 

A  "  Government  of  National  Defence,"  hastily  set 
up  under  Jules  Favre,  Gambetta,  and  General  Trochu, 
Governor  of  Paris,  made  an  heroic  effort  to  restore  the 
national  morale  and  to  avert  the  worst  consequences  of  a 
crushing  military  disaster;   but  the  effort  was  vain,  and 


Commune 


38  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

France  was  compelled  to  accept  the  terms  dictated  by 
the  conqueror. 

The By  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  France  was  humiliated  and 

dismembered  but  she  was  not  crushed.  With  hardly  an 
instant's  delay  her  thrifty  and  patriotic  citizens  set  their 
hands  to  the  task  of  staunching  the  wounds  inflicted  by 
the  enemy  and  rebuilding  the  body  politic.  But  her  cup 
of  agony  was  not  yet  full.  Before  the  preliminaries  of 
peace  were  ratified  an  insurrectionary  movement  broke 
out  in  Paris  ;  the  Provisional  Government  withdrew  to 
Versailles,  and  Paris  was  handed  over  to  the  tender  mercies 
of  the  Commune.  A  curious  situation  ensued.  The 
German  flag  still  waved  over  St.  Denis  ;  the  tricolour  of 
the  Republic  over  Versailles  ;  the  red  flag  of  the  Com- 
mune over  Paris.  The  Government  was  compelled  there- 
fore to  reconquer  its  o'wn  capital ;  for  six  weeks  Paris 
was,  for  the  second  time,  besieged,  and  w^hen  the  Republican 
troops  at  last  forced  an  entry  (21st  May)  they  found  the 
devoted  city  in  ruins  and  ablaze.  Fierce  fighting  followed 
in  the  streets,  but  at  last  order  was  restored  ;  10,000 
persons  were  imprisoned  or  exiled,  and  perhaps  30,000  in 
aU  were  slain,  though  it  is  difficult  to  arrive  ^'at  precise 
estimates.  Nor  is  it  easy  to  determine  the  exact  character 
of  the  insurrection  thus  successfully  suppressed.  It  was 
partly  patriotic^ — a  demonstration  against  those  who 
would  surrender  the  soil  of  France  to  the  enemy  ;  partly 
anarchical — "  the  first  attempt  "  (in  the  words  of  an 
apologist)  "  of  the  proletariat  to  govern  itself."  ^  What- 
ever the  motive  which  inspired  the  movement,  it  could 
not  fail  to  weaken  and  embarrass  France  at  a  critical 
juncture  of  her  fortunes.  GraduaUy,  however,  order  was 
restored  in  Paris,  though  it  was  full  four  years  before  the 
Republic  was  definitely  established. 

The  losses  in  men  and  money  which  external  war 
and  internal  strife  inflicted  upon  France  were  enormous : 
1,597,000  citizens  were  transferred  from  the  French  to 

^  For  the  Commune,  c/.  E.  Lepelletier  :  Histoire  de  la  Commune 
(2  vols.,  1911-12),  or  History  of  the.  Commune  of  1871  by  Lissagaray 
(Eng.  trans.  E.  M.  Aveling,  1886).     The  latter  an  uncritical  apologetic. 


THE  NEW  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEW  FRANCE  39 

the  German  flag;  491,000  persons  were  killed  in  the  war 
and  the  Commune ;  while  the  loss  in  money  is  reckoned  at 
£614,000,000.1 

The  rapidity  with  which  France  repaired  this  havoc  The 
was  marvellous.  The  enthusiasm  and  energy  of  Thiers,  f^^r^^^^ 
now  a  veteran  of  seventy-four,  infected  the  whole  nation. 
Nominated  as  Head  of  the  National  Executive  in  February, 
1871,  Thiers  in  August  exchanged  the  title  for  that  of 
President  of  the  Republic.  This  was  a  broad  hint  to  the 
Monarchists  and  Imperialists  who,  could  they  have  com- 
posed their  domestic  differences,  would  have  found  little 
difficulty  at  this  time  of  re-estabUshing  in  some  form 
a  monarchical  regime.  Between  the  Legitimists,  the 
Orleanists,  and  the  Bonapartists  feeling  still,  however,  ran 
high.  The  National  Assembly,  elected  during  the  war, 
was  predominantly  monarchical  and,  in  July,  1871,  re- 
pealed by  a  large  majority  the  laws  which  condemned  to 
exile  the  Bourbon  and  Oiieanist  princes.  In  the  same 
summer  an  effort  was  made  to  effect  a  reconciliation 
between  the  Comte  de  Chambord,  as  representing  the 
elder,  and  the  Comte  de  Paris,  who  represented  the  younger, 
line.     But  nothing  came  of  it. 

The  country  proved  itself  decidedly  more  republican 
than  its  elected  representatives.  In  the  bye-elections  of 
July,  1871,  the  Republicans  captured  100  seats  out  of  111, 
and  of  the  candidates  elected  in  the  Departmental  elections 
(October)  two-thirds  were  of  the  same  persuasion.  Thiers, 
therefore,  with  his  superb  instinct  for  politics,  moved, 
though  very  slowly,  towards  the  Left,  and  with  the  help  of 
men  like  Casimir-Perier  and  Remusat  was  able  to  form 
gradually  a  Left  Centre  Party  pledged  to  the  support  of  a 
Government  "  which  though  republican  in  form  was 
conservative  in  policy."  Such  a  Government  could  most 
effectively  carry  through  the  immediate  task  of  recupera- 
tion— political,  financial,  military,  social,  and  commercial. 

In  the  short  space  of  four  years  that  task  was  accom-  Thiers  and 
pHshed.     The  German  indemnity  was  paid  off  by  instal-    ^^    ^ 
ments,  and  with  each  payment  the  area  of  occupation 

^  Hanotaux  :   Contemporary  France,  i.  323-27. 


40  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

was  reduced.  A  loan  of  £80,000,000  issued  in  June, 
1871,  was  covered  two  and  a  half  times;  a  second,  for 
£120,000,000,  in  July,  1872,  was  covered  twelve  times.  By 
the  autumn  of  1873  not  a  German  soldier  remained  on 
French  soil,  and  Thiers  was  deservedly  acclaimed  as  "  The 
Liberator  of  the  Patrie.^^  Financial  equilibrium  was  re- 
stored by  fresh  taxation,  mostly  indirect.  Meanwhile,  by 
the  Constitutional  Laws  of  August  and  September,  1871, 
a  Provisional  Constitution  was  estabhshed ;  executive 
power  was  vested  in  a  President  of  the  Republic,  who  was 
to  appoint  and  dismiss  the  Ministers,  but  the  latter, 
Hke  the  President  himself,  were  to  be  "  responsible  "  to 
the  Assembly  which  was  to  sit  at  Versailles.  Local 
Government  was  reorganised  by  the  Municipal  Act  of 
1871 — a  skilful  compromise  which  kept  the  larger  towns 
under  Prefets  appointed  from  Paris,  while  permitting  the 
democratic  luxury  of  election  to  the  smaller  communes. 
The  new  frontier  was  re-fortified,  and  in  1872  compulsory 
miUtary  service,  on  the  Prussian  model,  was  introduced. 
Presidency  The  Services  rendered  to  France  by  Thiers  were,  indeed, 
Mahon'  beyond  computation  ;  yet  his  power  rested  on  a  danger- 
1873-79  ously  narrow  base.  Confronted,  on  the  one  hand,  by  the 
Monarchists,  numerous  though  divided  ;  attacked  on  the 
other,  by  the  extreme  Repubhcans  who,  lacking  numbers, 
found  in  Gambetta  a  leader  of  brilliant  parts  and  proud 
patriotism,  Thiers  with  difficulty  maintained  his  position 
until  May,  1873.  Defeated  in  the  Assembly  on  a  vote  of 
confidence,  Thiers,  instead  of  dismissing  his  Ministers, 
preferred  to  resign  the  Presidency,  and  Marshal  MacMahon, 
an  avowed  Royalist,  was  elected  in  his  stead.  Thiers 
had  always  refused  to  accept  the  principle  of  ministerial 
responsibility  on  the  ground  that  "  though  it  was  perfectly 
consistent  with  the  dignity  of  a  constitutional  king,  it 
was  for  him,  a  httle  bourgeois,  entirely  out  of  the  question." 
Conformably  with  this  view  of  his  position,  he  accepted 
his  dismissal  at  the  hands  of  the  Assembly. 

MacMahon  appointed  a  Ministry  representative  of  all 
the  monarchical  parties  under  the  leadership  of  the  Due 
de  BrogKe,  and  frantic  efforts  were  made  to  consolidate 


THE  NEW  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEW  FRANCE   41 

the  mouarchical  forces.  But  in  vain.  The  Comte  de 
Chambord,  being  childless,  did  indeed  recognise  the 
Comte  de  Paris  as  heir-presumptive  in  return  for  a  promise 
of  Orleanist  support  to  the  Legitimist  claims  during  his 
own  lifetime  (August,  1873)  ;  but  there  was  no  real 
reconciliation.  Still  there  is  little  doubt  that  if  "  Henri  V." 
could  have  been  persuaded  to  acknowledge  the  tricolour, 
the  monarchy  would  have  been  restored.  How  long  it 
would  have  lasted  is  another  question.  The  obstinacy 
of  "  Henri  V."  forbade  the  experiment ;  he  preferred  the 
"  White  Flag  "  to  the  throne  of  France.  In  May,  1874, 
Broghe's  Ministry  was  defeated  owing  to  monarchical 
dissensions,  and  the  Republicans,  encouraged  by  a  series 
of  consistently  favourable  bye-elections,  felt  themselves 
strong  enough  to  demand  revision,  and  on  30th  January, 
1875,  the  principle  of  a  Repubhc  (though  only  by  a  majority 
of  one)  was  definitively  accepted  by  the  Assembly. 

A  series  of  organic  laws,  passed  in  the  course  of  1875,  The  Consti- 
defined  the  Repubhcan  Constitution  under  which,  with  ^gj^  ^  °^ 
some  few  and  unimportant  modifications,  France  is  still 
governed. 

The  President  is  elected  for  a  term  of  seven  years  by  a  (a)  The 
National  Assembly,  and  is  a  "  constitutional "  chief  of  Executive 
the  State.  As  M.  Raymond  Poincare  writes :  "  The 
President  presides,  but  does  not  govern ;  he  can  form  no 
decision  save  in  agreement  with  his  Ivlinisters  ;  and  the 
responsibihty  is  theirs.  .  .  .  The  President,  therefore, 
exercises  no  power  alone."  ^  Sir  Henry  Maine  declared, 
with  some  exaggeration,  that  there  was  no  hving  function- 
ary who  occupied  a  more  pitiable  position  than  a  French 
President.  It  is  true  that  he  neither  reigns  nor  governs, 
but  his  position  plainly  depends  largely  on  his  personaUty  ; 
and  many  French  Presidents,  not  excluding  M.  Poincare 
himself,  have  played  not  merely  a  dignified  but  an  im- 
portant part  in  the  pubHc  hfe  of  France.  The  President 
is  "  responsible  "  only  in  case  of  high  treason,  and  acts 
invariably  on  the  advice  of  Ministers  responsible  to  the 
Legislature. 

^  How  France  is  Governed  (Eng.  trans.),  p.  173. 


42  EUROPE    AND   BEYOND 

(b)  The  The  Legislature  consists  of  two  Houses  :    a  Seriate  and 

Legislature  ^  Chamber  of  Deputies.  Together  they  form  the  National 
Assembly  by  which  the  President  is  elected  and  the 
Constitution  revised.  The  Senate  contains  300  (now  ^  317) 
members.  Of  the  original  300  Senators  75  were  elected 
for  hfe  by  the  National  Assembly  and  the  remaining  225 
for  nine  years  by  electoral  colleges  in  the  Departments 
and  Colonies.  The  Chamber,  comprising  610  members, 
is  elected  for  four  years,  virtually  by  manhood  suffrage. 
The  President  can  dissolve  the  Chamber  before  the  expira- 
tion of  its  legal  term  only  with  the  concurrence  of  the 
Senate.  The  prerogative  thus  attaching  to  the  Senate 
is  plainly  one  of  great  importance,  since  it  gives  it  great 
influence  over  the  Executive.  Only  by  its  leave  can  the 
Executive  make  a  special  appeal  to  the  electorate. 

The  Constitution  thus  defined  has  stood  the  testjof 
experience  with  singular  success,  only  five  amendments 
of  any  importance  having  been  carried  in  forty-five  years. 
In  1883,  the  Republican  form  of  Government  was  declared 
to  be  fundamental  and  not  subject  to  revision ;  in  1884, 
the  principle  of  Life-Senatorships  was  denounced,  the 
places  of  the  Life-Senators  being  filled,  as  vacancies  occur, 
by  indirect  election  ;  in  1886,  members  of  famihes  which 
have  reigned  in  France  were  declared  ineligible  for  the 
Presidency  of  the  Republic ;  in  1889,  single  districts  were 
re-established  for  the  election  of  deputies,  and  multiple 
candidatures  were  prohibited ;  in  1919  the  scrutin  de 
liste  with  proportional  representation  was  again  restored. 
In  December,  1875,  the  National  Assembly  was  finally 
dissolved,  and  the  elections  of  1876  gave  to  the  Republicans 
an  overwhelming  majority  in  the  Chamber  and  a  large 
party  in  the  Senate.  The  Third  Repubhc  was  estabhshed. 
The  Constitution  of  1875  as  a  whole  represented  a 
compromise  between  the  Conservative  majority,  who  were 
too  divided  to  procure  the  restoration  of  any  form  of 
monarchy,  and  the  Repubhcan  minority.  They  combined 
to  draft  a  simple  form  of  Constitution  which  neither  party 
imagined  would  be  other  than  temporary.     Both  the  ex- 

1  1920. 


THE  NEW  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEW  FRANCE   43 

treme  parties  have  been  disappointed  in  their  expecta- 
tions :  the  Constitution  of  1875  has  already  lasted  more 
than  twice  as  long  as  any  Constitution  in  France  since 
the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  in  1789. 

Bismarck  watched  the  rapid  recuperation  of  France  Bismarck 
with  astonishment  and  chagrin.  The  indemnity  which  ^^^^^ 
was  intended  to  cripple  France  for  a  generation  was 
paid  ofi  in  two  years,  and  the  payment  inflicted  less 
harm  upon  France  than  upon  Germany.  The  acquisition 
of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  opened  the  French  frontier  to 
Grerman  attack  and  contributed  immensely  to  the  industrial 
prosperity  of  Germany.  But  would  France  permanently 
acquiesce  in  the  loss  of  these  Provinces  ?  Would  the 
inhabitants  permanently  accept  the  harsh  German  rule  ? 
What  might  not  happen  if  the  recovery  of  France  should 
proceed  with  the  same  rapidity  as  it  had  exhibited  in  the 
half-decade  since  the  debacle  ?  France  could  do  little 
without  allies  ;  but  might  she  not  get  them  ?  A  day 
must  come  when  Germany  would  have  to  choose  between 
the  friendship  of  Austria  and  that  of  Russia.  If  she  chose 
Austria,  would  not  Russia  be  flung  into  the  arms  of  France  ? 
And  England  ?  England,  in  1874,  abjured  the  domina- 
tion of  the  Manchester  School,  and  the  old  aristocracy 
in  aUiance  with  the  newly  enfranchised  artisans  placed 
the  Conservatives  in  power  for  the  first  time  since  1830. 
Under  Disraeli  England  might  emerge  from  her  splendid 
isolation,  and  again  take  a  hand  in  continental  diplomacy. 

Under  these  circumstances  might  it  not  be  the  msest  The 
pohcy  for  Germany  to  attack  France  before  her  strength  ^  is??'^^ 
was  removed,  and  while  she  was  still  isolated  in  Europe  ? 
This  time,  if  fortune  favoured  German  arms,  France  should 
be  "  bled  white  "  ;  the  "  French  mortgage  "  should  be  once 
for  all  cleared  ofi.  France  had  indeed  given  no  sort  of 
pretext  for  attack ;  she  had  more  than  punctually  dis- 
charged all  her  obligations,  and  had  wisely  heeded  Gam- 
betta's  warning :  "to  think  of  Ravanche  always,  and 
never  to  speak  of  it."  Despite  this,  there  is  little  doubt 
that  Bismarck  in  the  winter  of  1874-75  tried  to  pick  a 
quarrel  with  France.     His  own  master  confided  to  Prince 


44  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


^ 


Huhenlohe :  "  I  do  not  wish  war  with  France  .  .  .  but 
I  fear  that  Bismarck  may  drag  me  into  it  little  by  little." 
"  Bismarck,"  wrote  Lord  Odo  Russell  from  Berlin  to  Lord 
Derby,  "is  at  his  old  tricks  again."  On  15th  April,  1875, 
there  appeared  in  the  Berlin  Post  an  article,  obviously 
inspired:  "  Krieg  in  sicht  ? "  On  4th  May  the  Due 
Decazes,  the  French  Premier,  informed  de  Blowitz,  the 
Times  correspondent  in  Paris,  that  Germany  intended  to 
"  bleed  France  white,"  to  demand  from  her  a  fine  of 
ten  milliards  of  francs  (about  £400,000,000),  payable  in 
twenty  instalments,  and  to  keep  an  army  of  occupation 
in  her  eastern  Departments  until  the  fine  was  paid.  Similar 
reports  appear  to  have  reached  the  Czar  Alexander  in 
St.  Petersburg  and  to  have  been  privately  transmitted  to 
Queen  Victoria  by  her  daughters  in  Berlin  and  Darmstadt. 
The  Queen  wrote  to  Alexander  begging  him  to  use  his 
influence  with  the  Emperor  to  avert  war,  and  the  Czar, 
accompanied  by  Gortschakoff,  hurried  to  Berlin.  In 
June  the  Queen  wrote  a  personal  letter  to  the  German 
Emperor  offering  her  mediation.  The  Emperor  assured 
her  in  reply  that  her  fears  were  groundless.  It  was  true. 
Bismarck  had  been  outplayed  by  Decazes  and  Gortschakoff 
at  his  own  game.     The  scare  was  over. 

Hardly,  however,  had  the  fear  of  renewed  war  in  Western 
Europe  been  averted,  when  the  rumblings  of  a  coming 
storm  began  to  be  heard  in  the  Near  East.  The  rumblings 
deepened,  and  for  the  next  three  years  the  centre  of  political 
interest  shifted  from  Berlin  and  Paris  to  Constantinople. 
The  Eastern  Question  was  reopened. 

AUTHORITIES 

A.    L.    Lowell  :    Governments   and    Parties  in    Continental    Europe. 

(London,  1896.) 
DoDD  :   Modern  Constitutions,  with  texta  in  l^nglieh.     (Chicago,  1909.) 
C.  G.  Robertson  :  Bismarck.     (London,  1918.) 
Lanessan  :  L' Empire  germanique  sous  Bismarck  et  Guillaume  II. 
Marriott  and  Robertson  :  Evolution  of  Prussia.     (Oxford,  1915.) 
W.  H.  Dawson:  The  Evolution  of  Modern  Germany.     (London,  1911.) 
M.  Lenz  :  Geschichte  Bismarcks. 
P.  Matter  :  Bismarck  et  son  temps  (3  volumes). 
H.  Blum:  Das  Deutsche  Reich  ziir  Zeit  Bismarcks. 


THE  NEW  GERMANY  AND  THE  NEW  FRANCE   45 

W.  Oncken  :  Das  Zeitalter  des  Kaisers  Wilhelm. 

M.  BuscH  :    Bismarck  :   Some  Secret  Pages  of  his  History  (3   vols., 

London,  1898),  and  other  works. 
F.  CuRTius  (ed.) :  The  Memoirs  of  Prince  Hohenlohe  (Eng.  trans.,  G.  W. 

Chrystal).    (2  vols.,  London,  1906.) 
Bismarck  :    Reflections  and  Reminiscences  (trans,    by  A.   J.   Butler). 

(London,  1898.) 
FiTZMAXJRiCE  :  Life  of  the  Second  Earl  Granville.     (London,  1905.) 
E.    Bourgeois:    Modern  France  (1815-1914).     (2  vols.,  Cambridge, 

1919.) 
Hanotaux  :   Hist,  de  la  France  contemporaine.     (Paris,  1904.) 
Blowitz  :  Memoirs.     (London,  1903.) 
Thiers  :   Notes  et  Souvenirs. 


CHAPTER  111 

THE  EASTERN  QUESTION  (1875-98) 

Russia  and  Turkey.    The  Balkan  States 

Amongst  the  great  problems  of  our  age  none  is  more  fitted  to  occupy 
the  thoughts,  not  only  of  the  professional  statesman  but  of  every  keen- 
sighted  indivividual  who  takes  an  interest  in  politics,  than  the  so-called 
Eastern  Question.  It  is  the  pivot  upon  which  the  general  politics  of 
the  century  now  drawing  to  an  end  are  turning,  and  it  will  be  so  for  the 
coming  century  also.  ...  It  is  not  a  question  which  has  disturbed  the 
peace  of  Europe  only  yesterday:  it  is  not  even  a  production  of  this 
century.  It  has  exercised  a  powerful  influence  upon  the  course  of  the 
world's  history  for  about  five  hundred  years. — J.  I.  Von  Dollingee, 

Tout  contribue  k  developper  entre  ces  deux  pays  I'antagonisme  et  la 
haine.  Les  Russes  ont  recur  leur  foi  de  Byzance,  c'est  leur  metropole, 
et  les  Turcs  la  souillent  de  leur  presence.  Les  Turcs  oppriment  les 
coreligionnaires  des  Russes,  et  chaque  Russe  considere  comme  une 
oeuvre  de  foi  la  delivrance  de  ses  freres.  Les  passions  populaires 
s'accordent  ici  avec  les  conseils  de  la  politique  :  c'est  vers  la  mer  Noire, 
vers  le  Danube,  vers  Constantinople  que  les  souverains  russes  sont 
naturellement  portes  a  s'etendre :  delivrer  et  conquerir  deviennent 
pour  eux  synonymes.  Les  tsars  ont  cette  rare  fortune  que  I'instinct 
national  soutient  leurs  calculs  d'ambition,  et  qu'ils  peuvent  retourner 
contre  I'empire  Ottoman  ce  fanatisme  religieux  qui  a  precipite  les  Turcs 
sur  r  Europe  et  rendait  naguere  leurs  invasions  si  formidables. — Sorel. 

The  Christian  East  has  had  enough  of  Turkish  misrule.  .  .  .  High 
diplomacy  will  never  solve  the  Eastern  Question  ;  it  can  be  solved  only 
in  the  East,  in  the  theatre  of  war,  with  the  co-operation  of  the  peoples 
directly  concerned. — Prince  Carol  of  Roumania. 

These  newly  emancipated  races  want  to  breathe  free  air,  and  not 
through  Russian  nostrils. — Sir  William  White,  1885. 

The  ^T^HE  quotations  prefixed  to  tliis  chapter  may  serve 

Eastern         J^    ^q    indicate     in     rough    fashion     the     many-sided 

complexity  of  "  that  shifting,  intractable,  and  interwoven 

tangle  of  conflicting  interests,  rival  peoples,  and  antagonistic 

46 


THE   EASTERN   QUESTION   (1875-98)  47 

faiths  that  is  veiled  under  the  easy  name  of  the  Eastern 
Question."  ^  That  question  has,  in  one  form  or  another, 
been  perplexing  Europe  for  more  than  five  hundred  years. 
It  is  only  with  its  latest  phases  that  this  book  is  concerned, 
but  to  render  those  phases  intelligible  a  brief  retrospect 
is  not  merely  permissible,  but  essential. 

The  root  of  the  problem  is  to  be  found  in  the  presence.  Origins 
embedded  in  the  living  flesh  of  Europe,  of  an  alien  substance  problem 
— ^the  Ottoman  Turk.  Akin  to  the  European  family 
neither  in  creed,  in  race,  in  language,  in  social  custom, 
nor  in  political  aptitudes  and  traditions,  the  Ottomans 
have  long  presented  to  the  European  Powers  a  problem, 
now  tragic,  now  comic,  now  bordering  on  burlesque,  but 
always  baffling  and  paradoxical.  How  to  deal  with  this 
alien  substance  has  been  for  five  hundred  years  the  essence 
and  core  of  the  Problem  of  the  Near  East. 

Crossing  the  Hellespont  into  Europe  in  the  middle  of  Advance 
the  fourteenth  century,  the  Turks,  in  the  course  of  two  ottoman 
hundred  years,  made  themselves  masters  of  all  the  lands  Turks 
bordering    on    the    Eastern    Mediterranean.     Adrianople 
was  snatched  from  the  feeble  hands  of  the  Byzantine 
Empire  in  1361  ;    the  historic  victory  at  Kossovo  (1389) 
meant  at  once  the  dissolution  of  a  great  Slavonic  combina- 
tion and  the  overthrow  of  the  Serbian  Empire  ;    the  de- 
struction of  Tirnovo  in  1393  marked  the  extinction  of 
Bulgarian  independence  ;    finally,  in  1453,  the  Imperial 
capital  surrendered  to  the   Turks ;   and   Constantinople, 
with  all  that  it  meant  to  Europe  in  commerce,  in  communica- 
tions, and  in  ecclesiastical  sentiment  was  in  the  hands  of 
the  Infidel.     For  two  hundred  and  fifty  years  after  the 
capture   of   Constantinople   the   Turks  were   a   terror  to 
Christian  Europe,  but  towards  the  end  of  the  seventeenth 
century  the  problem  changed.     The  decrepitude  of  the 
Turks  was  manifest  to  all  men,  and  the  rapid  decline  of  Their 
their  power  presented  to  Europe  a  problem  almost  as  ^^^  ^"^ 
baffling  as  their  marvellous  rise.     Ever  since  the  early 
years  of  the  eighteenth  century,  Europe  has  been  haunted 
by  the  apprehension  of  the  consequences  likely  to  ensue 
*  Lord  Morley. 


48 


EUROPE   ANT)   BEYOND 


upon  the  demise  of  the  "  sick  man,"  and  the  subsequent 
disposition  of  his  heritage. 

The  first  claimant  was  Russia,  and  from  1702  to  1820 
the  Eastern  Question  largely  turned  upon  the  relations 
of  Russia  and  Turkey.  United  to  many  of  the  subjects 
of  the  Sultan  by  ties  of  religion  and  of  race,  the  Russian 
Sovereigns  made  rapid  progress  in  the  course  of  the 
eighteenth  century  towards  the  domination  of  the  Black 
Sea.  Their  obvious  goal,  if  not  Constantinople  itself, 
was  the  command  of  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles. 
When  Peter  the  Great  took  up  the  reins  of  government  in 
1689,  Russia  had  little  claim  to  be  regarded  as  a  European 
power.  She  had  access  neither  to  the  Baltic  nor  to  the 
Black  Sea.  The  foundation  of  St.  Petersburg  secured 
the  one,  the  conquest  of  Azov  (1696)  opened  the  door  to 
the  other.  Temporarily  lost  in  1711,  Azov  was  finally 
secured  by  Russia  by  the  Treaty  of  Belgrade  (1739).  By 
the  same  Treaty  the  Russians  were  permitted  to  trade  on 
the  Sea  of  Azov  and  the  Black  Sea,  provided,  however, 
that  all  their  goods  were  carried  in  Turkish  vessels.  The 
Empress,  Catherine  II.,  carried  on  the  work  begun  by 
Peter  the  Great.  At  the  bidding  of  France,  whose  diplo- 
macy had  for  nearly  two  hundred  years  been  dominant 
at  Constantinople,  the  Turks  attacked  Russia  in  1768, 
and  brought  upon  themselves  a  crushing  defeat  which  was 
signalised  by  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Kutschuk- 
Kainardji. 

By  that  famous  Treaty,  Russia  obtained  a  firm  grip 
upon  the  northern  shores  of  the  Black  Sea  ;  the  right  to 
estabhsh  Consuls  and  Vice-Consuls  wherever  she  might 
think  fit ;  free  commercial  navigation  on  the  Black  Sea, 
and  a  strong  diplomatic  footing  in  Constantinople  itself. 
The  Crimea  was  annexed  by  Catherine  in  1782,  and  ten 
years  later  the  Russian  frontier  was  advanced  to  the 
Dniester,  an  advance  which  gave  Russia  the  great  fortress 
of  Oczakov.  Thus,  by  the  close  of  the  ^century,  Russia 
was  firmly  entrenched  upon  the  shores  of  the  Euxine  and 
was  already  beginning  to  look  beyond  them.  "  I  came 
to  Russia,"   said  Catherine,    "  a  poor  girl.     Russia  has 


THE   EASTERN   QUESTION   (1875-98)  49 

dowered  me  riclily,  but  I  have  paid  her  back  with  Azov, 
the  Crimea,  and  the  Ukraine."  Proudly  spoken,  it  was 
less  than  the  truth. 

The  next  phase  of  the  Eastern  Question  was  dominated  Napoleon 
by  Napoleon.  He  it  was  who  first  directed  the  attention  N^elr^^E^st 
of  the  French  people  to  the  high  significance  of  the 
problem  of  the  Near  East.  The  acquisition  of  the  Ionian 
Isles,  the  expedition  to  Egypt  and  Syria,  the  grandiose 
schemes  for  an  attack  on  Buddhist  India,  the  agreement 
with  the  Czar  Alexander  for  a  partition  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire — all  combined  to  stir  the  imagination  aUke  of 
traders  and  diplomatists  in  France.  And  not  in  France 
only.  If  Napoleon  was  a  great  educator  of  the  French, 
hardly  less  was  he  an  educator  of  the  English.  Hitherto 
the  Enghsh  had  been  curiously  careless  as  to  the  fate  of 
the  Near  East.  Napoleon  was  quick  to  perceive  where 
their  vital  interests  lay.  "  Really  to  conquer  England," 
said  Napoleon,  "  we  must  make  ourselves  masters  of 
Egypt."  His  schemes  failed,  but  the  attempt  opened  the 
eyes  of  the  Enghsh,  though  it  was  not  until  the  Greek 
insurrection  of  1821  that  the  English  Foreign  Office  or 
the  Enghsh  pubhc  began  to  take  a  sustained  interest  in 
the  development  of  events  in  South-Eastern  Europe. 

With  the  Greek  insurrection  the  Eastern  Question  enters  The  Greek 
on  an  entirely  new  phase.  Hitherto,  it  had  meant  the  Jion"^J82i 
relations  of  the  dominant  Turks  with  the  Habsburgs,  with 
Venice,  with  France,  and  with  Russia.  Of  the  submerged 
and  conquered  peoples  of  the  Balkans,  Europe  had  taken 
no  heed.  In  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century,  how- 
ever, the  Eastern  Question  was  largely  concerned  with  the 
re-emergence  of  these  conquered  peoples — Greeks,  Serbs, 
Bulgarians,  and  Roumanians.  Greece  led  the  way.  In  1832 
the  Greeks  succeeded,  thanks  in  large  measure  to  the 
cordial  sympathy  of  England  and  France,  and  in  even 
larger  measure  to  the  renewal  of  war  between  Russia 
and  the  Porte,  in  estabhshing  themselves  as  an  inde- 
pendent kingdom. 

In  that  same  year  the  Sultan  appealed  to  the  Powers  Mehemet 
against  his   own   overmighty   vassal,   Mehemet  AH,   the  ^^ 
4 


50  EUROrE    AND   BEYOND 

Pasha  of  Egypt.  Rewarded  for  services  rendered  to  his 
Suzerain  during  the  Greek  revolt  by  the  island  of  Crete, 
this  brilUant  Albanian  adventurer  began  to  conceive  a 
larger  ambition.  He  aspired  to  an  independent  rule  in 
Egypt,  to  the  Pashalik  of  Syria,  perhaps  to  the  lordship 
of  Constantinople  itself.  The  attempt  to  realise  these 
ambitions  kept  Europe  in  a  state  of  almost  continuous 
unrest  for  ten  years  (1831-41). 
Treaty  of  To  save  himseH  from  Mehemet  AH,  the  SuHan  appealed 
skSessi  ^^  ^^®  Powers.  Russia  alone  responded  to  the  appeal, 
1833  '  and  in  return  for  her  services  imposed  upon  the  Porte  the 
humiliating  Treaty  of  Unkiar-Skelessi  (1833).  By  that 
Treaty  Russia  became  virtually  mistress  of  the  Bosphorus 
and  the  Dardanelles.  The  Sultan  undertook,  while  per- 
mitting free  egress  to  the  Russian  Fleet,  to  close  the  straits 
to  the  ships  of  war  of  all  nations.  The  Black  Sea  had 
become  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a  Russian  Lake,  and 
the  key  of  the  narrow  straits  had  passed  into  Russian 
keeping. 
England  The  triumph  of  Russia  aroused  the  jealous  interest  of 

Rifssia  England.  For  the  first  time  England  became  seriously 
alarmed  by  Russian  progress  in  South-Eastern  Europe  ; 
and  for  the  next  half-century  the  problem  of  the  Near 
East  revolved  round  the  antagonism  of  these  two  Powers. 
The  Czar  Nicholas  of  Russia  made  more  than  one  effort  to 
bring  about  an  accommodation  with  England,  but  he 
failed  to  dispel  the  mistrust  with  which  the  designs  of 
Russia  had  come  to  be  regarded  in  this  country. 
The  The  first  result  of  this  failure  was  the  Crimean  War. 

Wa"^^"  The  significance  of  that  war  has  been  very  variously 
estimated.  Sir  Robert  Morier  described  it  as  "  the  only 
perfectly  useless  modern  war  that  has  been  waged." 
Lord  Cromer,  on  the  other  hand,  maintained  that  if  it  had 
not  been  "  for  the  Crimean  AVar  and  the  pohcy  subsequently 
adopted  by  Lord  Beaconsfield's  government,  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Balkan  States  would  never  have  been 
achieved,  and  the  Russians  would  now  be  in  possession  of 
Constantinople."  Be  that  as  it  may,  this  much,  at  any 
rate,   is  certain :    the    Crimean  War,  for    good    or   evil, 


THE   EASTERN   QUESTION   (1875-98)  51 

registered  a  definite  set-back  to  the  policy  of  Russia  in  the 
Near  East.  It  also  gave  the  Sultan  an  opportunity  to 
put  his  house  in  order  had  he  been  minded  to  do  so.  For 
twenty  years  he  was  reheved  of  all  anxiety  on  the  side  of 
Russia.  The  event  proved  that  the  Sultan's  zeal  for 
reform  was  in  direct  ratio  to  his  anxiety  for  self-preserva- 
tion. To  reheve  him  from  the  one  was  to  remove  the 
only  incentive  to  the  other.  Consequently  httle  or  nothing 
was  done  to  amehorate  the  lot  of  the  subject  populations, 
and  towards  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  those 
populations  began  to  take  matters  into  their  own  hands. 
Crete,  "  the  Great  Greek  Island,"  had  been  indeed  in  a 
state  of  perpetual  revolt  ever  since  in  1840  it  had  been 
replaced  under  the  direct  government  of  the  Sultan.  In 
1875  the  unrest  spread  to  the  Peninsula,  and  the  whole 
Eastern  Question  was  again  reopened  by  the  outbreak  of 
insurrection  among  the  peoples  of  Bosnia  and  the  Herze- 
govina. Thence  it  spread  to  their  kinsmen  in  Serbia 
and  Montenegro. 

How  far  this  insurrection  was  spontaneous,  how  far  it  The 
was  stimulated  from  St.  Petersburg,  is  a  question  which  it  f^^^c- 
is  not  easy  to  decide.     Plainly,  Russia  was  not  sorry  to  tion,  1875 
have  the  opportunity  of  fishing  again  in  troubled  waters. 
It  had  been  obvious  for  some  time  past  that  the  Czar 
Alexander  did  not  intend  to  accept  as  final  the  results  of 
the  Crimean  War.     He  had,  as  we  have  seen,  taken  ad- 
vantage in  1870  of  the  preoccupation  of  Europe  to  de- 
nounce, with  the  connivance  of  Bismarck,  those  clauses  of 
the  Treaty  of  Paris  which  decreed  the  neutrality  of  the 
Black    Sea.      That    neutrality    Disraeh    declared    to    be 
"  the  very  basis  and  gist  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris."     The 
rising  of  the  Southern  Slavs  in  1875  gave  the  Czar  a  still 
larger  opportunity. 

Turkish  misgovernment  in  the  European  provinces  had  Turkish 
become  a  crying  scandal.     The  subject  peoples  groaned  JJe?t°^^™" 
under  the  oppressiveness  and  uncertainty  of  a  fiscal  system 
which  nevertheless  ruined  the  Treasury,  for  it  is  one  of  the 
salutary  paradoxes  incidental  to  misgovernment  that  it  is 
as  ruinous  to  the  sovereign  as  it  is  hurtful  to  the  subject. 


52  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

The  inherent  extravagance  of  a  bad  system  combined  with 
the  peculation  of  an  army  of  officials  to  bring  disaster  upon 
Turkey,  and  in  October,  1875,  the  Sultan  was  compelled 
to  inform  his  creditors  that  he  could  not  pay  the  full 
interest  on  the  debt.  Partial  repudiation  complicated  an 
international  situation  already  suflS.ciently  embarrassing. 
The  three  Emperors  took  counsel  together,  and  on  30th 
December,  1875,  the  Austrian  Chancellor,  Count  Andrassy, 
issued  from  Budapest  the  Note  which  bears  his  name. 
The  The  Andrassy  Note  expressed  the  anxiety  of  the  Powers 

Noi^^^  to  curtail  the  area  of  the  insurrection,  and  to  maintain  the 
peace  of  Europe  ;  it  drew  attention  to  the  failure  of  the 
Porte  to  carry  out  reforms  long  overdue,  and  it  insisted 
that  pressure  must  be  put  upon  the  Sultan  effectually 
to  redeem  his  promises.  In  particular,  he  must  be 
pressed  to  grant  complete  religious  liberty  ;  to  abolish 
tax  farming  ;  to  apply  the  direct  taxes,  locally  levied  in 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  to  the  local  needs  of  those  Pro- 
vinces ;  to  improve  the  condition  of  the  rural  population 
by  multiplpng  peasant  owners,  and  above  all  to  appoint 
a  special  commission,  composed  in  equal  numbers  of  Mussul- 
mans and  Christians,  to  control  the  execution  not  only  of 
the  reforms  now  demanded  by  the  Powers,  but  also  of  those 
spontaneously  promised  by  the  Sultan  in  the  decrees  of 
2nd  October  and  12th  December.  To  this  Note  the  British 
Government  gave  in  their  general  adhesion,  though  they 
pointed  out  that  the  Sultan  had,  during  the  last  few 
months,  promised  the  more  important  of  the  reforms  in- 
dicated therein. 

The  Note  was  accordingly  presented  to  the  Porte  at  the 
end  of  January,  1876,  and  the  Sultan,  with  almost  suspicious 
promptitude,  accepted  four  out  of  the  five  points — ^the 
exception  being  the  application  of  the  direct  taxes  to  local 
objects. 

The  friendly  efforts  of  the  diplomatists  were  foiled, 
however,  by  the  attitude  of  the  insurgents.  The  latter 
refused,  not  unnaturally,  to  be  satisfied  with  mere  assur- 
ances, or  to  lay  down  their  arms  without  substantial 
guarantees.     The    Sultan    insisted    again,    not    without 


THE    EASTERN   QUESTION   (1875-98)  53 

reason,  that  it  was  impossible  to  initiate  a  scheme  of  reform 
while  the  Pro\ances  were  actually  in  armed  rebellion. 
Meanwliile,  the  mischief  was  spreading.  Bulgaria  broke 
out  into  revolt  in  April ;  on  7th  May  a  fanatical  Muham- 
madan  emeute  at  Salonika  led  to  the  murder  of  the  French 
and  German  Consuls  ;  the  Sultan  Abdul  Aziz  was  deposed 
on  30th  May,  and  on  4th  June  was  found  dead,  "  having 
apparently  committed  suicide."  More  drastic  measures 
were  obviously  necessary,  if  a  great  European  conflagra- 
tion was  to  be  avoided. 

On  1 1th  May  the  Austrian  and  Russian  Chancellors  were  The  Berlin 
in  conference  with  Prince  Bismarck  at  Berlin,  and  deter-  ^emoran- 
mined  to  make  further  and  more  peremptory  demands 
upon  the  Sultan.  There  was  to  be  an  immediate  armistice 
of  two  months'  duration,  during  which  certain  measures  of 
pacification  and  repatriation  were  to  be  executed  under  the 
superintendence  of  the  delegates  of  the  Powers.  If  by  the 
expiry  of  the  armistice  the  object  of  the  Powers  had  not 
been  attained,  diplomatic  action  would  have  to  be  rein- 
forced. France  and  Italy  assented  to  the  Note,  but  the 
British  Government  regarded  the  terms  as  unduly  peremp- 
tory ;  they  resented  the  independent  action  of  the  three 
Imperial  Powers,  and  declined  to  be  a  party  to  the 
Memorandum.  Accordingly  the  proposed  intervention 
was  abandoned. 

Mr.  Disraeli's  refusal  created,  as  was  inevitable,  pro-  Attitude  of 
found  perturbation  abroad,  and  evoked  a  storm  of  criticism  J^^  q^' 
at  home.     There  can  be  no  question  that  the  European  emment 
Concert,  whatever  it  was  worth,  was  broken  by  the  policy 
of  Great  Britain.     Had  the  British  Cabinet  gone  whole- 
heartedly with  the  other  Powers,  irresistible  pressure  would 
have  been  put  upon  the  Porte,  and  some  terrible  atrocities 
might,  perhaps,  have  been  averted.     On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  clear  that  the  Imperial  Chancellors  were  guilty,  to 
say  the  least,  of  grave  discourtesy  towards  Great  Britain ; 
nor  can  it  be  denied  that,  assuming  a  sincere  desire  for 
the  preservation  of  peace,  they  committed  an  inexcusable 
blunder  in  not  inviting  the  co-operation  of  England  before 
formulating  the  demands  of  the  Berlin  Memorandum. 


54  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Spread  of  Events  were  in  the  meantime  moving  rapidly  in  the 
i^u??ic-^  Balkans.  On  30th  June,  1876,  Serbia  formally  declared 
tion  war  upon  the  Porte,  and  on  1st  July  Prince  Nicholas  of 

Montenegro  followed  the  example.  Nor  was  the  insurrec- 
tion confined  to  Slavs  of  the  purest  blood.  On  1st  May 
some  of  the  Bulgarian  Christians,  imitating  the  peasants 
of  the  Herzegovina,  defied  the  orders  of  the  Turkish 
officials,  and  put  one  hundred  of  them  to  death.  This  was 
a  serious  matter.  The  Herzegovina  was  relatively  remote, 
but  now  the  spirit  of  insubordination  seemed  to  be  in- 
fecting the  heart  of  the  Empire.  The  Porte,  already 
engaged  in  war  with  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  was  terrified 
at  the  idea  of  an  attack  upon  the  right  flank  of  its  army, 
and  determined  upon  a  prompt  and  terrible  suppression  of 
the  Bulgarian  revolt.  A  force  of  18,000  regulars  was 
marched  into  Bulgaria,  and  hordes  of  irregulars,  Bashi- 
Bazouks,  and  Circassians  were  let  loose  to  wreak  the 
vengeance  of  the  Sultan  upon  a  peasantry  unprepared 
for  resistance  and  mostly  unarmed.  Whole  villages  were 
wiped  out,  and  in  the  town  of  Batak  only  2,000  out  of  7,000 
inhabitants  escaped  massacre. 
Bulgarian  On  23rd  June  a  London  newspaper  published  the  first 
account  of  the  horrors  alleged  to  have  been  perpetrated  by 
the  Turks  in  Bulgaria.  How  much  of  exaggeration  there 
was  in  the  tale  of  atrocities  with  which  England  and  the 
world  soon  rang  it  was  and  is  impossible  to  say.  But 
something  much  less  than  the  ascertained  facts  would  be 
sufficient  to  account  for  the  profound  emotion  which  moved 
the  whole  Christian  world. 
Turco-Serb  Meanwhile  another  compKcation  had  arisen.  At  the 
end  of  June,  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  as  we  have  seen,  had 
declared  war  upon  the  Porte.  How  far  would  that  conflict 
extend  ?  Could  it  be  confined  within  the  original  limits  ? 
The  Serbian  Army  consisted  largely  of  Russian  volunteers 
and  was  commanded  by  a  Russian  general.  How  long 
would  it  be  before  the  Russian  Government  became  a 
party  to  the  quarrel  ?  The  Serbian  Army,  even  reinforced 
jby  the  volunteers,  could  ofier  but  a  feeble  resistance  to 
the  Turk,  and  in  August  Prince  Milan,  acting  on  a  hint 


Atrocities 


War 


THE   EASTERN   QUESTION   (1875-98)  55 

from  England,  asked  for  the  mediation  of  tlie  Powers.^ 
England,  thereupon,  urged  the  Sultan  to  come  to  terms 
with  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  lest  a  worse  thing  should 
befall  him.  The  Sultan  declined  an  armistice,  but  formu- 
lated his  terms,  and  intimated  that  if  the  Powers  approved 
them  he  would  grant  an  immediate  suspension  of  hostilities. 
But  Serbia  would  accept  nothing  less  than  an  armistice, 
and,  after  six  weeks'  suspension,  hostilities  recommenced. 
Nevertheless,  the  English  Government  was  untiring  in  its 
efforts  to  promote  a  pacification,  and  suggested  to  the 
Powers  some  heads  of  proposals  (21st  September)  :  the 
status  quo  in  Serbia  and  Montenegro  ;  local  or  administra- 
tive autonomy  for  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  ;  guarantees 
against  maladministration  in  Bulgaria,  and  a  comprehensive 
scheme  of  reform,  all  to  be  embodied  in  a  protocol  concluded 
between  the  Porte  and  the  Powers.  Russia  then  proposed 
(26th  September)  that,  in  the  event  of  a  refusal  from 
Turkey,  the  allied  fleets  should  enter  the  Bosphorus,  that 
Bosnia  should  be  temporarily  occupied  by  Austria,  and 
Bulgaria  by  Russia.  Turkey,  thereupon,  renewed  her 
dilatory  tactics,  but  Russia's  patience  was  almost  ex- 
hausted ;  General  Ignatieff  arrived  at  Constantinople, 
on  a  special  mission  from  the  Czar,  on  15th  October,  and 
on  the  30th  presented  his  ultimatum.  If  an  armistice 
were  not  concluded  with  Serbia  within  forty-eight  hours, 
the  Russian  Embassy  was  to  be  immediately  withdrawn. 
On  2nd  November  the  Porte  gave  way ;  Serbia  was 
saved  ;  a  breathing-space  was  permitted  to  the  operations 
of  diplomacy. 

The  interval  was  utilised  by  the  meeting  of  a  Conference  Conference 
of  the  Powers  at  Constantinople.     The  Powers  agreed  to  ^f^^p^**"' 
the  terms  suggested  by  Lord  Derby  in  September,  but  the  pec.  isTO 
Sultan,  though  prodigal  in  the  concession  of  reforms,  on 
paper,  was  determined  that  no  one  but  himself  should 
have  a  hand  in  executing  them.     On  this  point  he  was 
inexorable.     Thereupon  General  Ignatieff,  refusing  to  take 
further  part  in  a  solenm  farce,  withdrew  from  the  Con- 
ference.    The  Czar  had  already  (10th  November)  announced 
I  Turkey,  1877  (No.  1),  p.  380. 


56  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

his  intention  to  proceed  single-handed  if  the  Porte  refused 
the  demands  of  the  Powers  ;  his  army  was  already  mobilised 
on  the  Pruth,  and  war  appeared  imminent. 

The  diplomatists,  however,  made  one  more  effort  to 
avert  it.  Their  demands  were  reduced  to  a  minimum  : 
putting  aside  an  extension  of  territory  for  Serbia  or  Monte- 
negro, they  insisted  upon  the  concession  of  autonomy  to 
Bosnia,  to  the  Herzegovina,  and  to  Bulgaria,  under  the 
control  of  an  international  commission.  On  20th  January 
the  Sultan  categorically  refused,  and  on  the  21st  the  Con- 
ference broke  up.  Great  Britain,  nevertheless,  persisted 
in  her  effoi-ts  to  preserve  peace,  and  on  31st  March,  1877, 
the  Powers  signed  in  London  a  protocol  proposed  by  Count 
Schouvaloff.  The  Turk,  in  high  dudgeon,  rejected  the 
London  Protocol  (10th  April),  and  on  14th  April  the  Czar, 
having  secured  the  friendly  neutrality  of  Austria,^  declared 
war. 

Russia  had  behaved,  in  face  of  prolonged  provocation, 
with  commendable  patience  and  restraint,  and  had  shown 
a  genuine  desire  to  maintain  the  European  Concert.  The 
Turk  had  exhibited  throughout  his  usual  mixture  of 
shrewdness  and  obstinacy,  but  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that 
he  would  have  maintained  his  obstinate  front  but  for 
expectations  based  upon  the  supposed  goodwill  of  the 
British  Government.  Had  the  English  Cabinet,  even  in 
January,  1877,  frankly  and  unambiguously  gone  hand  in 
hand  with  Russia  there  would  have  been  no  war. 
Russo-  Meanwhile  the  armistice  arranged  in  November  between 

Turkish  Turkey  and  Serbia  had  been  further  prolonged  on  28th 
December,  and  on  27th  February,  1877,  peace  was  con- 
cluded at  Constantinople.  But  on  12th  June,  Montenegro, 
encouraged  by  the  action  of  Russia,  recommenced  hostili- 
ties, and  on  22nd  June  the  Russian  Army  effected  the 
passage  of  the  Danube. 

No   other   way  towards   Constantinople   was   open   to 

^  By  the  Agreement  of  Reichstadt  (8th  July,  1876),  confirmed  by 
definite  treaty,  15th  January,  1877.  The  terms  of  the  Austro-Russian 
agreement  have  never  been  authoritatively  revealed  :  cf.  Rose :  De- 
velopment of  European  Nations,  p.  180. 


THE   EASTERN   QUESTION   (1875-98)  57 

them,  for  tlie  Russian  Navy  had  not  yet  had  time  since 
1871  to  regain  the  position  in  the  Black  Sea  denied  to  it 
in  1856.  The  co-operation  of  Roumania  was,  therefore, 
indispensable.  The  Roumanian  Army  held  the  right  flank 
for  Russia,  but  an  offer  of  more  active  co-operation  was 
declined  with  some  hauteur  by  the  Czar.  From  the  Danube 
the  Russians  pushed  on  slowly  but  successfully  until  their 
advanced  guard  suffered  a  serious  check  before  Plevna 
on  30th  July.  On  the  following  day  Osman  Pasha,  strongly 
entrenched  at  Plevna,  inflicted  a  very  serious  reverse 
upon  them. 

Instead,  therefore,  of  carrying  Plevna  by  storm  the  Siege  of 
Russians  were  compelled  to  besiege  it,  and  the  task  proved  P*'"^"* 
to  be  a  tough  one.  In  chastened  mood  the  Czar  accepted, 
in  August,  the  contemned  offer  of  Prince  Carol,  who 
was  appointed  to  the  supreme  command  of  the  Russo- 
Roumanian  Army.  For  five  months  Osman  held  120,000 
Russians  and  Roumanians  at  bay,  inflicting  meantime 
very  heavy  losses  upon  them ;  but  at  last  his  resistance 
was  worn  down,  and  on  10th  December  the  remnant  of 
the  gallant  garrison — some  40,000  haK-starved  men — 
were  compelled  to  surrender. 

Four  days  later  Serbia,  for  the  second  time,  declared  Re-entry 
war  upon  the  Porte,  and  recaptured  Prizrend,  the  ancient  ?f  Serbia 
capital  of  the  Idngdom.     The  Russians,  meanwhile,  were  war 
pushing  the  Turks  back  towards  Constantinople  ;    they 
occupied  Sofia  on  5th  January,  and  Adrianople  on  the 
20th.     In  the  Caucasus  their  success  was  not  less  com- 
plete ;  the  great  fortress  of  Kars  had  fallen  on  18th  Novem- 
ber ;  the  Turkish  Empire  seemed  to  lie  at  their  mercy,  and 
in  March,  Russia  dictated  to  the  Porte  the  Treaty  of  San 
Stephano. 

A   basis   of   agreement   had   already   been   reached   at  Treaty  of 
Adrianople  (31st  January)  ;   the  terms  were  now  emborlied  ^f"  ^*^" 
in  a  treaty  signed,  on  3rd  March,  at  a  village  not  far  from  March' 
Constantinople.     Montenegro,  enlarged  by  the  acquisition  ^^'^ 
of  some  strips  of  Bosnia  and  the  Adriatic  port  of  Antivari, 
was  to  be  recognised  definitely  as  independent  of  the  Porte  ; 
so  also  was  Serbia,  which  was  to  acquire  the  districts  of 


68  EUEOPE   AND   BEYOND 

Nishi  and  Mitrovitza  ;  the  reforms  recommended  to  the 
Porte  at  the  Conference  of  Constantinople  were  to  be 
immediately  introduced  into  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina, 
and  to  be  executed  under  the  conjoint  control  of  Russia 
and  Austria  ;  the  fortresses  on  the  Danube  were  to  be 
razed ;  reforms  were  to  be  granted  to  the  Armenians  ; 
Russia  was  to  acquire,  in  lieu  of  the  greater  part  of  the 
money  indemnity  which  she  claimed,  Batoum,  Kars,  and 
other  territory  in  Asia,  and  part  of  Dobrudja,  which  was 
to  be  exchanged  with  Roumania  (whose  independence  was 
recognised  by  the  Porte)  for  the  strip  of  Bessarabia  retro- 
ceded  in  1856.  The  most  striking  feature  of  the  treaty 
was  the  creation  of  a  greater  Bulgaria,  which  was  to  be 
constituted  an  autonomous  tributary  principality  mth  a 
Christian  government  and  a  national  mihtia,  and  was  to 
extend  from  the  Danube  to  the  ^Egean,  nearly  as  far  south 
as  Midia  (on  the  Black  Sea)  and  Adrianople,  and  to  include, 
on  the  west,  the  district  round  Monastir  but  not  Salonika. ^ 
The  Ottoman  Empire  in  Europe  was  practically  annihilated. 
Attitude  of  These  events  caused,  as  we  have  seen,  grave  disquietude 
great  in  Great  Britain.  Before  the  Russian  armies  crossed 
the  Danube  the  Czar  had  undertaken  to  respect  Enghsh 
interests  in  Egypt  and  in  the  Canal,  and  not  to  occupy 
Constantinople  or  the  Straits  (8th  June,  1877) ;  but  the 
Russian  victories  in  the  closing  months  of  1877  excited  in 
England  some  alarm  as  to  the  precise  fulfilment  of  his 
promises.  Accordingly,  in  January,  1878,  Lord  Derby, 
then  Foreign  Secretary,  deemed  it  at  once  friendly  and 
prudent  to  remind  the  Czar  of  his  promise,  and  to  warn 
him  that  any  treaty  concluded  between  Russia  and  Turkey 
which  might  affect  the  engagements  of  1856  and  1871 
"  would  not  be  valid  without  the  assent  of  the  Powers 
who  were  parties  to  those  Treaties."     (14th  January.) 

In  order  to  emphasise  the  gravity  of  the  warning,  the 
Fleet,  which  had  been  at  Besika  Bay,  was  ordered  to  pass 
the  Dardanelles  (23rd  January),  and  the  Government 
asked  Parliament  for  a  vote  of  credit  of  £6,000,000. 

1  See  Turkey  Papers,  No.  22,  1878  ;  Holland  :  European  Concert, 
pp.  335  seq. 


THE   EASTERN   QUESTION   (1875-98)  59 

A  fortniglit  later  the  British  Cabinet,  in  response  to 
urgent  telegrams  from  Mr.  Layard,  the  British  Ambassador 
in  Constantinople,  decided  to  send  a  detachment  of  the 
Fleet  into  the  Sea  of  Marmora  for  the  protection  of  British 
subjects  in  Constantinople.  Russia  retorted,  that  if  British 
ships  sailed  up  the  Straits,  Russian  troops  would  enter 
Constantinople  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  lives  of 
Christians  of  every  race.  But  the  Sultan,  equally  afraid 
of  friends  and  foes,  begged  the  English  Fleet  to  retire,  and 
it  returned,  accordingly,  to  Besika  Bay. 

■'he  extreme  tension  was  thus  for  the  moment  relaxed. 
Austria  then  proposed  that  the  whole  matter  should  be 
referred  to  a  European  Congress,  and  Great  Britain  assented 
on  the  express  condition  that  all  questions  dealt  with  in 
the  Treaty  of  San  Stephano  "  should  be  considered  as 
subjects  to  be  considered  in  the  Congress." 

To  the  demand  that  the  treaty  in  its  entirety  should  be 
submitted  to  a  congress,  Russia  demurred.  Great  Britain 
insisted.  Again  peace  hung  in  the  balance.  Apart  from 
the  dispute  between  England  and  Russia  there  was  a  great 
deal  of  inflammable  material  about,  to  which  a  spark 
would  set  hght.  Greece,  Serbia,  and,  above  all,  Roumania, 
who  with  incredible  tactlessness  and  base  ingratitude  had 
been  excluded  from  the  peace  negotiations,  were  all  gravely 
dissatisfied  with  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  San  Stephano. 
Greece  had  indeed  actually  invaded  Thessaly  at  the 
beginning  of  February,  and  only  consented  to  abstain 
from  further  hostihties  upon  the  assurance  of  the  Powers 
that  her  claims  should  have  favourable  consideration  in 
the  definitive  Treaty  of  Peace. 

Lord  Beaconsfield  then  announced,  on  17th  April, 
that  he  had  ordered  7000  Indian  troops  to  embark  for 
Malta.  The  couf  was  denounced  in  England  as  "  sensa- 
tional," un-English,  unconstitutional,  even  illegal;  but  if 
it  alarmed  England  it  impressed  Europe,  and  there  can 
be  no  question  that  it  made  for  peace. 

The  operation  of  other  forces  was  tending  in  the  same  Russia, 
direction.     The  terms  of  settlement  proposed  by  Russia  ^^^"^' 
were  not  less  distasteful  to  Austria  than  to  England.     An  Austria 


60  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Austrian  Army  was  mobilised  on  the  Russian  flank  in  the 
Carpathians,  and  on  4th  February  the  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph  demanded  that  the  terms  of  peace  should  be 
referred  to  a  Congress  at  Vienna.  Austria  might  well  take 
a  firm  hne,  for  behind  Austria  was  Germany. 
Bismarck's  Bismarck  had  made  up  his  mind.  He  would  fain  have 
Policy  preserved  in  its  integrity  the  Dreikaiserhiind  of  1872  ;  he 
was  under  deep  obligations  to  Russia,  and  was  only  too 
glad  to  assist  and  even  to  stimulate  her  ambitions  so 
long  as  they  conflicted  only  with  those  of  Great  Britain  or 
France.  But  when  it  came  to  a  possible  conflict  between 
Russia  and  Germany  matters  were  different.  It  was  true 
that  Russia  had  protected  Prussia's  right  flank  in  1864, 
and  her  left  flank  in  1866,  and — highest  service  of  all — had 
"  contained "  Austria  in  1870.  The  Czar  thought,  not 
unnaturally,  that  in  the  spring  of  1878  the  time  had  arrived 
for  a  repayment  of  the  debt,  and  requested  Bismarck  to 
contain  Austria.  Bismarck  was  still  anxious  to  "  keep 
open  the  wire  between  Berhn  and  St.  Petersburg,"  provided 
it  was  not  at  the  expense  of  that  between  Berhn  and  Vienna. 
He  rephed,  therefore,  to  the  Czar  that  Germany  must 
keep  watch  on  the  Rhine,  and  could  not  spare  troops  to 
contain  Austria  as  well.  The  excuse  was  trans j)arent. 
Bismarck  had,  in  fact,  decided  to  give  Austria  a  free  hand 
in  the  Balkans,  and  even  to  push  her  along  the  road  towards 
Salonika.  His  attitude  was  regarded  in  Russia  as  a  great 
betrayal,  a  dishonourable  repudiation  of  an  acknowledged 
debt.  It  is  not,  however,  too  much  to  say  that  it  averted 
a  European  conflagration.  The  Czar  decided  not  to  fight 
Austria  and  England,  but,  instead,  to  accept  the  invitation 
to  a  Congress  at  Berlin. 
The  Treaty  On  30th  May  Lord  Salisbury  and  Count  Schouvaloff 
of  Berlin  ^ame  to  an  agreement  upon  the  main  points  at  issue,  and 
on  13th  June  the  Congress  opened  at  Berhn.  Prince 
Bismarck  presided,  and  filled  his  chosen  role  of  "  the 
honest  broker  "  ;  but  it  was  Lord  Beaconsfield  whose  per- 
sonaUty  dominated  the  Congress.  "  Der  alte  Jude,  das 
ist  der  Mann,"  was  Bismarck's  shrewd  summary  of  the 
situation. 


THE   EASTERN   QUESTION   (1875-98)  61 

Little  time  was  spent  in  discussion ;  the  treaty  was 
signed  on  13th  July.  Russia's  sole  acquisition  in  Europe 
was  the  strip  of  Bessarabia  which  had  been  retroceded 
to  Roumania  in  1856,  and  was  now,  by  an  act  of  grave 
impolicy  and  base  ingratitude,  snatched  away  from  her 
by  the  Czar.  In  Asia  she  retained  Batoum,  Ardahan, 
and  Kars.  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina  were  handed  over 
for  an  undefined  term  to  Austria,  who  was  also  to  be 
allowed  to  occupy  for  mihtary,  but  not  administrative, 
purposes  the  Sanjak  of  Novi  Bazar.  England,  under  a 
separate  Convention  concluded  with  Turkey  on  4th  June,  The  Cypx-us 
was  to  occupy  and  administer  the  island  of  Cyprus,  so  long  ^^^^'^^'^o" 
as  Russia  retained  Kars  and  Batoum.  Turkey  was  to 
receive  the  surplus  revenues  of  the  island,  to  carry  out 
reforms  in  her  Asiatic  dominions,  and  to  be  protected  in 
the  possession  of  them  by  Great  Britain.  France  sought 
for  authority  to  occupy  Tunis  in  the  future  ;  Italy  hinted 
at  claims  upon  Albania  and  TripoU.  Germany  asked  for 
nothing,  but  was  more  than  compensated  for  her  modesty 
by  securing  the  gratitude  and  friendship  of  the  Sultan. 
Never  did  Bismarck  make  a  better  investment. 

Greece  with  no  false  modesty  claimed  Crete,  Thessaly,  The  Bai- 
Epirus,  and  part  of  Macedonia ;  but  Lord  Beaconsfield,  in  ''^"  ^^^^^ 
resisting  the  claim,  suggested  that  Greece  being  "  a  country 
Vr^th  a  future  could  afford  to  wait."  The  Congress  of 
Berlin  did  indeed  invite  the  Sultan  to  grant  to  Greece  such 
a  rectification  of  frontiers  as  would  include  Janina  and 
Larissa  in  Greek  territory ;  but  the  Sultan,  not  unnaturally, 
ignored  the  invitation.  Two  years  later  (1880),  the  Powers 
suggested  to  the  Porte  the  cession  of  Thessaly  and  Epirus  ; 
and  at  last,  in  1881,  the  tact  and  firmness  of  Mr.  Goschen 
wrung  from  the  unwilling  Sultan  one-third  of  the  latter 
province  and  the  whole  of  the  former.  Macedonia  was 
still  left,  fortunately  for  Greece,  under  the  heel  of  the 
Sultan.  Lord  Beaconsfield  did  not  exhibit  much  positive 
benevolence  towards  Greece,  but  negatively  she,  like 
Serbia,  owes  him  a  considerable  debt.  If  he  had  not  torn 
up  the  Treaty  of  San  Stephano,  Bulgaria  would  have 
obtained  a   commanding   position  in   Macedonia,   Serbia 


62  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

would  never  have  got  Uskub  and  Monastir,  Greece  would 
still  be  sighing  for  Kavala  and  perhaps  for  Salonika. 

At  the  moment,  however,  the  Southern  Slavs  were 
bitterly  disappointed  by  the  terms  of  the  settlement. 
Serbia  did  indeed  gain  some  territory  at  the  expense  of 
Bulgaria,  but  the  gain  was  more  than  ofi-set  by  the  position 
assigned  to  Austria.  The  Sarjak  of  Novi  Bazar,  still 
governed  by  the  Turks  but  garrisoned  by  Austrians,  cut 
off  the  Southern  Slavs  of  Serbia  from  their  brethren  in 
Montenegro,  while  the  Austrian  "  occupation  "  of  Bosnia 
and  the  Herzegovina  made  a  further  breach  in  the  solidarity 
of  the  Jugo-Slav  and  brought  the  Habsburgs  into  the 
heart  of  Balkan  affairs. 

Roumania  was  equally  dissatisfied.  Treated  with  dis- 
courtesy and  gross  ingratitude  by  Russia  at  San  Stephano, 
she  fared  no  better  at  Berlin.  Bismarck,  indifferent  to 
the  dynastic  ties  which  united  Prussia  and  Roumania, 
was  not  sorry  to  see  Russia  neglecting  a  golden  opportunity 
for  binding  Roumania  in  gratitude  to  herself.  A  Roumania 
alienated  from  Russia  would  be  the  less  likely  to  quarrel 
with  the  Dual  Monarchy  and  to  press  her  claims  to  the 
inclusion  of  the  unredeemed  Roumanians  in  Transylvania 
and  the  Bukovina.  Lord  Beaconsfield  professed  much 
Platonic  sympathy  for  the  disappointment  of  their  wishes 
in  regard  to  Bessarabia,  but  frankly  confessed  that  he 
could  not  turn  aside  from  the  pursuit  of  the  larger  issues 
to  befriend  a  State  in  whose  fortunes  Great  Britain  was 
not  directly  interested.  It  was  a  gross  blunder,  the 
consequences  of  which  are  not  yet  exhausted.  For  the 
loss  of  Southern  Bessarabia,  Roumania  deemed  herself  ill- 
compensated  by  the  organisation  of  part  of  the  Dobrudja, 
but  she  secured  complete  independence  from  the  Porte, 
as  did  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  who  received  most  of  the 
districts  promised  to  them  at  San  Stephano. 

Bulgaria  did  not.  And  herein  lay  the  essential  differ- 
ence between  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  and  that  of  San  Stephano. 

"  Bulgaria,"  as  defined  at  Berlin,  was  not  more  than  a 
third  of  the  Bulgaria  mapped  out  at  San  Stephano.  It  was 
to  consist  of  a  relatively  narrow  strip  between  the  Danube 


THE   EASTERN   QUESTION   (1875-98)  63 

and  the  Balkans,  and  to  be  an  independent  State  under 
Turkish  suzerainty.  South  of  it  there  was  to  be  a  province, 
Eastern  Roumelia,  which  was  to  be  restored  to  the  Sultan, 
who  agreed  to  place  it  under  a  Christian  governor  approved 
by  the  Powers.  By  this  change  the  Sultan  recovered 
2,500,000  of  population  and  30,000  square  miles  of  terri- 
tory ;  Bulgaria  was  cut  off  from  the  ^gean  ;  Macedonia 
remained  intact. 

Such  were  the  main  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin. 
That  Treaty  forms  a  great  landmark  in  the  history  of  the 
Eastern  Question  ;  but  its  most  important  features  were 
not  those  which  at  the  time  attracted  most  attention. 
The  enduring  significance  of  the  Treaty  is  to  be  found,  not 
in  the  fact  that  Lord  Beaconsfield  snatched  from  the 
brink  of  destruction  a  renmant  of  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
but  that  he  left  a  door  open  to  the  new  nations  which 
were  arising  upon  the  ruins  of  that  Empire.  The  oflOicial 
attitude  of  Great  Britain  during  the  critical  years  1875-78 
might  seem  to  have  committed  the  English  people  to  the 
cause  of  reaction  and  the  Turkish  misgovernment.  In 
effect,  the  policy  of  Lord  Beaconsfield,  whatever  its  motive, 
was  far  from  obstructive  to  the  development  of  the  Balkan 
Nationalities.  Two  of  them  at  least  have  reason  to 
cherish  the  memory  of  the  statesman  who  tore  up  the 
Treaty  of  San  Stephano.  Had  that  Treaty  been  allowed 
to  stand,  both  Greece  and  Serbia  would  have  had  to  re- 
nounce their  ambitions  in  Macedonia,  while  the  enormous 
accessions  of  territory  secured  by  that  Treaty  to  Bulgaria 
might  ultimately  have  proved,  even  to  her,  a  doubtful 
advantage. 

The  partition  of  Bulgaria  was,  however,  manifestly  an  Union  of 
artificial  arrangement,  and  did  not  long  survive  the  death  BuigrHas 
(in  1881)  of  its  real  author.  Lord  Beaconsfield.  But 
Bulgaria  proper  had  in  the  meantime  to  be  provided  with 
a  Constitution  and  a  ruler.  A  single-chamber  Legis- 
lature and  a  responsible  Executive  were  bestowed  by 
the  Organic  Law  of  1879  upon  a  people  entirely  unfitted 
for  "  constitutional "  government.  That  business  accom- 
plished, the  Czar  recommended  and  the  Assembly  in  April, 


64  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

1879,  elected  as  ruler  Prince  Alexander  of  Battenberg, 
a  scion  by  a  morganatic  of  the  House  of  Darmstadt,  a 
nephew  by  marriage  of  the  Czar,  and  an  ofl&cer  in  the 
Prussian  Army.  It  was  hoped  that  the  "  Battenberg  " 
would  prove  a  pliant  instrument  of  Russian  diplomacy  ; 
but  during  the  years  which  succeeded  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 
a  remarkable  change  took  place  in  Bulgaria.  The  accession 
of  the  new  Czar  Alexander  III.  (1881)  altered  for  the  worse 
the  personal  relations  between  St.  Petersburg  and  Sophia  ; 
the  arrogance  of  the  Russian  officials  towards  the  Bul- 
garian peasants  obliterated  the  remembrance  of  the  service 
rendered  to  them  by  their  "  liberators  "  in  1877  ;  above 
all,  a  "  strong  man  "  had  appeared  in  Bulgaria  in  the  person 
of  Stephen  Stambulofi,  who  in  1884  became  President  of 
the  Sobranje.  In  the  two  Bulgarias  there  was  a  keen  desire 
for  union,  and  Stambuloff  ardently  espoused  the  cause. 

In  September  1885  Gamil  Pasha,  the  Turkish  Governor 
of  Eastern  Roumelia,  was  expelled,  and  the  Province 
announced  its  union  with  Bulgaria  proper.  Prince  Alex- 
ander had  no  option  but  to  yield  to  the  clearly  expressed 
will  of  the  people,  and  at  once  agreed  to  the  union  of  the 
two  Bulgarias.  The  diplomatic  position  was,  however, 
curiously  paradoxical :  the  parts  were  reversed  ;  Russia 
was  now  indignant ;  Great  Britain  not  merely  acquiescent 
but  approving.  The  explanation  is  simple.  Russia  had 
played  her  cards  in  Bulgaria  as  badly  as  they  could  be 
played.  In  opposition  to  her  high-handed  and  self-seeking 
methods,  there  had  grown  up  a  strong  national  party. 
The  "  Greater  Bulgaria "  of  1878  would  have  been  a 
Russian  Province,  within  striking  distance  of  Constan- 
tinople. The  Bulgaria  of  1885  was,  as  Lord  Salisbury 
(again  in  office)  clearly  perceived,  a  sure  bulwark  against 
Russia.  "  If,"  wrote  Sir  Robert  Morier  from  St.  Peters- 
burg to  Sir  William  White  at  Constantinople,  "  you  can 
help  to  build  up  these  peoples  into  a  bulwark  of  independent 
States  and  thus  screen  the  '  sick  man '  from  the  fury  of 
the  Northern  blast,  for  God's  sake  do  it."  With  Lord 
Salisbury's  help  Sir  William  White  did  it,  and  thus  in 
Morier's  words  :    "A  State  has  been  evolved  out  of  the 


THE   EASTEEN   QUESTION   (1875-98)  G5 

protoplasm  of  Balkan  chaos."  It  is  fair  to  remember 
that  but  for  Lord  Beaconsfield's  action  in  1878  that  evolu- 
tion would  have  been  impossible. 

Prince  Alexander  waited  for  no  leave  from  the  Powers. 
Stambulofi  had  bluntly  told  him  that  there  were  only 
two  paths  open  to  him  :  the  one  to  PhilippopoUs,  and  as 
far  beyond  as  God  may  lead  ;  the  other  to  Darmstadt." 
Alexander's  choice  was  soon  made,  and  on  20th  September 
he  amiounced  his  acceptance  of  the  throne  of  united 
Bulgaria.  Meanwhile  Bulgaria  was  threatened  with  a  new 
danger.  If  Russia  began  to  see  in  a  united  Bulgaria  a 
barrier  in  her  advance  towards  the  Straits,  Austria  had 
no  mind  to  see  the  multiplication  of  barriers  between 
Budapest  and  Salonika. 

On  14th  November,  King  Milan  of  Serbia,  who  in  1882  Seibo- 
had  followed  the  example  of  Prince  Carol  of  Roumania  and  ^^^ar '^^^^" 
had  assumed  a  royal  crown,  suddenly  seized  an  obviously 
frivolous  pretext  to  declare  war  upon  Bulgaria.     Whether 
Austria  actually  instigated  this  attack,   it  is  impossible 
to  say.     There  were  perhaps  sufficient  reasons  apart  from 
this  for  Serbian  jealousy  against  the  aggrandisement  of 
Bulgaria.     The    Serbian   attack    was,    however,    repulsed 
by  Bulgaria,  which  in  its  turn  took  the  offensive  against 
Serbia.     Thereupon  Austria  intervened,  and  the  Bulgarians 
were  informed  that  a  further  advance  would  bring  them 
"  face  to  face  no  longer  with  Serbian,  but  with  Austrian 
troops."     Serbia  was  saved,  but  so  also  was  the  union  of 
the  two  Bulgarias.      Early  in  1886   the    Porte  formally 
recognised  the  union  of  the  two  Bulgarias,  and  appointed 
Prince  Alexander  to  be   "  Governor-General  of   Eastern 
Roumelia."      Alexander    did    not    long    enjoy    his    new 
honour.     Alexander  III.  was  deeply  mortified  by  the  turn 
events  had  taken  in  the  Balkans,  and  inspired  by  implacable 
enmity  against  his  cousin   determined  to  dethrone  him. 
On  21st  August,  1886,  Prince  Alexander  was  kidnapped  Rassian 
by  a  band  of  Russian  officers  and  carried  off  into  captivity.  ^^^^  ^^ 
A  provisional  government  was  hastily  set  up  at  Sofia  under  isse' 
Stambuloff,  and  its  first  act  was  to  recall  the  kidnapped 
prince.     Permitted    temporarily    to    return   to    Bulgaria, 


66  EUROPE   AND  BEYOND 

Alexander  played  his  cards  badly,  and  on  7tli  September, 
under  renewed  pressure  from  the  Czar,  he  abdicated  and 
left  Bulgaria  for  ever.  The  Bulgarians  were  obliged  to 
seek  a  new  prince,  and  after  several  mishaps  eventually 
found  a  ruler  in  Prince  Ferdinand  of  Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, 
a  grandson  of  King  Louis  Philippe.  Kussia  refused  to 
recognise  Ferdinand,  but  strong  in  the  support  of  Bismarck 
and  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph,  the  young  Prince  defied 
the  opposition  of  Russia,  and  on  14th  August,  1887,  ascended 
the  Bulgarian  throne. 
Stambuioff  For  the  next  seven  years,  however,  Bulgaria  was  ruled 
by  Stephen  Stambuioff,  a  rough,  coarse-grained  peasant  of 
indomitable  will,  strong  passions,  and  burning  patriotism. 
Stambuioff  effected  a  great  work  for  Bulgaria.  He  intro- 
duced internal  order  and  discipline  ;  he  laid  the  founda- 
tions of  a  modern  civihsed  State,  and  he  emancipated  his 
country  from  foreign  tutelage.  In  1894,  however,  he  was 
dismissed  by  Prince  Ferdinand,  that  crafty  diplomatist, 
after  an  apprenticeship  of  seven  years,  having  determined 
to  take  up  the  reins  of  government.  Stambuioff  bitterly 
resented  his  dismissal,  and  took  no  pains  to  hide  the  fact ; 
but  in  July,  1895,  he  was  finally  removed  from  the  scene 
by  assassination. 

Prince  Ferdinand  was  now  master  in  his  own  house, 
and  the  first  use  he  made  of  power  was  to  effect  a  recon- 
ciliation with  Russia.     By  this  time,  however,  the  centre 
of  interest  in  the  Near  East  had  shifted  from  Bulgaria 
to  Greece. 
The  Pro-        Handed  back  to  the  Porte  in  1840,  Crete  had  been  for 
biem  of       more  than  half  a  century  in  almost  perpetual  insurrection. 
All    these    insurrections    had    one    supreme    object — the 
reunion  of  the  "  Great  Greek  island  "  with  the  Greeks  of 
the  mainland. 
Cretan  In-       In  the  Spring  of  1896  the  islanders  were  once  more  in 
189&^97°"'  arms.     Civil  war  broke  out  between  Moslems  and  Christians 
in  Canea,  and  the  Powers,  to  prevent  the  spread  of  dis- 
turbances, put  pressure  upon  the  Sultan  to  make  con- 
cessions.    The    latter    accordingly    agreed    to    grant    an 
amnesty,  to  summon  a  National  Assembly,  and  to  appoint 


THE   EASTERN   QUESTION   (1875-98)  C7 

a  Christian  governor.  But  neither  Moslems  nor  Christians 
took  the  Sultan's  promises  seriously,  and  in  February, 
1897,  war  again  broke  out  at  Canea,  and  the  Christians 
again  proclaimed  union  with  Greece. 

No  power  on  earth  could  now  have  prevented  the  Greek 
patriots  from  going  to  the  assistance  of  the  islanders.  Prince 
George,  the  king's  second  son,  was  accordingly  sent  (10th 
February)  with  a  torpedo-boat  flotilla  to  intercept  Turkish 
reinforcements,  and  three  days  later  an  army  was  landed 
under  Colonel  Vassos.  The  admirals  of  the  Powers  then 
occupied  Canea  with  an  international  landing  party,  and 
compelled  the  insurgents  to  desist  from  further  fighting. 

Interest    then    shifted    back    to    the    mainland.      The  The 
"  patriots  "  believed  that  the  moment  for  decisive  action  ^^^w^  „ 
against  the  Turks  had  at  last  come,  and  King  George  I7th  April 
yielded  to  the  warhke  sentiments  of  his  people,  perhaps  ^j/^i897 
with  the  secret  hope  that  the  Powers  would  again  inter- 
vene to  avert  war.     But  if  the  Greek  hot-heads  wanted 
war,  the  Sultan  was  prepared  for  it,  and  his  august  ally 
at  Berhn  urged  him  to  put  to  the  test  the  new  weapon 
which  German  soldiers  had  forged  for  him,  and,  once  for 
all,  teach  the  insolent  Greeks  their  place. 

On  17th  April  the  Porte  accordingly  declared  war. 
"  The  Thirty  Days  War  "  ensued.  It  was  all  over  before 
the  end  of  May.  Russia  had  warned  her  friends  in  the 
Balkans  that  there  must  be  no  intervention.  The  Greeks 
were  diplomatically  isolated  ;  they  made  no  use  of  their 
superior  sea-power,  and  on  land  the  forces  which  had 
invaded  Thessaly  were  quickly  pushed  back  over  their 
own  frontiers.  The  Turkish  Army  under  Edhem  Pasha 
occupied  Larissa,  and  won  two  decisive  victories  at 
Pharsalos  and  Domokos.  So  disorganised  were  the  Greek 
forces  that  Athens  became  alarmed  for  its  own  safety, 
and  turned  savagely  upon  the  King.  The  Powers,  however, 
having  no  mind  to  embark,  for  the  third  time,  upon  the 
tedious  task  of  providing  the  Greeks  with  a  king,  imposed 
an  armistice  upon  the  combatants  (20th  May).  The 
definite  peace  was  signed  in  December. 

The  war  was  nothing  less  than  disastrous  to  Greece  : 


68  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

it  discredited  the  dynasty ;  it  involved  tlie  retrocession  of 
a  strip  of  Thessaly  ;  and  it  imposed  upon  a  State,  already 
on  tlie  verge  of  bankruptcy,,  the  burden  of  a  considerable 
war  indemnity.  Nor  was  Greece  spared  the  further 
humiliation  of  International  Control,  exercised  by  means  of 
a  mixed  Commission,  over  her  external  finance.  On  the 
Crete  other  hand,  the  war  brought  to  Crete  final,  though  not 
formal,  emancipation. 

It  was  some  time,  however,  before  the  position  in  Crete 
was  regularised.  In  1898  an  ingenious  arrangement  was 
devised  under  which  the  four  protecting  Powers — Great 
Britain,  France,  Russia,  and  Italy — nominated  Prince 
George  of  Greece  to  act  as  their  High  Commissioner  in 
the  island.  In  1899  a  new  Constitution  on  hberal  fines 
was  approved  by  a  Constituent  Assembly.  Its  author 
was  a  young  lawyer  destined  to  fill  a  conspicuous  place  in 
the  history,  not  merely  of  Greece,  but  of  Europe,  Eleu- 
therios  Venizelos,  and  thanks  largely  to  him  Crete  enjoyed 
real  self-government.  In  1905  the  islanders,  led  by 
Venizelos,  proclaimed  the  union  of  Crete  with  the  Hellenic 
Kingdom  ;  but  it  was  not  until  after  the  whilom  rebel  had 
become  Prime  Minister  of  Greece  (1910)  that  the  union 
was  formally  acknowledged. 

Long  before  this  the  Eastern  Question  had  entered 
upon  a  new  phase,  and  the  Ottoman  Sultan  had  found 
a  new  ally  in  the  German  Emperor.  But  much  was  to 
happen  in  Germany  and  elsewhere  before  the  German 
factor  became  dominant  in  the  Balkan  problem,  and  to 
these  events  we  must  now  return. 

AUTHORITIES 

Marriott  :  The  Eastern  Question.     (Oxford,  1918.) 

Driault  :  La  Question  d' Orient.     (Paris.) 

Duke  of  Argyll  :   The  Eastern  Question.     (2  vols.,  London,  1879.) 

Duke  of  Argyll:  Our  Responsibilities  for  Turkey.     (London,  1896.) 

Klaczko  :     The    Two    Chancellors.       (Gortschakoff    aiid    Bismarck.) 

(London,  1876.) 
PiNON  :   U Europe  et  V Empire  Ottoman. 
MoNYPENNY    AND    BucKLE  :    Life    of   Lord    Beaconsfield.      (6    vols,, 

London,  1910-20.) 
MoRLEY  :  Life  of  Gladstone.     (3  vols.,  London,  1903.) 

(See  also  authorities  for  Bismarck  under  Chapter  II.) 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  ASCENDANCY  OF  GERMANY  (1879-90).    THE  TRIPLE 
ALLIANCE.     THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  IN  AFRICA 

The  Close  of  a  Chapter 

To  Bismarck  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  20tli  May,  1882,  was  the 
culmination  of  his  sj^^stem.  .  .  .  The  Triple  Alliance  comijleted  Central 
Europe  ;  it  closed  the  Alpine  passes  ;  it  barred  the  great  gate  to  Vienna 
through  which  Napoleon  had  marched  m  1796  ;  it  opened  the  Mediter- 
ranean to  Germany  ;  it  rent  away  from  France  the  ally  of  the  sister 
Latin  race  ;  .  .  .  Best  of  all,  it  shivered  the  serious  menace  of  1869 
and  1871. — C.  Grant  Robeetson. 

All  distant  possessions  are  a  burden  to  the  State.  A  village  on  the 
frontier  is  worth  a  principality  two  hmidred  and  fifty  miles  away. — 
Frederick  the  Great. 

This  colonial  business  would  be  for  us  Germans  like  the  wearing  of 
sables  by  Polish  noblemen  who  have  no  shirt  to  their  backs. — Bismarck. 

Tropical  Africa,  which  was  the  dark  continent  and  a  great  field  of 
geographical  discovery  a  little  more  than  a  generation  ago,  has  marched 
with  great  suddemiess  to  the  centre  of  the  European  stage,  and  must 
henceforth  profoundly  influence  the  problems  of  its  statesmanship. — 
General  Smuts. 

THE  Balkan  crisis  of  1875  broke  in  awkwardly  upon  Bismarck's 
Bismarck's  diplomatic  schemes.  To  the  Eastern  ^^p^*^'"^"'^ 
Question  he  always  expressed  complete  indifference.  "  I 
never  take  the  trouble,"  he  said,  "  to  open  the  mail  bag 
from  Constantinople."  "  The  whole  of  the  Balkans,"  he 
petulantly  declared,  "  is  not  worth  the  bones  of  a  single 
Pomeranian  grenadier."  Whatever  the  value  of  these  pro- 
fessions, Bismarck  lost  no  oppoi-tunity  of  turning  the  Near 
East  to  account  as  a  convenient  arena  in  which  to  reward 
the  services  of  friends  or  to  assuage  the  disappointment  of 
temporary  opponents  without  expense  to  Prussian  pockets 
or  detriment  to  Prussian  interests. 


70  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Two  illustrations  of  tHs  policy  will  suffice.  In  1866, 
Bismarck  not  only  turned  Austria  out  of  Germany,  but,  in 
order  to  secure  the  assistance  of  Victor  Emmanuel,  he 
deprived  the  Habsburgs  of  the  last  remnant  of  their 
heritage  in  Italy.  He  had,  however,  no  desire  to  see 
Austria  unnecessarily  humiliated,  still  less  permanently 
disabled.  Provided  it  were  clearly  understood  that 
henceforward  she  had  no  part  or  lot  in  German  affairs, 
Austria  might  regard  him  as  a  friend  and  ally. 
The  Drang  Two  results  eusucd.  The  new  frontier  of  Italy  was 
oUhe^^^^^*  drawn  with  a  niggardly  hand.  If  Bismarck  had  really 
Habsburgs  been  animated  in  1886  by  friendly  feelings  towards  Italy, 
he  would  unquestionably  have  insisted,  without  any  nice 
regard  for  ethnography,  upon  the  transference  to  the 
Italian  kingdom  of  the  whole  of  the  Venetian  inheritance, 
including  Istria  and  Dalmatia.  As  it  was,  even  "  Venetia  " 
itself  was  interpreted  in  the  narrowest  possible  sense,  and 
the  northern  frontier  of  the  Italian  kingdom  was  so  drawn 
as  to  deprive  Italy  of  a  compact  mass  of  370,000  Italians, 
to  exclude  these  people  and  their  products  from  their 
natural  market  in  North  Italy,  and  to  thrust  into  the 
heart  of  an  Italian  province  the  military  outpost  of  an 
unfriendly  neighbour.  From  this  niggardly  interpreta- 
tion of  "  Venetia "  arose  the  Trentino  problem,  which 
found  a  solution  only  in  the  Treaty  of  Paris  (1919). 

Bismarck,  however,  was  concerned  much  less  with  the 
future  of  Italy  than  with  the  future  of  Austria-Hungary, 
and  he  deliberately  encouraged  the  Drang  nach  Osten, 
which,  from  1866  onwards,  became  a  marked  feature  of 
Habsburg  policy.  Istria  and  Dalmatia,  therefore,  were 
retained  by  Austria.  Thus  did  Bismarck  conciliate  a 
temporary  enemy  and  a  potential  ally.  Four  years  later 
he  took  the  opportunity  of  rewarding  the  services  of  a 
most  constant  friend.  The  Black  Sea  clauses  of  the  Treaty 
Bismarck  of  Paris  were,  as  we  have  seen,  torn  up  in  favour  of  Russia, 
gj^jj^  That  transaction  was  not,  of  course,  inspired  entirely  by 
benevolence  towards  Russia.  Bismarck's  supreme  object 
was  to  keep  Russia  at  arm's  length  from  France,  and, 
what  was  at  the  moment  more  important,  from  England. 


THE   ASCENDANCY   OF   GERMANY   (1879-90)      71 

Nothing  was  more  likely  to  conduce  to  tliis  end  than  to 
encourage  the  pretensions  of  Kussia  in  the  Near  East, 
and,  indeed,  in  the  Further  East.  The  Black  Sea  served 
his  purpose  in  1870 ;  the  "  Penjdeh  incident  '*  was 
similarly  utilised  in  1885. 

Another  critical  situation  arose  in  1877.  Since  1872  The  Crisis 
the  DreiJcaiserhund  had  formed  the  pivot  of  Bismarck's  °^  1^77-78 
foreign  policy.  But  the  interests  of  two  out  of  the  three 
emperors  were  now  in  sharp  conflict  in  the  Balkans.  It 
is  true  that  in  July,  1876,  the  Emperors  of  Russia  and 
Austria  had  met  at  Keichstadt,  and  that  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph  had  agreed  to  give  the  Czar  a  free  hand 
in  the  Balkans  on  condition  that  Bosnia  and  the  Herze- 
govina were  guaranteed  to  Austria.  But  by  1878,  Russia 
was  in  occupation  of  Bulgaria  and  Roumelia,  and  in  less 
complaisant  mood  than  in  1876  ;  an  immense  impulse 
had  been  given  to  the  idea  of  Pan-Slavism  by  recent 
events  ;  the  Southern  Slavs  were  beginning  to  dream  of 
the  possibility  of  a  Jugo-Slav  empire  in  the  west  of  the 
peninsula.  Under  the  new  circumstances,  Bosnia  and 
the  Herzegovina  might  easily  slip  from  Austria's  grip  ; 
the  Drang  nach  Osten  might  receive  a  serious  set-back ; 
the  road  to  the  ^Egean  might  be  finally  barred ;  even 
access  to  the  Adriatic  might  be  endangered.  Thus 
Bismarck  had  virtually  to  choose  between  his  two  friends. 
At  the  Berlin  Congress  he  played,  as  we  saw,  the  role 
of  the  "  honest  broker."  For  aught  he  cared  Russia 
might  go  to  Constantinople,  a  move  which  would  have 
the  advantage  of  embroiling  her  with  England ;  but 
Austria  must  have  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina.  Austria 
got  them,  and  the  road  to  Salonika  was  kept  open. 

Prince  Gortschakofi  never  forgave  his  pupil  for  the 
rupture  of  the  Dreikaiserhund ;  but  the  mind  of  Bismarck 
was  already  turning  towards  another  diplomatic  combina- 
tion. He  had  devoted  ten  years  of  his  life  to  the  task  of 
creating  a  united  Germany  under  the  hegemony  of  Prussia  ; 
the  remaining  twenty  he  gave  to  the  consolidation  of  the 
position  thus  acquired. 

The  main  plank  in  his  diplomatic  platform  was  friend- 


72  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

The  Dual  sliip  with  tlic  Habsburg  Empire.  After  the  Treaty  of 
tsio^^^'  Berlin,  Euroj)e  was  in  a  condition  of  very  unstable 
equilibrium  ;  no  single  Power,  except  perhaps  Austria- 
Hungary,  was  satisfied  with  the  "  settlement  "  ;  least  of 
all  Russia.  Russia  cherished  not  unnatural  resentment 
against  all  the  Great  Powers  ;  primarily  against  Great 
Britain  and  Austria,  but  most  deeply  against  Germany, 
who  had  been  guilty  not  merely  of  betrayal,  but  of  the 
basest  ingratitude.  Even  France  did  not  entirely  escape  ; 
for  Russia  imagined  that  her  pretensions  in  the  Near 
East  had  been  at  the  outset  encouraged  by  France,  though 
the  latter  had  failed  to  support  them  when  the  crisis 
actually  arrived.  Two  other  factors  not  to  be  neglected 
were,  on  the  one  hand,  the  embarrassments  caused  to 
England  by  events  in  Afghanistan,  in  South  Africa,  and 
in  Ireland ;  and,  on  the  other,  the  increasing  tension 
between  France  and  Italy,  due  partly  to  rivalry  in  North 
Africa,  but  more  immediately  to  the  failure  of  negotia- 
tions for  a  commercial  treaty,  and  the  consequent  eruption 
of  a  tariff  war. 

In  August,  1879,  Bismarck  met  Count  Andrassy,  the 
Austrian  Chancellor,  at  Gastein,  and  on  7th  October  an 
alliance  between  the  two  empires  was  concluded.  Bis- 
marck's greatest  difficulty  in  effecting  this  most  significant 
arrangement  arose  not  on  the  side  of  the  Austrian  but 
of  the  German  Emperor.  His  Imperial  master  could  not 
forget  the  injury  he  had  inflicted  upon  Austria  in  1866,  nor 
would  he  forget  the  debt  he  had  incurred  to  Russia  in 
1863,  in  1866,  and  in  1870.  Moreover,  the  Czar  Alex- 
ander II.  had,  on  15th  August,  addressed  a  personal  letter 
to  the  Emperor  William  protesting  his  own  friendship 
for  Germany  and  his  concern  at  the  growing  unfriendhness 
of  Bismarck.  Early  in  September  the  two  sovereigns 
met  at  Alexandrovno  in  Poland,  and  the  German  Emperor 
returned  from  the  interview  convinced  of  his  nephew's 
good  faith,  and  resolved  to  take  no  step  calculated  to  cause 
a  breach  in  the  good  relations  between  the  two  countries. 
But  Bismarck  was  inexorable  ;  there  was  no  room  either 
for  eternal  hatreds  or  for  eternal  gratitude  in  pohtics. 


THE   ASCENDANCY   OF   GERMANY   (1879-90)      73 

He  was  convinced  tliat  there  had  been  negotiations  be- 
tween St.  Petersburg  and  Paris,  and  that  the  Czar,  partly 
to  pay  Bismarck  out  for  his  conduct  in  regard  to  the 
Balkans,  partly  to  divert  the  attention  of  his  own  subjects 
from  questions  of  domestic  reform,  partly  to  lay  the  spectre 
of  Nihilism  by  a  brilliant  feat  of  arms,  was  contemplating 
an  attack  upon  Germany.  At  last  the  Kaiser  reluctantly 
and  regretfully  gave  way,  and  gave  his  consent  to  the 
momentous  treaty  with  Austria  (15th  October).  Its  terms 
were  to  be  kept  secret,  and  not  until  1888  were  they 
officially  published.  The  compact  provided  that  if  either 
ally  were  attacked  by  Kussia,  the  other  must  assist  it  with 
all  its  forces  ;  if  any  Power,  other  than  Russia,  were  the 
assailant,  then  the  ally  was  to  observe  neutrahty,  and  was 
not  bound  to  mobihse  until  Russia  entered  the  field.  In 
plain  Enghsh,  if  France  attacked  Germany,  Austria  must 
contain  Russia.^ 

Bismarck  always  maintained  that  the  Dual  Alliance  in  "  iieinsur- 
no  wise  involved  the  dissolution  of  the  Dreikaiserhund  of  ^reat"  of 
1872,  and  his  contention  was,  in  some  degree,  substantiated  Skiemie- 
by  the  conclusion,  in  1884,  of  the  famous  "  reinsurance  "  gp'^^ember 
treaty  between  the  three  Emperors.     By  this  compact  it  i884 
is  beheved  that  the  three  Powers  mutually  bound  them- 
selves to  maintain  a  benevolent  neutrality  if  any  one  of 
the  three  made  war  upon  a  fourth  Power,  and  to  oppose 
stoutly  any  assault  upon  the  institution  of  monarchy. 
There  were  also,  it  would  seem,  provisions  in  regard  to 
the  Balkans.     The  Treaty  was  to   hold  good  for  three 
years. 2    This   compact   was   a   conspicuous   triumph  for 
Bismarckian  diplomacy.     The   Czar  Alexander  III.   was 
tied  to  the  tail  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  without  being  ad- 
mitted to  the  confidence  of  the  Allies.     Between  1879  and 
1884,  however,  events  had  happened  which  it  is  neces- 
sary to  recapitulate,  and  which  may  in  part  explain  this 
paradoxical  situation. 

During  the  last  twenty  years  of  the  nineteenth  century 

1  P.  Albin  :  Le-s  Grand  Trait cs  Politique,  pp.  58-60. 
-  For  a  discussion  of  the  "  Reinsurance  Treaties,"  cf.   Robertson  : 
Bismarck,  pp.  435  seq.,  and  Appendix  B. 


74  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

The  Ex-  a  new  factor  began  to  intrude  itself  into  the  problem  of 
Europ?  °^  international  politics  of  Europe.  Ever  since  the  sixteenth 
century  the  relations  of  the  European  Powers — notably 
those  of  Spain,  England,  France,  and  the  United  Provinces 
— had  been  materially  affected  by  their  rivalry  in  distant 
oceans  and  in  non-European  continents.  But  the  con- 
tinents and  oceans  were  distant,  and  the  reactions  they 
evoked  in  European  affairs  were,  therefore,  relatively 
feeble.  It  was  otherwise  in  the  last  years  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  The  uttermost  parts  of  the  earth  were  no  longer 
distant  from  Europe,  but  were  in  close  and  almost  con- 
tinuous contact  with  the  nerve-centres  of  world-affairs  : 
with  London,  Paris,  and  BerHn. 

From  the  'eighties  onwards,  therefore,  we  must  be 
prepared  to  give  a  larger  interpretation  to  "  European 
History "  and  "  European  Pohtics."  Africa  and  Asia, 
the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific,  begin  to  react  upon  Europe 
in  a  way  they  had  never  done  before.  Not  in  England 
only  did  men  begin  "  to  think  in  continents."  Imperiahstic 
ambition — the  lust  for  territory — was  in  large  measure 
the  outcome  of  economic  necessity.  The  industriahsation 
of  the  great  European  countries,  in  particular  Great  Britain 
and  Germany,  brought  in  its  train  three  results  :  a  demand 
for  food  for  the  new  town  populations,  a  demand  which 
German  agriculturists  could  barely  meet  and  which 
British  agriculturists  entirely  failed  to  supply  ;  a  demand 
for  raw  materials,  most  of  which  were  produced  only  in 
non-European  lands,  and  a  demand  for  markets  for  the 
disposal  of  their  manufactured  products.  Had  the  dream 
of  the  Manchester  School  materialised  ;  had 

"  the  wise  who  think,  the  wise  who  reign, 
From  growing  commerce  loose(d)  her  latest  chain," 

the  competition  among  the  European  peoples  for  com- 
modities and  for  markets  might  have  been  peaceable  if 
not  entirely  friendly.  The  reaction  against  Free  Trade  and 
the  advent  of  high  Protectionism  rendered  it  practically 
certain  that  the  struggle  would  be  bitter  and  probably 
not  bloodless. 
The  scramble  began  in  Africa.    Africa  was  near  ;  Africa 


THE   ASCENDANCY   OF   GEKMANY   (1879-90)      V5 

was  full  of  wealth  ;  it  offered  strategical  points  of  immense  The 
potential  importance,  and  though  it  teemed  with  native  fo^^^ic^ 
peoples  it  was,  in  a  European  sense,  "  almost  unoccupied." 
From  this  description  the  northern  coast  must  clearly  be 
excepted ;  but  the  northern  coast  of  Africa,  from  Morocco 
to  the  peninsula  of  Sinai  and  Sjnria,  where  it  joins  the 
continent  of  Asia,  geographically  belongs,  as  Principal 
Grant  Robertson  has  observed,  "to  the  Mediterranean 
area  and  system,  cut  off  by  the  girdle  of  mountains 
and  the  deserts  of  their  hinterland  from  the  rest  of  the 
vast  continent  of  which  it  is  a  part.  The  history  of  this 
portion  is  primarily  European,  secondarily  Asiatic,  and 
only  in  the  last  degree  African."  ^  But  of  the  rest  of 
Africa  it  was  true  that  prior  to  the  period  at  which  we  have 
arrived,  European  enterprise  was  represented  by  a  fringe 
of  settlements  and  trading  stations.  The  Portuguese  had 
been  at  Delagoa  Bay  for  nearly  four  hundred  years  ;  the 
Dutch,  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  for  nearly  two  hundred 
and  fifty ;  the  Enghsh,  in  Cape  Colony  and  Natal  during  the 
greater  part  of  the  century ;  while  French,  Dutch,  British, 
and  Portuguese  trading  stations  had  been  dotted  along  the 
coasts  from  Senegal  round  to  the  Straits  of  Bab-el-Mandeb. 

A  new  era  in  the  history  of  Africa  opens  with  the  'eighties. 
The  struggle  between  Britons  and  Boers  for  supremacy 
in  South  Africa  (1880-1902),  and  the  regeneration  of 
Egypt  and  the  Soudan  under  British  rule  (1882-98),  will 
form  the  subject  of  subsequent  chapters.  We  are  con- 
cerned here  with  the  partition  of  Africa  between  the 
several  European  Powers  carried  out  between  1880  and 
1890. 

France  opened  the  ball.  The  French  had  long  been  The  French 
interested  in  North  Africa,  which  they  regarded  as  within  ^^  '^^^^^ 
the  sphere  of  their  Mediterranean  influence.  The  conquest 
and  organisation  of  Algeria  (1830-47)  was  the  most 
notable  achievement  of  the  Orleans  monarchy.  French 
interest  in  Egypt  was  of  even  longer  standing,  and  had 
been  more  lately  manifested  by  the  construction  of  the 

^  Robertson  and  Bartholomew  :  Historical  Atlas  of  Modern  Europe, 
p.  20. 


76  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

*Suez  Canal  (1859-69),  an  enterprise  initiated  by  a  French 
engineer  and  carried  through  mainly  by  French  capital. 
The  administration  of  their  Algerian  colony  brought  the 
French  into  inevitable  contact  with  Tunis,  then  ruled  in 
virtual  autonomy  by  its  Beys  under  the  suzerainty  of  the 
Sultan.  For  some  years  past  the  economic  penetration 
of  Tunis  by  Frenchmen  and  Italians  had  proceeded  apace. 
Most  of  the  public  works,  railways,  telegraphs,  and  aqueducts 
had  either  been  constructed  or  were  maintained  by  French 
capitalists,  and  of  the  123  millions  of  pubhc  debt,  100  was 
held  in  France.  The  native  administration  was  shockingly 
bad,  and  on  several  occasions  France  and  Italy  had  had 
to  intervene  to  save  the  State  from  bankruptcy.  As 
early  as  1878,  Bismarck  had  broadly  hinted  to  Italy  that 
the  Tunisian  pear  was  ripe  ;  but  Italy,  out  of  regard  for 
French  susceptibihties,  refused  to  pluck  it.  If  Italy  could 
not  be  made  to  quarrel  with  France,  France  must  be  in- 
duced to  offend  Italy.  At  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  Bismarck 
suggested  to  Lord  Salisbury  that  an  offer  of  Tunis  to  France 
might  smooth  the  path  for  England  in  the  Near  East. 
Lord  Salisbury  accordingly  assured  France  that  if  she 
wished  to  establish  a  Protectorate  over  Tunis  she  would 
encounter  no  opposition  from  England. 
Risniarck  Bismarck  was  supremely  anxious  to  divert  the  attention 
of  France  from  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  hardly  less  anxious 
to  stir  up  strife  between  France  and  Italy.  If  he  could 
at  the  same  time  bring  Italy  into  the  bosom  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  set  England  and  France  by  the  ears,  sow  the 
seeds  of  discord  between  England  and  Russia,  his  diplo- 
matic purpose  would  be  finally  achieved.  Tunis  served 
to  secure  the  first  three  ends  ;  Egypt  the  fourth  ;  the 
Near  and  the  Middle  East  the  fifth. 

Jules  Ferry,  who  had  become  Prime  Minister  of  France 
in  September,  1880,  cherished  large  colonial  ambitions, 
and  proved,  therefore,  an  easy  prey  to  the  wiles  of  Bis- 
marck. Pretexts  were  not  wanting  to  the  French  for  an 
attack  on  Tunis.  The  undisciplined  tribesmen  who  OTVTied 
the  suzerainty  of  the  Bey  were  troublesome  neighbours 
to  the  rulers  of  Algiers.     Reparations  were  demanded  ; 


THE   ASCENDANCY   OF   GEEMANY   (1879-90)       77 

the  Bey  appealed  to  the  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid ;  the  latter 
showed  a  disposition  to  fight,  but,  having  no  friends  in 
Europe,  restrained  his  ardour.  Italy  entered  a  strong 
protest  against  the  action  of  France,  and  appealed  to  the 
Powers.  The  Czar  Alexander  III.,  who  had  but  now 
(1881)  succeeded  to  the  unsteady  throne  of  his  murdered 
father,  was  not  in  a  position  to  respond  ;  England  was 
morally  pledged  to  France  ;  Germany  and  Austria  were 
her  only  possible  friends. 

Bismarck  spared  no  effort  to  estrange  Italy  and  France,  The  Triple 
and  to  encourage  King  Humbert  to  enter  into  closer  re-  -^^^'•'^"^^ 
lations  with  the  Dual  Allies.  As  far  as  Germany  was 
concerned  there  was  no  serious  obstacle  to  friendship  ; 
but  friendship  with  Germany  meant  friendship  with 
Austria  ;  and  between  Austria  and  Italy  there  was  inter- 
posed the  barrier  of  Italian  irredentism.  The  Trentino, 
Gorizia,  Trieste  ;  the  Istrian  peninsula  ;  Pola  and  Fiume  ; 
the  Dalmatian  coast  and  archipelago — were  not  these  part 
of  the  Venetian  heritage  ?  (3r  if  not  Venetian,  Italian 
in  tradition  and  blood  ?  What  right  had  Austria  in  the 
Adriatic  ?  How  could  Italy  be  mistress  in  her  o^vn  house 
so  long  as  Trieste  and  Pola  were  in  Austrian  hands  ? 
Between  Italy  and  Austria  there  was  an  antagonism  of 
interest  (as  the  outbreak  of  the  World- War  was  to  make 
manifest)  too  fundamental  to  be  overcome  even  by  the 
mingled  honey  and  gall  of  Bismarck's  diplomacy. 

In  1881,  however,  Italy  sorely  needed  a  friend.  Except 
in  Germany,  where  was  she  to  find  one  ?  England,  her 
traditional  friend,  was,  on  the  Tunisian  question,  irre- 
vocably committed  to  France.  Moreover,  Bismarck  had 
another  card  up  his  sleeve  ;  whether  he  actually  played  it 
mil  never,  perhaps,  be  known.  Bismarck  had  adhered  to 
his  resolution  never  to  go  to  Canossa  ;  but  since  the  death 
of  Pius  IX.  in  1878  he  had  met  his  successor  Leo  XIII. 
at  a  half-way  house.  The  days  of  the  KuUurJcampf  were 
over  ;  Falk,  the  instrument  of  that  policy,  had  been  dis- 
missed ;  the  "  May  Laws "  were  in  suspense.  The 
prisoner  of  the  Vatican  was  a  nightmare  to  the  Quirinal ; 
what    if   Bismarck   w^ere    to  espouse  the    cause    of   the 


78  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Temporal  Power  ?  He  was  moving  towards  the  Catholic 
Centre  party  in  Germany ;  Austria  was  the  last  refuge  of 
extreme  Ultramontanism ;  the  Clericals  did  not  even 
despair  of  France.  That  one  of  the  arguments  used  by 
Bismarck  to  estrange  Italy  from  France  was  the  possi- 
bility of  republican  France  resuming  the  Napoleonic 
role  of  protector  of  the  Temporal  Power  is  almost  certain. 
Is  it  impossible  that  he  should  have  clenched  the  argument 
by  a  hint  that  if  France  declined  the  role,  Germany  might 
assume  it  ?  Be  this  as  it  may,  Italy  came  to  heel ;  the 
compact  was  signed  on  20th  May,  1882,  and  the  Dual  was 
converted  into  the  Triple  Alliance.  Concluded  in  the  first 
instance  for  five  years,  it  was  renewed  in  1887,  and  again 
in  1891,  1902,  and  1912.  The  precise  terms  of  the  Treaty 
have  never  been  officially  published  ;  but  it  is  well  under- 
stood that  Italy  promised  her  full  support  to  Austria 
and  Germany  if  either  were  attacked  by  a  third  Power  ; 
while  a  similar  guarantee  was  given  to  Italy  by  the  Central 
Empires.  A  year  later  the  HohenzoUern  King  (Carol) 
of  Roumania  was  virtually  admitted  as  a  sleeping  partner 
into  the  same  firm. 
Bismarck's  The  conclusion  of  the  Triple  Alliance  constituted  a 
Diplomacy  ygj-j^aijie  triumph  for  the  Iron  Chancellor.  Germany  was 
now  as  safe  as  friendships  carefully  cultivated,  and  enmities 
sedulously  fomented,  could  make  her.  ''  Henceforward," 
as  Principal  Robertson  writes,  "  German  hegemony  in 
Central  Europe  moved  securely  on  the  pivotal  point 
of  the  Triple  AlHance,  which  gradually  and  naturally 
grew  into  the  one  grand  combination  in  the  European 
State  System,  with  which  all  other  possible  combinations 
or  ententes  had  to  reckon."  ^ 

Of  such  counter-combinations  there  seemed  at  the 
moment  little  probability.  Early  in  1880  there  were  some 
signs  of  a  rapprochement  between  Russia,  France,  and 
Great  Britain,  but  the  terrible  crime  of  1881  frightened 
Russia  off  from  any  closer  association  with  the  Western 
democracies,  the  existence  of  which  constituted,  so  Bis- 
marck was  always  careful  to  insist,  a  persistent  menace 
1  Bismarck,  p.  407. 


THE   ASCENDANCY   OF   GERMANY   (1879-90)       79 

to  all  respectable  monarcliies.  Besides,  England  was 
sufficiently  preoccupied  with  Ireland,  South  Africa,  and 
Egypt.  France  was  in  more  cautious  mood  after  the 
fall  of  the  Ferry  Cabinet  (November,  1881)  ;  and,  apart 
from  that,  had  her  own  quarrel  with  England  in  Egypt. 

Bismarck,  therefore,  could  feel  reasonably  secure,  and  Germany's 
in  1884  secured  his  position  still  further,  as  we  have  seen,  Ambitions 
by  the  "  Keinsurance  Treaty  "  with  Russia.  Accordingly, 
there  seemed  to  be  no  reason  why  she  should  not  turn  a 
more  friendly  eye  upon  the  younger  enthusiasts  in  Ger- 
many who  were  beginning  to  complain  that  the  old  Father- 
land was  too  "  cribb'd,  cabined,  and  confined,"  and  that 
Germany  was  as  much  entitled  to  a  place  in  the  sun  as 
any  of  her  European  neighbours.  "  I  am  not  a  Colony 
man  "  Bismarck  was  wont  to  say  when  pressed  to  over- 
seas enterprise  by  German  merchants.  But  by  1884  he 
was  confronted  by  the  inexorable  facts  of  a  new  economic 
situation,  the  significance  of  which  he  could  not  gainsay. 

Much  later  than  England,  or  even  than  France,  Germany  The 
had  at  last  felt  the  impulse  of  the  new  industriaUsm.  Revdutfon 
Hamburg,  Bremen,  Cologne,  and  Frankfort — to  name  only  in  Germany 
a  few  of  her  great  cities — had  long  been  among  the  most 
important  commercial  and  financial  centres  in  the  world  ; 
but    Germany  as   a   whole   was   predominantly  a   rural 
community.     After  1871  a  change  set  in,  and  during  the 
next  thirty  years  the  social  and  economic  hfe  of  Germany 
was  revolutionised. 

In  1871  the  population  of  Germany  was  41,000,000  ;  it  Urban 
had  risen  by  1910  to  just  short  of  65,000,000.  During  pop^^don 
the  same  period  the  ratio  of  urban  {i.e.  hving  in  towns  of 
upwards  of  5000  inhabitants)  to  rural  population  was 
completely  altered.  In  1871  the  percentage  of  urban 
inhabitants  was  23-7,  of  rural  76-3  ;  in  1890,  32*2  and  67-8 
respectively;  in  1900,  42-26;and  57-74;  and  in  1910, 
48.8  and  51.2  respectively.  In  other  words,  between 
1871  and  1900  the  urban  population  increased  by  18'56 
per  cent.,  and  the  rural  population  decreased  by  18*25 
per  cent.  In  1871  the  population  of  BerHn  was  800,000 ; 
in  1890,  1,578,000;  in  1905,  2,040,000;  while  in  1910  the 


80  EUKOPE   AND   BEYOND 

number  of  "  large  "  towns,  wliich  in  1871  was  only  8,  had 
risen  to  48,  of  which  6  had  over  half  a  million,  and  17  over 
a  quarter  of  a  miUion,  of  inhabitants.  The  statistics  of 
the  occupation  censuses  of  1882  and  1895  reinforce  these 
results.  It  has  been  calculated  that  in  1871  about  60  per 
cent,  of  the  population  earning  a  livehhood  were  engaged  in 
agriculture  and  kindred  occupations,  and  40  per  cent,  in 
industry,  trade,  and  commerce.  In  1895  the  60  per  cent. 
had  fallen  to  37-5.  The  occupation  census  of  1907  showed 
that  broadly  9,750,000  of  the  population  were  engaged  in 
"  agriculture,"  while  14,750,000  were  engaged  in  industry, 
mining,  trade,  and  commerce — a  complete  reversal  of  the 
distribution  obtaining  in  1871. 
Foreign  The  statistics  of  foreign  trade  tell  the  same  tale.  In 
Trade  jggQ  ^^^  imports  Were  valued  at  £141,000,000,  the  exports 
at  £144,800,000 — interesting  figures,  for  in  that  year 
Germany  was  still  a  debtor  country,  exporting  more  than 
she  imported.  By  1907  the  imports  were  £443,000,000 
and  the  exports  £356,000,000.  Apart  from  the  gigantic 
increases,  piled  up  steadily  with  every  decade  after  1880, 
Germany  was  now  a  creditor  country,  balancing  the  excess 
of  her  imports  by  her  invisible  exports,  interest  on  capital 
invested  abroad,  and  profits  of  her  shipping,  etc.  The 
advance  of  that  shipping  has  been  as  remarkable  as  other 
advances.  In  1871  German  shipping  was  892,000  tons, 
and  her  share  of  the  mercantile  marine  of  the  world  was 
5-2  per  cent.  ;  in  1905  she  had  2,200,000  tons  of  shipping, 
representing  9-9  per  cent,  of  the  world's  mercantile  marine. 
In  1913  the  tonnage  had  risen  to  over  5,000,000  tons,  and 
Germany  had  attained  the  second  place  in  the  shipping  of 
the  world.  Moreover,  an  analysis  of  the  trade  returns 
between  1870  and  1890  discloses  four  significant  facts  : 
first,  the  rapid  increase  in  the  import  of  raw  materials 
for  industry  ;  secondly,  the  steady  increase  in  the  export 
of  manufactured  goods  ;  thirdly,  the  relative  decrease 
in  the  ratio  of  imported  to  exported  manufactured 
goods ;  and,  finally,  the  steady  increase  in  the  import 
of  food,  luxuries,  and  cattle.  These  tendencies  were  all 
accentuated  after  1890.     With  every  decade  after  1870 


THE   ASCENDANCY   OF   GERMANY   (1879-90)      81 

Germai)^  has  become  more  and  more  a  worksliop  of  the 
world,  less  and  less  able  to  feed  her  increasing  population 
from  her  own  resources,  more  and  more  dependent  on 
the  import  of  raw  materials  for  her  industries,  more  and 
more  dependent  on  keeping  and  opening  up  foreign  markets 
for  her  exports,  and  spheres  of  investment  for  her  capital. 
Dr.  Rohrbach  in  1903  emphasised  the  bearing  of  these 
data  on  German  poHcy.  A  yearly  increase  of  population 
of  800,000  demanded  answers  to  these  questions  :  Where 
will  this  population  Hve  ?  How  will  it  be  employed  ? 
How  will  it  be  fed  ? 

Bismarck  saw  only  the  beginning  of  these  things,  but 
he  saw  enough  to  convince  him  that  an  entirely  new  situa- 
tion had  arisen  ;  that  the  increase  of  Germany's  overseas 
trade  justified  the  demand  for  a  development  of  sea- 
power  ;  that  the  steady  outflow  of  German  capital  for 
investment  abroad  made  her  economic  interests  world- 
wide ;  and  that  her  increasing  dependence  on  the  import 
of  raw  materials  and  upon  foreign  markets  for  the  disposal 
of  her  surplus  manufactured  products  rendered  irresistible, 
if  they  did  not  actually  justify,  the  cry  for  a  forward 
Colonial  pohcy. 

There  was  another  reason  which  appealed  even  more 
powerfully  to  Bismarck.  Of  all  forms  of  capital,  human 
capital  was  in  his  eyes  the  most  valuable.  The  rapid 
growth  of  population  stimulated  the  tide  of  emigration. 
After  1876,  Germans  began  to  leave  the  homeland  at  the 
rate  of  about  200,000  a  year,  and  on  leaving  Germany 
they  were  mostly  lost  to  Germany.  Until  1884  there 
was  no  German  flag  flj^ng  abroad.  Bismarck  deplored  the 
loss  of  citizens  and  soldiers  :  "  A  German  who  can  put  off 
his  Fatherland  hke  an  old  coat  is  no  longer  a  German  for 
me."  The  Fatherland  therefore  must  be  expanded  to 
receive  its  citizens.  Where  was  the  new  Fatherland  to  be 
found  ?  The  fijst  incHnation  was  to  look  towards  Brazil, 
where  there  was  already  a  large  and  increasing  German 
population ;  but  the  entrance  to  South  America  was 
barred  by  the  Monroe  doctrine,  and  Germany  therefore 
turned  to  Africa. 

6  //2Lar^ 


82  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Colonial  Africa  offered  everything  whicli  Germany  was  seeking  : 

Enterprise  ^j^told  wealth  in  law  material ;  inexhaustible  man-power, 
which,  if  brought  under  German  discipline,  might  well  be 
utilised  for  European  warfare ;  strategical  points  of 
immense  significance — especially  in  relation  to  the 
eventual  conflict  with  the  British  Empire  to  which  the 
thoughts  of  far-seeing  Germans  were  already  beginning  to 
turn.  The  way  was  carefully  prepared.  In  December, 
1882,  there  was  founded  at  Frankfort  the  Deutscher 
Kolonialverein.  The  idea  was  taken  up  with  immense 
enthusiasm  and  was  carefully  fostered  by  an  elaborate 
Press  campaign.  On  22nd  April,  1884,  the  Kolnische 
Zeitung  published  an  article  containing  the  following 
words  :  "  Africa  is  a  large  pudding  which  the  English 
have  prepared  for  themselves  at  other  people's  expense, 
and  the  crust  of  which  is  already  fit  for  eating.  Let  us 
hope  that  our  sailors  will  put  a  few  pepper- corns  into  it 
on  the  Guinea  Coast  so  that  our  friends  on  the  Thames 
may  not  digest  it  too  rapidly." 

The  Press  campaign  was  only  one  of  many  indications 
that  the  Colonial  enterprise  of  Germany  was  directed 
from  above.  This  point  has  been  strongly  emphasised 
by  a  recent  writer.  "  In  a  degree  unparalleled  in  the 
history  of  European  Imperialism,  the  German  Colonial 
Empire  was  the  result  of  force,  and  of  design,  not  of  a 
gradual  evolution.  It  was  not  the  product  of  German 
enterprise  outside  of  Europe,  for,  owing  to  the  conditions 
of  her  history,  Germany  had  hitherto  taken  no  direct 
part  in  the  expansion  of  Europe  ;  it  was  the  product  of 
Germany's  dominating  position  in  Europe  and  the  ex- 
pression of  her  resolve  to  build  up  an  external  Empire 
by  the  same  means  which  she  had  employed  to  create 
this  position."  ^  That  is  the  reason  why  it  has  been 
deemed  proper  to  treat  German  colonisation  in  a  chapter 
mainly  devoted  to  European  diplomacy. 
The  Ex-  Germans,  however,  had  long  since  taken  their  full  share 
of^Afiica  ^^  African  exploration.  As  far  back  as  1796  Friedrich 
Hornemann  made  a  remarkable  journey  from  Tripoli  to 

^  Ramsay  Muir  :  Expansion  of  Europe,  p,  140. 


THE   ASCENDANCY   OF   GERMANY   (1879-90)       83 

the  Niger.  A  little  later  Heinrich  Barth,  a  citizen  of 
Hamburg,  also  starting  from  Tripoli,  "  crossed  the  Sahara 
by  a  new  route,  reached  Lake  Chad,  visited  the  mysterious 
city  of  Timbuctoo,  and  helped  to  fill  up  gaps  in  our  know- 
ledge of  the  Central  Niger  regions."  ^  In  1860  Baron 
Karl  Von  Der  Decken  performed  a  notable  service  to 
geographical  science  by  his  survey  of  Mount  Kilimanjaro. 
As  Mr.  Lewin  points  out.  Von  Der  Decken  was  one  of  the 
first  to  conceive  the  idea  of  a  German  colony  in  East 
Africa.  "  I  am  persuaded,"  he  wrote,  "  that  in  a  short 
time  a  Colony  established  here  would  be  most  successful, 
and  after  two  or  three  years  would  be  self-supporting.  .  .  . 
It  would  become  of  great  importance  after  the  opening 
of  the  Suez  Canal.  It  is  unfortunate  that  we  Germans 
allow  such  opportunities  of  acquiring  colonies  to  slip, 
especially  at  a  time  when  it  would  be  of  importance  to 
the  Navy."  German  explorers  were  equally  active  in 
South  Africa.  In  1869  Mohr  undertook  a  remarkable 
journey  to  the  Victoria  Falls,  and  about  the  same  time 
Karl  Mauch  was  travelling  "  in  the  Zambesi  regions, 
visited  the  Mashonaland  goldfields,  and  discovered  the 
Zinbabwe  ruins."  Nor  did  these  and  other  explorers 
conceal  their  chagrin  that  England  was  ahead  of  Germany 
in  South  Africa.  "  Would  to  God,"  said  Mauch,  on  his 
return  from  the  Transvaal,  "  that  this  fine  country  might 
soon  become  a  German  colony."  "Is  it  not  deplorable," 
asked  Gerhard  Rohlfs,  after  a  journey  to  the  Cameroons, 
"  that  we  are  obliged  to  assist  inactive  and  without  the 
power  to  intervene  in  the  extension  of  England  in  Central 
Africa  ?  "  ^ 

England,  however,  was  not  alone  among  the  promoters  Brussels 
of  African  exploration  and  settlement.      In   1876  King  Jf  ^^^q  j,. 
Leopold    of    the    Belgians    summoned    an    International  ference, 
Conference  at  Brussels,  in  order  to  discuss  various  problems  ^^'^^ 
connected  with  the  future  of  Africa.     As  a  result  of  this 

^  Cf.  Evans  Lewin  :  The  Germans  in  Africa  (Oxford  Pamphlets). 
p.  10.  A  work  to  which  I  am,  in  the  following  paragraphs,  deeply 
indebted. 

2  Quoted,  op.  cit. 


84  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Conference,  tlie  International  Congo  Association  was 
founded,  an  Association  whicii  was  afterwards  responsible 
for  the  development  of  tlie  Congo  Free  State.  In  1878 
Stanley  returned  from  Lis  famous  journey  in  the  Congo, 
and  his  reports  served  still  further  to  stimulate  European 
interest  in  the  future  of  the  dark  continent.  A  bare 
enumeration  of  dates  is  at  this  point  highly  suggestive. 
In  1879  the  Belgians  began  their  occupation  of  the  Congo. 
In  1880  the  French  resumed  their  acti\'ities  in  West  Africa, 
and  in  1881  established  their  Protectorate  over  Tunis. 
In  1882  England  established  a  virtual  Protectorate  over 
Egypt.  In  the  same  year  the  Port  of  Assab,  on  the 
Abyssinian  coast,  was  transferred  from  a  private  trading 
company  to  Italy.  In  1883  the  French  began  to  occupy 
Madagascar.  In  1885  Massowah  was  occupied  by  the 
Italians  and  was  subsequently  developed  by  them  into 
the  colony  of  Eritrea.  Meanwhile  the  English,  as  will  be 
disclosed  in  a  subsequent  chapter,  after  a  long  period  of 
apparent  carelessness  and  indifference,  had  resumed  their 
advance  in  South  Africa. 
Germany  Under  these  circumstances  it  is  small  wonder  that  the 
and  South  Germans,  having  established  an  almost  unparalleled  position 
for  themselves  in  Europe,  should  have  decUned  to  be 
left  in  the  shade  in  Africa.  Besides,  the  notorious  unrest 
among  the  Dutch  in  South  Africa  seemed  to  offer  a 
favourable  opportunity  for  German  activities.  To  this 
opportunity  Ernst  von  Weber  had  called  attention  in 
1879.  He  strongly  advocated  the  acquisition  of  Delagoa 
Bay  from  Portugal,  and  the  economic  penetration  of  the 
Transvaal  and  British  South  Africa.  "  In  South-East 
Africa  we  Germans,"  so  he  wrote  in  the  Geographische 
Nachrichten,  "  have  a  peculiar  interest,  for  here  dwell  a 
splendid  race  of  people  nearly  alhed  to  us  by  speech  and 
habits  .  .  .  pious  folk  with  their  energetic,  strongly 
marked,  and  expressive  heads,  they  recall  the  portraits 
of  Rubens,  Teniers,  Ostade,  and  Van  Eyck  .  .  .  and  one 
may  speak  of  a  nation  of  Africanders  or  low-German 
Africans  which  forms  one  sympathetic  race  from  Table 
Moimtain  to  the  Limpopo.     What  could  not  such  a  country 


THE   ASCENDANCY   OF   GERMANY   (1879-90)      85 

become  if  in  the  course  of  time  it  were  filled  with  German 
emigrants  ?  The  constant  mass  immigration  of  Germans 
would  gradually  bring  about  a  decided  numerical  pre- 
ponderance of  Germans,  and  of  itself  would  by  degrees 
effect  the  Germanisation  of  the  country  in  a  peaceful 
manner." 

Von  Weber  was  not  writing  in  the  sand.  Paul  Kruger 
had  already  visited  Berhn  to  seek  German  intervention 
at  the  time  of  the  first  British  annexation  of  the  Transvaal. 
He  visited  it  again  in  1884,  and  was  cordially  welcomed 
both  by  the  Emperor  and  his  Chancellor.  Meanwhile  a 
resolute  attempt  had  been  made  by  Germany  to  secure  a 
footing  at  Delagoa  Bay,  at  St.  Lucia  Bay  and  in  Pondo- 
land,  and  it  was  subsequently  stated  by  Sir  Donald  Currie, 
speaking  with  knowledge,  that  "  the  German  Govern- 
ment would  have  secured  St.  Lucia  Bay,  and  the  coast- 
hne  between  Natal  and  the  possessions  of  Portugal,  had 
not  the  British  Government  telegraphed  instructions  to 
dispatch  a  gunboat  from  Cape  Town  with  orders  to  hoist 
the  British  Flag  at  St.  Lucia  Bay."  ^ 

In  1884  German  effort  in  Africa  was  abundantly  re-  German 
warded.  In  the  course  of  less  than  two  years  (1884-85),  ^^"^^ 
Germany  leapt  into  the  position  of  the  third  European 
Power  in  Africa.  She  established  a  Protectorate  over 
Damaraland  and  Namaqualand,  a  district  which  was  after- 
wards known  as  German  South- West  Africa.  That  terri- 
tory, with  an  area  of  332,450  sq.  miles  and  a  population — 
terribly  depleted  by  German  cruelties — of  79,556,  passed 
into  British  keeping  in  July,  1915.  A  second  German 
Colony  was  estabhshed  by  the  annexation  of  Togoland 
and  the  Gamer oons.  The  former,  with  an  area  of  33,700 
sq.  miles  and  a  population  of  over  a  milhon,  was  conquered 
by  Great  Britain  in  August  1914 ;  the  latter,  with  an  area 
of  191,130  sq.  miles  and  a  population  of  2,643,720,  fell 
into  British  hands  in  February,  1916.  Most  important  of 
all,  however,  ahke  from  the  point  of  view  of  strategy,  of 
man-power,  and  of  raw  materials,  was  the  great  province 
on  the  East  Coast  which  became  known  as  German  East 

^  Quoted  by  Lewin,  op.  ciL,  p.  17. 


86  EUROPE   AND  BEYOND 

Africa.     That  province,  with  an  area  of  384,180  sq.  miles 
and  a  population  of  7,645,770  persons,  mostly  belonging 
to  strong  fighting  races,  was  conquered  by  Great  Britain  in 
December,  1917. 
Germany        Simultaneous  with  these  German  annexations  in  Africa 
Pacific        ^^^  ^^®  establishment  of  German  possessions  in  the  Pacific. 
The  northern  coast  of  New  Guinea,  subsequently  known 
as  Kaiser  Wilhelm's  Land,  and  the  group  of  islands  col- 
lectively known  as  the  Bismarck  Archipelago  were  acquired 
by  Germany  in  1884.     They  passed  to  the  British  Empire, 
together  with  Samoa,  which  Germany  had  divided  with 
the  United  States  (1900),  in  the  first  weeks  of  the  Great 
War. 
The  The  achievement  of  Germany,  though  destined  to  be 

Empire  of  transitory,  was  nevertheless  remarkable.  In  the  space  of 
Germany  less  than  two  years,  Germany  had  become  a  great  world- 
power.  Colonies  in  the  English  sense,  however,  she  did 
not  seek,  and  has  never  obtained.  "  My  aim,"  said 
Bismarck  in  1885,  "  is  the  governing  merchant  and  not 
the  governing  official  in  those  regions.  Our  privy 
councillors  and  expectant  subalterns  are  excellent  enough 
at  home,  but  in  the  Colonial  territories  I  anticipate  more 
from  the  Hanseatics."  In  one  sense  the  hopes  of  Bis- 
marck were  entirely  disappointed.  The  German  colonies 
were  never  self-supporting,  they  never  became  the  home 
on  any  considerable  scale  of  German  colonists  ;  they  were 
exploited  to  the  great  profit  of  German  capitahsts  and 
merchants,  but  from  first  to  last  they  were  the  affair  of 
the  German  Government,  and  never  really  evoked  the 
interest  of  the  German  people. ^ 

One  thing  more  must  be  added.  The  German  Colonial 
Empire  came  into  being  with  the  express  sanction,  if  not 
with  the  blessing,  of  the  dominant  Colonial  Power.  The 
German  settlements  in  South  Africa  and  in  the  Pacific  were 
not  effected  without  loud  protests  from  the  Englishmen 
on  the  spot.  But  to  these  protests  the  Government  at 
home  refused  to  listen.     "  If  Germany  is  to  become  a  great 

^  For  German  aims  in  Africa,  cf.  E.  Zimmerman  :  The  German  Empire 
oj  Central  Africa  ;  for  her  treatment  of  natives,  cf.  Cd.  9210  (1910). 


THE   ASCENDANCY   OF   GEEMANY   (1879-90)      87 

colonising  power,  all  I  say  is,  God  speed  her.  She  becomes 
our  ally  and  partner  in  the  execution  of  the  great  pur- 
poses of  Providence  for  the  advantage  of  mankind."  So 
spake  Mr.  Gladstone  in  the  House  of  Commons.  The 
natives  of  Africa,  after  a  few  years'  experience  of  the 
German  rule,  entertained  very  different  sentiments.  "  The 
Germans,"  wrote  Bishop  Weston  of  Zanzibar  to  General 
Smuts,  "  rule  entirely  by  fear,  and  cruel  punishments 
are  their  means  of  spreading  terror  throughout  the 
land."  1  There  was  indeed  universal  testimony  from  the 
late  German  colonies  in  Africa  that  "  their  return  to 
German  rule  would  be  regarded  by  every  native  tribe  in 
Africa  as  the  greatest  disaster  in  their  tribal  history." 

In  1884,  however,  this  could  not  be  foreseen,  and  in  Tiie  Berlin 
November  of  that  year  an  International  Conference  met  at  issSs^^^' 
Berlin  under  the  presidency  of  Prince  Bismarck  to  discuss 
the  whole  African  situation.  The  General  Act  of  the 
Conference,  which  is  contained  in  a  long  and  elaborate 
document,  was  approved  by  Great  Britain,  France, 
Germany,  Belgium,  Portugal,  as  well  as  other  Powers. 
The  Act  laid  down  regulations  as  to  the  traffic' in  slaves; 
in  regard  to  freedom  of  trade  in  the  Congo  Basin ;  to  the 
neutrality  of  territories  in  the  same  region ;  to  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  Congo  and  the  Niger ;  and  finally  in  regard  to 
the  treatment  of  the  native  populations.^  The  Congo 
State  under  King  Leopold  was  recognised,  and  in  1908  was 
transferred  to  the  Belgian  Kingdom. 

Six  years  later,  an  even  more  comprehensive  agreement  Anglo- 
was    concluded    between    Germany    and    Great    Britain.  ^^^^ 
Great    Britain    transferred    to    Germany   the    island    of  i890 
Heligoland,   and  recognised  German  claims  to  the  land 
north  of  Lake  Nyassa.     On  the   other  hand,   Germany 
acknowledged  the  claims  of  Great  Britain  to  the  northern 
haK  of  the  shores  and  waters  of  Lake  Victoria  Nyanza, 
to  the  valley  of  the  Upper  Nile,  and  to  the  coast  of  the 
Indian  Ocean  about  Vitu  and  thence  northwards  to  Kis- 

1  The  Black  Slaves  of  Prussia,  p.  5. 

^  For  text    of    the    General  Act,  cf.  P.  Albin  :    Les  Grands  traites 
politiqves,  pp.  368-406. 


88  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

majTTi.  Germany  also  recognised  the  Britisli  Protectorate 
over  the  islands  held  by  the  Sultan  of  Zanzibar. 
Partition  The  final  partition  of  Africa  left  France  in  a  territorial 
of  Africa  ggj^ge  i]^q  largest  of  African  Powers  —  her  territories, 
including  the  Sahara  Desert,  extending  over  an  area  of 
3,804,974  square  miles.  British  territory,  excluding  Egypt 
and  the  Soudan,  covered  before  the  World- War  an  area  of 
2,713,910  square  miles.  Germany  came  third,  with  some- 
thing less  than  1,000,000.^  Statistics  of  area  give,  however, 
a  very  false  impression  of  relative  values.  In  any  scientific 
computation  the  advantage  unquestionably  rested  with 
Great  Britain.  For  the  British  possessions,  as  Principal 
Grant  Robertson  has  pointed  out,  have  three  distinctive 
features.  Firstly,  "  they  are  grouped  on  the  shores  of  each 
of  the  waters  that  wash  the  continent,  the  Mediterranean, 
the  Eed  Sea,  the  Indian  Ocean,  and  the  Atlantic, 
and  at  four  critical  points  aided  by  possessions  outside 
Africa  proper  they  control  strategic  lines  of  the  first 
importance.  Gibraltar,  Aden,  and  Socotra,  Zanzibar, 
St.  Helena,  and  Cape  Town  have  and  confer  a  military 
and  naval  significance  indisputable  and  incomparable. 
Secondly,  in  the  solid  block  of  British  South  Africa,  Great 
Britain  possesses  the  one  great  area  fitted  to  be  a  colony 
for  the  White  races.  Thirdly,  of  the  four  great  African 
rivers,  the  Nile,  the  Niger,  the  Zambesi,  and  the  Congo, 
British  territory  controls  or  shares  in  the  control  of  the 
three  first.  Mastery  of  the  arterial  rivers  of  a  huge  con- 
tinent, as  the  history  of  the  American  continent  proves,  is 
a  brief  expression  of  the  great  truth  that  poKtical  power 
follows  and  rests  on  the  trunk  waterways.  What  the 
Danube,  the  Rhine,  and  the  Vistula  have  been  to  the  Europe 
of  the  past,  the  Nile,  the  Zambesi,  the  Niger,  and  the 
Congo  will  be  to  the  Africa  of  the  future,  for  a  great  river 
can  be  the  perpetual  cradle  of  a  great  civilisation."  ^  It 
is  truly  and  finely  said — ^but  we  are  anticipating  the  sequence 
of  events,  and  must  return  to  Europe. 

Close  of  Before  the  Anglo-German  agreement  of  1890  was  con- 

Bismarck's 

Reign,  ^  These  are  the  figures  of  Mr.  Scott  Keltie :  a^.EncyclopoBdia  Britannica. 

1 890  2  Historical  A  tlas,  p.  2 1 . 


THE   ASCENDANCY   OF    GERMANY   (1879-90)      89 

eluded,  the  greatest  figure  had  been  removed  from  the 
stage  of  European  politics.  In  1888  the  Emperor  William  I. 
had  died,  and  after  a  few  months'  interval  during  which 
his  son,  the  gifted  but  stricken  Emperor  Frederick,  nominally 
reigned,  had  been  succeeded  by  Ms  grandson,  the  Emperor 
William  II.  The  young  Emperor  had  taken  to  heart  the 
advice  given  by  his  ancestress  to  his  great-great-grand- 
father, George  III.  of  England,  "  George,  be  King."  As  in 
England  there  was  no  room  for  George  III.  and  William 
Pitt,  so  in  Germany  there  was  no  room  for  William  II.  and 
Bismarck.  In  1890  the  young  Emperor  dropped  "  the 
old  pilot."     Bismarck's  long  reign  was  ended. 

In  the  history  of  the  nineteenth  century,  Bismarck  will  Bismarck' 
always  claim  a  foremost  place  ;  in  the  sphere  of  diplomacy  ^^^oj" 
no  one  except  Cavour  could  dispute  his  claim  to  the  first 
place.  That  he  was  a  great  patriot  will  be  denied  only 
by  those  to  whom  patriotism  is  an  exploded  superstition. 
He  desired  to  see  Germany  united,  and  after  the  tragic 
failure  of  1848,  he  believed,  rightly  or  wrongly,  that  it 
could  never  be  united  by  parliamentary  action ;  that  it 
must  be  made  by  blood  and  iron.  These  were  the  tradi- 
tional instruments,  not  of  German,  but  of  Prussian  state- 
craft, and  Bismarck  was  primarily  a  Prussian  patriot. 
Germany  must  be  made  not  by  the  merging  of  Prussia  in 
Germany,  but  by  the  merging  of  Germany  in  Prussia. 
That  was  Bismarck's  supreme  aim,  and  that  was  his 
remarkable  achievement.  The  end  was  reached  by  methods 
which  no  plain  man  can  approve  :  by  diplomacy,  which 
was  a  masterpiece  of  bluff  duplicity,  and  by  overwhelming 
force  unscrupulously  applied.  Every  move  in  a  complicated 
game  was  carefully  planned  from  the  outset :  calculated 
assistance  to  Russia  in  Poland  in  1863  ;  a  quarrel  picked 
with  Denmark  for  the  twofold  purpose  of  acquiring  Kiel 
and  of  estranging  his  master  from  Austria  and  from  the 
Germanic  Confederation ;  the  rupture  with  Austria  and 
the  dissolution  of  the  Bund ;  the  formation  of  a  North 
German  Confederation  under  the  presidency  of  Prussia  ; 
the  luring  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  III.  to  his  fate  ;  the 
Hohenzollern  candidature  in  Spain  ;   the  quarrel  fastened 


90  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

upon  France  in  1870  ;   the  crushing  German  victory  ;   the 
formation  of  the  new  German  Empire  ;    the  undisputed 
hegemony  of  Prussia  in  Germany  ;   the  almost  undisputed 
ascendancy  of    Germany   in   Europe— the   sequence   was 
logical  and  unbroken.     Did  Bismarck  ever  look  beyond 
Europe  ?     The  question  has  been  often  asked.     It  cannot 
yet   be   authoritatively   answered.     He   himself   declared 
that  "  the  Colonial  business  would  be  for  us  in  Germany 
like   the    wearing    of    sables    by    Polish    noblemen    who 
had  no  shirts  to  their  backs."     As  late  as  1889  he   re- 
peated :  "I  am  still  no  Colony  man."     Lord  Odo  Russell 
always   maintained   that   Bismarck's    discouragement    of 
Colonial  enterprise   was  not  mere   diplomatic  bluff   but 
represented    his    genuine    conviction ;    and    Mr.    Sarolea 
agrees  with  him.     "  Bismarck,"  he  writes,  "  was  a  realist 
and   a  materialist.     He  did  not  indulge  like  Talleyrand 
in  visions  of  a  distant  future,  in  dreams  of  a  German 
Oceana.  .  .  .   Bismarck's    ambition    was   to    control   the 
Continent,  to  establish  a  Napoleonic  Empire  in  Europe."  ^ 
Mr.  Lewin,  on  the  other  hand,  insists  that  when  Bismarck 
was  convinced  that  the  time  for  action  had  arrived,  he  was 
as  eager  for  expansion  as  the  most  advanced  exponents 
of    Colonialism. 2      But   with   or   ^vithout    Bismarck    the 
leaven  of  Imperialism  was  already  working  in  Germany,  and 
was  destined  to  produce  results  of  world- Vvdde  significance. 
Bismarck  had   made  Prussia  supreme  in  Germany,  and 
Germany  supreme  upon  the   continent   of   Europe.     The 
young  ruler  who  dismissed  him  in  1890  was  determined  to 
make  Germany  supreme  in  world-politics. 

AUTHORITIES 

See  as  for  Chapter  II.,  and  in  addition  : — 

V.  Deville  :  Le  Partage  d'Afrique. 

Evans  Lewin  :  The  Germans  and  Africa.     (London,  1915.) 

E,  Deschamps  :   UAfrique  Nouvelle. 

^  The  Anglo- German  Problem,  p.  230.  ^  Qp  (.^  p  5^ 


THE  NILE 


TTT^ 


Candia 


4/i 


ez 


^nc^r 


'><? 


Op 
^®  Jerusalem 
^mz  Canal 


SCALE  ?    '90  ?°  y  yPnglVlilPR 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  EGYPTIAN  PROBLEM 

The  British  Occupation — The  Regeneration  of 
Egypt  and  the  Conquest  of  the  Soudan 

L'Egypte  vaut  moins  par  elle  meme  que  par  sa  situation.  Au  centre 
de  I'ancien  Continent  ayant  vue  a  la  fois  sur  I'Europe,  I'Asie  et  I'Afrique 
dominant  le  bassin  oriental  de  la  Mediterranee  et  la  mer  des  Indes, 
base  d' operation  incomparable  pour  envahir  la  Syrie,  menacer  ou 
proteger  le  Sultan,  donnant  la  maitrise  des  voies  de  terre  et  d'eau  entre 
I'Europe  et  I'Extreme- Orient  aussi  bien  canal  de  Suez  que  des  chemins 
de  fer  diriges  vers  le  golfe  Persique  I'Egypte  voit  son  role  international 
grandir  tous  les  jours. — C.  de  Freycinet. 

Really  to  conquer  England  we  must  make  ourselves  masters  of 
Egypt. — Napoleon  I. 

Egypt  is  the  keystone  of  English  ascendancy  in  the  Indian  Ocean. — 
Paul  Rohrbach  (1912). 

En  somme  I'figypte  etait  perdue  pour  nous,  par  notre  faute,  et  nous 
etions  brouilles  avec  I'Angleterre,  comme  nous  I'etions  depuis  1881 
avec  ritalie. — D^bidour. 

ON  12tli  May,  1881,  France  signed  with  the  Bey  of  British 
Tunis  the  Treaty  of  Bardo,  or  Kassar-Said.  That  ^f'g^^^p^i^" 
Treaty  confirmed  the  French  Protectorate  over  Tunis,  and 
determined  in  that  country  the  influence  of  Italy.  Four- 
teen months  later  Great  Britain  embarked  on  an  enterprise 
which  eventuated  in  the  substitution  of  British  for  French 
influence  in  a  country  far  more  important  to  France  and 
to  the  world  than  Tunis. 

For  centuries  past  France  had  manifested  an  interest  France  and 
in   Egypt,    Syria,    and  the   Levant.     It   was    powerfully  Egypt 
quickened  by  the  mihtary  and  political  strategy  of  Napoleon 
and  by  the  romantic  career  of  Mehemet  Ali.     In  the  dull 
days  of  the  July  monarchy  there  sprang  up  in  France  a 


92  EUKOPE   AND   BEYOND 

curious  cult  for  that  brilliant  adventurer,  who  was  regarded 
by  the  Bonapartists  as  a  disciple  of  Napoleon,  almost  as 
his  apostolic  successor  in  Egypt. 
England  The  indificrence  of  England  was  almost  as  marked  as 
and  Egypt  ^^iq  interest  of  France.  On  two  occasions  did  the  Czar 
Nicholas  I.  suggest  to  English  statesmen  his  readiness  for 
a  "  deal  "  in  Near  Eastern  affairs  on  the  basis  of  England's 
annexation  of  Egypt.  Both  overtures  met,  however,  with 
a  chilling  response.  England  was  either  too  scrupulous 
or  too  indifferent  even  to  take  the  suggestion  into  con- 
sideration. 

In  the  later  years  of  the  century  a  different  attitude 
prevailed  in  England.  Apart  from  the  general  progress  of 
Imperialist  sentiment  two  causes  in  particular  contributed 
to  this  change :  the  rapid  advance  of  Kussia  in  South-Eastern 
Europe,  and  the  opening  (1869)  of  the  Suez  Canal.  The 
significance  of  the  latter  event  was  emphasised  by  the 
announcement  (25th  November,  1875)  that  the  British 
Government  had  purchased  from  the  Khedive  for  the 
sum  of  £4,000,000  sterling  his  176,000  shares  in  the  Canal. 
This  shrewd  and  brilliant  stroke  of  policy  was  due  to 
Disraeli's  imaginative  insight,  but  was  facilitated  by  his 
friendship  with  the  Kothschilds.  Financially  it  proved  to 
be  an  excellent  bargain,  for  the  value  of  the  shares  has 
increased  nearly  tenfold,  and  they  have  yielded  a  revenue 
of  over  £1,000,000  a  year. 

The  sale  of  the  shares  was  due  to  the  increasing  financial 
embarrassments  of  the  Khedive  Ismail,  a  grandson  of 
Mehemet  Ah.  The  debt  which  at  his  accession  (1863) 
stood  at  £3,293,000,  had  increased  by  1876  to  £94,000^000. 
To  this  "  carnival  of  extravagance  and  oppression "  ^ 
we  may  trace  the  European  intervention  in  the  affairs  of 
Egypt,  and  thus  the  whole  of  the  latest  phase  in  its  long 
history.  In  1876  Mr.  Stephen  Cave,  who  had  been  sent 
out  to  make  a  report  upon  Egyptian  finance,  described  the 
country  as  suffering  "  from  the  ignorance,  dishonesty, 
waste,  and  extravagance  of  the  East  .  .  .  and  at  the 
same  time  from  the  vast  expense  caused  by  hasty  and 

1  The  phrase  is  Lord  Milner's. 


THE   EGYPTIAN   PROBLEM  93 

inconsiderate  endeavours  to  adopt  the  civilisation  of  the 
West."  No  description  could  have  been  more  apt.  The 
Enghsh  and  French  creditors  of  the  Khedive,  naturally 
alarmed  as  to  the  security  of  their  loans,  sent  out  Mr. 
Goschen  and  M.  Joubert  to  look  after  their  interests. 
The  immediate  result  was  the  establishment  of  the  Gaisse 
de  la  dette  (2nd  May,  1876).  This  international  Commis- 
sion was  originally  empowered  only  to  receive  the  revenue 
set  apart  for  the  service  of  the  debt,  and  to  sanction  or  veto 
fresh  loans  ;  but  its  functions  were  rapidly  enlarged  to 
embrace  the  whole  financial  administration  of  the  country. 
France,  Austria,  and  Italy  appointed  commissioners.  Lord 
Derby  refused  to  follow  their  example,  but  Mr.  Goschen, 
devoid  of  Lord  Derby's  oflS.cial  responsibihty,  suggested 
at  the  Khedive's  request  the  name  of  Captain  Evelyn 
Baring,  a  member  of  the  famous  financial  house  and  until 
recently  Private  Secretary  to  Lord  Northbrook  in  India. 
In  this  characteristic  fashion  there  was  introduced  into 
Egypt  the  man  destined  to  be  the  regenerator  of  the 
country,  "  the  Great  Pharaoh  of  Modern  Egypt." 

"  '  The  state  of  Egypt,'  says  Lord  Sanderson,  quoting 
Lord  Cromer's  own  words,  '  at  this  time  was  deplorable.' 
About  one-fifth  of  the  arable  land  of  the  country  had  passed 
into  the  hands  of  the  Khedive,  was  administered  directly 
by  him,  and  cultivated  to  a  great  extent  by  forced  labour. 
There  was  no  appeal  from  the  arbitrary  demands  of  the 
officials  charged  with  the  collection  of  the  taxes,  and  these 
demands  were  enforced  with  the  most  pitiless  severity. 
In  addition  to  the  heavy  payments  required  for  the  service 
of  the  funded  debt,  large  sums  were  due  to  contractors  and 
others  for  goods  supphed  to  the  Egyptian  Government,  and 
the  pay  of  most  of  the  employees  was  greatly  in  arrear."  ^ 

By  1879  Ismail's  tyranny  and  extravagance  had  become 
insupportable,  and  on  26th  June  his  suzerain  the  Sultan 
was  induced  by  the  Powers  to  procure  his  abdication. 
His  abdication,  writes  Lord  Cromer,  "  sounded  the  death- 
knell  of   arbitrary  personal   rule  in  Egypt."  ^    But  his 

^  Lord  Sanderson  :  Evelyn,  Earl  of  Cromer,  p.  10. 
2  Modern  Egypt,  i.  145. 


94  EUROPE  AND   BEYOND 

son  and  successor,  Tewfik,  though  honest  and  well-meaning, 
was  not  the  man  to  cope  with  the  situation  by  which  he 
was  confronted. 
Rebellion  The  country,  and  more  particularly  the  army,  was  seeth- 
B  ^^1881  "^8  ^^^^  discontent.  Of  this  discontent  an  obscure  colonel, 
named  Arabi  Bey,  became  the  mouthpiece  and  representa- 
tive. It  is  not,  even  now,  easy  to  determine  the  precise 
character  and  significance  of  the  movement  which  Arabi  led. 
Primarily  a  military  revolt,  it  was  directed  partly  against 
Turkish  suzerainty,  partly  against  Occidental  intervention. 
"  Egypt  for  the  Egyptians  "  was  the  battle-cry  of  the 
rebels,  but  how  far  either  Egypt  or  the  Egyptians  would 
have  been  profited  by  their  success  it  is  difficult  to  say. 

On  9th  September,  1881,  the  Khedive  found  his  palace 
surrounded  by  a  large  force  under  the  command  of  Arabi, 
and  was  compelled  to  assent  to  their  demands.  He  pro- 
mised to  dismiss  two  of  his  leading  Ministers,  to  accept  a 
responsible  Ministry,  to  convoke  an  Assembly  of  Notables 
before  the  end  of  the  year,  and  to  limit  the  functions  of  the 
Caisse  to  the  service  of  the  debt.  The  democratic  catch- 
words adopted  by  Arabi  and  his  faction  were,  of  course, 
a  thin  veneer,  calculated  to  cover  a  movement  of  the 
regular  Oriental  type.  Europe  became  more  and  more 
uneasy  at  the  situation.  Order  must  be  restored  in  Egypt ; 
but  how  ?  By  Turkey  ?  By  the  European  Concert  ? 
By  France  and  England  conjointly,  or  by  either  of  these 
alone  ?  At  this  moment  a  difficult  situation  was  not 
rendered  easier  by  a  change  of  government  in  France. 
In  November,  1881,  the  Ministry  of  Jules  Ferry  fell,  and 
Grambetta  came  into  power.  In  regard  to  Egypt,  Gambetta 
was  confronted  with  three  alternative  courses  :  to  go  on  in 
full  and  friendly  accord  with  England  and  to  see  the  thing 
through  ;  to  invoke  the  intervention  of  the  Powers  and 
so  "  internationaUse "  the  Eg3rptian  situation ;  or  to 
abandon  Egypt  altogether  and,  in  return  for  a  free  hand  for 
France  in  Tunis  and  Morocco,  to  leave  England  to  work  her 
will  in  Egypt.  Gambetta  himself  strongly  favoured  the 
first  course,  joint  action  with  England ;  but  a  fresh  obstacle 
then  presented  itself.     Bismarck,  anxious  on  the  one  hand 


THE  EGYPTIAN  PROBLEM  95 

to  ingratiate  himself  at  Constantinople,  and  on  the  other 
to  set  England  and  France  by  the  ears,  encouraged  the 
Sultan  to  assert  his  suzerain  authority,  and  to  inform  the 
Powers  that  the  restoration  of  order  in  Egypt  was  his 
business,  and  his  alone.  Meanwhile,  Gambetta  had  fallen 
(January,  1882),  and  been  replaced  by  Freycinet,  who 
favoured  internationahsation.  It  was  decided,  therefore, 
to  summon  a  European  Conference.  The  Conference  met 
in  Constantinople  at  the  end  of  June  and  proved  entirely 
abortive.  Meanwhile,  an  emeute  at  Alexandria  precipi- 
tated the  crisis.  On  11th  June  the  Arabs  attacked  the 
European  population  and  slaughtered  fifty  or  more  of  them, 
mostly  Greeks,  in  cold  blood.  "  Manifestly,"  says  Lord 
Cromer,  "  something  had  to  be  done,  for  the  whole  frame- 
work of  society  in  Egypt  was  on  the  point  of  collapsing. 
By  17th  June,  14,000  Christians  had  left  the  country."  i 
Tewfik  was  powerless  to  restrain  the  fanaticism  aroused 
by  Arabi,  now  one  of  his  "  responsible  "  Ministers.  The 
Concert  of  Europe  was  equally  impotent.  Great  Britain 
decided  to  act,  if  necessary,  alone.  Sir  Beauchamp 
Seymour,  commanding  the  British  fleet  off  Alexandria, 
was  instructed  to  demand  that  the  construction  of  fortifica- 
tions should  cease. 

The  demand  being  ignored,  the  Admiral  proceeded  (11th  Bombard- 
July)  to  bombard  and  demohsh  the  forts.  Arabi  let  loose  ?f^^°j  . 
the  convicts,  and  then  with  his  troops  abandoned  the  town, 
which  for  two  whole  days  was  delivered  up  to  fire,  pillage, 
and  massacre.  At  length  the  British  Admiral  landed  a 
body  of  bluejackets  and  marines,  and  order  was  tardily 
restored  in  the  ruined  city. 

From  the  moment  it  became  clear  that  decisive  action  The 
was  necessary,  France  refused  to  co-operate,  and  her  Fleet  ^1^^^^"  ^ 
left  Alexandria  for  Port  Said.  England  had,  therefore, 
to  go  through  with  the  task  alone,  and  the  first  units 
of  an  expeditionary  force  left  England  on  27th  July. 
Almost  simultaneously  troops  were  dispatched  from  India, 
and  among  these  the  Government,  following  the  precedent 
of  Lord  Beaconsfield,  decided  to  include  a  native  con- 

1  Op.  cit.  i.  289. 


96  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

tingent.  The  command  was  entrusted  to  Sir  Garnet 
Wolseley,  wlio  fulfilled  his  commission  with  promptitude 
and  skill.  Debouching  not  from  Alexandria  but  from 
Port  Said,  he  landed  in  Egypt  on  19th  August,  and  march- 
ing on  Cairo  across  the  desert,  he  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat 
on  Arabi,  storming  the  formidable  lines  of  Tel-el-Kebir 
on  13th  September.  So  masterly  were  his  strategy  and 
tactics  that  the  total  British  loss  in  killed  was  only  54,  and 
in  wounded  only  342.  On  14th  September,  Cairo  surren- 
dered to  a  couple  of  squadrons  of  British  cavalry.  The 
"  series  of  military  operations,"  to  adopt  Mr.  Gladstone's 
periphrasis,  was  now  complete.  Arabi  was  captured, 
brought  to  trial,  sentenced  to  death,  and  finally  deported 
to  Ceylon.  England  was  now  vis-d-vis  the  Khedive,  and 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  mistress  of  Egypt.  France 
had  abdicated,  and  on  attempting  to  resume  condominium 
was  pohtely  informed  that  she  had  forfeited  her  rights. 
The  fact  was  indisputable,  and  no  candid  Frenchman 
could  deny  it.  "  En  somme,"  writes  Debidour,  "  I'Egypte 
etait  perdue  pour  nous,  par  notre  faute  et  nous  etions 
brouilles  avec  I'Angleterre,  comme  nous  I'etions  depuis 
1881,  avec  I'ltalie."  i  ^ 

The  Re-  .  A  British  army  was  left  in  occupation  of  Egyi3t  in  order 
storation  ^q  complete  the  restoration  of  order,  or,  in  official  phrase, 
°  ■  ^  ^^  the  "  authority  of  the  Khedive."  When  that  task  had 
been  accomplished  the  occupation  would  cease.  That 
such  was  the  genuine  desire  and  intention  of  the  Govern- 
ment, there  is  not  a  shadow  of  doubt.  "  We  shall  not 
keep  our  troops  in  Egypt  any  longer  than  is  necessary  ; 
but  it  would  be  an  act  of  treachery  to  ourselves,  to  Egypt, 
and  to  Europe  if  we  withdrew  them  without  having  a 
certainty — or  .  .  .  until  there  is  reasonable  expectation — 
of  a  stable,  a  permanent,  and  a  beneficial  Government 
being  established  in  Egypt."  ^  Thus  spoke  Lord  Granville 
in  the  House  of  Lords,  and  his  famous  dispatch  on 
3rd  January,  1883,  announced  that  policy  to  the  Great 
Powers.  That  dispatch  further  intimated  that  "  the 
position  in  which  Her  Majesty's  Government  is  placed 

1  Hist.  Diplomatique,  i.  67.  ^  Hansard,  cclxxvi.  41. 


THE   EGYPTIAN   PROBLEM  97 

towards  His  Highness  (the  Khedive)  imposes  upon  them 
the  duty  of  giving  advice,  with  the  object  of  securing 
that  the  order  of  things  to  be  established  shall  be  of  a 
satisfactory  character  and  possess  the  elements  of  stability 
and  progress."  "  Giving  advice "  is,  as  Lord  Milner 
observes,  a  "  charming  euphemism  of  the  best  Granvillian 
brand  "  ;  ^  but  Lord  Granville  was  at  one  with  his  colleagues 
in  his  anxiety  that  the  function  should  be  temporary. 

The  anomaly  of  the  whole  position  was  strikingly  The 
illustrated  by  the  events  which  ensued  in  the  Egyptian  ^o^dan 
Soudan.  The  Arabs  of  the  South,  as  of  the  North,  had 
long  groaned  beneath  the  burdens  imposed  upon  them 
by  their  Egyptian  taskmasters.  Colonel  Charles  Gordon, 
who  had  acted  as  Governor  of  the  Soudan  under  Ismail, 
retired  in  1879,  and  from  that  moment  the  condition 
of  its  inhabitants  was  pitiful.  Consequently,  when 
Muhammad  Ahmed  announced  himself  as  the  Mahdi  or 
promised  Messiah,  the  Soudanese  rallied  to  his  standard 
and  drove  the  Egyptian  troops  into  the  fortresses.  In 
September,  1883,  General  Hicks  was  dispatched  by  the 
Khedive,  in  command  of  a  wholly  inadequate  Egyptian 
force,  to  reconquer  the  Soudan.  In  November,  Hicks 
Pasha,  his  European  stafi,  and  his  Egyptian  soldiers  were 
cut  to  pieces  by  the  Mahdi  near  Shekan.  Sir  Evelyn 
Baring,  who  in  September,  1883,  had  returned  to  Egypt 
as  Consul- General,  advised  the  abandonment  of  the 
Soudan.  Lord  Dufferin,  in  his  report  of  1883,  had  advised 
that  the  Western  Soudan  should  be  abandoned,  and  that 
Egypt  should  be  content  to  hold  Khartoum  and  Sennaar. 
Lord  Wolseley  concurred  in  this  opinion.  After  the  Hicks 
disaster,  however.  Lord  Wolseley  urged  that  a  strong 
garrison  should  be  established  at  Assouan,  and  that  rein- 
forcements should  be  sent  to  Suakim,  Berber,  and 
Khartoum. 

Uncertain  as  to  the  wisest  course  to  follow  under  these  Gordon's 
difficult  circumstances,  the  Cabinet  sought  the  advice  of  Mission, 
General  Gordon.  Gordon  replied  :  "I  should  send  out  i884  ' 
myself."     The   distracted   Cabinet    caught   at   the    idea, 

^  England  in  Egypt,  p.  33. 


98  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

and  on  18tli  January,  1884,  General  Gordon  was  sent  out 
to  Khartoum  to  report  on  the  situation  with  a  view  to 
immediate  evacuation.^  The  Khedive  appointed  him 
Governor-General  of  the  Soudan,  the  Home  Government 
acquiesced  in  the  appointment,  and  in  that  capacity  he 
started  for  Khartoum.  Meanwhile  the  facts  of  the  local 
situation  were  hardening.  Gordon  had  hardly  left  Cairo 
for  Khartoum  when  Colonel  Valentine  Baker,  the  head  of 
the  Egyptian  Gendarmerie,  was  defeated  in  an  attempt 
to  relieve  Tokar,  near  the  Ked  Sea  coast  (4th  February). 
Gordon  now  found  himself  besieged  by  the  Mahdists  in 
Khartoum.  Lord  Wolseley  was  quick  to  perceive  the 
danger  of  the  situation,  and  urged  upon  Ministers  the 
immediate  dispatch  of  reinforcements  to  Suakim,  and 
the  advance  of  an  English  Brigade  to  Wady  Haifa. 
Gordon  at  Weeks  and  even  months  were,  however,  allowed  to  pass 
Khartoum  j^efore  any  decision  was  arrived  at.  The  miserable  troops 
on  whom  alone  Gordon  could  rely  were  defeated  outside 
Khartoum  on  16th  March,  and  it  became  clear  that  if 
ever  Gordon  was  to  leave  Khartoum  alive  he  would  have 
to  be  succoured  by  his  own  countrymen.  Berber,  the 
half-way  house  between  Suakim  and  Khartoum,  was 
captured  by  the  Mahdi  (26th  May) — an  event  which  still 
further  jeopardised  Gordon's  position  in  Khartoum. 

Not  until  August  did  the  Gladstone  Government  decide 
to  send  out  an  expedition,  under  Wolseley's  command, 
to  rescue  Gordon.  Wolseley  left  England  at  the  end  of 
August,  and  started  from  Cairo  to  lead  an  expedition  up 
the  Nile  at  the  beginning  of  October.  Wolseley  made  all 
the  haste  possible  under  circumstances  of  great  difficulty, 
but  the  procrastination  of  the  Cabinet  had  delayed  the 
expedition  until  it  was  too  late.  On  reaching  Korti 
(29th  December),  Lord  Wolseley  dispatched  Sir  Herbert 
Stewart  with  a  small  force  by  land  to  avoid  the  wide 
bend  of  the  Nile.  Stewart,  after  a  hard  fight  at  Abu 
Klea  (17th  January,  1885),  forced  his  way  to  the  Nile, 

*  There  is  still  some  confusion  as  to  whether  Gordon's  orders  were  to 
"  report"  or  to  "evacuate."  For  text  of  instruction,  c/.  Morley,  Life 
of  Gladstone,  iii.  554. 


THE   EGYPTIAN   PROBLEM  99 

not  far  below  Khartoum,  but  on  19tli  January  was  mortally 
wounded.  The  command  then  devolved  on  Sir  Charles 
Wilson.  Exactly  a  week  later  (26th  January)  the  Mahdi 
stormed  Khartoum  and  General  Gordon  was  killed. 
Wilson  came  in  sight  of  the  city  two  days  after  it  had 
fallen. 

The  news  of  the  tragedy  caused  mingled  grief  and  Death  of 
indignation  in  England,  but  the  Government,  after  many  ^  °" 
vacillations,  decided  in  April,  1885,  to  abandon  the  Soudan 
south  of  Wady  Haifa,  and,  though  retaining  the  port  of 
Suakim,  to  abandon  the  construction,  already  com- 
menced, of  a  railway  from  Suakim  to  Berber.  This 
resolution  was  due  to  the  threat  of  danger  in  another 
quarter.  On  30th  March,  Russia,  quick  to  take  advantage 
of  England's  preoccupation,  had  occupied  Penjdeh  on  the 
frontier  of  Afghanistan. 

The  danger  in  Afghanistan  passed,  and  with  its  passing  The  Sequel 
there  was  some  disposition  to  modify  the  policy  of  complete  q\  the^*^'^ 
evacuation  of  the  Soudan,  and  to  retain  the  province  of  Soudan 
Dongola.     Baring,    Wolseley,    and    Kitchener    were    all 
strongly  in  favour  of  its  retention,  but  the  Ministry  decided 
to  withdraw  the  British  force  in  the  summer  of  1885,  and 
for  another  twelve  years  the  Soudan  was  a  prey  to  anarchy. 
When  the  Mahdi  was  poisoned  in  1885,  the  Khalifa  whom 
he  had  nominated  as  his  successor  continued  his  tyranny. 

Meanwhile  Egjrpt  itseK  had,  under  the  skilful,  firm,  and 
prudent  administration  of  Sir  E.  Baring,  who  in  1892  was 
created  Lord  Cromer,  been  literally  remade.  There  is 
no  episode  in  her  history  which  England  can  regard  with 
more  unfeigned  satisfaction  than  the  regeneration  of 
Egypt;  but  the  story  belongs  to  English  or  Egyptian 
history,  not  to  that  of  Europe.  A  word  must,  however, 
be  added  as  to  the  reconquest  of  the  Soudan,  since  it 
involved  grave  diplomatic  consequences  and  brought 
England  and  France  to  the  brink  of  war.  By  1896,  thanks 
to  the  patient  labours  of  General  Grenfell  and  General 
Kitchener,  the  Egyptian  Army  was  completely  reorganised, 
and  the  Government  of  the  Khedive  determined  to  attempt 
the  reconquest  of  the  Soudan.     This   decision   coincided 


100  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

with,  and  may  have  been  precipitated  by,  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Italians  from  Kassala.^  General  Kitchener  was 
appointed  to  the  command  of  the  Nile  Expedition,  and 
slowly  and  patiently  advanced  towards  the  completion 
of  his  great  design.  Before  the  end  of  September,  1896, 
Kitchener  was  in  possession  of  Dongola  ;  Abu  Hamed 
was  taken  in  August,  1897,  and  at  the  Atbara  the  Dervishes 
were  scattered  (7th  April,  1898).  On  2nd  September 
the  power  of  Mahdiism  was  finally  annihilated  by  the  great 
victory  of  Omdurman.  Two  days  later  the  British  and 
Egyptian  forces  were  paraded  before  the  ruined  palace 
of  Khartoum  and  the  shattered  tomb  of  the  Mahdi,  and 
there,  on  the  spot  where  Gordon  had  perished,  a  funeral 
service  was  held  in  solemn  memory  of  the  dead  hero  and 
saint. 
Fashoda  Hardly,  however,  had  General  Kitchener  reached 
Khartoum  when  the  diplomatic  sky  was  suddenly  overcast 
by  a  threatening  cloud.  The  French  Government  had 
never  forgiven  themselves  for  their  withdrawal  from 
Egypt  at  the  critical  moment  in  1882.  For  more  than  a 
dozen  years  they  had  impeded,  in  every  way,  the  work 
of  financial  and  political  reconstruction  undertaken  by 
Great  Britain  in  Egypt.  That  task,  unwillingly  assumed 
but  patiently  fulfilled,  seemed  now  to  be  on  the  point  of 
final  triumph  and  consummation. 

At  the  dramatic  moment  the  French  reappeared  upon 
the  scene.  For  many  years  past,  French  adventurers  had 
been  displaying  remarkable  activity  in  Central  Africa.  The 
Anglo-German  agreement  of  1890  had  been  followed  by  a 
similar  attempt  to  delimit  the  French  and  British  spheres 
of  influence  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Lake  Chad.  In  1894 
the  British,  operating  from  the  east,  estabhshed  a  Pro- 
tectorate over  Uganda,  and  in  the  same  year  the  French, 
operating  in  West  Africa,  captured  the  city  of  Timbuctoo. 
In  May,  1894,  Great  Britain  had  also  concluded  an  Anglo- 
Congolese  Convention,  according  to  which  England  ceded 
to  the  Congo  Free  State  the  left  bank  of  the  Upper  Nilejn 

1  Occupied  by  them  after  a  successful  encounter  with  the  Khalifa 
(Dec.  1893). 


THE  EGYPTIAN  PROBLEM         101 

return  for  a  recognition  of  the  acquisition  of  the  right  bank 
by  Great  Britain.  In  deference  to  French  susceptibiHties, 
the  Convention  was  annulled,  and  France  in  her  turn 
secured  from  the  Free  State  the  recognition  of  her  rights, 
with  certain  limitations,  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Upper 
Nile.  In  March,  1895,  however,  Sir  Edward  Grey  declared 
that  the  dispatch  of  a  French  expedition  to  the  Upper 
Nile  would  be  regarded  by  Great  Britain,  who  must  in 
this  matter  regard  herseK  as  the  trustee  of  the  Khedive, 
as  "an  unfriendly  act."  Obviously  the  situation  was 
already  a  dehcate  one  when,  in  June,  1896,  Major  Marchand 
left  France  to  take  command  of  the  expeditionary  force 
which  was  at  that  time  being  organised  in  the  French 
Congo.  In  the  course  of  two  years  and  in  the  face  of 
incredible  difficulties  this  intrepid  French  soldier  pushed 
his  way  from  the  French  Congo  across  Central  Africa.  It 
would  seem  that  Marchand  in  leading  his  expedition 
from  the  west  was  counting  on  a  junction  with  another 
French  force  which  was  to  make  its  way  from  the  east 
coast  by  way  of  Abyssinia  to  the  Upper  Nile.  The 
Russians,  too,  were  active  in  the  same  region  ;  but  both 
the  Russian  force  and  the  French  had  been  compelled  to 
retire,  and  consequently  Marchand,  on  his  arrival  at 
Fashoda,  found  himself  unsupported,  and  face  to  face  with 
the  British  forces  under  General  Kitchener. 

General  Kitchener,  steaming  up  from  Khartoum,  denied 
Marchand's  right  to  be  at  Fashoda  as  the  poHtical 
representative  of  France.  The  victory  of  Omdurman 
was  a  potent  argument,  but  even  to  it  Marchand 
refused  to  yield.  The  quarrel  was  then  referred  to 
the  diplomatists.  Lord  Sahsbury  claimed  for  the 
Khedive  all  the  lands  over  which  the  KhaUfa  had  borne 
sway,  and  made  it  clear  to  the  French  Government  that 
the  claim  would  be  asserted  by  the  whole  force  of  Great 
Britain.  In  the  autumn  of  1898  the  two  nations  were  on 
the  brink  of  war.  France,  however,  gave  way,  recalled 
Marchand,  and  in  March,  1899,  concluded  with  Great 
Britain  a  comprehensive  agreement  in  regard  to  the 
Soudan.     By  this  treaty  the  rights  of  Great  Britain  over 


102  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

the  whole  Nile  basin,  from  the  source  of  that  river  to  its 
mouth,  were  acknowledged ;  France  was  confirmed  in 
possession  of  a  great  West  African  Empire,  but  the  whole 
of  the  Egyptian  Soudan  was  to  be  subject  to  the  power 
which  ruled  at  Cairo.  Thus  the  way  to  the  Cape  was  still 
open,  unblocked  by  any  other  European  Power.  From 
that  moment  Anglo-French  relations  rapidly  improved, 
and  in  1904  the  diplomacy  of  the  Sahsbury-Balfour 
Government  was  crowned  by  the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo- 
French  agreement,  whereby  France  agreed  to  give  Great 
Britain  for  thirty  years  a  free  hand  in  Egypt. 

AUTHORITIES 

A.  Lbroy  Beaulieu  :  UEgypte  et  le  controle  anglo-franQais. 

C.  DE  Freycinet  :  La  Question  d'Egypte  {presents  the  French  point  of 

view  admirably)  (1905). 
Lord  Ceomer  :  Annual  Reports  in  Blue  Books ;  Modern  Egypt  (1908). 
Lord  Cromer:  Abbas  II.  (1915). 
Lord  MiLNER  :  England  in  Egypt  (1892). 

D.  A.  Cameron  :  Egypt  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (1898). 
Sir  A.  CoLViN  :  The  Making  of  Modern  Egypt  (1906). 

E.  Dicey  :  The  Story  of  the  Khedivate  (1902). 

Sir  R.  Wing  ATE  :  Mahdism  and  the  Egyptian  Soudan  (1891). 

A.  E.  Hake  :  Gordon^ s  Journals  at  Khartoum  (1885). 

G.  W.  Steevens  :   With  Kitchener  to  Khartoum  (1898). 

Sir  D.  M.  Wallace  :  Egypt  arid  the  Egyptian  Question  (1883). 

Marriott:  England  since  Waterloo.     (London,  1913.) 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  EXPANSION  OF  RUSSIA 

The  Franco-Russian  Alliance  (1890-98) 

england  and  russia  in  central  asia 

Les  tsars  ont  cette  rare  fortune  que  I'instinct  national  soutient  leurs 
calculs  d'ambition.  ...  La  propagande  revolutionnaire  ne  pouvait  pas 
atteindre  la  Russie.  .  .  .  Rien  n'y  etait  mur  ni  pour  la  liberte  politique, 
ni  pour  la  liberte  civile. — Albert  Sorel,  1887. 

WE  have  strayed  in  tlie  preceding  chapter  from  the 
chronological  sequence  of  events,  and  it  is  time 
therefore  to  retrace  our  steps.  Upon  the  dismissal  of 
Bismarck  in  1890,  three  important  results  ensued.  In 
the  first  place,  the  young  and  impetuous  ruler  of  Germany 
made  it  clear  to  the  world  that  a  new  era  had  dawned ; 
that  the  old  ways  and  old  methods  were  to  be  abandoned  ; 
that  Germany  was  no  longer  to  be  content  with  supremacy 
upon  the  continent  of  Europe,  but  was  determined  to 
assert  her  position  as  a  World- Power.  Secondly,  Russia 
drew  further  and  further  apart  from  Germany ;  and,  thirdly, 
Russia  and  France,  after  a  prolonged  flirtation,  contracted 
a  regular  and  lasting  alhance. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  Emperor,  WiUiam  II.,  was  Russia  and 
to  dechne  to  renew  Bismarck's  reinsurance  treaty  with  Germany 
Russia.  Only  by  virtue  of  that  treaty  had  Russia  in 
recent  years  been  connected  with  the  poHtics  of  Western 
Europe.  Ever  since  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  (1878),  Russia, 
geographically  cut  ofi  from  the  West  by  the  solid  block 
of  the  Central  Empires  and  diplomatically  isolated  in 
Europe,  had  concentrated  her  attention  upon  Asia.     It 


104  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

was,  indeed,  part  of  the  deliberate  but  defensive  tactics  of 
Bismarck  to  thrust  Russia  eastward,  partly  in  order  to 
divert  her  attention  from  Western  pohtics — from  a  possible 
rapprochement  with  France,  and  partly  in  order  to  involve 
her,  if  possible,  in  a  quarrel  with  England  in  Central  Asia. 
The  Penjdeh  incident  was  indicative  of  his  partial  success  ; 
but  even  Bismarck  could  not  for  an  indefinite  period  play 
fast  and  loose  A^dth  Russian  susceptibihties,  and  between 
1885  and  1888  many  circumstances  combined  to  weaken 
the  good  accord  between  Berhn  and  St.  Petersburg. 
The  Among  these,  two  in  particular  may  properly  be  em- 

inddent'^''  phasised.  The  first  was  the  Schnaebele  incident,  which 
aroused  the  suspicions  of  the  Czar  Alexander  in  regard  to 
the  pacific  intentions  of  Germany.  On  20th  April,  1887, 
Schnaebele,  a  French  Police  commissioner,  was,  with  every 
circumstance  of  insolence  and  brutality,  arrested  by  two 
German  agents  on  the  Alsatian  frontier  and  flung  into 
prison.  The  affair  created  intense  excitement  in  France, 
which  had  lately  exhibited  unmistakable  signs  of  a  desire 
to  abandon  the  colonial  activities  in  which  she  had  been 
involved  by  the  policy  of  Jules  Ferry,  and  once  more  to 
concentrate  all  her  efforts  upon  the  reversal  of  the  verdict 
of  1870.  Jules  Ferry  fell  in  1885,  and  in  1886  there  took 
office  in  the  Freycinet  Cabinet  a  man  who  for  some  years 
gave  a  new  direction  to  French  pohcy,  and  who  in  1887 
might  well  have  involved  Europe  in  a  great  war.  General 
Buuiaiiger  Boulanger  was  an  adventurer  of  mediocre  abihty  to  whom 
the  changes  and  chances  of  French  pohtics  under  the 
Third  Republic  almost  gave  a  great  opportunity.  For- 
tunately for  Europe,  and  on  the  whole  for  France, 
Boulanger  was  not  big  enough  to  redeem  it.  Boulanger 
seems  to  have  aspired  to  play  the  part  of  Monk,  and  to 
effect  through  the  army  a  restoration  of  the  monarchy. 
The  details  of  his  dealings  with  the  exiled  princes  are 
obscure,  but  it  is  certain  that  Boulanger  was  one  of  the 
first  to  proclaim  in  France  the  necessity  of  a  better  under- 
standing with  Russia. 
Russia  and  In  Russia  there  was  not  lacking  a  disposition  for  closer 
France        relations  with  France.      On  20th  February,  1887,   there 


THE   EXPANSION   OF   RUSSIA  105 

appeared  in  Le  Nord,  the  organ  of  the  Russian  Minister, 
De  Giers,  a  remarkable  article  containing  the  following 
passage  :  "  Henceforth  Russia  mil  watch  the  events  on 
the  Rhine,  and  will  relegate  the  Eastern  Question  to  the 
second  place.  The  interests  of  Russia  forbid  her  in  the 
event  of  another  Franco-German  war  to  observe  the  same 
benevolent  neutrality  which  she  previously  maintained. 
The  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg  mil,  in  no  case,  permit  a 
further  weakening  of  France.  In  order  to  keep  her  freedom 
of  action  for  this  event  Russia  will  avoid  all  conflict  with 
Austria  and  England,  and  will  allow  matters  to  take  their 
course  in  Bulgaria."  Two  months  later,  after  the  news 
of  the  Schnaebele  incident  had  reached  St.  Petersburg,  the 
Czar,  Alexander  III.,  addressed  an  autograph  letter  to 
the  Emperor  William,  in  which  he  formally  announced 
to  his  august  kinsman  that  he  no  longer  regarded  himself 
as  bound  by  the  "  Reinsurance  Treaty  "  of  1884,  and  in 
particular  that  he  held  himseK  under  no  obligation  to 
maintain  neutrality  in  the  event  of  a  war  between  Germany 
and  France.  The  Emperor  William  was  so  far  impressed 
by  the  communication  as  to  give  immediate  orders  without 
even  consulting  his  Chancellor  for  the  release  of  the  French 
police  commissioner^ — Schnaebele.  So  the  immediate 
incident  was  closed.  The  Czar's  letter  had,  however,  a 
larger  significance.  Taken  in  conjunction  with  the  article 
in  Le  Nord  it  showed  clearly  enough  in  what  direction  the 
wind  was  blowing  in  St.  Petersburg. 

Not  less  disquieting  to  the  Czar  than  the  Schnaebele  Russia  and 
incident  was  the  turn  which  events  were  taking  in  Bulgaria,  ^^^na 
Here  again  he  insisted  upon  tracing  the  hand  of  Germany, 
ever  at  work  to  destroy  the  prestige  and  undermine  the 
influence  of  Russia. 

After  the  final  abdication  of  Prince  Alexander,  Russia, 
it  will  be  remembered,  made  a  supreme  effort  to  establish 
permanently  her  ascendancy  in  Bulgaria.  But  the  Czar 
overreached  himself.  General  Kaulbars,  who  had  been 
dispatched  from  St.  Petersburg  to  act  as  "  adviser  "  to 
the  Regency,  behaved  with  consummate  insolence,  but 
failed  ignominiously  to  rouse  the  country  to  revolt  against 


106  EUROPE  AND   BEYOND 

the  regents.  Government  and  people  alike  refused  to  be 
browbeaten  by  the  Russian  agent,  and  Kaulbars  was 
recalled.  An  appeal  to  the  electorate  resulted  in  the 
return  of  an  overwhelming  Russophobe  majority  to  the 
Sobranje.  Their  first  business  was  to  elect  a  Prince  in 
place  of  Alexander.  Several  candidates  were  approached 
in  vain,  but  at  last  the  Sobranje,  after  a  stout  refusal  to 
elect  the  Czar's  nominee,  the  Prince  of  Mingrelia,  offered 
the  throne  to  a  German  princeling.  Prince  Ferdinand  of 
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha,  by  whom  it  was  accepted.  Prince 
Ferdinand  was  a  son  of  Princess  Clementine  of  Orleans, 
and  a  grandson,  therefore,  of  Eang  Louis  Philippe,  but  he 
had  served  in  the  Austrian  Army,  and  was  to  all  intents 
and  purposes  an  Austrian  Prince.  The  Czar  was  deeply 
mortified  by  the  election,  and  refused  to  recognise  Prince 
Ferdinand  ;  but  strong  in  the  support  both  of  Berlin  and 
Vienna,  and  urged  to  the  task  by  an  exceedingly  able  and 
ambitious  mother.  Prince  Ferdinand  adhered  to  his  decision 
to  accept  the  throne  (July,  1887). 

A  year  later,  during  the  brief  reign  of  the  Emperor 
Frederick,  a  further  slight  was  inflicted  upon  the  Czar, 
who  resented  it  so  bitterly  that  the  two  Empires  were 
brought  to  the  brink  of  war.  The  Empress  Frederick, 
encouraged  by  her  mother.  Queen  Victoria,  sanctioned 
the  engagement  of  her  daughter  to  Prince  Alexander  of 
Battenberg,  the  Prince  whom  the  Czar  had  virtually 
dismissed  from  the  Bulgarian  throne.  The  ill-advised 
project  was  peremptorily  and  even  brutally  vetoed  by 
Bismarck,  but  the  mischief  was  done.  The  Czar  deemed 
himself  to  have  been  deliberately  insulted  by  the  German 
Court,  and  never  forgave  the  ofience. 

Even  before  the  fall  of  Bismarck,  therefore,  indications 
were  not  wanting  that  forces  were  operating  in  the  direc- 
tion of  an  entirely  new  combination  in  European  politics. 
Tiie  Reia-        Between   France  and   Russia  there   had  not  hitherto 
France^and  ^®®^  ^^^  ^^^^  tradition  of  political  friendship.     It  is  true 
Russia '      that,  at  the  zenith  of  his  career.  Napoleon  I.  cast  his  glamour 
over  more  than  one  Russian  ruler.     But  the  historic  tradi- 
tions of  French  diplomacy  pointed  to  the  maintenance  of 


THE   EXPANSION   OF   RUSSIA  107 

a  close  understanding  not  with  St.  Petersburg,  but  with 
Stockholm,  Warsaw,  and  Constantinople.  The  diplomatic 
system  of  the  old  regime  had,  of  course,  its  origin  in  the 
secular  rivalry  between  Bourbon  and  Habsburg,not  between 
Bourbon  and  Romanoff.  But  a  system  primarily  devised 
to  check  the  ambitions  of  the  Habsburgs  might  well  serve 
the  secondary  purpose  of  restraining  the  westward  advance 
of  Russia.  For  that  purpose  it  proved  tolerably  effective 
until  the  lynch-pin  was  Imocked  out  of  it  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  Poland.  The  defeat  of  France  in  1870  and  the  rapid 
rise  of  Germany  to  a  position  of  ascendancy  in  Europe 
entirely  altered  the  balance  of  diplomatic  forces.  Dimly 
perceived  during  the  regime  of  Bismarck,  it  was  unmistak- 
ably apprehended  after  the  [accession  of  the  Kaiser 
WilUam  II.  A  French  writer  goes,  indeed,  so  far  as  to 
assert  that  ^the  conclusion  of  the  Franco-Russian  alliance 
was  the  most  important  event  in  European  history  during 
the  quarter  of  a  century  which  preceded  the  outbreak  of 
the  Great  War.  This  may  perhaps  be  regarded  as  a  some- 
what continental  view  of  high  politics,  but  no  student  of 
history  can  ignore  the  significance  of  the  rapprochement, 
deepening  into  formal  alliance,  between  the  vast  and  half- 
barbaric  empire  of  Russia  and  the  Third  French  Republic. 

Events,  as  we  have  seen,  had  been  for  some  time  past  French 
moving  in  this  direction.  The  intervention  of  Alexander  II.  ^^f^*^ 
during  the  crisis  of  1875  was  in  itself  significant ;  not  less 
were  his  words  to  Le  Flo :  "  Our  relations  will  become 
more  and  more  cordial.  We  have  common  interests. 
We  must  hold  together."  Equally  significant  was  the 
intervention  of  Alexander  III.  in  regard  to  the  Schnaebele 
affair ;  but  the  fijst  overt  indication  of  the  new  orientation 
of  Russian  policy  dates  from  the  years  between  1889  and 
1891.  The  new  intimacy  had  a  financial  origin— Russia,  as 
usual,  was  badly  in  want  of  money.  Berlin  had  in  January, 
1888,  refused  to  lend  to  Russia,  but  from  1888  onwards  a 
series  of  Russian  loans  were  issued  in  Paris  and  very  largely 
taken  up  by  French  financiers.  A  4  per  cent,  loan  for  500 
millions  issued  at  86*45  fr.  in  December,  1888,  was  so  largely 
over-subscribed  that  in  1889  two  further  loans  were  issued, 


108  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

the  one  for  700  million  francs,  the  other  for  1,200  millions. 
In  1890  there  were  three  issues  :  one  of  260  millions,  one  of 
360,  and  one  of  41.  In  1891  there  were  two  loans  aggre- 
gating 820  millions.  In  1893  another  of  178  millions, 
in  1894  over  1000  millions,  and  in  1896  400  millions. 
After  the  turn  of  the  new  century  a  Russian  loan  was 
issued  in  Paris  with  almost  tiresome  regularity  every  few 
years.  The  financial  assistance  thus  rendered  to  Russia 
was  invaluable.  It  enabled  her  to  convert  the  whole  of 
her  external  debt  into  a  4  per  cent,  denomination,  to  im- 
prove the  equipment  of  the  army  and  the  navy,  and  to 
extend  her  gravely  defective  railway  system. 
Russian  The  Trans-Siberian  Railway,  projected  some  twenty- 

Extensfon  ^^^  years  before,  was  at  last  put  in  hand,  and  in  1891 
work  commenced  on  seven  sections  simultaneously.  "  In 
the  course  of  that  year,  the  line  was  carried  across  the 
Ural  Mountains  to  the  western  terminus  at  CheHabinsk. 
At  the  end  of  March,  1899,  it  was  open  to  traffic  as  far 
as  Irkutsk,  2029  miles  from  Cheliabinsk  ;  while  on  the 
eastern  section  Vladivostok  was  Hnked  with  Khabarovsk 
on  the  Amur."  Another  railway  enterprise  was  rapidly 
pushed  on.  The  construction  of  a  Hne  intended  to  con- 
nect the  Caspian  with  Merv  was  authorised  in  April,  1885. 
By  1888  the  line  was  carried  as  far  as  Samarkand,  the 
ancient  capital  of  Tamerlane,  and  in  1898  extensions  of 
the  Trans-Caspian  Railway  from  Samarkand  to  Tashkent 
^and  Andijan  were  opened  to  traffic,  while  another 
branch  running  south  from  Merv  to  the  frontier  of 
Afghanistan  was  completed.^  The  construction  of  these 
railways,  particularly  the  Trans-Caspian,  was  primarily 
due  to  strategic  considerations,  but  that  constitutes  no 
reason  for  overlooking  their  economic  significance. 
Bismarck  The  rapprochemefit  between  France  and  Russia  was, 
and  Russia  liowever,  more  than  financial  and  economic.  Russia  was 
becoming  more  and  more  alarmed  by  the  menacing  tone 
adopted  by  German  statesmen.  In  1888,  Bismarck 
thought  that  the  time  had  come  for  pubhshing  the  text 
of  the  Triple  AlHance.    Russia  was  startled  and  alarmed 

^  F.  H.  Skrine  :  Expansion  of  Russia,  pp.  314-316. 


THE   EXPANSION   OF   EUSSIA  109 

by  the  terms  of  a  document  to  wliich  in  1884  she  had 
ahnost  made  herself  party.  Nor  were  her  fears  removed 
by  a  speech  made  by  Bismarck  only  a  few  days  after  the 
pubhcation  of  the  text.  "  The  fears,"  said  the  Chancellor, 
"  that  have  arisen  in  the  course  of  the  present  year  have 
been  caused  by  Russia,  more  even  than  by  France,  chiefly 
through  an  exchange  of  provocations,  threats,  insults, 
and  reciprocal  investigations,  which  have  occurred  during 
the  past  summer  in  the  Russian  and  French  Press.  .  .  . 
God  has  given  us  on  our  flank  the  French,  who  are  the 
most  warlike  and  turbulent  nation  that  exists,  and  He 
has  permitted  the  development  in  Russia  of  warlike 
propensities  which  until  lately  did  not  manifest  them- 
selves to  the  same  extent.  ...  By  means  of  courtesy 
and  kind  methods  we  may  be  easily,  too  easily  perhaps, 
influenced,  but  by  means  of  threats,  never.  We  Germans 
fear  God  and  nothing  else  in  the  world."  ^  The  terms  of 
this  speech  were  no  doubt  carefully  calculated  to  give 
both  to  France  and  to  Russia  serious  pause  in  any  steps 
they  might  be  contemplating  towards  a  closer  diplomatic 
or  military  understanding.  But  in  1890,  Bismarck  was 
removed,  and  power  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  young 
Emperor. 

From  this  moment  things  began  to  move  even  more  Develop- 
rapidly  towards  a  Franco-Russian  Alliance.     In  1890  the  ^^entof 
Russian  Government  had  to  acknowledge  two  striking  Russian 
acts  of  courtesy  at  the  hands  of  the  French  Ministry.  Entente 
The  great  Armament  factory,  Chatellerault,  was  placed 
by  the  French  Government  at  the  disposal  of  Russia, 
and  about  the  same  time  a  notorious  gang  of  Nihilist 
conspirators  engaged  in  France  in  the  manufacture  of 
bombs,  for  eventual  use  in  Russia,  were  cleverly  arrested 
by  the  French  police. 

A  year  later  there  was  an  even  more  conspicuous  demon-  French 
stration  of  the  friendly  relations  which  were  so  rapidly  J}^^^  ^* 
developing  between  the  two  countries.     In  July,  1891,  a 
French  fleet,  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Gervais, 
paid  a  ceremonial  visit  to  Cronstadt.     It  was  received 

*  Quoted  by  Seymour,  Diplomatic  Background  of  the  War,  pp.  47-48. 


110  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

by  tlie  Russian  authorities  with  the  greatest  enthusiasm. 
The  Czar  dined  on  board  the  French  flagship  and  stood 
uncovered  while  the  French  national  anthem  was  played. 
The  French  Admiral  and  his  officers  were  magnificently 
entertained  at  Cronstadt  by  the  Russian  Fleet  and  by 
the  Czar  and  his  officials  when  they  subsequently  visited 
St.  Petersburg  and  Moscow.  And  the  welcome  came 
not  only  from  the  Government,  but  from  the  people. 
Nowhere  since  1871  had  the  representatives  of  France 
received  so  cordial  a  welcome  abroad,  and  the  French 
people  were  deeply  touched. 
Franco-  Nor   was    the   ceremonial   visit   empty   of   diplomatic 

AiHance  consequences .  On  21st  August  an  alliance  is  believed 
to  have  been  definitely  concluded ;  it  was  followed  in 
1892  by  the  signature  of  a  military  convention  of  a  purely 
defensive  character,  and  in  June,  1893,  by  a  commercial 
treaty  of  far-reaching  importance.  The  cordial  relations 
between  the  two  countries  were  further  emphasised  in 
the  same  year  by  a  visit  paid  by  the  Russian  Mediterranean 
squadron  to  Toulon. 
Exchange  In  1894  the  diplomatic  position  of  Russia  was  rendered 
of  Visits  rather  more  uncertain  by  the  premature  death  of  the 
Czar  Alexander  III.  and  the  accession  of  Nicholas  II. 
The  young  Czar  was  passionately  devoted  to  the  cause 
of  peace.  He  became  the  husband,  in  November,  1894, 
of  a  German  princess  (Princess  AHce  of  Hesse-Darmstadt), 
and  made  no  secret  of  his  admiration  for  the  German 
Emperor.  His  accession  caused  no  interruption,  however, 
to  the  cordial  relations  which  subsisted  between  France 
and  his  own  country.  On  10th  June,  1895,  Monsieur 
Hanotaux,  who  had  succeeded  to  the  Foreign  Office  in 
1894,  made  pubhc  reference  to  the  Franco-Russian 
AUiance,  and  in  the  following  year  the  Alliance  was 
officially  acknowledged.  In  the  autumn  of  1896,  the 
Czar  and  his  young  bride  paid  official  visits  to  Berlin, 
to  Queen  Victoria  (the  bride's  grandmother),  and  finally, 
in  October,  to  Paris.  The  welcome  accorded  to  the  Czar 
and  ^Czarina  in  the  French  capital  was  unprecedently 
enthusiastic.     The  French  people  acclaimed  their  visitors 


THE   EXPANSION   OF   RUSSIA  111 

not  merely  as  a  bridal  pair,  but  as  staunch  and  honoured 
allies.  The  Czar  reviewed  100,000  French  troops  on  the 
plain  of  Chalons,  and  subsequently  declared  that  the 
army  whose  manoeuvres  he  had  witnessed  was  "  a  powerful 
support  of  the  principles  of  equity  upon  which  peace, 
order,  and  the  well-being  of  nations  were  founded,"  and 
declared  that  the  Empire  and  the  Repubhc  were  united 
in  indissoluble  friendship.  Ten  months  later,  in  August, 
1897,  these  courtesies  were  reciprocated  by  a  visit  paid 
by  President  Faure  to  Cronstadt.  The  significance  of 
this  exchange  of  courtesies  was  enhanced  by  the  presence 
at  Cronstadt  of  the  French  Minister,  M.  Hanotaux.  In 
a  speech  on  board  the  French  flagship  at  Cronstadt,  the 
Czar  pointedly  referred  to  France  and  Russia  as  "  friendly 
and  aUied  powers,"  and  insisted  that  "  they  were  equally 
resolved  to  maintain  the  world's  peace  in  a  spirit  of  right 
and  equity."  A  French  writer  has  emphasised  the 
significance  of  the  Franco-Russian  AlHance  from  the 
French  point  of  view  in  the  following  words  :  "It  assured 
us  in  Europe  a  moral  authority,  which  since  our  defeats 
had  been  wanting  to  us.  It  augmented  our  diplomatic 
value.  It  opened  to  us  the  field  of  political  combinations 
from  which  our  isolation  had  excluded  us.  From  mere 
observation  we  could  pass  to  action,  thanks  to  the  recovered 
balance  of  power.  .  .  ."  ^ 

If  the  results  of  the  alliance  were  important  to  France,  The 
they  were   certainly  of  not  less  significance  for  Russia,  j^^j"^^. 
For  two  hundred  years    Russia    had  pursued  a  foreign  Russia 
policy   of   singular   consistency.     That,   indeed,   is   small 
wonder,  if  we  remember  that  her  policy  was  dictated  by 
the  hard  and  unchanging  facts  of  physical  geography. 
The    dominant   facts    of    Russian   geography    are   three. 
First,  the  absence  of  a  coast-line  open  to  the  warm  water. 
Secondly,  a  great  river  system  tending  to  the  disintegration 
of  the  country  ;  and  thirdly,  a  vast  expanse  of  wind-swept 
plain  ;  the  absence  of  any  natural  barriers  except  the  Urals 
and  the  Caucasus,  and  the  consequent  liability  of  Russia 

1  Tardieu  :    France  and  her  Alliances,  p.  14  ;    quoted  by  Seymour  : 
op.  cit.  p.  53. 


112  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

to  invasion,  alike  from  the  east,  whence  the  Tartars 
in  distant  days  had  come,  and  from  the  west,  where,  in 
the  days  of  Polish  greatness,  she  had  been  open  to  the 
attacks  of  the  Poles,  and  since  the  destruction  of  Poland, 
of  the  Germans.  Policy,  therefore,  was  dictated  by 
geography,  and  the  policy  of  Russia  during  the  last  two 
hundred  years  may  be  summarised  in  the  two  words 
"  Unification  "  and  "  Expansion."  To  those  two  ends  a 
succession  of  remarkable  rulers  from  Peter  the  Great  to 
Alexander  II.  had  devoted  themselves.  With  the  unifica- 
tion of  Russia  this  narrative  is  not  immediately  concerned. 
It  is  her  expansion  which  concerns  the  international 
politics  of  Europe,  and  not  less,  indeed,  of  Asia.  Russia's 
supreme  object  was  to  reach  an  open  sea  not  closed  to  her 
commerce  by  ice.  The  obvious  door  was  through  the 
Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles  ;  but  that  door  had,  as  we 
have  seen,  been  thrice  banged  in  her  face  by  England  : 
by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  in  1856,  by  the  Treaties  of  London 
in  1840-41,  and  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  in  1878.  For  the 
check  to  her  ambition  imposed  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin, 
Russia  could  forgive  neither  England  nor  Germany.  But 
Bismarck,  with  great  subtlety,  pointed  out  to  the  Czar  that 
England,  though  not  open  to  attack  by  Russia  in  Europe, 
was  by  no  means  invulnerable  in  Asia.  The  idea  was  not, 
indeed,  original  to  Bismarck.  It  formed  the  basis  of  the 
accord  which  had  been  established  at  Tilsit  between 
Napoleon  I.  and  Alexander  I.  But,  thanks  to  the  develop- 
ment of  railway  communication,  Alexander  III,  was  in  a 
position  far  more  favourable  than  his  predecessors  to 
follow  the  hints  repeatedly  dropped  by  Bismarck. 
The  The  expansion  of  Russia  has,  during  the  last  century, 

^f^*"^"*'"  proceeded  upon  three  main  lines  :  first,  the  Caucasus  or 
C5is-Caspian  ;  secondly,  the  Trans-Caspian  ;  and  thirdly, 
the  Trans-Siberian.  Russia,  as  we  have  seen  in  another 
connection,  had  established  her  hold  upon  the  Black  Sea 
in  the  latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Later  on, 
the  north-eastern  and  eastern  shores  of  the  Black  Sea 
were  secured  by  a  gradual  advance  towards  the  Caucasus 
and  the  Caspian.     ''  In  1725  the  Russian  frontier  ran  in  an 


THE   EXPANSION   OF   RUSSIA  113 

irregular  line  from  Azof  to  the  river  Terek  on  the  Caspian  ; 
by  1815,  Kuban  (1784),  Derbend,  and  Baku  (1806),  Georgia, 
Mingrelia,  and  Karabagh  (1803)  had  been  annexed,  so 
that  the  western  shore  of  the  Caspians  as  far  as  the 
Persian  frontier  was  Russian.  The  nineteenth  century  has 
witnessed  a  steady  progress  and  consolidation.  In  1828 
Erivan  was  ceded  by  Persia  ;  the  conquest  and  absorption 
of  Kuban,  Circassia,  and  Daghestan  were  completed  be- 
tween 1859  and  1864,  and  though  Kars  was  captured  in 
1855  its  final  cession  with  the  free  port  of  Batoum  was  not 
made  until  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  of  1878."  ^  By  this  ad- 
vance Russia  was  brought  into  immediate  contact  with 
two  of  the  greatest  Muhammedan  Powers,  Persia  and  the 
Ottoman  Empire  in  Asia. 

More  significant,  however,  was  the  Trans-Caspian  ad-  Russia  in 
vance  of  Russia,  since  it  was  destined  to  raise  in  an  acute  ^"^^^^ 
form  the  relations  between  Russia  and  England.  The 
probability  of  a  conflict  in  Central  Asia  between  the  two 
great  European  Powers  had  long  been  foreseen  by  Russian 
diplomatists.  In  1844,  the  Czar  Nicholas  visited  England 
with  the  avowed  intention  of  reaching  some  agreement 
with  her  in  regard  to  outstanding  questions  in  the  Near 
and  the  Middle  East.  His  proposals  in  regard  to  the  future 
disposition  of  the  Turkish  heritage  in  Europe  do  not  imme- 
diately concern  us.  His  proposals,  however,  were  not 
confined  to  Europe ;  on  the  contrary,  he  suggested  that  it 
would  be  to  the  best  interests  of  both  empires  to  arrive 
at  a  frank  understanding  in  regard  to  their  relations  in 
Central  Asia.  The  Czar  undertook  to  refrain  from  any 
movement  against  the  Khanates  of  Turkestan,  and  to 
leave  them  as  a  neutral  zone  in  order  to  keep  the  Russian 
and  British  possessions  in  Asia  from  "  dangerous  con- 
tact." The  overtures  of  the  Czar,  which  were,  it  would 
seem,  inspired  by  a  genuine  desire  for  peace,  were  at  the 
time  coldly  received  by  English  statesmen.  The  matter 
was  reopened  by  Nicholas  on  the  eve  of  the  Crimean  War, 
in  his  historic  interviews  with  Sir  Hamilton  Seymour  at 
St.  Petersburg ;  but  with  a  similar  result.     The  failure  of 

^  Robertsou  :  op.  cit.  p.  19. 

8 


114  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

those  negotiations  precipitated  the  Crimean  War,  and  as  a 
result  of  that  war  a  definite  check  was  imposed  upon  Kussian 
ambition  in  regard  to  the  control  of  Constantinople  and  the 
Narrow  Straits.  Denied  access  to  European  waters  by  way 
of  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles,  Russia  renewed  her 
activities  in  Central  Asia.  The  tendency  at  Calcutta  in  the 
'sixties  was  to  regard  those  activities  with  a  careless  eye, 
and  Lord  Lawrence  ^  expressed  the  opinion  that  Russia 
"  might  prove  a  safer  neighbour  than  the  wild  tribes  of 
Central  Asia."  For  the  time  being,  therefore,  Russia  was 
left  free  to  fish  in  the  troubled  waters  of  Central  Asian 
politics.  Constant  strife  among  the  Turkoman  and 
Kirghiz  tribesmen  of  Turkestan,  and  between  the  Muham- 
iT^e  madan  Khanates   of   Bokhara,   Khiva,   Samarkand,   and 

Khanates    Khokaud,  gavc  Russian  emissaries  an  opportunity  which 
BtaL^^^^'    ^^®y  ^^  ^^^  neglect.     Russian  troops  occupied  Tashkend 
in  1864,  and  four  years  later  captured  Samarkand,  the 
capital  of  the  Khanate  of  Bokhara,  and  once  the  capital 
of  the  famous  empire  of  Tamerlane.     After  the  capture 
of  his  capital,  the  Khan  of  Bokhara  ceded  to  Russia  the 
whole  province  of  Samarkand. 
Afghani-         Russian  agents  had  meanwhile  been  showing  considerable 
Stan  activity  in  Afghanistan.     One  of  the  first  acts  of  Lord 

Auckland,  as  Governor-General  of  India  (1836-42),  was  to 
dispatch  Captain  Alexander  Burnes  on  a  mission  to  Kabul. 
On  arriving  at  Kabul,  Burnes  found  that  his  mission  had 
been  anticipated  by  a  Russian  envoy,  Vicovitch.  Vico- 
vitch  had  the  ear  of  Dost  Muhanuned,  the  brilliant  Afghan 
adventurer  who  had  recently  made  himself  master  of  the 
fierce  tribes  of  Afghanistan,  and  who  was  then  ruling  them 
with  an  iron  hand  as  Amir  of  Kabul.  Burnes  could 
ofier  him  nothing  but  the  platonic  friendship  and  half- 
hearted diplomatic  support  of  England.  Lord  Auckland 
thereupon  decided  to  withdraw  the  Burnes  Mission,  and 
to  replace  Dost  Muhammed  on  the  throne  of  Afghanistan 
by  a  puppet  of  his  o^vn.  An  expedition  was  dispatched 
from  India,  and  in  May,  1839,  legitimacy  was  restored  in 
Afghanistan  in  the  person  of  Shah  Suja.     The  inwardness 

^  Governor- General  of  India,  1863-69. 


THE   EXPANSION   OF   RUSSIA  115 

of  Auckland's  policy  is  clearly  revealed  by  a  dispatch  from 
Lord  Palmerston.  "  By  taking  tlie  Afghans  under  our 
protection,"  he  wrote,  "  and  in  garrisoning  if  necessary 
Herat,  we  shall  regain  our  ascendancy  in  Persia.  .  .  . 
British  security  in  Persia  gives  security  on  the  eastward  to 
Turkey,  and  tends  to  make  the  Sultan  more  independent, 
and  to  place  the  Dardanelles  more  securely  out  of  the  grasp 
of  Nicholas."  The  immediate  enterprise  in  Afghanistan 
proved,  however,  a  terrible  failure,  issuing  in  the  ghastly 
tragedy  which,  opening  with  the  assassination  of  two 
distinguished  Englishmen,  Burnes  and  Macnaughten  (1841), 
ended  in  the  costly  and  humiliating  retreat  from  Kabul. 

After  the  disasters  of   the  early  'forties,  the  English  British 
Government  pursued  for  some  thirty  years  a  consistent  cenS" 
poUcy   of   masterly   inactivity   in   Central   Asia.     Russia  Asia 
employed   the   opportunity  for   steady   though   stealthy 
advance.     The  Afghans  did  not  understand  the   policy 
of  masterly  inactivity,  and  again  and  again  apphed   to 
Calcutta    for    assistance.     Successive    Enghsh    rulers    at 
Calcutta  were  profuse  in  professions   of   platonic   good- 
will,   but    nothing    more    substantial    was    forthcoming. 
Meanwhile    the    conquest    of    Samarkand    had    brought 
Russia  up  to  the  northern  frontiers  of  Afghanistan,  and 
the  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Russia  deemed  it 
wise   therefore   to   make    some    attempt   to   delimit   the 
frontiers  between  the  two  Powers  in  Asia.     In  January, 
1873,  the  frontiers  were  formally  defined  by  treaty ;  but 
the  ink  upon  the  treaty  was  hardly  dry,  when  the  news 
arrived  that  Russian  troops  had  occupied  Khiva  (June,  Russians 
1873).     Count    Schuvaloff    assured    the    British    Govern-  ^^  ^^^^ 
ment  that  the  occupation  was  a  purely  temporary  ex- 
pedient,   but   the    moment    of    evacuation    has   not   yet 
arrived.     At  Khiva,  Russia  was  within  four  hundred  miles 
of  the  north-western  frontier  of  British  India. 

On  the  eve  of  his  departure  from  India  (1869),  Lord  British 
Lawrence  indited  a  dispatch  which  seemed  to  indicate  a  ?^^^/^J 
change  of  attitude,  if  not  of  policy  ;   he  advised  a  "  clear  stan 
understanding  with  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  as  to  its 
projects  and  designs  in  Central  Asia,  and  that  it  might  be 


Hi 

Afghani* 


116  EUKOPE   AND   BEYOND 

given  to  understand  in  firm  and  courteous  language  tliat 
it  cannot  be  permitted  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of 
Afghanistan,  or  in  those  of  any  State  which  hes  contiguous 
to  our  frontier."  Such  an  intimation  to  Russia  was 
clearly  inconsistent  with  the  poUcy  of  masterly  inactivity 
to  which  Lawrence  had  previously  adhered.  But  that 
poHcy  still  commended  itself  to  the  Home  Government. 
Sher  Ah,  then  ruler  of  Afghanistan,  was  seriously  alarmed 
by  the  advance  of  Russia,  and  when,  in  1873,  the  Russians 
were  marching  on  Khiva,  he  tried  to  persuade  the  Viceroy 
that  "  the  interests  of  the  Afghan  and  Enghsh  Government 
are  identical,  and  that  the  border  of  Afghanistan  is  in 
truth  the  border  of  India."  The  Government  in  Whitehall 
thought  otherwise,  and  instructed  the  Viceroy  to  inform  the 
Amir  that  the  British  Government  could  not  share  his 
alarm,  and  considered  that  there  was  no  cause  for  it. 
Nevertheless  we  promised  to  "  maintain  our  settled  poHcy 
in  favour  of  Afghanistan  if  the  Amir  abides  by  our  advice 
in  external  affairs."  Repulsed  by  Calcutta,  Sher  Ali 
threw  in  his  lot  with  Russia. 

Russia  meanwhile  was  steadily  advancing.  In  January, 
1874,  Russia  went  out  of  her  way  to  inform  Great  Britain 
that  she  "  continued  to  consider  Afghanistan  as  entirely 
beyond  her  sphere  of  action."  Her  deeds,  however, 
appeared  to  behe  her  words,  with  the  result  that  Lord 
Lytton,  who  in  1876  had  been  appointed  by  DisraeH  to 
the  Viceroyalty  of  India,  attempted  to  induce  the  Amir 
of  Afghanistan  to  receive  British  residents  at  Kanda- 
har and  Herat.  The  Amir  demurred.  Meanwhile  the 
Russians  had  made  themselves  masters  of  Khokand,  while 
the  British  Government  had  concluded  with  the  Khan  of 
Kelat  in  Baluchistan  the  important  Treaty  of  Jacobabad 
(December,  1876).  That  treaty  gave  us  the  right  of 
garrisoning  Quetta,  a  position  which  turns  the  flank 
of  the  Afghan  frontier,  opposed  to  India,  along  the 
mountains  across  the  Indus.  The  Treaty  of  Jacobabad 
alarmed  the  Amir,  but  not  sufl&ciently  to  induce  him  to 
receive  a  British  resident,  though  he  deemed  it  not  in- 
consistent to  receive  in  1878  a  mission  from  Russia.    Under 


THE   EXPANSION   OF   RUSSIA  117 

these  circumstances  there  could  be  but  one  answer  to 
the  Amir's  refusal.  A  large  British  force  marched  into 
Afghanistan,  and  in  May,  1879,  dictated  the  Treaty  of 
Gandamak.  Sher  Ali,  reahsing  the  hopelessness  of  resist- 
ance, had  fled  into  Turkestan  with  such  members  of  the 
Kussian  Mission  as  Ungered  at  Kabul.  His  son,  Yakub 
Khan,  agreed  to  receive  a  permanent  British  Embassy, 
with  a  suitable  escort  at  Kabul ;  to  conduct  his  foreign 
pohcy  under  the  advice  of  Great  Britain  ;  to  give  facilities 
for  trade,  and  to  allow  such  a  rectification  of  the  north- 
western frontier  as  was  demanded  by  the  scientific  school 
of  British  strategists.  In  return,  he  was  to  be  supported 
against  external  aggression,  and  to  receive  an  annual 
subsidy  of  six  lacs  of  rupees. 

The  circumstances  of  Burnes'  fatal  mission  were  then  Cavagnari's 
almost  precisely  reproduced.  Sir  Louis  Cavagnari,  having  ^fath"^'^'* 
accepted  the  mission  to  Kabul,  arrived  in  the  city  in 
July,  1879.  In  September  he  and  all  his  comrades  were 
murdered  by  the  mutinous  soldiery  of  the  Amir.  The 
news  reached  Simla  on  4th  September,  and  two  days  later 
Major- General  Roberts  left  Simla  to  take  command  of  the 
Kabul  Field  Force.  Roberts  reached  Kabul  early  in 
October.  He  found  Kabul  "  much  more  Russian  than 
Enghsh,  the  officers  arrayed  in  uniform  of  Russian  pattern, 
Russian  money  in  the  Treasury,  and  Russian  wares  in  the 
bazaar."  Before  he  left,  he  brought  to  light  much  evidence 
as  to  Russian  designs  in  Afghanistan,  and  he  placed  it  on 
formal  record  that  in  his  opinion  the  recent  rupture  with 
Sher  Ah  had  "  been  the  means  of  unmasking  and  checking 
a  very  serious  conspiracy  against  the  peace  and  security 
of  our  Indian  Empire." 

Afghanistan  itself  remained  a  problem.     To  retain  it  Alternative 
in  perpetuity  was  out  of  the  question.     Only  two  alter-  Afghani-" 
natives  presented  themselves,  either  to  erect  Afghanistan  stan 
into  a  strong  buffer  State,  or  to  retain  Enghsh  influence  in 
the  country  by  breaking  it  up  among  several  rulers.     The 
latter  pohcy  was  favoured  by  Lord  Lytton,  but  the  at- 
tempt to  carry  it  out  proved  unexpectedly  difficult.     A 
strong  ruler  having  appeared  in  Afghanistan  in  the  person 


118  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

of  Abdur  Rahman,  the  British  Government  ultimately 
decided  to  evacuate  Kandahar  (which  had  in  the  mean- 
time been  relieved  after  a  superb  march  by  General  Roberts) 
and  to  rely  upon  the  friendship  of  Abdur  Rahman  and  the 
policy  of  the  buffer  State. 
Merv  Meanwhile  Russia,  simultaneously  headed  off  from 
Afghanistan  and  from  Constantinople  (Treaty  of  Berlin, 
1878)  mainly  by  England  and  her  minions,  again  turned 
her  activities  towards  Central  Asia.  A  disastrous  campaign 
against  the  Tekke-Turkomans  in  the  autumn  of  1878  was 
followed  in  1879  by  an  unsuccessful  attack  upon  the 
strong  fortress  of  Denghil-Tepe  and  a  disorderly  retreat 
to  the  Caspian.  These  disasters  were,  however,  amply 
retrieved  in  1881  by  the  brilhant  campaign  of  General 
Scobeleff  ;  by  the  capture  of  Denghil-Tepe,  and  by  a 
terrible  punishment  inflicted  upon  the  predatory  tribes 
which  had  found  in  it  their  stronghold.  This  renewal  of 
Russian  activity  excited  serious  alarm  both  in  London 
and  in  Calcutta.  There  were  rumours  that  Russia  was 
preparing  to  occupy  Merv.  Russia  disavowed  the  inten- 
tion ;  but  early  in  1884,  Russia,  relying  upon  England's 
pre-occupation  in  the  Soudan,  occupied  Merv  and  Saraks, 
and  thus  came  within  200  miles  of  Herat.  This  step  was 
in  direct  violation  of  Gortchakoff's  assurance  given  to  the 
British  Government  in  1882,  that  Merv  "  lay  outside  the 
sphere  of  Russian  influence."  ^ 

Nevertheless,  the  British  Government  assented,  some- 
what tamely,  to  the  proposal  for  the  appointment  of  a 
joint  Commission  to  delimit  the  northern  frontier  of 
Afghanistan.  The  disputed  boundary  line  lay  between 
the  rivers  Hari  Rud  and  Oxus.  Sir  Peter  Lumsden,  the 
British  Commissioner,  reached  the  Afghan  Frontier  on 
19th  November,  1884.  His  Russian  colleague,  M.  Zehnoi, 
excused  himself  on  the  score  of  illness  until  February. 
February  came,  but  still  no  Zelinoi.  The  affront  was 
unmistakable,  and  British  patience  was  almost  exhausted, 
the  more  excusably  as  the  Russians  usefully  employed 
the  interval  by  occupying  various  eligible  points  in  dispute. 
^  Fitzmaiirine  :  TAfe  of  Lord  Granville,  ii.  p.  420. 


THE   EXPANSION   OF   RUSSIA  119 

Matters  came  to  a  crisis  when,  in  March,  1885,  the  The  Penj- 
Russians  seized  Penjdeh,  a  village  about  a  hundred  miles  1834:^^5*^'^' 
due  south  of  Merv.  The  news  of  the  seizure  of  Penjdeh 
aroused  pubhc  excitement  in  England  to  the  highest  pitch. 
"  We  know,"  said  Gladstone,  "  that  the  attack  was  a 
Russian  attack  ;  we  know  that  the  Afghans  suffered  in 
life,  in  spirit,  and  in  repute  ;  we  know  that  a  blow  was 
struck  at  the  credit  and  authority  of  the  Sovereign,  our 
protected  ally,  who  had  committed  no  offence  ...  we 
must  do  our  best  to  have  right  done  in  the  matter."  The 
British  Government  acted  with  unusual  promptitude. 
They  called  out  the  Reserves,  and  moved  a  vote  of  credit 
for  £11,000,000,  £4,500,000  of  which  was  for  the  Soudan 
Expedition.  The  Vote  was  agreed  to  without  a  dissentient 
voice — a  broad  hint  to  Russia  which  contributed  not  a 
Uttle  to  a  peaceful  issue.  Lord  Dufferin,  who  had  become 
Viceroy  in  1884,  exercised  all  his  great  diplomatic  skill  to 
the  same  end,  and  converted  Abdur  Rahman,  who  fortun- 
ately happened  to  be  at  the  moment  his  guest  at  Rawal 
Pindi,  to  a  similar  view.  "  My  country,"  the  Amir  after- 
wards wrote,  "  is  like  a  poor  goat  on  whom  the  lion  and  the 
bear  have  both  fixed  their  eyes,  and  without  the  protec- 
tion of  the  Almighty  Deliverer  the  victim  cannot  escape 
very  long."  For  the  moment,  however,  war  between 
England  and  Russia  was  averted.  Penjdeh,  for  which 
Abdur  Rahman  cared  comparatively  Httle,  was  left  in  the 
hands  of  Russia,  but  in  compensation  the  Amir  secured 
the  exclusive  control  of  the  Zulfikar  Pass,  for  which  he 
cared  much. 

Between  Russia  and  Afghanistan  the  matter  was  thus  Angio- 
satisfactorily  adjusted.     Between  Russia  and  England,  on  Agree-" 
the  contrary,  negotiations  were  protracted  until  July,  1887,  ments, 
when  a  protocol  between  the  two  Powers  was  signed  at  ^^^^" 
St.  Petersburg.     By  the  agreement  then  reached  a  definite 
check  was  put  upon  Russian  advance  towards  Herat,  and 
the  frontier  was  settled  up  to  the  line  of  the  Oxus.     The 
same  year  witnessed  the  annexation  to  India  of  the  Quetta 
district   under   the    designation   of    British   Baluchistan. 
Checked  on  the  western  frontier  of  Afghanistan,  the  Russians 


120  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

continued  their  advance  northwards  and  eastwards,  and  in 
1895  annexed  the  Pamirs.     Their  frontier  thus  came  to 
march  with  that  of  Chinese  Turkestan  to  the  east,  and  on 
the  south  with  that  of  the  British  North- West  Frontier 
Provinces,  the  frontier  being  defined  by  another  Anglo - 
Russian   Convention    signed   in    1895.     "  The    boundary- 
pillars, "  writes  Sir  Alfred  Lyall,  "  now  set  up  by  British 
and  Russian  officers  on  the  Hindu  Kush  and  by  the  Oxus, 
record  the  first  dehberate  and  practical  attempts  made  by 
the  two  European  Powers  to  stave  off  the  contact  of  their 
incessantly  expanding  Asiatic  Empires."     Not,  however, 
until  the  conclusion  of  the  comprehensive  Anglo -Russian 
Convention  of  1907  was  a  complete  understanding  reached 
between  the  two  Empires.    Afghanistan  was  then  definitely 
recognised  by  Russia  as  faUing  within  the  British  sphere 
of  influence  ;   Russia  undertook  that  all  negotiations  with 
the  Amir  should  be  conducted  through  Great  Britain,  and 
Afghanistan  at  last  became  what  one  school  of  British 
statesmen  had  always  desired  to  make  it,  a  real  buffer 
State,  calculated  to  resist  the  impact  of  Russia  on  the  one 
side  and  Great  Britain  on  the  other,  though  "  protected  " 
by  the  latter. 
Russia  in        Russian  activities  were  not,  however,  confined  to  Central 
eTs^^^       Asia  and  the  borders  of  Afghanistan.     For  a  century  past, 
Russia  had  been  pushing  steadily  on  towards  the  Pacific. 
By  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  whole  of 
Siberia  up  to  the  frontiers  of  the  Chinese  Empire  had  been 
brought  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Czars.     A  further 
period  of  advance  was  marked  by  the  appointment  in 
1847  of  one  of  the  most  remarkable  of  Russian  soldier 
adventurers,   General  Muraviev,  as  Governor- General  of 
Eastern  Siberia.     In  1849,  Muraviev  constructed  on  the 
eastern  shore  of  Kamskatka  the  fortress  of  Petropavlovsk, 
and  so  well  was  his  work  done  that  the  fortress  resisted  the 
attack  of  an  Anglo-French  squadron  in  the  course  of  the 
Crimean  War  (1854).     In  1850  Nikolaievsk  was  established 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Amur,  and  eight  years  later,  by  the 
Treaty  of  Aigun   (May,   1858),  Muraviev  obtained  from 
China  the  cession  of  the  entire  Pacific  seaboard  between  the 


THE   EXPANSION   OF   RUSSIA  121 

rivers  Amur  and  Usur.  Two  years  later  (October,  1860) 
a  war  between  England  and  France,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
China  on  the  other,  resulted  in  large  commercial  conces- 
sions to  the  Western  Powers  (October,  1860).  Muraviev 
promptly  claimed  similar  concessions  for  Russia.  "  Hither- 
to inland  trade  between  the  two  Empires  had  been  confined 
to  a  point  south  of  Lake  Baikal.  By  a  Treaty  with  China, 
signed  in  November,  1860,  this  restriction  was  swept 
away  in  the  case  of  caravans  of  less  than  200  persons,  and 
the  previous  agreement  of  Aigun  was  confirmed.  The 
Amur  became  a  Russian  river,  and  was  protected  by  a  chain 
of  fortresses.  At  the  southern  bend  of  the  Pacific  seaboard, 
the  Rassians  founded  Vladivostok,"  ^  which  despite  the  Vladivos- 
ice  which  blocks  it  during  the  winter  months  became  an  ^^^ 
important  naval  base  and  gave  to  the  Russians  a  firm  grip 
upon  the  Northern  Pacific.  Conformably  with  their  tra- 
ditional policy,  the  Russians  proceeded  to  connect  the 
extreme  points  of  their  vast  land  empire  by  an  elaborate 
railway  system.  The  administration  of  M.  Witte  was 
particularly  memorable  in  this  regard,  and  by  the  close  of 
the  nineteenth  century  the  Russian  Empire  possessed  no 
less  than  41,577  miles  of  permanent  way,  of  which  22,846 
miles  were  owned  by  the  State.  Among  these  enterprises 
the  most  ambitious  was  that  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway, 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  was  definitely  begun  in  1891  with 
the  object  of  connecting  St.  Petersburg  and  Vladivostok. 
The  work  was  pushed  on  with  tireless  energy,  and  the  vast 
system,  extending  over  5,542  miles,  was  opened  for  through 
traffic  in  1902. 

Long  before  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway  was  com-  Russia  and 
pleted,  however,  the  entrance  of  a  new  factor  into  the  ^^"* 
politics  of  the  Far  East  was  revealed  by  the  outbreak  of  a 
war  between  China  and  Japan,  the  significance  of  which 
will  be  discussed  in  a  later  chapter.  That  war  was  brought 
to  an  end  by  the  Treaty  of  Shimonseki  in  1895.  Before 
that  Treaty  was  ratified,  Russia,  acting  in  concert  with 
France  and  Germany,  intimated  to  the  Japanese  conquerors 
that  they  would  not  be  permitted  to  reap  the  full  harvest 

1  Skrine  :.  op.  cit.  p.  243. 


122  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

of  victory.  The  European  Powers  declared  that  the  cession 
of  the  Liaotung  Peninsula  would  give  to  Japan  a  dangerous 
predominance  in  the  affairs  of  China,  would  disturb  the 
whole  balance  of  power  on  the  Pacific,  and  would  inevit- 
ably prove  a  perpetual  obstacle  to  the  permanent  peace  of 
the  Far  East.  The  Liaotung  Peninsula  was  consequently 
sullenly  restored  to  China,  but,  foiled  for  the  moment  in 
her  ambitious  schemes,  Japan  immediately  set  to  work  to 
prepare  for  the  greater  struggle  which  European  inter- 
vention had  clearly  revealed  to  be  imminent. 

Meanwhile  Kussia  took  full  advantage  of  her  new 
position  as  protectress  of  the  integrity  of  China.  China 
found  herself  unequal  to  the  task  of  paying  the  war  in- 
demnity imposed  upon  her  by  Japan,  and  Eussia  therefore 
undertook  to  assist  her  by  raising  in  Paris  a  4  per  cent, 
loan  of  400,000,000  francs.  As  a  price  for  this  assistance, 
Russia  was  permitted  to  establish  in  China  the  Russo- 
Chinese  Bank,  with  very  extensive  fiscal  powers,  including 
the  receipt  of  taxes,  the  management  of  local  finances, 
and,  under  concessions  by  the  Chinese  authorities,  the 
construction  of  an  extended  system  of  railway  and  tele- 
graph lines.  Even  more  important  was  the  conclusion 
(1896)  of  a  secret  treaty  of  alliance  between  Russia  and 
China,  under  the  terms  of  which  Russia  obtained  the  right 
to  make  use  of  any  harbour  in  China,  to  levy  Chinese 
troops  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  with  any  Asiatic  State,  the 
free  use  of  Port  Arthur  or,  if  the  other  Powers  should 
object,  of  Kiaochow  in  time  of  peace,  while  the  whole  of 
Manchuria  was  thrown  open  to  Russian  ofiicers  for  pur- 
poses of  survey,  etc. ;  and  it  was  agreed  that  on  the  com- 
pletion of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway  a  line  should  be 
constructed  southwards  to  Talienwan  or  some  other  point 
mutually  agreed  upon  under  the  joint  control  of  Russia 
and  China.^ 
Europe  Already,  however,  other  complications  were  making 
^p"^^/^®g^  themselves  felt  in  the  politics  of  the  Far  East.  The 
European  Powers  might  intervene  to  prevent  the  spoliation 

^  Asakawa y  The  Russo- Japanese  Conflict,  pp.  85-7  ;  quoted  by  Rose  : 
op.  cj7.'p.  57, 


THE   EXPANSION   OF   RUSSIA  123 

of  China  at  the  hands  of  Japan,  but  the  events  of  1898  to 
1900,  to  which  further  reference  must  presently  be  made,  are 
a  sufficient  indication  that  the  intervention  was  not  purely 
altruistic.  The  occupation  of  Port  Arthur  by  Kussia,  of 
Kiaochow  by  Germany,  and  of  Wei-Hai-Wei  by  England 
(1898),  marks  the  beginning  of  a  fresh  stage  in  the  ex- 
pansion of  Europe  and  the  opening  of  a  new  chapter  in 
the  history  of  Asia. 

AUTHORITIES 

Rambaud  :  Russia.      (2  vols..  London.  1879.) 

F.  H.  Skrine  :  Expansion  of  Russia.     (Cambridge,  190f?.) 

D.  M.  Wallace  :  Russia.     (2  vols.,  London.  1905.) 

Kluchevsky  :  History  of  Russia. 

Leroy-Beaulieu  :  U Empire  des  Tsars  et  Us  Russes. 

Stepniak  :  Russia  under  the  Czars.      (London,  1885.) 

T.  E.  Holland  :  Treaty  Relations  between  Russia  and  Turhey.    (London, 

1877.) 
T.  E.  Holland  :  European  Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question.     (Oxford. 

1885.) 
J.  A.  R.  Marriott  :  The  Eastern  Question.     (Oxford,  1918.) 
Serge  Goriainow  :  Le  Bosphore  et  les  Dardanelles. 
Seymour:  Diplomatic  Background  of  the  War.     (Yale,  1910.) 
Tardieu  :  France  and  the  Alliances. 

Daudet  :  Histoire  Diplomatique  de  V  Alliance  Franco- Rv.'isp. 
Reventlow  :   Deutschlnnds  answt'irtege  Politik. 
Bebidour  :  op.  cit. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA  AS  A  WORLD-POWER 

The  Spanish- American  War  (1898) 

The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us  in  regard  to  foreign  nations  is,  in  extend- 
ing our  commercial  relations,  to  have  with  them  as  little  political  connec- 
tion as  possible.  ...  It  is  our  true  policy  to  steer  clear  of  permanent 
alliances  with  any  portion  of  the  foreign  world. — Washington  (1795). 

Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should  be  never  to  entangle  our- 
selves in  the  broils  of  Europe ;  our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to 
intermeddle  with  Cis- Atlantic  affairs. — Jefferson  (1801). 

The  march  of  events  rules  and  overrules  human  action.  Avowmg 
unreservedly  the  purpose  which  has  animated  all  our  effort,  and  still 
solicitous  to  adhere  to  it,  we  cannot  be  unmindful  that,  without  any 
desire  or  design  on  our  part,  the  war  has  brought  us  new  duties  and 
responsibilities  which  we  must  meet  and  discharge  as  becomes  a  great 
nation  on  whose  growth  and  career  from  the  beginning  the  Ruler  of 
Nations  has  plainly  written  the  high  command  and  pledge  of  civilisa- 
tion.—McKinley  (1898). 

Neutrality  is  no  longer  feasible  or  desirable  where  the  peace  of  the 
world  is  involved  and  the  freedom  of  its  peoples. — Woodrow  Wilson 
(2nd  April,  1917). 

America  '^  I  ^HE  entrance  of  the  United  States  of  America  into 
poHc^*''^'^'  1  ^1^^  World-War  in  1917  was  acclaimed  as  the 
opening  of  a  new  chapter  in  world- history.  In  one  sense 
the  instinct  which  so  regarded  it  was  not  at  fault.  In  1917 
the  United  States  of  America  took  their  place  side  by  side 
with  great  European  Powers  in  a  conflict  which  on  a 
superficial  view  was  primarily  European.  It  is,  however, 
a  mistake  to  imagine  that  because  America  is  separated 
from  Europe  by  several  thousand  miles  of  sea,  and  because 
her  statesmen,  from  Washington  downwards,  have  in- 
sisted that  it  was  no  part  of  the  business  of  America  to 
intervene  in  the  domestic  politics  of  Europe,  that  America 

124 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AS   A   WORLD-POWER      125 

was  guiltless  of  a  foreign  policy,  and  had  no  intention  of 
playing  its  part  in  world- affairs.  "  Nothing,"  writes  Pro- 
fessor J.  B.  Moore,  "could  be  more  erroneous  than  the 
supposition  that  the  United  States  has,  as  the  result  of 
certain  changes  in  its  habits,  suddenly  become  within  the 
past  few  years  a  world-power.  The  United  States  has, 
in  reality,  always  been  in  the  fullest  and  highest  sense  a 
world-power."  And  again  :  "As  conventionalised  in  the 
annual  messages  of  Presidents  to  Congress,  the  American 
people  are  distinguished  chiefly  by  their  peaceful  disposi- 
tion and  their  freedom  from  territorial  ambitions.  Never- 
theless, in  spite  of  their  quiet  propensities,  it  has  fallen  to 
their  lot,  since  they  forcibly  achieved  their  independence, 
to  have  had  four  foreign  wars,  three  general  and  one 
limited,  and  the  greatest  civil  war  in  history,  and  to  have 
acquired  a  territorial  domain  almost  five  times  as  great  as 
the  respectable  endowment  with  which  they  began  their 
national  career."  ^  The  point  here  emphasised  is  one 
which  EngKsh  commentators  on  Ajnerican  politics  have 
been  curiously  apt  to  overlook.  The  United  States  of 
America  have  had  their  full  share  in  the  movement  towards 
territorial  expansion  which,  as  we  have  seen,  has  been 
characteristic  of  the  Great  Powers  during  the  last  century. 
The  expansion  in  the  case  of  the  United  States  was  mainly 
upon  American  soil,  and  the  annexations  were,  for  the  most 
part,  effected  by  purchase  or  other  forms  of  peaceful 
negotiation.  Consequently,  the  world  has  taken  com- 
paratively little  note  of  them,  and  has  been  disposed  to 
regard  such  transactions  as  coming  within  the  sphere  of 
domestic  politics,  and  so  has  tended  to  minimise  the  part 
which  foreign  affairs  have  played  in  the  politics  of  the 
American  people. 

Yet  the  facts  briefly  and  bluntly  stated  must  dispel  The 
any  illusion  on  this  head.     The  continental  area  of  the  of^i^e"^^°" 
United  States  is  now  (1920)  2,973,890  square  miles.     The  United 
area  of  the  territory  ceded  by  Great  Britain  to  the  colonies  ^^^^^ 
which  renounced  their  allegiance  to  her  was  in  1783  about 
827,844  square  miles.     Of  this,  considerably  less  than  half 

^  American  Diplumacy,  p.  223. 


126  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

belonged  to  the  original  thirteen  colonies  which  occupied 
the  narrow  strip  between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Alleghanies. 
The  larger  hali  comprised  the  Hinterland,  between  the 
Alleghanies  and  the  Mississippi,  out  of  which  were  carved 
the  States  of  Kentucky  (1791)  and  Tennessee  (1796),  and 
the  vast  territory  originally  known  as  the  North-West 
Territory.  This  territory  was  for  many  years  held  by 
the  United  States  as  Federal  Domain,  but  was  gradually, 
between  the  years  1803  and  1858,  carved  up  into  the  fully 
constituted  States  of  Ohio,  Indiana,  lUinois,  Michigan, 
Wisconsin,  and  part  of  Minnesota.  Meanwhile  the  United 
States  had  taken  the  first  of  many  steps  on  the  path  of 
territorial  expansion,  a  step  which  involved  the  absorp- 
tion of  a  large  population  of  Frenchmen  and  Spaniards. 
In  1803,  President  Jefferson  purchased  from  Napoleon 
for  815,000,000  the  great  Louisiana  territory,  out  of 
which  no  less  than  twelve  States  were  ultimately  carved 
out.  By  this  purchase,  Jcjierson  more  than  doubled 
the  area  of  the  United  States.  In  1819  Florida  was 
purchased  from  Spain,  and  in  1845  Texas  was  annexed. 
The  Mexiraii  War  of  1846-48  resulted  in  a  fresh  annexa- 
tion comprising  nearly  600,000  square  miles  of  territory — a 
territory  nearly  equal  in  area  to  Germany,  France,  and 
Spain.  Out  of  this,  the  States  of  Cahfornia,  Nevada,  and 
parts  of  Colorado  and  Wyoming  were  created.  The 
settlement  of  the  Oregon  dispute  with  England  in  1846 
ultimately  added  to  the  union  the  States  of  Oregon, 
Washington,  and  Idaho,  while  the  purchase  of  Alaska 
from  Russia  in  1867  added  more  than  500,000  square  miles 
of  territory  to  the  States.  These  facts  will  at  least 
suffice  to  show  that  the  American  record  of  expansion 
does  not  fall  behind  that  of  the  leading  European  Powers 
in  the  nineteenth  century.  In  less  than  one  hundred 
years  after  the  recognition  of  Independence,  the  United 
States  was  more  than  quadrupled  in  size.  Thus,  as 
Professor  Muir  has  truly  said  :  "  The  Imperiahst  spirit 
was  working  as  powerfully  in  the  democratic  communities 
of  the  New  World  as  in  the  monarchies  of  Europe.  Not 
content  with  the  possession  of  vast  and  almost  unpeopled 


THE    UNITED   STATES   AS   A   WORLD-POWER       127 

areas,  they  had  spread  their  dominion  from  ocean  to 
ocean,  and  built  up  an  empire  less  extensive  indeed  than 
that  of  Kussia,  but  even  more  compact,  far  richer  in 
resources,  and  far  better  suited  to  be  the  home  of  a  highly 
civihsed  people."  ^ 

If,  however,  it  be  erroneous  to  imagine  that  the  United  ^'ii« 
States  has  lacked  the  will  and  the  power  to  expand,  it  Doctrine 
would  be  equally  erroneous  to  ignore  the  truth  that, 
throughout  the  greater  part  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
the  United  States  was  even  more  concerned  with  the 
problem  of  maintaining  national  unity.  With  her  success- 
ful solution  of  that  problem,  this  narrative  cannot  concern 
itself.  It  is,  however,  proper  to  point  out  that  the 
enunciation  and  maintenance  of  the  Monroe  doctrine 
largely  contributed  to  the  success.  The  germ  of  that 
famous  doctrine  may  perhaps  be  discovered  in  a  passage 
in  the  speech  with  which,  in  1795,  George  Washington 
bade  farewell  to  office.  "  The  great  rule  of  conduct  for 
us  in  regard  to  foreign  nations  is,  in  extending  our  com- 
mercial relations,  to  have  with  them  as  httle  Political 
connection  as  possible.  Europe  has  a  set  of  primary 
interests  which  to  us  have  none,  or  a  very  remote,  relation. 
Hence  she  must  be  engaged  in  frequent  controversies, 
the  causes  of  which  are  essentially  foreign  to  our  concerns. 
Hence,  therefore,  it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to  implicate 
ourselves,  by  artificial  ties,  in  the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of 
her  politics,  or  the  ordinary  combinations  and  colHsions 
of  her  friendships  or  enmities.  Our  detached  and  distant 
situation  invites  and  enables  us  to  pursue  a  different 
course.  .  .  .  Why  forego  the  advantages  of  so  peculiar 
a  situation  ?  Why  quit  our  own  to  stand  upon  foreign 
ground  ?  Why,  by  interweaving  our  destiny  with  that 
of  any  part  of  Europe,  entangle  our  peace  and  prosperity 
in  the  toils  of  European  ambition,  rivalship,  interest, 
humour,  or  caprice  ?     It  is  our  true  policy  to  steer  clear 

^  The  Expansion  of  Europe,  p.  91.  Mr.  Pitman  Potter  {American 
Journal  of  International  Law,  1920)  takes  exception  to  Mr.  Muir's 
assertion,  and  still  more  to  the  argument  of  the  present  chapter,  the 
substance  of  which  appeared  in  the  Edinburgh  Review  (April,  1919). 


128  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

of  permanent  alliances  with  any  portion  of  the  foreign 
world."  On  his  accession  to  oJB&ce  in  1801,  Jefferson 
reaffirmed  in  phrase  even  more  trenchant  the  maxims 
first  enunciated  by  Washington.  "  Peace,  commerce,  and 
honest  friendship  with  all  nations ;  entangUng  alliances 
with  none."  This  principle  contributed  only  one-half  of 
the  Monroe  doctrine.  To  the  pohcy  of  non-intervention 
by  America  in  Europe  was  later  added  the  complementary 
principle  of  no  intervention  by  Europe  in  America.  The 
latter  haH  of  the  formula  was  due  immediately  to  the 
revolt  of  the  Spanish  colonies  in  South  America,  and 
to  the  anxiety  of  George  Canning,  then  Foreign  Secretary 
in  England,  to  thwart  the  supposed  designs  of  the  Holy 
AlHance,  and  in  particular  of  France,  upon  the  Spanish 
colonies. 
ThePresi-  The  Message  sent  to  Congress  on  2nd  December,  1823, 
M^^aee  ^y  President  Monroe  contained  the  following  passages  : — 
of  2nd  "...  The  occasion  has  been  judged  proper  for  assert- 

Dec.  1823  jj^g^  g^g  g^  principle  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of 
the  United  States  are  involved,  that  the  American 
continents,  by  the  free  and  independent  condition  which 
they  have  assumed  and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not 
to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  any  future  colonisation 
by  any  European  Powers.  .  .  .  We  owe  it,  therefore, 
to  candour  and  to  the  amicable  relations  existing  between 
the  United  States  and  those  Powers,  to  declare  that  we 
should  consider  any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend 
their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere,  as  dangerous 
to  our  peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing  colonies  or 
dependencies  of  any  European  Power  we  have  not  inter- 
fered, and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with  the  Governments 
who  have  declared  their  independence  and  maintained  it, 
and  whose  independence  we  have,  on  great  consideration 
and  on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view 
any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or 
controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any 
other  European  Power,  in  any  other  light  than  as  the 
manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  towards  the 
United  States.  .  .  . 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AS   A   WORLD-POWER      129 

"  Our  policy  in  regard  to  Europe  ...  is,  not  to  inter- 
fere in  the  internal  concerns  of  any  of  its  Powers  ;  to 
consider  the  government  de  facto  as  the  legitimate  govern- 
ment for  us  ;  to  cultivate  friendly  relations  with  it,  and 
to  preserve  those  relations  by  a  frank,  firm,  and  manly 
policy,  meeting  in  all  instances  the  just  claims  of  every 
Power,  submitting  to  injuries  from  none." 

In  this  message  Canning  got  much  more  than  he  had 
bargained  for.  All  he  wanted  was  the  co-operation  of  the 
United  States  in  warning  the  Holy  Alliance  off  from  South 
America.  What  he  got  was  a  general  intimation  urhi  et 
orbi  that  henceforward  the  American  Continent  would  be 
the  exclusive  preserve  of  the  American  people,  and  that 
no  further  acquisitions  on  American  soil  would  be  per- 
mitted to  European  or  to  other  States. 

From  1823  to  1917  the  Monroe  doctrine  has  been  the  The 
sheet-anchor  of  American  diplomacy.    It  was  not,  how-  Question^" 
ever,  until  the  last  years  of  the  nineteenth  century  that  isos 
the  doctrine  was  invoked  by  the  United  States  in  a  matter 
of  serious  importance.     For  many  years  past  there  had 
been  some  dispute  between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela 
as  to  the  precise  boundary  between  the  latter  State  and 
British  Guiana.    Lord  Aberdeen  had  attempted  to  effect 
a  settlement  of  the  question  as  long  ago  as  1844,  but  his 
suggested  delimitation  was  declined.    Thirty  years  later 
Venezuela  professed  its  willingness  to  accept  the  Aberdeen 
line,  but  Great  Britain  then  refused  to  concede  it.     The 
dispute  dragged  on  until  in  July,  1895,  Mr.  Olney,  Secretary 
of  State  under  President  Cleveland,  insistently  demanded 
that  Great  Britain  should  submit  the  whole  question  to 
arbitration,  and  incidentally  reasserted  in  the  most  extreme    - 
form  the  underlying  principles  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  : — 

"  That  distance  and  three  thousand  miles  of  intervening  The  oiney 
ocean  make  any  permanent  political  union  between  a  ^'-^p^^-^^ 
European  and  an  American  State  unnatural  and  in- 
expedient will  hardly  be  denied.  .  .  .  The  States  of 
America,  south  as  well  as  north,  by  geographical  proximity, 
by  natural  sympathy,  by  similarity  of  governmental  con- 
stitutions, are  friends  and  allies,  commercially  and  politic- 


130  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

ally,  of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  To-day  the  United  States 
is  practically  sovereign  on  this  continent,  and  its  fiat  is 
law  upon  the  subjects  to  which  it  confines  its  interposition. 
.  .  .  There  is,  then,  a  doctrine  of  American  public  law, 
well  founded  in  principle,  and  abundantly  sanctioned  by 
precedent,  which  entitles  and  requires  the  United  States 
to  treat  as  an  injury  to  itself  the  forcible  assumption  by  a 
European  Power  of  political  control  over  an  American 
State." 
Attitude  of  Mr.  Olncy's  dispatch  unquestionably  gave  a  wide  ex- 
England  tension  to  the  principle  which  was  laid  down  by  President 
Monroe,  and  it  was  needlessly  provocative  in  tone.  For- 
tunately, however.  Lord  Salisbury  declined  to  be  provoked. 
He  did,  indeed,  refuse  to  accept  unrestricted  arbitration  : 
he  politely  questioned  the  applicability  of  the  Monroe 
doctrine  to  the  particular  dispute,  and  he  insisted  that  the 
United  States  was  not  entitled  to  affirm  "  with  reference 
to  a  number  of  States  for  whose  conduct  it  assumes  no 
responsibility,  that  its  interests  are  necessarily  concerned 
in  whatever  may  befall  those  States,  simply  because 
they  are  situated  in  the  Western  hemisphere."  At  the 
same  time.  Lord  Salisbury  made  it  clear  that  he  had  no 
intention  of  allowing  Great  Britain  to  be  drawn  into  a 
serious  quarrel  with  the  United  States.  Unfortunately 
Attitude  of  the  attitude  of  American  statesmen  rendered  it  none  too 
America  3^3^  ^o  keep  the  peace.  On  17th  December,  1895,  Pre- 
sident Cleveland  sent  a  special  message  to  Congress, 
wherein  he  declared  that : — 

"...  If  a  European  Power,  by  an  extension  of  its 
boundaries,  takes  possession  of  the  territory  of  one  of  our 
neighbouring  Republics  against  its  will,  and  in  derogation 
of  its  rights,  it  is  difficult  to  see  why,  to  that  extent,  such 
European  Power  does  not  thereby  attempt  to  extend  its 
system  of  government  to  that  portion  of  this  continent 
which  is  thus  taken.  This  is  the  precise  action  which 
President  Monroe  declared  to  be  dangerous  to  our  peace 
and  safety."  Had  the  direction  of  English  policy  been  in 
less  wise  and  experienced  hands,  such  a  message  might 
easily  have  provoked  war.     As  it  was,  the  message  accentu- 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AS   A    WORLD-POWER      131 

ated  a  difficult  situation  and  feeling  began  to  run  liigli  in 
America.  "  Fortunately  for  us,"  writes  an  American 
publicist,  "  Lord  Salisbury  bad  a  very  good  sense  of  bumour 
and  declined  to  take  tbe  matter  too  seriously."  ^  Botb 
Great  Britain  and  Venezuela  agreed  to  submit  tbe  evidence 
for  tbeir  conflicting  claims  to  a  "  committee  of  investiga- 
tion "  appointed  by  tbe  United  States  ;  and  tbe  investiga- 
tion issued  in  a  Treaty  of  Arbitration,  concluded  nominally 
between  tbe  immediate  disputants,  but  in  reality  between 
Great  Britain  and  tbe  United  States.  Tbe  result  of  tbe 
arbitration  was,  on  tbe  wbole,  to  substantiate  tbe  Britisb 
claim.  A  still  more  important  result  ensued.  In  January, 
1897,  a  General  Ai'bitration  Treaty  between  tbe  two  great 
Englisb-spealdng  nations  was  signed  by  Sir  Julian  Paunce- 
forte  and  Secretary  Olney.  Tbe  Senate,  bowever,  refused 
its  assent,  and  tbe  treaty  was  not  actually  concluded  until 
November,  1914. 

In  tbe  meantime  mucb  bad  bappened.  Tbe  Venezuelan 
afiair  really  brougbt  to  an  end  tbe  period  of  American  isola- 
tion in  world-pobtics.  "  Cleveland's  policy,"  writes  an 
American  bistorian,  "as  to  tbe  Venezuelan  boundary, 
announced  to  tbe  world  witb  seismic  suddenness  and 
violence  tbat  tbe  American  democracy  was  of  age."  ^ 
From  tbe  position  asserted  by  Cleveland  and  Obiey  in 
1895,  tbeir  countrymen  could  not  well  recede,  and  tbe 
position  involved  important  corollaries.  If  tbe  United 
States  is  "  practically  sovereign  "  on  the  American  Con- 
tinent, if  "  its  fiat  is  law  "  it  can  bardly  avoid  responsi- 
biUty  for  tbe  doings  of  its  neighbours  and  tbe  general 
maintenance  of  order.  Several  of  its  neighbours  have 
shown  themselves  both  weak  and  turbulent,  and  in  1904 
President  Roosevelt  frankly  admitted  that  "  the  adher- 
ence of  the  United  States  to  the  Monroe  doctrine  may 
force  the  United  States,  however  reluctantly,  in  flagrant 
cases  of  wrong-doing  or  impotence  to  the  exercise  of  an 
international  police  Power." 

As   a  fact  the  policy  of  isolation  had  been  already 

1  H.  Bingham  :  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  12. 

2  W.  A.  Dunning  :  The  British  Empire  and  the  United  States,  p.  3G8. 


132 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


The 

Spanish- 
Ainerican 
War,  1898 


Explosion 
of  the 
Maine 


Future  of 
Cuba 


abandoned.  On  21st  April,  1898,  war  broke  out  between 
tbe  United  States  and  Spain.  Spain  bad  for  many  years 
past  been  involved  in  difficulties  with  her  Colonists  in 
Cuba.  A  rising  had  occurred  in  1868,  and  for  ten  years 
the  Colony  was  in  a  state  of  almost  perpetual  insurrection. 
A  compromise  was  arrived  at  in  1878  by  the  Convention 
of  El  Lanjon,  but  the  local  government  was  exceedingly 
oppressive  and  corrupt,  and  in  1895  a  fresh  rebelhon 
broke  out.  General  Weyler  was  sent  to  the  Colony  to 
restore  order  by  whatsoever  means  seemed  good  to  him. 
The  methods  he  employed  were  as  barbarous  as  they  were 
ineffectual,  and  in  view  of  the  increasingly  close  business 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  Cuba  it  became 
more  and  more  difficult  for  the  American  Government 
to  look  on  unconcerned.  In  1897  the  United  States 
offered  its  good  offices  to  Spain,  but  the  latter  neglected 
to  avail  herself  of  the  offer.  Meanwhile,  the  drastic 
measures  taken  by  General  Weyler  excited  increasing 
indignation  in  the  United  States,  and  a  Cuban  Rehef 
Committee  was  set  up.  At  this  juncture  relations,  already 
strained,  were  broken  by  an  incident  which  may  or  may 
not  have  been  fortuitous  :  the  United  States'  cruiser 
Maine  was  on  15th  February,  1898,  destroyed  by  a  mine 
in  the  harbour  of  Havana.  The  American  Government 
decHned  to  regard  the  explosion  as  accidental,  and  on 
21st  April  declared  war  against  Spain.  The  Spanish 
army  and  navy  were  both  concentrated  at  Santiago,  where 
they  were  blockaded  both  by  land  and  sea  by  the  American 
forces.  The  Spanish  Admiral,  Cervera,  was  ordered  to 
run  the  gauntlet  of  the  blockade,  with  the  result  that  he  and 
his  entire  fleet  were  destroyed  after  a  few  hours'  engage- 
ment by  the  American  squadron  under  the  command  of 
Commodore  Schley  (2nd  July).  A  fortnight  later  the  city 
of  Santiago  capitulated. 

As  a  result  of  the  brief  but  decisive  war,  Porto  Rico 
was  acquired  by  the  United  States,  and  Spain  disappeared 
from  the  Caribbean  Sea.  Cuba,  after  some  years'  occupa- 
tion by  American  troops,  was  declared  independent,  as 
its  annexation  to  the  United  States  might  have  involved 


THE   UNITED   STATES  AS  A  WORLD-POWER      133 

complications  with  the  South  American  Kepubhcs,  and 
would  certainly  have  proved  embarrassing  to  the  United 
States  ;  but  the  latter,  by  requiring  that  the  Cuban  Govern- 
ment should  respect  rights  of  person  and  property,  retained 
a  quasi-suzerainty  over  it. 

From  1905  to  1909  Cuba,  in  consequence  of  the  failure 
of  the  Cuban  President,  Estrada  Palma,  to  keep  order, 
was  again  occupied  by  an  American  force.  During  that 
period  its  affairs  were  administered  by  an  American 
Governor,  but  in  1909  it  was  again  handed  over  to  a 
native  administrator.  The  United  States  retain,  however, 
certain  coahng  stations  in  the  island  and  reserve  to  them- 
selves the  right  of  interference  if  the  conditions,  upon  which 
Cuban  independence  was  recognised,  are  not  observed. 
Plainly  that  independence  is  exceedingly  precarious,  and 
might  at  any  time  be  forfeited  should  the  native  govern- 
ment fail  in  its  duties,  or  should  strategical  considerations 
render  annexation  to  the  United  States  imperative  or  even 
convenient. 

The  war  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  was  not.  The  Phiiip- 
however,  confined  to  the  Atlantic.  As  in  Cuba  so  in  the  P^^^^^ 
Phihppine  archipelago,  the  rule  of  the  Spaniards  had  for 
many  years  past  been  both  tyrannical  and  ineffective. 
The  missionary  friars  who  really  ruled  the  islands  in  the 
name  of  the  Spanish  sovereign  had  done  useful  work  in 
days  gone  by,  but  their  administration  had  rapidly  dete- 
riorated, and  a  movement  for  their  expulsion  developed 
among  the  Filipinos,  who  in  1896  petitioned  the  Emperor 
of  Japan  in  favour  of  annexation  to  that  country.  The 
Emperor  betrayed  the  plans  of  his  would-be  subjects  to 
their  legitimate  rulers  at  Madrid,  who  therefore  instituted 
a  reign  of  terror  in  the  archipelago.  The  islanders  retorted 
by  a  demand  for  "  constitutional "  government,  freedom 
of  the  press,  equal  laws,  and  in  particular  the  expulsion 
of  the  friars. 

Thus  matters  stood  when  war  broke  out  between  Spain  Capture  of 
and  the  United   States.     An  American  squadron  under  p^nes^^^'^" 
the  command  of  Admiral  Dewey  appeared  before  Manila, 
forced  an  entrance  into  the  ill-defended  harbour,  and  in 


134  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

two  hours  destroyed  the  entire  Spanisli  Fleet  (1st  May). 
In  July  an  American  army,  under  General  Merritt,  landed 
at  Luzon,  and  in  August,  Manila  surrendered.  These 
disasters  inclined  the  Spaniards  to  peace,  which  was 
concluded  at  Paris  in  December,  1898.  The  United  States 
demanded  and  obtained  the  cession  of  the  Phihppines, 
but  agreed  to  pay  Spain  $20,000,000  in  compensation  for 
her  loss. 

The  annexation  of  Cuba  to  the  United  States  might,  as 
we  have  seen,  have  raised  complications  both  in  the 
domestic  pohtics  and  in  the  foreign  relations  of  the  Re- 
pubHc.  It  was  otherwise  with  the  Phihppines,  and  no 
question  was  ever  entertained  as  to  their  restoration  to 
Spain,  or  even  as  to  their  independence.  On  this  point 
the  instructions  given  by  President  McKinley  to  the 
American  Peace  Commissioners  were  specific.  "  Without 
any  original  thought  of  complete  or  even  partial  acquisi- 
tion, the  presence  and  success  of  our  arms  at  Manila 
imposes  upon  us  obligations  that  we  cannot  disregard. 
The  march  of  events  rules  and  overrules  human  action. 
Avowing  unreservedly  the  purpose  which  has  animated 
all  our  effort,  and  still  solicitous  to  adhere  to  it,  we  cannot 
be  unmindful  that,  without  any  desire  or  design  on  our 
part,  the  war  has  brought  us  new  duties  and  responsibihties 
which  we  must  meet  and  discharge  as  becomes  a  great 
nation  on  whose  growth  and  career  from  the  beginning 
the  Ruler  of  Nations  has  plainly  written  the  high  command 
and  pledge  of  civiHsation." 
The  President  McKinley's  words  were  strikingly  indicative  of 

Filipinos  the  new  temper  in  which  the  United  States  was  facing 
external  problems,  and  of  its  new  and  wider  outlook  upon 
world- politics.  It  was  not,  however,  all  plain  sailing  with 
American  pohcy  in  the  Philippines.  The  insurgent  leader, 
Aquinaldo,  had  been  deported  from  the  Archipelago 
under  the  terms  of  the  treaty  between  the  Filipinos  and 
their  Spanish  rulers  in  1897.  On  19th  May,  1898,  however, 
Aquinaldo  was  permitted  to  return  to  Manila  on  board  a 
United  States  man-of-war.  It  would  seem  to  have  been 
the  intentions  of  the  American  authorities  to  employ  the 


THE    UNITED   STATES   AS   A   WORLD-POWER      135 

insurgent  leader  to  restore  order  among  the  islanders, 
and  to  establish  some  form  of  local  autonomy  under  the 
American  flag.  Possibly  the  terms  were  insufficiently 
defined ;  but  be  this  as  it  may,  Aquinaldo  proclaimed 
the  independence  of  the  Archipelago,  and  established 
a  Philippine  Republic  with  himself  as  President.  In 
February,  1899,  therefore,  the  United  States  found  itself 
involved  in  a  fresh  war  with  the  Filipinos.  The  latter  could 
not,  of  course,  offer  any  effective  resistance,  and  by  the 
end  of  1899  an  American  army  of  60,000  men  had  brought 
to  an  end  aU  orgam'sed  resistance  in  the  Archipelago. 
Aquinaldo,  however,  was  still  at  large,  and  for  some  two 
years  longer  the  American  troops  had  to  face  a  considerable 
amount  of  guerilla  warfare,  in  the  course  of  which  they 
suffered  considerable  losses,  including  the  death  of  General 
Lawton.  At  last,  in  April,  1901,  Aquinaldo  was  captured  ; 
on  1st  July,  1901,  the  insurrection  was  officially  declared 
to  be  at  an  end,  and  the  Philippines  were  handed  over  to  a 
civil  government  at  the  head  of  which  Judge  Taft  was 
placed.  The  avowed  intention  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment was  to  prepare  the  Filipinos  for  eventual  autonomy. 
In  1902  a  form  of  parliamentary  government  was  estab- 
lished in  which  a  large  share  was  given  to  the  natives,  and 
in  his  message  to  Congress  in  1904,  President  Roosevelt 
made  the  following  pronouncement :  "I  firmly  believe 
that  you  can  help  them  (the  Filipinos)  to  rise  higher  and 
higher  in  the  scale  of  civilisation  and  of  capacity  for  self- 
government,  and  I  most  earnestly  hope  that  in  the  end 
they  will  be  able  to  stand,  if  not  entirely  alone,  yet  in  some 
such  relation  to  the  United  States  as  Cuba  now  stands." 
Under  American  rule  the  economic  prosperity  of  the 
Archipelago  has  developed  with  remarkable  rapidity,  and 
in  1916  an  Organic  Act  was  passed  by  the  American  Con- 
gress under  which  a  large  measure  of  local  autonomy  was 
granted  to  the  Philippines. 

Meanwhile    American    activities    in    the    Pacific    were  Hawaii 
developing  in  other  directions.     The  United  States  had  for 
a  full  half-century  manifested  an  interest  in  the  future  of 
the  Sandwich  Islands.    As  far  back  as  1854  a  treaty  for 


136  EUROPE   AND  BEYOND 

the  annexation  of  tlie  islands  to  the  United  States  had  been 
concluded  with  the  native  government,  but  for  the  time 
being  no  positive  results  ensued.  Internal  feuds  gave  to 
the  United  States  an  opportunity  of  interference,  and 
in  1887,  King  Kalakana  accepted  a  form  of  government 
which,  in  fact,  involved  control  by  the  white  settlers.  Five 
years  later,  however  (1892),  the  native  party  reasserted 
itself,  and  under  the  championship  of  Queen  Lilinokalani 
effected  a  coup  d'etat.  Thereupon  a  counter-revolutionary 
movement  was  started,  a  republic  was  proclaimed,  the 
Queen  was  compelled  to  abdicate,  and  appealed  to 
Washington.  A  treaty  of  annexation  was  then  signed 
at  Washington  with  the  representatives  of  the  provisional 
government,  and  was  sent  to  the  Senate  for  approval. 
The  treaty  was,  however,  subsequently  withdrawn  by  the 
President,  and  Commissioners  were  sent  out  to  the  Sandwich 
Islands,  where  a  form  of  constitutional  republic  was 
established.  Finally,  in  July,  1898,  the  islands  were 
definitely  annexed  to  the  United  States,  and  two  years 
later  (1900)  were  formally  constituted  the  Territory  of 
Hawaii. 
Suiiioa  In  a  similar  way  the  Samoan  group,  or  a  part  of  it,  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  United  States.  Germany  had  for 
some  time  past,  as  we  have  seen,  been  exhibiting  activity 
in  the  Pacific.  In  December,  1885,  friction  arose  between 
the  German  administrators  and  the  natives,  with  the 
result  that  in  January,  1886,  Mr.  Bayard,  then  Secretary 
of  State  at  Washington,  instructed  the  American  Minister 
at  Berlin  to  "  express  the  expectation  that  nothing  would 
be  done  to  impair  the  rights  of  the  United  States  under 
the  existing  treaty."  The  German  reply  was  couched  in 
friendly  terms,  and  Conferences  ensued  between  Germany, 
the  United  States,  and  Great  Britain.  A  few  months 
later,  however  (July,  1886),  Germany  suddenly  declared 
war  on  the  reigning  King  of  Samoa,  deposed  and  deported 
him,  and  set  up  her  own  nominee,  Tamasese,  as  king, 
with  a  German  commissioner,  Herr  Brandeis,  as  his  "  ad- 
viser." In  September,  1888,  the  natives  rose  in  insurrec- 
tion against  Tamasese  and  his  adviser,  and  enthroned  in 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AS   A  WORLD-POWER      137 

their  place  a  cliieftain  named  Mataafa.  The  Germans 
thereupon  landed  a  force  of  marines,  who  were  ambushed 
by  the  native  forces,  and  suffered  severe  losses  in  killed 
and  wounded.  The  Germans  asserted  that  the  ambushing 
force  was  led  by  an  American  citizen  ;  consequently  con- 
siderable friction  arose  between  Germany  and  the  United 
States,  and  the  latter  Power  deemed  it  prudent  to  make 
considerable  additions  to  its  Pacific  Fleet. 

Bismarck,   however,   was    anxious    to  keep  the  peace  Germany 
in  the  Pacific  as  elsewhere,  and  in  1889  conferences  between  ^^^^ 
the  interested  Powers  were  resumed  at  Berlin,  with  the  States 
result  that  the  Samoan  Islands  were  placed  under  the  joint 
control  of  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  the  United  States. 
The  Condominium  worked  badly,  and  in  1899  a  troublesome 
situation  was  cleared  up  by  a  division  of  the   Samoan 
group   between   Germany  and   the  United  States,  Great 
Britain    receiving    her    compensation    elsewhere.     "  The 
chief  historical  significance  of  the  Samoan  incident  lies, 
as  an  American  historian  has  pointed  out,  in  the  assertion 
by  the  United  States  not  merely  of  a  willingness  to  believe 
it  right  to  take  part  in  determining  the  fate  of  a  remote  and 
semi-barbarous  people  whose  possessions  lay  far  outside 
the  traditional  sphere  of  American  political  interests."  ^ 

The  part  played  by  the  United  States  in  Far  Eastern  The 
pohtics  will  demand  and  receive  attention  later  on.  It  canai^^ 
may,  however,  be  here  noted  that  the  whole  situation  has 
been  revolutionised,  as  far  as  America  is  concerned,  by  the 
completion  of  the  Panama  Canal.  That  enterprise  was 
initiated  in  1901:,  when  the  United  States  purchased  from 
the  Repubhc  of  Panama  a  ten- mile  strip  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  canal.  The  consideration  was  a  lump  sum 
payment  of  ten  milhon  dollars,  and  the  promise  of  a 
perpetual  annuity  of  250,000  dollars  a  year,  payable  as 
from  1914.  The  significance  of  this  enterprise  can  hardly 
as  yet  be  estimated.  The  results  upon  world-pohtics  may 
well  prove  in  the  future  to  be  hardly  less  noteworthy  than 
those  which  accrued  from  the  discovery  in  the  late  fifteenth 
century  of  the  Cape  route  to  the  East,  or  the  opening  in 

^  Professor  J.  B.  Moore :  ap.  Cambridge  Modem  History,  vii.  p.  663. 


138  EUROPE  AND   BEYOND 

1869  of  tlie  Suez  Canal.     The  cutting  of  such  a  waterway 
can  hardly  fail  to  bring  about  an  important  shifting  in  the 
centre  of  pohtical  and  commercial  gravity. 
The  United      It  remains  to  summarise  the  general  effect  of  the  events 
mit^^^^  narrated  in  this  chapter  upon  the  position  of  the  United 
Foiitik        States  as  a  World-Power,  and  upon  its  relations  with  its  new 
neighbours.     The  Spanish- American  War  unquestionably 
gave  an  iramense  impulse  to,  if  it  did  not  actually  initiate, 
a    new   movement   in   American    history.      The    United 
States,  which  in  the  course  of  a  century  had  become  a 
vast  continental  Power,  mainly  looking  eastwards,  became 
also  a  great  Pacific  Power,  and  took  its  place  alongside 
the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  as  a  participator  in  world- 
politics. 
The  U.S.A.      The   war   also   led   to   increasingly   intimate   relations 
South^^      between  the  United  States  and  the  Latin  Kepublics  of 
American    South  America.     The  incidents  recorded  in  this  chapter 
Repubhcs    ^gj.g  j^Q^^  ^g  g^^  American  scholar  has  pointed  out,  "  caused 
by  any  desire  to  protect  the  sister  Republics  of  Latin 
America  from  European  interference  or  aggression,  but 
by  local  rebellions  or  outrages,  which  have  led  the  United 
States  to  undertake  the  exercise  of  a  certain  supervisory 
or  police  power  over  the  affairs  of  the  less  stable  of  them. 
This,"  adds  Mr.  Merriman,  "  is  perhaps  the  logical  outcome 
of  the  passage  in  Mr.  Olney's  note  which  declares  the 
United    States    to    be    '  practically    sovereign    on    this 
continent,  and  its  fiat    law  upon  the  subjects  to  which 
it   confines   its   interposition.'     But   it   certainly   carries 
things  much  further  than  was  contemplated  in  President 
Monroe's    message    in    1823.     In    1904,    Mr.    Roosevelt 
expressed  the  views  of  his  Government  on  the  duties  of 
the   United   States   in  this    particular   in   the   following 
words  : — 

"  '  It  is  not  true  that  the  United  States  feels  any  land 
hunger  or  entertains  any  projects  as  regards  the  other 
nations  of  the  Western  hemisphere  save  such  as  are  for 
their  welfare.  All  that  this  country  desires  is  to  see  the 
neighbouring  countries  stable,  orderly,  and  prosperous. 
Any  country  whose  people  conduct  themselves  well  can 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AS   A   WORLD-POWER      139 

count  upon  our  hearty  friendsMp.  If  a  nation  shows  tliat 
it  knows  how  to  act  with  reasonable  efficiency  and  decency 
in  social  and  political  matters,  if  it  keeps  order  and  pays 
its  obhgations,  it  need  fear  no  interference  from  the 
United  States.  Chronic  wrong- doing,  or  an  impotence 
which  results  in  a  general  loosening  of  the  ties  of  civihsed 
society,  may,  in  America  as  elsewhere,  ultimately  require 
intervention  by  some  civihsed  nation,  and  in  the  Western 
hemisphere  the  adherence  of  the  United  States  to  the 
Monroe  doctrine  may  force  the  United  States,  however 
reluctantly,  in  flagrant  cases  of  such  wrong-doing  or 
impotence,  to  the  exercise  of  an  international  pohce 
power.'  "  1 

By  far  the  most  significant  result  of  the  Spanish-  England 
American  War  was  the  estabhshment  for  the  first  time  ^nltecf 
of  really  cordial  relations  between  the  United  States  and  states 
Great  Britain.  During  that  war  Great  Britain  did  some- 
thing more  than  keep  the  ring  for  the  United  States.  In 
the  Phihppines,  a  British  squadron  actually  interposed 
itself  between  the  American  Fleet  and  German  warships 
which  were  threatening  to  open  fire  upon  it.  That  inter- 
position alone  prevented  the  broadening  out  of  the  petty 
quarrel  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  into  a  conflict 
which  might  well  have  become  world-mde.  The  friendly 
attitude  of  Great  Britain  thus  conspicuously  manifested 
had  a  very  important  bearing  upon  Anglo-American 
relations,  and  in  particular  upon  the  attitude  of  America 
towards  the  war  which  almost  immediately  ensued  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  Dutch  Repubhcs  in  South  Africa. 

Ever  since  the  great   schism   of  1783  there  had  been  Anglo- 
considerable   and   at   times    dangerous    tension   between  ^^^tS 
Great  Britain  and  the  colonies  which  had  achieved  their  1783-1898 
independence.     The  treatment  of  the  Empire  loyahsts  by 
the  American  Government  in  1783  constituted  a  legitimate 
grievance,  and  brought  British  Canada  into  being  in  sharp 
antagonism   to   its   American  neighbours.      The   war   of 
1812-14,  into   which   the   two  English-speaking   peoples 
drifted,   accentuated  the   antagonism.     To  England  that 

^  R.  B.  Merriman  :  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  7-8. 


140 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


war  was  almost  a  negligible,  thougli  none  tlie  less  a 
regrettable,  incident  in  a  titanic  struggle.  To  American 
minds  it  loomed  much  larger  at  tlie  time,  and  it  left  very 
bitter  memories  behind.  Since  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty 
of  Ghent  in  1814,  peace  was,  however,  consistently  main- 
tained between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  That 
Hundred  Years'  Peace,  as  Dr.  Nicholas  Murray  Butler  has 
justly  said,  "is  of  itself  an  eloquent  testimony  of  the 
English-speaking  peoples,  and  a  noble  tribute  to  the 
statesmen  who  have  in  succession  guided  their  policies  and 
conducted  their  international  business.  The  long  invisible 
line  which  separates  the  United  States  and  the  Dominion  of 
Canada  has  been  left  unguarded  despite  the  fact  that  two 
energetic,  rapidly-expanding  peoples  have  been  pushing 
steadily  westward  on  either  side  of  it.  This  long  invisible 
unguarded  Hne  is  the  most  convincing  testimony  that 
the  world  has  to  offer  to  the  abihty  of  modern  seK- 
discipHned  peoples  to  keep  the  peace."  ^ 

But  though  the  sword  was  fortunately  never  drawn, 
there  was  a  great  deal  of  bad  blood  between  the  two 
peoples,  and  on  several  occasions,  even  before  1895,  acute 
differences  might  easily  have  sharpened  into  war.  "  There 
have,"  as  Dr.  Butler  has  pointed  out,  "  been  more  tempting 
occasions  for  misunderstanding  and  armed  conflict  between 
the  British  Empire  and  the  United  States  than  between 
the  United  States  and  all  other  nations  of  the  earth  com- 
bined." In  1830,  De  Tocqueville  made  the  observation 
that  he  could  conceive  of  no  hatred  more  poisonous  than 
that  which  the  Americans  then  felt  for  England.  In  1842 
there  was  acute  friction  between  the  two  peoples  over 
unsettled  boundary  questions  in  Maine  and  New  Brunswick. 
But  the  conclusion  in  that  year  of  the  Webster- Ashburton 
Treaty  provided  a  settlement  of  all  open  questions  as  to 
the  boundaries  of  British  North  America  and  the  United 
States  from  the  Atlantic  Ocean  to  the  Rocky  Mountains. 
The  Oregon  Boundary  question  in  1846  provided  another 
cause  of  friction,  but  it  was  not  until  the  outbreak  of  the 
Civil  War  in  America  (1861)  that  the  two  countries  came 

1  ap.  Dunning  :  The  British  Empire  and  the  United  States,  p.  v. 


THE   UNITED   STATES   AS   A   WORLD-POWER      141 

actually  to  the  brink  of  war.  The  affair  of  the  Trent  was 
only  one  of  several  incidents  which  during  the  war  between 
North  and  South  might  have  led  to  an  explosion.  Happily 
war  was  averted  at  the  time  and  more  friendly  relations 
ensued. 

Neither  party  in  America  was  satisfied  with  the  The 
English  attitude.  The  North  regarded  our  neutrality  ^rbUTation 
as  rather  more  than  malevolent.  The  South  thought  it 
inadequately  benevolent.  More  specifically  there  was  the 
question  of  the  damage  inflicted  upon  American  commerce 
by  the  Alabama  and  other  cruisers  sailing  from  English 
ports.  The  latter  question  was,  however,  ultimately 
submitted  to  arbitration.  After  prolonged  negotiation 
between  the  two  Governments,  the  Treaty  of  Washington — 
a  portentous  document  consisting  of  forty-three  articles — 
was  signed  (8th  May,  1871).  It  expressed  "  in  a  friendly 
spirit  the  regret  felt  by  Her  Majesty's  Government  for  the 
escape,  under  whatever  circumstances,  of  the  Alabama 
and  other  vessels  from  British  ports,  and  for  the  depreda- 
tion committed  by  these  vessels.  It  adjusted  in  minute 
detail  outstanding  disputes  as  to  fisheries  between  United 
States  and  Canada,  and  agreed  to  refer  the  question  of 
the  Vancouver  boundary  (involving  the  possession  of  the 
Island  of  San  Juan)  to  the  arbitration  of  the  German 
Emperor,  who  ultimately  decided  against  Great  Britain. 
It  accepted  new  principles  of  international  law,  involving 
greater  dilgence  in  preventing  the  equipment  of  ships  in 
neutral  harbours  for  use  against  friendly  belligerents,  and 
finally  it  agreed  to  refer  the  Alabama  claims  themselves  to 
a  tribunal  of  five  persons  nominated  by  Great  Britain, 
the  United  States,  Italy,  Switzerland,  and  Brazil.  In 
the  result,  Great  Britain  had  to  pay  £3,250,000  in  damages 
to  the  United  States.  Mr.  Gladstone,  who  was  largely 
responsible  for  the  submission  of  the  question  to  arbitra- 
tion, subsequently  expressed  the  opinion  that  "  the  sentence 
was  harsh  in  its  extent  and  unjust  in  its  basis."  But  he 
added,  "  I  regard  the  fine  imposed  on  this  country  as 
dust  in  the  balance,  compared  with  the  moral  value  of  the 
example  set   when  these  two  great  nations  of  England 


142  EUROPE   AND  BEYOND 

and  America  .  .  .  went  in  peace  and  concord  before  a 
judicial  tribunal,  rather  tlian  resort  to  tbe  arbitrament 
of  tbe  sword."  It  was  finely  said,  and  impartial  history- 
applauds  the  sentiment.  But  among  contemporaries  there 
was  an  uneasy  sense  that  we  had  been  unduly  complaisant. 
That  complaisance,  however,  perhaps  bore  fruit  in  the 
more  friendly  relations  which,  in  1898,  resulted  in  a  striking 
manifestation  of  the  solidarity  between  the  two  English- 
speaking  Powers,  and  which,  as  already  indicated,  inclined 
the  American  people  to  a  more  favourable  view  of  English 
policy  in  South  Africa  when  war  broke  out  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  Boer  Republics. 

AUTHORITIES 

A.  C.  CooLiDGE  :  The  United  States  as  a  World-Power.    (London,  1908.) 

J.  H.  Latan£  :  America  as  a  World-Power. 

J.  H.  Latane  :  The  United  States  and  Spanish  America. 

R.  B.  Merriman  :  The  Monroe  Doctrine  :  Its  Past  and  Present  Status. 

(Oxford,  1916.) 
H.  Bingham  :  The  Monroe  Doctrine  an  Obsolete  Shibboleth.     (Oxford, 

1913.) 
A.  B.  Hart  :  The  Monroe  Doctrine.     (London,  1916.) 
A.  B.  Hart  :  The  Foundations  of  American  Foreign  Policy.     (London, 

1902.) 
W.  F.  Redd  away  :  The  Monroe  Doctrine.     (Cambridge,  1898.) 
Freeman  Snow  :  Treaties  and  Topics  of  American  Diplomacy. 
J.  B.  Moore  :  American  Diplomacy. 

John  W.  Foster  :  A  Century  of  American  Diplomacy.     (Boston,  1900.) 
W.  R.  Thayer  :  John  Bay.     (London,  1915.) 
Cambridge  Modern  History,  vols.  vii.  and  xii.     (Cambridge,  1903  and 

1910.) 
W.  A.  Dunning  :  The  British  Empire  and  the  United  States.     (London, 

1915.) 
G.  L.  Beer  :  The  English- Speaking  Peoples :  Their  Future  Relations  and 

Joint  International  Obligations.     (London,  1917.) 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  ENGLISH  IN  SOUTH  AFRICA 

In  South  Africa,  more  perhaps  than  in  any  other  portion  of  the  world, 
there  are  common  questions  of  general  interest  which  can  only  be 
decided  with  safety  by  a  general  authority  expressing  the  considered 
j  udgment  of  a  United  South  Africa. — Egerton, 

The  keynote  of  South  African  history  is  retribution  following  a 
shirking  of  responsibility. — Violet  Mabkham. 

Spasmodic  violence  alternating  with  impotent  dropping  of  the  reins : 
first  severity  and  then  indulgence  and  then  severity  again. — J.  A.  Froudb 
on  South  Africa. 

WE  have  traced  in  a  preceding  chapter  the  remarkable  The  South 
sequence  of   events  by   which  English   authority  ^f^l^^" 
was  established  over  Egypt  and  the  Soudan.     In  March,  1899-1902 
1899,  a  Treaty  was  concluded  between  England  and  France, 
by  which  France  was  confirmed  in  possession  of  a  great 
West  African  Empire  and  at  the  same  time  acknowledged 
the  rights  of  Great  Britain  over  the  whole  Nile  basin, 
from  the  source  of  the  great  river  to  its  mouth.     Thus  the 
way  from  Cairo  to  the  Cape,  menaced  momentarily  by  the 
sudden  appearance  of  Major  Marchand  at  Fashoda,  was 
still  left  open,  unblocked  by  any  other  European  Power. 

Hardly  eight  months  had  passed,  however,  before  the 
position  of  the  English  in  the  south  of  the  African  continent 
was  gravely  threatened  by  the  outbreak  of  war  between 
England  and  the  two  Dutch  Eepublics — the  Transvaal 
and  the  Orange  Free  State  (10th  October,  1899).  That 
war  marked  the  culmination  of  a  series  of  quarrels  and 
misunderstandings  which  had  characterised  the  relations 
of  the  two  peoples,  or,  more  strictly,  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment and  the  Dutch  farmers,  ever  since  Cape  Colony  had 
passed  into  British  hands.     A  brief  retrospective  glance 

143 


144  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

at  the  history  of  these  relations  is,  therefore,  essential  to  an 
appreciation  of  the  issues  involved  in  the  war  of  1899-1902. 
The  Eng-        The  importance  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  in  relation 
UshinCape  |.Q  the  trade  with  the  East  Indies  was  appreciated  by 
Englishmen  from  the  early  days  of  the  seventeeth  century, 
and  in  1620  the  English  flag  was  hoisted  at  the  Cape  by 
two   adventurous   Englishmen,  Shilling  and  FitzHerbert, 
anxious  to  be  beforehand  with  the  Dutch.     The  reluctance 
of  the  infant  East  India  Company  to  face  fresh  responsi- 
bilities, and  the  absorption  of  James  I.  in  the  project  for 
a  marriage  alliance  with  Spain,  led  to  the  repudiation  of 
the  far-seeing  action  of  Shilling  and  FitzHerbert,  and  the 
flag  was  hauled  down  again. 
The  Dutch      The  Dutch  East  India  Company,  with  its  larger  re- 
in Cape       sources  and  broader  basis,  took  longer  views,  and  in  1652 
the  Cape  was  occupied  in  the  name  of  the  Company  by 
a  Dutch  expedition  commanded  by  Anthony  Van  Riebeck. 
From  that  day  until  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century 
Cape  Colony  remained  a  dependency  of  the  Dutch  East 
India  Company,  being  utilised  by  their  ships  as  a  port  of 
call,  and  by  their  merchants  and  sailors  as  a  vegetable 
garden.    That  vegetable  garden  saved  the  lives  of  thou- 
sands  of   people,   who   but  for  it  would  have   died    of 
scurvy  during  the  long  voyage  round  the  Cape.    In  1795 
the  United  Provinces  became  a  dependency  of  the  French 
Republic,  and  in  order  to  save  the  Cape  Colony  from  a 
similar  fate  it  was  occupied  by  a  British  force.     Handed 
back  to  the   Batavian  Republic   in  1802,  it  was   again 
conquered  by  England  in  1806,  and  at  the  Peace  of  Paris 
(1814)  it  was  purchased  for  £6,000,000  from  the  Dutch 
Government  and  became  the  property  of  Great  Britain. 
But  though  the  Government  was  British,  the  white  in- 
habitants were  mainly  Dutch.    Not  until  after  1820  was 
there    any  considerable   emigration   from    this    country. 
Between  the  British  Government,  progressive  in  poUcy, 
and  the  Dutch  farmers,  strongly  conservative  in  instinct, 
causes  of  friction   rapidly  developed — notably  in  regard 
to  the  treatment  of  the  natives.     The  zeal  of  the  English 
Government  and  of  the  English  missionaries  was  perhaps 


THE   ENGLISH   IN   SOUTH   AFRICA  145 

more  obvious  than  their  discretion,  and  with,  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  Act  for  the  aboHtion  of  slavery  the  cup  of 
Dutch  indignation  overflowed.  That  Act  was  administered 
with  flagrant  disregard  for  the  interests  of  the  Dutch 
farmers  and  with  scant  respect  for  their  vested  rights. 
They  consequently  determined  to  shake  off  the  dust  of 
the  British  Government  from  their  feet,  and  to  seek  free- 
dom in  the  vast  hinterland  of  South  Africa.  This  was  the 
meaning  of  the  Great  Boer  Trek  (1836-40) — the  cardinal  The  Great 
fact  of  South  African  history,  and  a  story,  in  some  °®^  ^^ 
respects,  curiously  romantic  and  pathetic.  The  ultimate 
result  of  the  Great  Trek  was  the  estabHshment  of  two 
Boer  States  virtually  independent,  the  Transvaal  and  the 
Orange  Free  State. ^ 

Meanwhile,  a  handful  of  English  colonists  had  estab-  Natal 
hshed  themselves  at  Port  Natal  (1824),  but  the  Boers 
from  the  north  and  west  of  the  Drakensberg  range 
threatened  their  existence,  and  in  the  early  'forties  it 
seemed  probable  that  a  third  Boer  State  would  be  estab- 
hshed  between  the  Drakensberg  and  the  sea.  In  1843, 
however.  Natal  was  formally  proclaimed  to  be  a  British 
Colony,  and  the  Boers  after  a  brief  struggle  sullenly  with- 
drew to  the  west  of  the  Drakensberg.  Down  to  1856 
Natal  was  regarded  as  forming  part  of  Cape  Colony,  but 
in  that  year  it  was  declared  independent,  and  it  attained 
to  the  full  dignity  of  "  responsible  "  government  in  1893. 

What  were  the  relations  between  Cape  Colony  and  the  British 
Boer  States  to  the  north  ?  From  the  moment  of  the  Trek  ^""^  ^°^''' 
there  were  two  possible  alternatives  open  to  the  Enghsh 
Government :  either  frankly  to  recognise  the  secession  of 
the  Boers,  and  in  due  time  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of 
European  States  in  South  Africa  independent  of  the  British 
flag ;  or,  to  make  it  clear  from  the  outset  that  no  other 
power  would  be  tolerated  in  South  Af]*ica,  and  that  the 
Boer  farmers,  go  where  they  would,  must  remain  subject 
to  the  Enghsh  Crown.  For  either  pohcy  there  was  some- 
thing to  be  said.  Unfortunately  for  the  credit  of  British 
rule  in  South  Africa  we  adopted  neither,  or,  rather,  we 

^  Slavery  abolition  was  only  one  of  many  causes  of  the  Great  Trek. 
lo 


146  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

adopted  both.  Thus  in  1848  Sir  Harry  Smith,  the  EngUsh 
Governor  of  Cape  Colony,  issued  a  proclamation  to  the 
effect  that  "  the  whole  territory  between  the  Orange 
and  Vaal  Rivers  as  far  east  as  the  Drakensberg  was  to  be 
under  the  Sovereignty  of  the  Queen."  The  Dutch  farmers 
under  Pretorius  protested  against  this  "  assumption  "  of 
Sovereignty,  but  they  were  worsted  in  battle  at  Boom- 
platz  (29th  August,  1848).  Some  of  them  fled  to  the  north 
of  the  Vaal,  the  rest  acquiesced  with  no  good  grace,  and 
accepted  the  authority  of  the  Queen  in  the  "  Orange  River 
Sovereignty."  The  Home  Government  was  lukewarm  in 
its  support  of  Sir  Harry  Smith.  In  1851  the  whole  force 
of  Cape  Colony  was  engaged  in  one  of  the  perennial  struggles 
mth  the  Kaffirs  on  the  eastern  frontier  of  the  Colony,  and 
Pretorius,  then  an  outlaw  beyond  the  Vaal,  threatened  to 
raise  an  insurrection  in  the  Orange  Sovereignty  unless  the 
independence  of  his  countrymen  to  the  north  of  the  Vaal 
was  recognised. 
The  Sand  Consequently,  in  1852,  the  Sand  River  Convention  was 
voatTon°"  concluded.  Great  Britain  thereby  conceded  "  to  the 
17th  Jmie,  emigrant  farmers  beyond  the  Vaal  River  the  right  to 
is^2  manage  their  own  affairs,  and  to  govern  themselves,  without 

any  interference  on  the  part  of  Her  Majesty  the  Queen's 
Government."     Thus    the    South    African    or    Transvaal 
Repubhc  came  into  being  as  an  independent  State.     But 
mth  two  reservations  :  it  was  to  be  open  to  all  comers 
on  equal  terms,  and  no  slavery  was  to  be  permitted  or 
practised.     Meanwhile,  we  were  involved  in  troubles  with 
the  Basutos,  the  natives  to  the  east  of  the  Orange  River 
Sovereignty,  and,  at  the  close  of  the  war,  General  Cathcart, 
the  officer  in  command,  reported  that  it  would  be  necessary 
to  station  2000  troops  permanently  in  the  Sovereignty. 
The  Home  Government  were  in  no  mind  for  the  assump- 
tion of  further  mihtary  responsibilities,  and  preferred  the 
alternative  of  withdrawal. 
The  Bioem-      ^he  Bloemfouteiu  Convention  was  a  counterpart  of  that 
Conven-      coucludcd  two  years  earher  with  the  Transvaal  Boers. 
Febma/^    Thus  the  Orange  Free  State  took  its  place  side  by  side 
^e_ ruary,    ^^-^  ^^^  South  African  Repubhc,  and  it  seemed  as  though 


THE   ENGLISH   IN   SOUTH   AFRICA  147 

a  definite  boundary  were  to  be  set  to  Britisli  Sovereignty 
towards  the  north-west.^ 

For  nearly  twenty  years  tbe  policy  of  non-interven-  Sir  George 
tion  was  consistently  maintained.  Meanwhile,  the  Cape  ^®^ 
Colony  itself  advanced  steadily  towards  the  goal  of  self- 
government.  During  the  vigorous  and  enlightened  ad- 
ministration of  Sir  George  Grey  (1854-61),  Cape  Colony 
was  endowed  with  an  elected  Legislature,  and  attained 
to  "  responsible  "  government  in  1872.  But  Sir  George 
Grey  had  a  far  wider  vision  than  that  bounded  by  the 
horizon  of  responsible  government.  Looking  beyond  the 
vacillating  policy  hitherto  pursued  by  Great  Britain  in 
South  Africa,  he  saw  that  the  only  possible  path  of  safety 
lay  in  some  form  of  federation.  The  State  Paper  in  which, 
in  1858,  he  submitted  his  views  to  the  Home  Government 
is  one  of  the  ablest  documents  in  the  history  of  our  Colonial 
Empire.  Grey  had  the  support  of  the  Boers  of  the  Orange 
River  Sovereignty.  Their  Volksraad  resolved  in  1858 
"  that  a  union  or  alHance  with  the  Cape  Colony,  either 
on  the  plan  of  federation  or  otherwise,  is  desirable." 
The  only  reply  of  the  Colonial  Office  was  to  recall  Grey 
for  exceeding  his  instructions.  He  was  restored  by  the 
personal  intervention  of  the  Queen,  but  he  returned  to 
Cape  Town  with  tarnished  prestige  and  with  gravely 
impaired  authority.  Had  the  Home  Government  grasped 
the  problem  as  Sir  George  Grey  grasped  it,  had  they  even 
had  the  sense  to  trust  "  the  man  on  the  spot,"  the  whole 
subsequent  course  of  South  African  history  might  have 
been  different.  Mr.  F.  W.  Reitz,  the  Transvaal  Secretary 
of  State  in  1899,  wrote  to  Sir  George  Grey  in  1893  :  "  Had 
British  Ministers  in  time  past  been  wise  enough  to  follow 
your  advice,  there  would  undoubtedly  be  to-day  a  British 
dominion  extending  from  Table  Bay  to  Zambesi."  ^  But 
in  those  days  the  Manchester  School  was  in  the  ascendant ; 
in  that  school  there  was  no  room  for  statesmen  of  Grey's 

^  For  the  remarkably  interesting  Constitutions  evolved  by  the  Boer 
Republics  during  the  period  of  independence,  see  Bryce  :  Studies  in 
History  and  Jurisprudence. 

^  Quoted  by  Egerton  :  Federations,  etc.,  p.  71. 


148  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

vision ;  the  weary  Titan  was  tired  of  the  whole  "  burden  " 
of  colonial  establishments  and  was  looking  forward  to 
the  happy  day  when  "  those  wretched  Colonies  would 
no  longer  hang  Hke  millstones  round  our  necks." 
Expansion  ResponsibiUties  once  assumed  are  not,  however,  so 
Afric^*^^  Hghtly  shaken  off.  Towards  the  end  of  the  'sixties  the 
period  of  masterly  inactivity  was  drawing  to  a  close. 
In  1868  the  Boers  on  the  Orange  River  became  involved 
in  a  dispute  with  the  Basutos  to  the  east  of  them. 
The  Basuto  Chief  addressed  a  prayer  to  the  British 
Government  :  "  Let  me  and  my  people  rest  under  the 
large  folds  of  the  flag  of  England."  His  prayer  was 
heard,  and  in  1869  British  Sovereignty  was  proclaimed 
over  Basutoland. 

In  1871  Griqualand  West,  a  native  territory  to  the  west 
of  the  Orange  State,  was  similarly  annexed  to  the  Crown. 
This  important  acquisition  gave  us  the  diamond  fields  of 
the  Kimberley  district.  But  its  importance  was  not 
measured  only  in  diamonds.  The  annexation  meant  a 
new  turn  in  the  wheel  of  poHcy  :  the  definite  abandonment 
of  the  laissez-faire  attitude  which  for  the  last  thirty  years 
had  been  characteristic  of  British  policy  in  South  Africa,  as 
elsewhere.  The  acquisition  of  the  Kimberley  diamond 
field  meant  also  a  new  strain  in  the  social  fife  of  South 
Airica.  "  The  digger,  the  capitahst,  the  company  pro- 
moter jostled  the  slow-moving  Dutch  farmer  and  quickened 
the  pace  of  fife."  ^ 
Lord  Car-  Such  was  the  condition  of  afiairs  in  South  Africa  when, 
narron's  jj^  1874,  Lord  Carnarvon  took  up  the  reins  at  the  Colonial 
I87S7  Office.  Lord  Carnarvon  was  the  Minister  who  had  been 
officially  responsible  for  the  enactment  of  a  Federal 
Constitution  for  British  North  America,  and  he  was 
anxious  to  confer  a  similar  boon  upon  South  Africa.  The 
moment  appeared  not  inopportune,  for  in  1872  a  Federa- 
tion Commission  had  been  appointed  in  Cape  Colony. 
But  Cape  Colony  was  in  the  first  flush  of  self-satisfaction 
at  the  attainment  of  responsible  government  and  had  no 
leisure  for  the  larger  problem. 

^  Lucas  :  South  Africa,  p.  246. 


THE   ENGLISH   IN   SOUTH   AFRICA  149 

Nevertheless,  Lord  Carnarvon  wrote  to  the  Governor  Attempted 
of  the  Cape  in  1875  to  propose  that  the  several  States  of  [jon '''^'''^' 
South  Africa  should  be  invited  to  a  Conference  to  discuss 
native  policy  and  other  points  of  common  interest,  and  to 
ventilate  "  the  all-important  question  of  a  possible  union 
of  South  Africa  in  some  form  of  confederation."  ^  The 
proposal  was  not  welcomed  in  Cape  Colony,  and  Mr. 
Froude,  the  eminent  historian,  who  had  been  sent  out  to 
represent  the  Colonial  Office  at  the  proposed  Conference, 
found  his  position  highly  embarrassing  both  to  himself 
and  to  his  hosts. ^  Froude  put  his  finger  with  great  acute- 
ness  upon  the  root  difficulty  :  "  If  we  can  make  up  our 
minds  to  allow  the  colonists  to  manage  the  natives  their 
own  way  we  may  safely  confederate  the  whole  country." 
Of  federation,  however,  imposed  upon  them  from  London, 
the  colonists  would  hear  nothing.  The  Conference  in 
South  Africa  never  met. 

Lord  Carnarvon,  not  to  be  foiled,  invited  various  gentle- 
men interested  in  South  Africa  to  confer  with  him  at  the 
Colonial  Office  (August,  1876).  The  Cape  Premier,  Mr. 
Molteno,  happened  to  be  in  London  but  was  forbidden  to 
attend  ;  no  delegate  was  present  from  the  Transvaal ; 
and  Mr.  Brand,  President  of  the  Orange  Free  State  (who 
greatly  impressed  Froude),  attended  under  strict  injunc- 
tions from  his  Volksraad  not  to  take  part  in  any  negotiations 
respecting  federation,  by  which  the  independence  of  his 
own  State  could  be  endangered.  Sir  Theophilus  Shepstone 
and  two  members  of  the  Legislature  represented  Natal. 
As  regards  federation  the  meeting  was  entirely  abortive.^ 

Despite  this  discouragement,  Lord  Carnarvon  sent  out  to 
South  Africa  (in  December,  1876)  the  draft  of  a  permissive 
Confederation  Bill,  which  in  the  session  of  1877  was  passed 
into  law  by  the  Imperial  Legislature.  This  enabling  Act 
contained  the  outline  of  a  complete  Federal  Constitution. 
It  was  for  the  South  African  Colonies  to  fill  it  in  if  they 

^  Lucas  :  op.  cit.  p.  264. 

2  Cf.  Paul  :  Life  of  Froude,  c.  vii.     Eight  gentlemen  invited  to  meet 
him  at  dinner  at  Government  House  refused. 
^  Lucas  :  op.  cit.  p.  265. 


150  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

would.  Lord  Carnarvon,  while  insisting  that  the  "  action 
of  all  parties  whether  in  the  British  Colonies  or  the  Dutch 
States  must  be  spontaneous  and  uncontrolled,"  informed 
the  new  Governor  of  the  Cape  that  he  had  been  selected 
"  to  carry  my  scheme  of  confederation  into  efiect."  ^ 
The  man  chosen  for  this  high  task  was  one  of  the  most 
trusted  and  experienced  servants  of  the  Crown,  one  to 
whose  life-work  the  confederation  of  South  Africa  might 
form  an  appropriate  and  noble  crown.  It  was  the  expressed 
hope  of  his  Chief  that  within  two  years  he  would  be  "  the 
first  Governor-General  of  South  Africa."  The  words  read 
ironically,  for  the  reign  of  Sir  Bartle  Frere  (1877-80) 
coincided,  through  no  fault  of  his  own,  with  the  darkest 
period  in  South  African  history. 
Annexa-  Less  than  a  month  after  Sir  Bartle  Frere  reached  Cape 
TrTnrvaS,^  Town  (31st  March,  1877),  another  agent  of  Lord  Carnarvon's 
1877  '  took  a  step  which  opened  a  new  chapter  in  British  policy 
in  South  Africa.  Sir  Theophilus  Shepstone  was  Secretary 
for  native  affairs  in  Natal,  and  no  man  had  more  intimate 
knowledge  of  the  native  problem.  In  October,  1876,  he 
was  sent  out  as  "  Special  Commissioner  to  inquire 
respecting  certain  disturbances  which  have  taken  place 
in  the  territories  adjoining  the  colony  of  Natal,"  and 
was  authorised,  at  his  discretion,  and  provided  it  were 
desired  by  the  inhabitants,  *'  to  annex  to  the  British 
dominion  all  or  part  of  the  territories  which  formed  the 
scene  of  his  inquiry."  ^  The  scene  was  the  Transvaal 
Republic.  At  that  moment  the  Boers  of  the  Transvaal 
were  in  serious  danger  of  annihilation  at  the  hands  of  their 
native  neighbours.  More  than  this.  The  condition  and 
policy  of  the  Republic  constituted  a  serious  menace  to  the 
reputation  and  even  the  existence  of  the  whole  white 
population  of  South  Africa.  The  Boers  had  incurred  the 
bitter  enmity  of  Cetewayo,  King  of  the  powerful  tribe  of 
the  Zulus,  as  well  as  of  the  Matabele  Chief,  Lobengula. 
With  another  Chief,  Sekukuni,  they  were,  in  1876,  actually 
at  war.    MoraUy  and  materially  the  Boers  were  bankrupt, 

^  Egerton  :  Federations,  etc.,  p.  72. 
-  Egerton  :  Federations,  etc.,  p.  274. 


THE   ENGLISH   IN   SOUTH   AFRICA  151 

and  their  native  enemies  were  only  awaiting  the  oppor- 
tunity to  "  eat  them  up."  That  process  might  begin  with 
the  Boers  ;  it  was  not  likely  to  end  with  them.  Under 
these  circumstances  Shepstone,  after  three  months  of 
careful  inquiry,  decided  that  annexation  was  the  only 
remedy  for  the  disease,  and  on  12th  April,  1877,  he  took 
over  the  administration  of  the  Transvaal  in  the  Queen's 
name,  promising  to  the  Boers  complete  self-government 
under  the  British  Crown.  The  President,  Mr.  Burgers, 
after  a  formal  protest,  retired  to  Cape  Town  on  a  pension  ; 
his  rival,  the  Vice-President,  Mr.  Kruger,  proceeded  to 
London  and  tried  to  persuade  Lord  Carnarvon  to  reverse 
the  poKcy  of  his  agent.  This  the  Colonial  Secretary 
declined  to  do. 

That  the  annexation  saved  the  Boers  of  the  Transvaal  The  Zulu 
from  destruction  is  hardly  open  to  question.  But  it  left  ^^^^'  •^^'^^ 
the  British  Government  face  to  face,  in  a  more  acute  form 
than  ever  before,  with  the  native  problem.  A  series  of 
disputes  with  the  Zulus  led  in  January,  1879,  to  the  out- 
break of  war.  The  history  of  that  war  may  be  thus 
briefly  summarised :  one  grievous  disaster,  several  deeds 
of  heightened  heroism,  one  great  and  final  victory. 
At  Isandhlwana  {22nd  January)  a  British  force  of  800 
whites  and  500  natives  was  literally  cut  to  pieces.  This 
was  the  disaster  more  than  half  redeemed  by  the  heroic 
defence  of  Rorke's  Drift.  For  eleven  and  a  half  hours,  less 
than  100  men  of  the  24th,  under  two  subalterns,  Bromhead 
and  Chard,  held  the  Drift  against  4000  Zulus.  The  defence 
of  this  post  on  the  Buffalo  River  saved  Natal.  The 
final  victory  was  won  by  Lord  Chelmsford  at  Ulundi  in 
the  Zulu  territory  on  4th  July.  Cetewayo  was  afterwards 
captured  and  sent  as  a  prisoner  to  Cape  Town,  and  the 
power  of  his  people  was  finally  broken.  In  the  course  of  a 
war,  brief  but  full  of  incident,  the  exiled  Prince  Imperial 
of  France,  the  heir  of  Napoleon  III.,  who  had  volunteered 
to  serve  with  the  British  force,  was  unfortunately  killed 
in  a  reconnaissance  (1st  June),  owing  to  the  carelessness  of 
the  officer  who  had  been  entrusted  with  the  operation. 

Before  the  year  1879  closed,  a  British  force  destroyed 


152  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

the  power  of  Sekukuni,  and  this  inveterate  enemy  of  the 
Boers  joined  Cetewayo  in  captivity. 
The  Boer  The  Boers  could  now  breathe  freely  ;  the  English  had 
1880^81  destroyed  their  enemies.  The  Dutch  leaders  had  never 
ceased  to  protest  against  annexation,  and  their  visits 
to  London  led  them  to  hope  much  from  the  rapid  vicissi- 
tudes of  party  government.  Their  hopes  were  not  destined 
to  disappointment.  In  the  Transvaal,  Frere  found  in  1879 
that  the  Boers,  despite  official  assertions  in  London,  were 
confident  that  their  country  would  be  given  back.  The 
history  of  the  retrocession  of  the  Orange  Free  State  had 
taught  them  a  lesson.  Most  unfortunately,  there  had 
been  grave  procrastination  in  regard  to  the  fulfilment  of 
Shepstone's  promise  of  self-government.  In  June,  1879, 
Sir  Garnet  Wolseley  was  sent  out  to  take  over,  as  High 
Commissioner,  supreme  civil  and  military  command. 
Shortly  after  his  arrival  a  Crown  Colony  Constitution 
was  conferred  upon  the  Transvaal.  But  this  was  far  short 
of  the  legitimate  expectations  of  the  Boers,  and  their  dis- 
appointment was  great.  The  new  High  Commissioner 
declared  in  the  Queen's  name  that  it  was  the  will  and  deter- 
mination of  Her  Majesty's  Covernment  that  the  Transvaal 
should  remain  for  ever  "  an  integral  portion  of  Her 
Majesty's  dominions  in  South  Africa."  Her  Majesty's 
Government  was  about  to  change  hands.  In  the  autumn  of 
1879  Mr.  Gladstone  insisted  in  his  Midlothian  speeches 
on  the  insanity  of  "  the  free  subjects  of  a  Monarch  going 
to  coerce  the  free  subjects  of  a  Eepublic."  On  coming 
into  power  in  1880  his  Government  declared  that  "  under 
no  circumstances  can  the  Queen's  authority  iu  the  Trans- 
vaal be  rehnquished."  Bitter  was  the  disappointment 
of  the  Boers,  and  on  16th  December,  1880,  Messrs.  Kruger, 
Pretorius,  and  Joubert  issued  a  proclamation  declaring 
the  independence  of  the  Transvaal  Republic.  The  moment 
was  well  chosen.  The  Basuto  rebellion  was  in  fuU  progress  ; 
the  Transvaal  was  almost  denuded  of  British  troops,  and 
on  10th  December  some  companies  of  the  94:th  were  sur- 
prised and  cut  to  pieces  at  Bronker's  Spruit,  a  place  about 
forty  miles  from  Pretoria.     Sir  George  CoUey  had  succeeded 


THE   ENGLISH   IN   SOUTH   AFRICA  153 

Wolseley  in  July,  and  with  a  small  force  lie  hurried  up  to 
Newcastle  in  January  (1881).  Checked  with  heavy  loss 
at  Laing's  Nek  (28th  January)  and  again  at  Ingogo  (7th 
February)  he  met  his  death  in  the  disastrous  defeat  at 
Majuba  Hill  (26th  February),  Ireland  combined  with 
South  Africa  to  compel  an  early  meeting  of  Parliament 
(6th  January,  1881),  and  the  Queen's  Speech  emphasised 
"  the  duty  of  taking  military  measures  with  a  view  to 
the  prompt  vindication  of  my  authority."  Sir  Frederick 
Roberts  was  sent  out  in  command  of  a  considerable  force, 
but  he  arrived  in  South  Africa  only  to  find  that  Sir  Evelyn 
Wood,  who  succeeded  CoUey,  had  signed  an  agreement 
with  the  Boers  acknowledging  their  right  to  complete  self- 
government  under  the  suzerainty  of  the  Queen  (23rd 
March).  The  Pretoria  Convention,  in  which  these  terms 
were  embodied,  was  amended  three  years  later  by  the  Con- 
vention of  London  (27th  February,  1884).  The  latter 
treaty  acknowledged  the  "  South  African  Repubhc,"  and, 
while  retaining  the  control  of  external  relations,  deleted 
all  reference  to  the  suzerainty  of  the  Queen.  The  whole 
poHcy  of  retrocession  was  violently  assailed  by  the  Con- 
servative opposition  in  England  ^  and  it  signally  failed  to 
achieve  a  final  settlement  in  South  Africa. 

Between  1884  and  the  close  of  the  century  a  series  of  British 
changes,  at  once  rapid  and  profound,  passed  over  South  jn^ffijca " 
Africa.  In  1884  there  began,  as  we  have  seen,  a 
scramble  for  Africa  among  the  European  Powers.  Partly 
under  the  impulse  of  European  competition  in  Africa, 
partly  stimulated  by  the  discovery  of  diamonds  and 
gold  in  great  profusion,  the  forward  movement  re- 
commenced. The  method  adopted  in  this  advance 
involved  the  revival  of  a  device  which  since  the  days  of 
Adam  Smith  had  fallen  into  some  discredit.  The  states- 
men of  the  seventeenth  century  cordially  encouraged 
the  concession  of  Charters  to  companies  of  merchants. 
Such  concessions  brought  to  the  Crown  a  maximum  of 
profit  with  a  minimum  of  responsibility.    Adam  Smith 

^  Cf.  in  particular  the  remarkable  speech  of  Lord  Cairns  in  the  House 
of  Lords,  31st  March,  1881. 


154  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

condemned  the  confusion  between  political  and  commercial 
purposes,  holding  that  the  function  of  a  merchant  was 
inconsistent  with  that  of  a  sovereign.  None  the  less, 
this  method  of  colonisation  had  solid  advantages,  and  in 
the  last  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century  they  became 
increasingly  obvious.  The  "  company  of  merchants " 
took  risks  and  tried  experiments,  the  Crown  and  the 
nation  reaped  where  the  Company  had  sown.  In  1885 
a  Protectorate  was  established  over  Bechuanaland,  partly 
no  doubt  with  a  view  of  preventing  over-close  relations 
between  the  Boer  Republics  and  the  recently  established 
German  colonies  of  Namaqualand  and  Damaraland 
(German  South- West  Africa).  In  the  same  year  a  Charter 
was  granted  to  the  Royal  Niger  Company,  who  established 
a  Protectorate  over  the  Niger  territory  on  the  west  coast. 
But  chartered  companies  and  Protectorates  alike  represent, 
as  a  rule,  somewhat  transitory  phases  of  development, 
and  in  1900  Nigeria  was  annexed  to  the  Crown.  On  the 
east  coast  the  Chartered  Company  of  East  Africa  (1888) 
prepared  the  way  in  similar  fashion  for  the  direct 
sovereignty  of  the  Crown  (1896).  In  the  same  year 
(1888)  Lobengula,  King  of  the  Matabeles,  was  induced 
to  accept  British  protection,  and  in  1889  the  Chartered 
Company  of  South  Africa  was  incorporated  and  started 
on  its  conquering  and  civilising  mission,  establishing  its 
sovereignty  in  no  long  time  over  the  vast  territory  which 
stretches  from  the  Limpopo  in  the  south  to  Lake  Nyassa 
on  the  east  and  Lake  Tanganyika  on  the  north — a  territory 
which  recalls  in  its  modern  name,  Rhodesia,  the  memory 
of  the  great  Imperial  statesman  whose  insight  and  imagina- 
tion conceived,  and  whose  resolute  will  went  far  to  secure, 
British  supremacy  in  Africa.  About  the  same  time  (1890) 
Portugal  was  induced  to  renounce  all  rights  over  the 
Hinterland  which  separated  its  possessions  in  the  west 
(Angola)  from  Mozambique  and  Portuguese  East  Africa. 
In  this  way  the  two  Boer  Republics  were  virtually  en- 
circled by  British  territory. 

Meanwhile,  in  the  Transvaal  itself  an  event  of  first- 
rate  importance  had  taken  place.     Valuable  gold  mines 


THE   ENGLISH   IN  SOUTH  AFRICA  155 

were  discovered  in  1886  on  the  Witwatersrand,  and  the  Gold- 
discovery  attracted  a  crowd  of  adventurers  who  intro-  JJ'^J^ai^- 
duced  into  the  social  and  economic  life   of  the   South  vaai 
African    Kepublic    an    entirely   new  strain.     The    slow- 
moving,    intensely    conservative    Boer    farmers    deeply 
resented  the  intrusion  of  the  miners  and  financiers.     Oil 
would  not  mix  with  water,  and  the  newly-founded  city 
of  Johannesburg,  with  its  new  Chamber  of  Mines,  soon 
found  itself  in  conflict  with  Pretoria  and  the  Volksraad. 
The   newcomers,    or    Uitlanders,  peremptorily  demanded  The 
political  rights  commensurate  with  their  contribution  to  Uitlanders 
the  wealth  of  the  community.     The  Boer  Government, 
at  that  time  dominated  by  President  Kruger,  refused  to 
grant  them.     In  1895  Cecil  Rhodes  became  Prime  Minister 
of  the  Cape  Colony,  and  in  December  of  that  same  year 
the  Uitlanders  of  the  Transvaal  attempted  to  take  by 
force   what   had   been  denied  to  their   arguments.     Dr. 
Jameson,  an  intimate  friend  of  the  Premier  of  Cape  Colony,  The 
and  himself  the  administrator  of  the  British  South  Africa  ^^j[J^^^°" 
Company,    foohshly    attempted   to    raid   the    Transvaal 
territory  with  an  armed  force.     The  force,  commanded 
by  Jameson,  was  surrounded  by  the  Boers  at  Krugersdorp 
and  forced  to  surrender.     Their  confederates  in  Johannes- 
burg were  imprisoned  ;  Jameson  himself  and  his  comrades 
were  handed  over  for  trial  to  the  British  Government. 

The  fiasco  of  the  Jameson  Raid  had  important  results.  The 
Though  disavowed  both  by  the  Cape  Colony  Government  p^gl^jp^t^ 
and  by  the  Imperial  Government  the  Raid  excited  the  Kmger 
contempt  and  hostility  of  all  our  rivals  in  Africa  and 
our  enemies  in  Europe,  and  on  3rd  January,   1896,  the 
German   Emperor  telegraphed   to   President   Kruger   in 
the    following    terms :    "I  congratulate    you  from  the 
bottom   of    my  heart   on   having,  in    conjunction    with 
your    own    people,    and   without   seeking  the   assistance 
of  friendly  Powers,   and  relying   exclusively  upon  your 
own  forces   against  the  armed  bands  who  have  raided 
your  territory,  succeeded  in  re-establishing  peace  and  in 
maintaining   the   independence   of    your  country  against 
foreign  invasion.'' 


156 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


Treaties  TLis  telegram  naturally  gave  great  offence  in  England, 

the^^oer  ^^*  Jameson's  Raid  rendered  it  impossible  for  the  para- 
Republics  mount  Power  to  interfere  on  behalf  of  tbe  Uitlanders 
mMiv^^"  '^tiose  position  became  more  and  more  desperate.  Mean- 
wMle,  in  March,  1897,  the  Transvaal  Republic  concluded 
with  the  Orange  Free  State  a  series  of  important  treaties. 
A  Convention  of  "  Friendship  and  Perpetual  Alliance  " 
was  concluded  for  the  mutual  defence  of  their  rights  and 
territories.  Reciprocal  facilities  for  commerce  and 
naturalisation  were  granted,  and  it  was  agreed  that  each 
Republic  should  nominate  delegates  to  a  Council  which 
was  to  meet  in  alternate  years  at  Pretoria  and  Bloem- 
fontein,  charged  with  the  duty  of  drawing  closer  the 
political  and  commercial  relations  of  the  two  Republics 
and  of  preparing  the  way  to  a  federal  union  between 
them.  A  month  later  the  Orange  Free  State  concluded  a 
Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Commerce  with  Germany.  In 
view  of  the  rapprochement  between  the  two  Dutch  Republics 
the  significance  of  this  new  engagement  hardly  requires 
demonstration. 

Events  were  clearly  hastening  towards  the  dinouew.ent 
of  1899.  In  1897,  Sir  Alfred  (now  Viscount)  Milner  was 
appointed  to  succeed  Sir  Hercules  Robinson  as  Governor 
of  Cape  Colony  and  High  Commissioner  of  South  Africa  ; 
and  in  the  same  year  Mr.  Chamberlain  addressed  to  the 
High  Commissioner  an  important  dispatch  setting  forth 
in  detail  the  grievances  of  the  Uitlanders  against  the 
Transvaal  Government,  and  at  the  same  time  instructing 
him  to  raise  specifically  the  question  of  the  status  of  the 
Transvaal  under  the  Convention  of  1884.  The  terms  of 
Mr.  Cham-^  that  Convention  were  admittedly  ambiguous  ;  the  renuncia- 
tion of  suzerainty  was  a  sentimental  blunder  and  recent 
events  rendered  it  imperative,  if  grave  consequences  were 
not  to  ensue,  that  the  situation  should  be  cleared  up.  The 
question  was  firmly  handled,  both  by  Mr.  Chamberlain 
at  home  and  by  Sir  Alfred  Milner  in  South  Africa.  The 
Transvaal  Government  attempted,  not  unnaturally,  to 
use  Jameson's  blunder  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a 
revision  in  their  favour  of  the  terms  of  the  Convention 


Towards 
War 


berlain  and 

Lord 

Milner 


THE  ENGLISH   IN   SOUTH   AFKICA  157 

of  London.  But  Mr.  Chamberlain  was  adamant  against 
any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Dutch  Republic  to  assert 
a  status  of  complete  sovereignty  and  independence. 
Meanwhile,  things  could  not  remain  as  they  were  at 
Johannesburg.  In  April,  1899,  Sir  Alfred  Mihier  forwarded 
to  the  Queen  a  Petition,  signed  by  21,000  British  subjects 
in  the  Transvaal,  praying  that  the  Queen  would  make 
inquiry  into  the  grievances  of  which  they  were  victims, 
and  in  particular  their  exclusion  from  all  poHtical  rights. 
A  month  later  Mr.  Chamberlain  expressed  in  the  House 
of  Commons  his  complete  sympathy  with  the  terms  of 
the  Petition.  Negotiations  between  the  two  parties 
ensued,  and  in  June  a  Conference  took  place  at  Bloem- 
fontein  between  President  Kruger  and  Sir  Alfred  Milner 
at  which  the  latter  vainly  attempted  to  persuade  the 
President  to  make  some  concession  to  the  Uitlanders. 
The  situation  became  so  menacing  that  reinforcements 
were  dispatched  from  England  to  the  Cape,  but  in  numbers 
insufficient  to  assert  the  British  claims,  though  more 
than  sufficient  to  provoke  the  apprehensions  of  the  Boers. 
In  October,  1899,  the  two  Dutch  Republics  demanded 
the  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  British  troops,  and  the 
submission  of  all  the  questions  at  issue  to  arbitration. 
To  concede  the  latter  claim  would  have  been  to  acknow- 
ledge the  equality  and  sovereign  status  of  the  Transvaal 
Government.  On  the  implicit  refusal  of  the  demand  the 
two  Dutch  Republics  declared  war  (10th  October). 

The  war  opened  disastrously  for  Great  Britain.     The  The  South 
British  Forces  were  quite  inadequate  to  meet  the  Boers,  ^f^^^" 
who,  mobilising  with  extreme  rapidity,  took  the  offensive 
in   Natal.    A  small  British   force  under   General  White 
checked  their  advance  at  Talana  Hill  and  Elandslaghte 
(21st  October),  but  was  compelled  to  fall  back  on  Lady- 
smith,  where  for  four  months  it  was  besieged  by  the  Boers. 
Sir  Redvers  Buller  was  sent  out  in  command  of  reinforce- 
ments, but  made  the  serious  blunder  of  dividing  his  force 
into  three  columns.     The  result  was  the  Black  Week  of  The 
December,  1899  :    General  Gatacre  was  heavily  repulsed  ^y^^|^» 
in  a  night  attack  at  Stromberg  (10th  December).    Lord  De^c.  i899 


158  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Methuen,  moving  to  the  relief  of  Kimberley,  was  defeated 
at  Magersfontein  (11th  December) ;  while  Buller,  in  a  dogged 
attempt  to  relieve  Ladysmith  by  a  direct  frontal  attack, 
sustained  a  terrible  reverse  at  Colenso  (15th  December). 
Three  days  after  Buller's  defeat  on  the  Tugela  River,  Lord 
Roberts,  heroically  responding  to  the  call  of  Queen  and 
country,  accepted  the  Command-in-Chief,  only  stipulating 
that  he  should  have  the  services  of  Lord  Kitchener  as 
Chief  of  his  Stafi.  The  two  Generals  landed  at  Cape  Town 
on  16th  January,  1900,  and  the  army  under  their  command 
was  substantially  reinforced  by  contiugents  dispatched  to 
South  Africa  from  Canada,  New  Zealand,  and  Australia. 
Victory  ^}^q  spirit  of  the  scene  changed  instantaneously.     On 

byR^Jberts  15th  February,  Roberts  relieved  Kimberley  ;  on  27th 
and  Kit-  February  (the  anniversary  of  Majuba)  he  surrounded  at 
Paardeberg  a  large  force  of  Boers  under  the  command  of 
Kronje  and  compelled  them  to  surrender ;  he  entered 
Bloemfontein  on  15th  March,  and  advancing  from  the 
Orange  Free  State  into  the  Transvaal,  occupied  Pretoria 
in  the  first  week  of  June.  Meanwhile  Buller,  after  re- 
peated failures  to  relieve  General  White  and  his  sorely-tried 
garrison  ui  Ladysmith,  at  last  turned  the  flank  of  the 
Boers  on  the  Tugela  by  the  capture  of  Pieter's  Hill,  and 
so  was  able  to  relieve  the  devoted  city.  In  November, 
Roberts  handed  over  the  command  to  Kitchener,  and 
returned  to  England  just  in  time  to  report  himself  at 
Osborne  to  his  dying  sovereign.  Despite  rapidly-failing 
health.  Queen  Victoria's  conduct  during  the  Boer  War 
was  little  short  of  heroic.  She  it  was  who  had  insisted,  in 
December,  1899,  that  large  reinforcements  should  be  sent 
out,  and  that  Lord  Roberts  should  be  induced  to  take  the 
command  ;  she  followed  closely  the  efforts  of  her  soldiers 
in  South  Africa,  and  expressed  special  appreciation  of  the 
gallantry  of  the  Colonial  contingents  ;  she  went  in  and 
out  among  her  people  at  home,  encouraging  the  fighter, 
consoling  the  wounded,  comforting  the  mourners,  warning 
and  stimulating  her  Ministers.  But  the  strain  of  the 
Death  of  effort  was  tremendous,  and  on  22nd  January,  1901,  death 
Victoria      closed  her  long  reign  of  sixty-three  years. 


THE   ENGLISH   IN   SOUTH   AFRICA  159 

The  war  in  South  Africa  was  by  no  means  at  an  end.  GuerUla 
Throughout  the  latter  part  of  1900  and  the  whole  of  1901  f^^^^'^  ^" 
it  was  prolonged  by  the  brilliant  tactics  of  Louis  Botha,  Africa 
De  Wett,  and  Delarey,  who  waged  gueriUa  warfare  with 
incomparable  skill.     Gradually,  however,  the  grim  tenacity 
of  Kitchener  bore  down  aU  resistance.     Boer  women  and 
children  were  collected  into  concentration  camps,  and  by 
a  system  of  blockhouses  the  whole  country  was  slowly 
subdued.     In  May,   1902,   peace  between  Great  Britain  Treaty  of 
and  the  Boers  was  concluded  at  Vereeniging.  Vereemging 

The  long  contest  between  the  two  European  races  for 
supremacy  in  South  Africa  was  at  last  ended,  and  ended 
in  the  only  possible  way.  The  two  Burgher  States  were 
annexed  to  the  British  Crown.  After  the  conclusion  of 
Peace,  matters  began  to  settle  down  so  rapidly  that  it  was 
deemed  possible  to  confer  responsible  self-government 
upon  the  Transvaal  in  1906,  and  upon  the  Orange  River 
Colony  in  1907.  But  as  in  the  case  of  Canada  and  Australia,  Union  of 
the  attainment  of  responsibility  was  but  the  prelude  to  ^^^^^ 
a  further  constitutional  development.  Between  the  four 
self-governing  Colonies  of  South  Africa  there  was  much 
in  common,  and  it  was  natural,  therefore,  that  attempts 
should  have  been  made  to  effect  some  form  of  Federal 
Union.  During  the  last  twenty  years  or  more  the  idea 
had,  for  obvious  reasons,  receded  into  the  background, 
but  after  the  concession  of  responsible  government  to  the 
conquered  RepubHcs  it  again  came  prominently  to  the 
fore.  "  In  South  Africa,"  writes  Professor  Egerton,  "  more 
perhaps  than  in  any  other  portion  of  the  world,  there 
are  common  questions  of  general  interest  which  can  only 
be  decided  with  safety  by  a  general  authority  expressing 
the  considered  judgment  of  a  United  South  Africa."  ^ 
Four  questions  in  particular  compelled  the  immediate 
consideration  of  some  scheme  of  Union :  that  of  Railway 
Rates  and  Communications ;  the  Tarifi  Question ;  the 
Labour  Question  ;  and,  above  all,  the  fact  that  the  two 
European  races  were  hopelessly  and  increasingly  out- 
numbered by  the  indigenous  tribes  of  South  Africa. 

1  Federations  and  Unions  in  the  British  Empire,  p.  74. 


160  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Problems  Under  Colonial  separatism  tlie  Railway  problem  pre- 
Afrlcr^  sented  a  hopeless  and  apparently  insoluble  tangle.  In 
the  interval  after  the  conclusion  of  the  war,  and  while 
the  Boer  States  were  under  Crown  Colony  administration, 
Lord  Miliier  did  something  towards  a  solution  of  the 
railway  problem  by  uniting  the  systems  of  the  Transvaal 
and  the  Orange  River  Colony.  But  his  scheme  provided 
no  more  than  a  palliative.  There  still  remained  three 
State  Railway  systems,  which  combined  all  the  drawbacks 
of  State  ownership  with  all  the  disadvantages  of  private 
competition.  In  May,  1908,  a  Conference  came  together 
at  Pretoria  to  consider  the  closely  related  problems  of 
Railway  Rates  and  Tarifis  ;  but  it  was  quickly  realised 
that  no  ultimate  solution  would  be  found  except  in  a 
political  union  between  the  four  Colonies.  Six  months 
later  a  Convention  met  at  Durban,  consisting  of  thirty- 
three  representatives  from  the  different  Colonies.  The 
proceedings  took  place  behind  closed  doors.  In  December, 
1908,  the  meetings  were  transferred  to  Cape  Town,  and  after 
three  months  of  close  and  continuous  application  a  scheme 
was  agreed  upon,  was  embodied  in  a  Bill,  and  was  sub- 
mitted for  consideration  to  the  several  Colonial  legislatures. 
After  various  amendments,  the  scheme  now  embodied  in 
the  South  African  Union  Act  was,  in  June,  1909,  approved 
by  all  four  Colonies.  The  scheme  as  finally  adopted  took 
the  form,  not  of  a  Federation,  but  of  a  Political  Union. 
Union  was  in  the  case  of  South  Africa  preferred  to  federal- 
ism for  several  reasons  :  the  two  most  important  being 
that  the  distinctions  in  South  Africa  run  upon  liues  not 
of  locality  but  of  race,  while  the  economic  problems 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  so  urgently  pressed  for  solution, 
were  more  readily  soluble  under  a  unitary  than  under 
a  federal  system. 
The  Union  Thus  was  the  dream  of  Sir  George  Grey  and  Lord 
Afrlcf ^  Carnarvon^  more  than  fulfilled.  They  had  dreamt  of 
confederation.  Under  the  new  Constitution,  four 
Colonies,  Cape  Colony,  Natal,  the  Transvaal,  and  the 
Orange  River  Colony,  agreed  to  merge  their  identity 
in  that  of  United  South  Africa,  and  accept  henceforward 


THE   ENGLISH   IN   SOUTH   AFRICA  IGl 

the  status  of  Provinces ;  but  each  Province  still  has  an 
elected  Provincial  Council  mth  a  standing  Executive 
Committee,  elected  by  the  Council  and  responsible 
thereto,  under  a  chairman  nominated  by  the  Union 
Government,  holding  the  title  of  administrator  of  the 
Province.  Provision  was  also  made  for  the  admission 
into  the  Union,  at  a  subsequent  date,  of  other  Provinces, 
such  as  Rhodesia,  should  it  be  mutually  desired.  The 
Union  Legislature  consists  of  two  Houses  :  a  Senate  of  40 
members,  and  a  House  of  130,  of  whom  Cape  Colony  elects 
ol,  the  Transvaal  45,  and  Natal  and  the  Orange  Free 
State  17  each.  The  Executive  Council,  appointed  by  the 
Governor-General,  is,  in  effect,  a  responsible  Cabinet.  By  a 
clumsy  but  perhaps  unavoidable  compromise,  the  seat  of  the 
Legislature  was  fixed  at  Cape  Town,  that  of  the  Executive 
at  Pretoria.  In  the  Union  Act  the  final  stage  in  the  con- 
stitutional evolution  of  South  iVfrica  has,  we  may  presume, 
been  reached.  "  Spasmodic  violence  alternating  with 
impatient  dropping  of  the  reins  ;  first  severity  and  then 
indulgence,  and  then  severity  again,  with  no  persisting 
in  any  one  system — a  process  which  drives  nations  mad 
as  it  drives  children."  Such  was  Froude's  summary  of 
England's  dealing  with  South  Africa  in  the  nineteenth 
century.    The  twentieth  has  opened  under  happier  auspices. 

The  South  African  War  reacted  powerfully  upon  inter-  Reaction  of 
national  relations  in  Europe.     The  sympathies  of  most  of  ^f^-ip^"^'^ 
the  European  Governments  and  peoples  were  manifestly  war  upon 
on  the  side  of  the  Boers.     That  this  should  have  been  the  p",^??^^" 
case  in  Holland  was  not  unnatural,  and  in  Germany  was 
inevitable  ;   nor  was  there  any  reason  for  surprise,  in  view 
of   recent   events   in   Egypt   and   the   Soudan,  that   the 
hostihty  of  France  to  England  should  have  been  as  marked 
as  that  of  Germany.     Italy  was  faithful  to  her  traditional 
friendship  for  England,   and  the   memory   of   England's 
friendly  offices  in  the  Spanish  War  was  sufficiently  recent 
to  check  the  disposition  in  America  towards  ostentatious 
espousal  of  the  Boer  cause. 

Had  the  German  Empire  possessed  in  1900  an  adequate 
fleet  it  is  probable  that  the  European  War  would  have  been 
II 


162  EUROPE    AND   BEYOND 

antedated  by  fourteen  years.  In  that  event  England's 
position  would  have  been  exceedingly  precarious  ;  her 
diplomatic  isolation  was  almost  complete  ;  her  relations 
with  France  were  indifferent,  while  Russia's  hostility  was 
at  least  equal  to  that  of  Germany.  Early  in  1900  the 
German  Emperor  actually  proposed  to  France  and  Russia 
that  they  should  co-operate  with  him  in  imposing  "  media- 
tion "  upon  England.  As,  however,  the  proposal  involved 
the  stipulation  that  the  three  Powers  should  enter  into  a 
mutual  guarantee  of  their  European  territories,  it  was 
promptly  declined  by  France.  Later  on,  when  the  Kaiser 
momentarily  desired  the  friendship  of  England,  he  had 
the  effrontery  to  suggest  to  her  that  this  stipulation  was 
expressly  inserted  by  him  in  order  to  prevent  a  Franco- 
Germano -Russian  combination  against  Great  Britain. 
Even  the  Kaiser  could  hardly  have  been  guilty  of  an 
insinuation  so  preposterous  but  for  the  marked  improve- 
ment in  Anglo-German  relations  which,  paradoxically, 
ensued  upon  the  Boer  War.  The  truth  was  that  Germany 
was  not  yet  ready  for  the  decisive  struggle,  and  in  the 
meantime  the  Kaiser's  supreme  object  was  to  avert  any 
rajjjyrochement  between  Russia  on  the  one  side  and 
England  and  France  on  the  other.  The  entanglement  of 
the  European  Powers,  and  in  particular  of  Russia,  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Far  East,  contributed  in  no  small  measure 
to  the  achievement  of  his  purpose. 

AUTHORITIES 

H.  E.  Egerton  :   Federations  and  Unions  within  the  British  Empire. 

(Oxford,  1911.) 
Sir  C.  P.  Lucas  :  A  Historical  Geography  of  the  British  Colonies  (South 

and  East  Africa).     (Oxford,  1906-18.) 
W.  B.  WoRSFOLD  :    The  Union  of  South  Africa;  and  Lord  Milner's 

Work  in  South  Africa.     (London,  1912  and  1906.) 
G.    M'C.    Theal  :    Progress    of   South    Africa    in    the    19th  Century. 

(London,  1902.) 
H.  A.  Bryden  :  A  History  of  South  Africa.     (London,  1904.) 
F.  R.  Cana  :  South  Africa  from  the  Great  Trek  to  the  Union.     (London, 

1909.) 
H.  Dehi^rain  :  L' expansion  des  Boers  au  19"  Siecle.     (Paris,  1905.) 
Sir  J.  P.   FiTZPATRiCK  :  The  Transvaal  from  Within.     (London,  1899.) 
E,  B.  IwAN  Mpller:  Lord  Milner  and  South  Africa.     (London,  1902.) 


THE   ENGLISH   IN   SOUTH   AFRICA  163 

V.  R.  Markham  :  New  Era  in  South  Africa^  and  South  Africa  Past  and 

Present.     (London,  1904.) 
L.  S.  Amery  :    "  The  Times "  History  of  the  War  in  South  Africa. 

(London,  1900-9.) 
Sir    F.    Matjrice  :    History   of  the    War   in   South  Africa    (official). 

(London,  1906-7.) 
A.  T.  Mahan  :  The  War  in  South  Africa.     (New  York,  1901.) 
R.  H.  Brand  :  The  Union  of  South  Africa.     (Oxford,  1909.) 
Williams:  Life  of  Cecil  Rhodes.     (London,  1921.) 


CHAPTER  IX 

WEST  AND  EAST 

China  and  Japan.    Europe  in  the  Far  East. 
Reform  Movement  in  Russia 

The  opening  or  reopening  by  white  men  of  intercourse  by  land  between 
furthest  West  and  furthest  East  is  an  event  of  first-rate  historical 
importance. — J.  D.  Rogers. 

Les  tsars  ont  cette  rare  fortune  que  I'instinct  national  soutient  leurs 
calculs  d'ambition.  ...  La  propagande  revolutionnaire  ne  pouvait  pas 
atteindre  la  Russie.  .  .  .  Rien  n'y  etait  mur,  ni  pour  la  liberte  politique, 
ni  pour  la  liberte  civile, — Albert  Sorel  (1887). 

What  we  want  in  Russia  is  not  gambling  in  revolution  with  its  fan- 
tastic prospects  and  terrible  realities  :  we  want  thorough  organic 
reforms,  something  like  the  movements  of  the  'sixties  on  a  larger  scale. 
— Sir  Paul  Vinoqradoff  (1914). 

Wdt-  \  GAIN  and  again  in  the  course  of  this  narrative  it  has 

Politik  ^^^^been  necessary  to  insist  upon  the  truism  that  the 
main  interest  of  European  History  in  the  last  half-century 
Hes  largely  beyond  the  confines  of  Europe.  The  contents 
of  the  two  preceding  chapters,  the  one  carrying  us  from  the 
American  Continent  to  the  Carribean  Archipelago,  from 
Cuba  to  the  PhiHp pines  ;  the  other  dealing  exclusively  with 
South  Africa,  supply  a  sufficient  commentary  upon  this 
text.  The  following  pages  will  afford  still  further  confirma- 
tion of  the  same  truth. 
Europe  ,  We  must  not,  however,  exaggerate  the  novelty  of  the 
and  the  situation.  The  history  of  Europe  in  its  modern  phase 
dates  m  reahty  from  the  geographical  renaissance  of  the 
later  fifteenth  century.  Among  the  impulses  to  that 
great  movement  not  the  least  powerful  was  the  desire  to 
maintain  and  develop  those  trading  relations  between 
Western  Europe  and  Eastern  Asia  which  had  been  tempor- 

164 


Far  East 


PAR    EAST.    Political  Divisions  avilr  Klisso- Japan  lslWar 


'BY.c^OLnJjn&lO^ft 


WEST  AND   EAST  165 

arily  interrupted  by  the  conquests  of  the  Ottoman  Turk 
in  the  Balkans  and  in  the  countries  which  fringe  the 
eastern  coast  of  the  Mediterranean.  The  pioneers  in 
Eastern  enterprise  were  the  Portuguese,  who  reached 
Japan  about  1542.  In  1519,  Francis  Xavier  arrived  at  the  Japan 
head  of  a  Jesuit  Mission  at  Kagoshima,  and  some  forty 
years  later  Japanese  Envoys  visited  the  western  capitals 
of  Lisbon,  Madrid,  and  Rome.  The  Portuguese  were  fol- 
lowed in  the  East  by  the  Dutch  and  the  English  ;  the 
EngUsh  East  India  Company  established  a  trading  factory 
in  Japan  in  1613,  and  another  two  years  later  on  the 
Island  of  Formosa.  Early  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
however,  a  domestic  revolution  in  Japan  led  to  the  exter- 
mination of  Christianity,  and  from  that  time  until  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  Japanese  were  able  to 
maintain  a  policy  of  complete  isolation. 

Hardly  less  complete  was  the  isolation  of  China.     The  China 
diplomatic  segregation  of  the  Celestial  Empire  was  absolute, 
but  since   1771   foreigners  had  been  permitted  to  trade, 
though  under  the  severest  restrictions,  at  Canton.    The  East  The  East 
India  Company  made  repeated  attempts  to  break  down  the  p^n^y  g^X' 
embargo.     Lord  Macartney  was  dispatched  on  a  mission  china 
to  China  in   1792,  and  obtained  an  audience  from  the 
Emperor.     But  in  reply  to  a  request  for  more  considerate 
treatment,  the  Emperor  made  it  clear  to  the  British  Envoy 
that  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  British  traders  to  obtain 
wider  privileges  would  be  peremptorily  resisted.     "  Should 
your  Majesty,"  wrote  the  Emperor  to  King  George  III., 
"  fit  out  ships  in  order  to  attempt  to  trade  either  at  Ningpo 
Chusan,  Tientsin,  or  other  places,  I  shall  be  compelled,  as 
our  laws  are  exceedingly  severe,  to  direct  my  Mandarins 
to  force  your  ships  to  quit  these  ports,  and  thus  the  in- 
creased trouble  and  exertions  of  your  merchants  would  at 
once  be  frustrated." 

After  Macartney's  mission  matters  somewhat  improved. 
But  foreign  traders  still  carried  on  their  operations  at 
great  personal  risk  ;  consequently,  in  1816  another  im- 
portant mission  was  dispatched  under  Lord  Amherst, 
who  was  instructed  by  the  British  Government  to  press  the 


166  EUROPE   AND  BEYOND 

Emperor  of  China  for  the  "  removal  of  the  grievances  which 
had  been  experienced,  and  for  an  exemption  from  them 
and  others  of  the  like  nature  for  the  time  to  come,  with 
the  establishment  of  the  Company's  trade  upon  a  secure, 
solid,  equitable  footing,  free  from  the  capricious,  arbitrary- 
aggressions  of  the  Local  Authorities  and  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Emperor,  and  the  sanction  of  regulations  to 
be  drawn  up  by  himself."  Amherst  was  permitted  to  reach 
Pekin,  but  the  net  result  of  his  mission  may  be  estimated 
by  the  message  dispatched  from  the  Chinese  Emperor  to 
the  Prince  Regent  of  England  :  "  Hereafter  there  is  no 
occasion  for  you  to  send  an  Ambassador  so  far,  and  to  be 
at  the  trouble  of  passing  over  mountains  and  crossing  over 
seas.  ...  I  therefore  send  down  my  pleasure  to  expel 
these  Ambassadors  and  send  them  back  to  their  own 
country  without  punishing  the  high  crime  they  have 
committed." 
The  Opium  Insult  was  heaped  upon  insult  and  restriction  upon 
Trade  restriction,  but  the  foreign  merchants  persisted  in  the 
attempt  to  force  their  unwelcome  presence  upon  the 
Chinese.  Their  persistence  was  largely  explained  and 
partially  compensated  by  the  increasing  profits  of  the 
Opium  Trade.  With  a  view  to  mitigating  the  hardships 
endured  by  the  merchants,  the  British  Government  decided 
to  appoint  a  Superintendent  of  Trade  who,  besides  con- 
trolling the  commercial  dealings  between  Englishmen  and 
the  Chinese,  should  also  be  invested  with  something  of  a 
diplomatic  character.  In  1833  Lord  Napier  was  appointed 
to  this  diflS.cult  post.  On  his  arrival  at  Canton  the  Governor 
published  a  Proclamation  in  the  following  terms  :  "A 
lawless  foreign  slave,  Napier,  has  issued  a  notice.  We 
know  not  how  such  a  dog  barbarian  of  an  outside  nation 
as  you  can  have  the  presumption  to  call  yourself  Superin- 
tendent .  .  .  according  to  the  laws  of  the  nation  the  royal 
warrant  should  be  respectfully  requested  to  behead  you, 
and  to  expose  your  head  publicly  to  the  multitude  as  a 
terror  to  perverse  dispositions."  Napier  failed  to  make 
any  impression  upon  the  Chinese  and  retired  to  Macao, 
where  in  1834  he  died,  and  was  succeeded  as  Superintendent 


WEST   AND   EAST  167 

in  1835  by  Captain  Elliot.  Elliot  could  liardly  fail  to 
sympatMse  with  the  intense  anxiety  manifested  by  the 
Chinese  Government  to  put  an  end  to  the  opium  traffic, 
though  their  methods  in  doing  it  were  open  to  criticism. 
In  1837  a  Special  Commissioner,  Lin,  arrived  at  Canton  with 
plenary  authority  to  use  all  necessary  means  to  put  down 
the  traffic.  Previous  to  1833  the  trade  in  opium  had  been 
regulated  by  the  East  India  Company,  who  enjoyed  a 
complete  monopoly.  The  Company's  Charter  lapsed 
in  1833,  and  on  its  reissue  the  monopoly  was  abrogated. 
As  a  result,  the  trade  not  only  increased  with  great  rapidity, 
but,  being  no  longer  regulated  by  a  responsible  Corpora- 
tion, gave  rise  to  many  regrettable  incidents.  The  Chinese, 
therefore,  were  entirely  justified  in  trying  to  stop  it,  though 
the  action  of  Commissioner  Lin  was  exceedingly  arbitrary 
and  high-handed.  Lin  peremptorily  demanded  that  all 
the  opium  in  the  hands  of  British  merchants  should  be 
surrendered  and  destroyed  ;  Elliot  had  no  option  but  to 
order  the  merchants  to  comply,  and  a  stock  worth  several 
millions  sterling  was  destroyed.  In  return,  Elliot  gave 
the  merchants  a  bond  on  the  English  Government.  Com- 
missioner Lin  next  demanded  that  henceforward  all 
vessels  engaged  in  the  trade  should  be  confiscated,  and  all 
traders  should  suffer  death.  Elliot  naturally  refused  these 
extravagant  demands ;  bade  the  merchants  evacuate 
Canton  ;  himself  withdrew  to  Macao,  and  called  upon  the 
Governor-General  of  India— Lord  Auckland — for  armed 
assistance. 

It  would  serve  no  useful  purpose  to  recount  in  detail  First  chin- 
the  ensuing  acts  of  violence  on  both  sides :  the  outrages,  JIlJ^S' 
the  reprisals  and  recriminations,  which  in  1840  eventuated 
in  war.  The  whole  business  was,  to  say  the  least,  un- 
savoury, but,  whatever  the  indiscretion  of  British  agents 
and  the  lawlessness  of  British  subjects  on  the  spot,  no 
blame  attaches  to  the  Home  Government.  Their  ^dews  on 
the  whole  question  were  admirably  expressed  in  a  letter 
written  by  Sir  James  Graham  to  Lord  William  Bentinck :  ^— 

"  Trade  with  China  is  our  only  object ;    conquest  there 
1 1828-35. 


168  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

would  be  as  dangerous  as  defeat,  and  commerce  never 
prospers  when  force  is  used  to  sustain  it.  No  glory  is  to 
be  gained  in  a  victory  over  the  Chinese.  Our  factory 
there  can  only  thrive  by  a  ready  compliance  with  the  laws, 
the  prejudices,  and  even  the  caprices  of  a  nation  which  we 
seek  to  propitiate,  and  the  supercargoes  must  not  imagine 
that  great  national  interests  are  to  be  sacrificed  to  a  spirit 
of  haughty  defiance  mixed  with  contempt  for  the  laws  and 
customs  of  an  independent  people.  Our  grand  object  is 
to  keep  peace,  and  by  the  mildest  means,  by  a  plastic 
adaptation  of  our  manners  to  theirs,  to  extend  our  influence 
in  China  with  the  view  of  extending  our  commercial  rela- 
tions. It  is  not  a  demonstration  of  force  that  is  required, 
but  proofs  of  the  advantage  which  China  reaps  from  her 
peaceful  intercourse  with  our  nation."  ^ 

The  sentiments  are  almost  too  obviously  "  correct." 
But  it  is  easier  to  be  "  correct  "  at  Whitehall  than  in  the 
Far  East,  and  the  two  nations  drifted  into  a  war,  from 
which,  as  Graham  truly  said,  no  glory  was  to  be  reaped. 
But  though  glory  was  absent  from  the  war,  substantial 
Treaty  of  advantages  were  embodied  in  the  Treaty  of  Nankin  by 
184?^"'  which,  in  1842,  the  war  was  brought  to  an  end.  The 
Chinese  agreed  to  cede  Hong-Kong  to  England,  to  pay  a 
sum  of  £6,000,000  sterling  as  "  ransom,"  compensation, 
and  indemnity,  and  to  open  to  the  trade  of  the  world  the 
five  port  towns  (henceforward  known  as  Treaty  Ports) 
of  Canton,  Anioy,  Shanghai,  Ningpo,  and  Foo-Chow-Foo. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Chinese,  despite  the  plausible 
arguments  of  the  English  negotiators,  refused  to  legalise 
the  opium  trade.  The  result  was  that  a  huge  smuggling 
trade  in  the  drug  sprang  up  ;  the  profits  derived  from  it 
were  in  proportion  to  the  risks,  and  a  class  of  traders  were 
attracted  to  it  who  gave  much  trouble  in  the  future  alike 
to  the  Chinese  and  to  the  English  Government. 

Two   years   after  the   Treaty  of  Nankin,   the   United 

States  concluded  a  commercial  treaty  with  China,  and  a 

large   trade   was   gradually   opened   through   the   Treaty 

Ports,  not  only  by  America  but  by  France  and  the  other 

1  Parker  :  Graham,  i.  150. 


WEST   AND   EAST  169 

Western  European  Powers.  The  situation  continued, 
however,  to  be  full  of  difficulty  and  to  give  cause  for 
perpetual  friction. 

By  1856  Great  Britain  was  again  involved  in  hostilities  The 
with  China.  The  dispute  arose  in  the  famihar  fashion,  f^i^^lf^ 
Under  existing  treaties  British  vessels  in  Chinese  waters  War,  1856 
were  subject  only  to  the  jurisdiction  of  our  own  Consuls. 
The  Arrow,  a  lorcha  or  coasting  schooner,  was  sailing, 
rightly  or  wrongly,  under  the  British  flag.  The  crew  were 
Chinamen,  and  while  the  lorcha  lay  in  the  Canton  River 
she  was  boarded  from  a  Chinese  warship,  and  the  crew 
were  carried  off  on  a  charge  of  piracy.  The  British  Consul 
demanded  their  extradition,  and  Sir  John  Bowring,  the 
Governor  of  Hong-Kong,  supported  him.  The  Chinese 
authorities  refused  reparation,  and  Sir  Michael  Seymour, 
with  the  British  Fleet,  proceeded  to  capture  some  of  the 
forts  on  the  Canton  River.  Bowring  now  seized  the 
opportunity  to  demand  the  admission  of  foreigners  to 
Canton,  under  the  terms,  hitherto  neglected,  of  the  Treaty 
of  Nankin  (1842).  The  Chinese  made  reprisals  according 
to  their  wont  :  burnt  down  foreign  factories,  massacred 
European  sailors,  and  set  a  price  upon  the  heads  of  "  the 
English  and  French  dogs."  Things  became  so  serious 
that  early  in  1857  troops  were  dispatched  from  England, 
and  Lord  Elgin  was  sent  out  as  plenipotentiary.  The 
troops  were  diverted  to  India  to  assist  in  the  suppression 
of  the  Sepoy  Mutiny,  but  Canton  was  taken  in  1858  and 
the  Enghsh  and  French  fleets  were  sent  up  to  Tientsin 
to  enforce  the  demands  of  the  Western  Powers.  Not 
until  June,  1858,  was  peace  concluded.  China  agreed  to  Treaty  of 
permit  a  permanent  British  embassy  at  Pekin  and  to  ^glg^^'"' 
establish  one  in  London  ;  to  open  the  Yang-tse  River 
and  five  additional  ports  to  foreign  trade,  and  to  protect 
the  Christian  rehgion. 

Throughout  the  negotiations  which  led  up  to  the  Treaty 
of  Tientsin  there  was  close  co-operation  between  the 
representatives  of  England  on  the  one  hand,  and  of 
Russia,  Germany,  and  more  particularly  France  on  the 
other.     The  Chinese,  however,  2^J^<^ved  very  reluctant  to 


170  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

carry  out  the  engagements  made  in  the  Treaty,  and  England 
and  France  found  themselves  again  involved  in  hostihties 
in  1860.  Lord  Elgin,  who  had  left  China  after  concluding 
Renewal  of  the  Treaty  of  Tientsin,  was  ordered  to  return,  and  with  a 
H(gtiiities,  j^j,gg  ioTCG  of  British  and  French  troops  reached  Shanghai 
in  June,  1860.  The  combined  force  captured  the  Taku 
Forts,  and,  having  secured  a  base,  marched  on  Pekin. 
The  brutal  treatment  accorded  by  the  Chinese  to  British 
and  French  prisoners  compelled  the  Alhes  to  inflict  signal 
punishment  upon  them.  The  Summer  Palace  of  the 
Emperor  near  Pekin  was  therefore  burnt  to  the  ground. 
The  Emperor  was  thus  brought  to  his  senses,  and  on  24th 
October,  1860,  the  Convention  of  Pekin  was  signed. 
The  Treaties  of  1858  were  ratified ;  China  agreed  to 
receive  a  British  Mnister  at  Pekin,  to  pay  an  increased 
indemnity,  to  open  Tientsin  to  trade,  and  to  cede 
Kowloon,  opposite  Hong-Kong,  to  the  British  Crown. 
A  month  later  General  IgnatieS  concluded  on  behaM 
of  Kussia,  who  had  taken  no  part  in  the  preceding 
hostilities,  a  Convention  by  which  a  long  strip  of  coast- 
hne  between  the  river  Usuri  and  the  sea  was  ceded  to 
the  Czar.  Russia  thus  acquired  the  Primorsk  Province, 
and  so  consoHdated  her  position  between  Vladivostok 
and  the  Amur. 

So  matters  continued  for  nearly  a  generation.  Relations 
between  England  and  China  were  temporarily  interrupted 
in  1875  by  the  murder  of  Augustus  Marjary,  an  official 
in  the  British  Consular  Service,  but  war  was  averted  by 
the  tact  of  Sir  Thomas  Wade,  the  British  Representative 
at  Pekin,  and  China  agreed  to  dispatch  to  London  a 
special  envoy  who  was  the  bearer  of  a  humble  apology 
to  the  British  Crown.  In  the  following  year  (1876),  four 
The  Great  additional  ports  were  opened  to  foreign  trade,  and  in  1878 
Sts^^'  ^^®  occurrence  of  a  terrible  famine  in  China,  involving 
the  loss  of  nine  miUion  hves,  gave  to  European  missionaries 
an  opportunity  of  exhibiting  Christianity  in  a  favourable 
light  to  the  distressed  inhabitants  of  China.  The  organisa- 
tion of  rehef  on  that  occasion  and  the  kindly  interest 
manifested  by  the  missionaries  in  the  troubles   of  the 


WEST   AND   EAST  171 

people  tended  not  a  little  to  improve  the  relations  between 
West  and  East. 

We  must  now  turn  from  China  to  the  Island  Empire  Japan 
destined  before  long  to  assert  its  superiority  in  the  Far 
East.  From  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  onwards 
persistent  efforts  were  made  by  the  United  States  to  open 
up  trade  relations  with  Japan,  and  in  1853  an  American 
squadron  under  the  command  of  Commodore  Perry 
appeared  off  Yokohama.  Perry  was  the  bearer  of  a  letter  Perry's  Ex- 
from  the  President  of  the  United  States  demanding  pro-  ^553^°"' 
tection  for  American  sailors  who  might  be  driven  by  stress 
of  weather,  while  whale-fishing  in  the  Pacific,  into  Japanese 
ports,  or  wrecked  upon  their  shores.  He  also  demanded 
leave  for  American  vessels  to  put  into  Japanese  ports  for 
repairs  or  supphes,  and  permission  to  dispose  of  their 
cargoes.  In  Japan,  which  for  two  hundred  years  had 
successfully  maintained  complete  isolation,  the  deHvery  of 
this  letter  created  nothing  less  than  consternation.  Perry 
was  induced  temporarily  to  withdraw,  but  his  visit  proved 
to  be  the  opening  of  a  new  era  in  the  history  of  Japan, 
and  indeed  in  that  of  the  Far  East.  According  to  agree- 
ment. Perry  returned  in  1854,  and  imposed  upon  Japan 
a  Treaty  by  which  the  ports  of  Shaimoda  and  Hakodate 
were  opened  to  the  ships  and  traders  of  the  United  States. 
In  the  same  year,  similar  facihties  were  conceded  to 
Great  Britain.  Four  years  later,  conventions  were  con- 
cluded between  Japan  on  the  one  side,  and  Great  Britain, 
the  United  States,  France,  Russia,  and  Portugal  on  the 
other,  by  which  diplomatic  agents  were  to  be  admitted 
to  reside  in  Yedo  ;  certain  ports^ — Kanawaga,  Nagasaki, 
and  Hakodate — were  to  be  opened  to  trade  in  the  near 
future,  and  consuls  were  to  be  allowed  to  reside  there. 

Reference  has  been  made  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs  The  French 
to  co-operation  between  the  English  and  the  French  in  ^ja^*^®"^ 
the  Far  East,  and  some  words  must  now  be  added  as  to 
the  position  which  the  French  occupied  in  that  region. 
For  a  century  or  more,  France  had  been  making  somewhat 
fitful  efforts  to  compensate  themselves  for  their  expulsion 
from  India  by  the  establishment  of  a  French  Dependency 


172  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

further  East.  As  long  ago  as  1787  Louis  XVI.  concluded 
a  Treaty  with  the  King  of  Cochin- China,  by  which  in 
exchange  for  certain  political  and  commercial  privileges 
France  restored  the  "  legitimate  "  Sovereign  to  his  throne. 
Owing  to  preoccupation  in  domestic  politics,  France  was 
unable  to  follow  up  the  advantage  thus  gained,  but  the 
Emperor,  Napoleon  III.,  was  no  sooner  firmly  established 
on  the  throne  of  France  than  he  resumed  the  project  for 
the  establishment  of  a  French  Dependency  in  the  Far 
East.  In  1859  France  acquired  Saigon ;  established  a 
Protectorate  over  Cambodia  in  1862  ;  and  in  the  course 
of  the  years  between  1859  and  1867,  made  herself  mistress 
Cochin-  of  Cochiu-China.  The  acquisition  of  Tonquin  in  1867 
Tonquin"'^  brought  France  into  immediate  contact  with  Southern 
China.  In  1874  de  Broglie  concluded  a  Treaty,  the  object 
of  which  was  to  impose  a  Protectorate  over  the  Emperor 
of  Ajinam,  the  peninsula  which  rests  on  the  Gulf  of  Tonquin 
and  the  South  China  Sea.  The  Treaty  failed  to  define 
with  sufficient  precision  either  the  French  position  in  rela- 
tion to  Annam  or  the  position  of  Annam  in  relation  to 
China.  China  had  from  the  first  protested  against  the 
action  of  France  in  establishing  a  Protectorate  over  a 
kingdom  which  was,  as  she  claimed,  a  dependency  of  her 
own,  and  in  1881  she  denounced  the  Treaty  concluded  in 
1874  between  France  and  Annam.  Simultaneously  attacks 
were  made  upon  the  French  in  Tonquin  by  bands  of  un- 
disciplined marauders  who  infested  the  Tonquin-China 
frontiers,  and  who  were  knowTi  as  the  "  Black  Flags." 
In  this  irregular  warfare  the  French  suffered  very  consider- 
able reverses.  Consequently  in  1882  Jules  Ferry,  then  in 
power  in  France,  sent  out  a  French  squadron  under  the 
command  of  Admiral  Courbet  and  considerable  reinforce- 
ments of  French  troops.  Courbet  wrested  the  delta  of 
Tonquin  from  the  Black  Flags,  and  compelled  the  Emperor 
of  Annam  to  acknowledge  the  French  Protectorate. 
Against  this  China  protested,  and  attempted  to  expel 
Franco-  the  French  from  Tonquin.  War,  therefore,  was  declared 
Chinese  between  the  two  Powers.  Admiral  Courbet  destroyed 
1882-84      the  arsenal  of  Foochow,  seized  Formosa  and  the  Pescadores, 


WEST   AND   EAST  173 

and  blockaded  Southern  China.  Negotiations  for  peace 
were  then  opened  through  the  intermediation  of  the  English 
resident,  Sir  Robert  Hart.  A  serious  disaster  to  the 
French  arms  near  Langson  threatened  to  impede  them,  but 
in  April,  1884,  peace  was  concluded.  China  definitely 
recognised  the  French  Protectorate  over  Annam  and 
Tonquin,  and  later  on  agreed  to  make  certain  commercial 
concessions  to  France. 

An  even  more  serious  trial  of  strength  awaited  the  Korea 
celestial  Empire.  For  many  years  past,  the  "  hermit  '* 
kingdom  of  Korea  had  been  a  bone  of  contention  between 
Japan  and  China.  A  long  and  narrow  peninsula  dividing 
the  sea  of  Japan  from  the  Yellow  Sea,  Korea  occupied  a 
strategical  position  which  invited,  if  it  did  not  compel, 
the  attentions  of  the  Japanese  on  the  one  side,  and  on  the 
other  of  the  Chinese  in  Manchuria,  and  the  Russians  at 
Vladivostok.  The  political  position  of  Korea  was  also 
ambiguous.  It  was  claimed  as  a  dependency  by  the 
Chinese  when  it  suited  their  purpose  to  do  so,  but  China 
was  quick  to  repudiate  any  responsibility  when  the  Koreans 
got  into  trouble  with  their  neighbours.  An  incident  of 
this  kind  occurred  in  1875,  when  the  Koreans  fired  upon 
a  Japanese  warship  engaged  in  a  survey  of  their  coasts. 
The  Japanese  thereupon  dispatched  an  Embassy  to  Pekin 
to  ascertain  definitely  the  position  of  the  Chinese  Empire 
in  relation  to  Korea.  The  Emperor  of  China  disclaimed 
all  responsibility,  whereupon  Japan  dispatched  an  expedi- 
tion to  the  Peninsula  and  compelled  the  Koreans  to  accept 
a  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce  and  to  open  three  of  their 
ports  to  Japanese  trade,  though  the  independence  of 
Korea  was  at  the  same  time  specifically  recognised  by 
Japan.  A  few  years  later  (1882),  Great  Britain,  the  United 
States,  and  Germany  concluded  a  Convention  ^vith  Korea 
for  the  opening  up  of  trade.  This  Convention  was  not  to 
the  liking  either  of  China  or  Japan,  who,  though  mutually 
hostile  in  Korea,  were  both  deeply  concerned  to  preserve 
the  Peninsula  from  the  grip  of  the  European  Powers  in 
general  and  in  particular  from  that  of  its  nearest  neighbour 
at  Vladivostok.     In  the  same  year  the  Japanese  Embassy 


174  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

in  Seoul  was  attacked  ;  the  members  of  the  Legation  had 
to  fly  from  the  capital,  and  the  Japanese  therefore  were 
compelled  to  insist  upon  the  right  to  maintain  troops  at 
Seoul  for  the  protection  of  their  Embassy.  In  1884  fresh 
disturbances  broke  out  in  Seoul,  directed  impartially 
against  the  Japanese  and  the  Chinese.  As  a  result  a 
Convention  was  concluded  at  Tientsin  (1885)  between 
China  and  Japan  under  which  Korea  was  to  be  left  un- 
molested by  the  two  Powers,  but  either  was  to  have  the 
right  to  send  troops  to  the  Peninsula  provided  due  notifica- 
tion was  given  to  the  other.  So  matters  remained  for 
about  ten  years,  but  in  1894  events  happened  destined  to 
exercise  a  profound  influence  upon  the  Far  East  and 
indeed  upon  the  world. 
Chino-  In  June,  1894,  the  King  of  Korea  appealed  to  the 
Japanese  Emperor  of  China  to  assist  him  with  troops  in  the  suppres- 
1894-95  sion  of  a  serious  domestic  rebellion.  The  Emperor  re- 
sponded by  the  dispatch  of  a  considerable  force,  at  the 
same  time  intimating  the  fact,  in  accordance  with  the 
Treaty  of  1894,  to  Japan.  Thereupon  Japan  also  sent  an 
army  to  Seoul,  and  intimated  to  China  that  she  refused 
to  recognise  Korea  as  in  any  sense  a  dependency  of  China. 
Plainly,  a  trial  of  strength  between  the  young  Power  and 
the  old  could  not  be  much  longer  delayed,  and  on  1st 
August,  1894,  war  was  formally  declared.  General  Nozu's 
victory  at  Ping  Ying  (15th  September)  cleared  Korea  of 
Chinese  troops,  and  two  days  later  the  Japanese  Navy 
won  a  decisive  victory  at  sea  near  the  mouth  of  the  Yalu 
River.  Japan  was  now  in  a  position  to  take  the  offensive 
against  China  on  Chinese  soil.  She  attacked  the  Chinese 
fortresses  and  arsenals  which  guarded  the  Shantung  and 
Liao-Tung  Peninsulas,  Wei-Hai-Wei,  Port  Arthur,  and 
Talienwan.  These  important  points  were  captured  one 
by  one,  and  on  18th  April,  1895,  the  Chinese  agreed  to 
Treaty  of  accept  the  term?,  imposed  by  Japan  in  the  Treaty  of 
Shimonseki  Sliimonseki.  By  that  treaty  the  absolute  independence 
of  Korea  was  formally  recognised  by  both  parties,  and 
China  ceded  to  Japan  the  peninsula  of  Liao-Tung  with 
the  fortresses  of  Port  Arthur    and    Talienwan,  together 


WEST   AND   EAST  175 

with  the  islands  of  Formosa  and  the  Pescadores.  China 
also  agreed  to  pay  an  indemnity  of  200  million  taels  (about 
£50,000,000)  and  to  allow  Japan  to  occupy  Wei-Hai-Wei 
until  the  indemnity  was  paid.  Japan  further  stipulated 
that  four  additional  cities  should  be  opened  by  China  to 
foreign  traders,  and  that  Japanese  vessels  should  be  allowed 
to  navigate  Chinese  waters. 

Never  was  the  victory  of  one  Power  over  another  more  The  Trans- 
strikingly  complete,  and  never  was  a  complete  victory  o^japan" 
more  clearly  reflected  in  the  terms  of  Peace.  At  one 
bound  Japan  had  advanced  to  the  foremost  place  in  the 
Far  East.  The  explanation  of  that  victory  must  be 
sought  in  the  astounding  revolution  which  in  the  preceding 
quarter  of  a  century  had  been  accompHshed  in  that 
country.  Into  the  details  of  the  revolution  which,  initi- 
ated only  in  1868,  had  in  the  short  space  of  twenty- five 
years  absolutely  transformed  an  ancient  people,  this 
narrative  cannot  enter.  Briefly  it  may  be  said  that 
Japan  which,  down  to  1868,  had  been  entirely  mediaeval 
and  Asiatic,  was  transformed  with  astonishing  rapidity 
into  an  up-to-date  Europeanised  Power.  The  first  line 
of  railway  to  connect  Tokio  with  Yokohama  was  begun 
in  1870.  Japan  now  possesses  6,700  miles  of  railways. 
The  old  feudal  system  of  land  tenure  and  of  local 
government  was  aboHshed,  a  brand-new  Constitution  on 
European  Hues  was  adopted,  and  in  1890  a  Japanese 
Parliament  consisting  of  the  orthodox  two  Chambers 
met  for  the  first  time.  Popular  education  was  introduced 
and  developed  with  feverish  haste,  and  universities  were 
established  at  Tokio  and  Kioto.  Above  all,  the  miUtary 
system  of  Japan  was  reorganised  on  German  models  and 
compulsory  service  was  introduced.  No  wonder  that  the 
fruits  were  reaped  in  the  war  against  the  Chinese  Empire 
in  1894-95. 

But  a  Europeanised  Japan  was  now  confronted  by  the  interven- 
jealousy   and   hostihty   of   the   European   Powers.     The  ^^j^"  9^ 
rapidity  and  completeness  of  Japan's  victory  over  China  France,  and 
seemed  to  threaten  the  pofitical  equilibrium  in  the  Far  Germany 
East.     Russia  was,  of  course,  the  Power  primarily  con- 


17G 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


cerned  by  Japan's  conquest  of  Southern  Manchuria,  upon 
which  Russia  had  herself  always  looked  with  envious 
eyes.  Germany  and  France  were  in  this  matter  tem- 
porarily in  accord  with  Russia  and  with  each  other,  and  the 
three  European  Powers  insisted  that  Japan  must  not  be 
permitted  permanently  to  occupy  the  territories  on  the 
mainland  of  China,  ceded  to  her  by  the  Treaty  of  Shimon- 
seki.  The  possession  of  Port  Arthur,  so  it  was  con- 
tended, would  dominate  Pekin,  and  so  would  prove 
detrimental  to  the  maintenance  of  peace  in  the  Far  East. 
Japan,  therefore,  yielding  ostensibly  to  "  the  dictates 
of  magnanimity  "  but  in  reality  to  stern  necessity,  accepted 
the  advice  of  the  three  Powers  and  surrendered  Port 
Arthur  and  the  Liao-Tung  Peninsula.  She  received  as  a 
solatium  an  increased  indemnity,  but  no  money  could 
compensate  for  the  loss  of  her  territorial  acquisition,  and 
she  withdrew,  only  to  cherish  in  her  heart  a  bitter  ani- 
mosity against  the  Power  which  had  been  primarily 
instrumental  in  robbing  her  of  the  fruits  of  victory,  and 
to  prepare  for  the  struggle  a  outrance  which  was  bound 
sooner  or  later  to  come. 

The  sequel  to  European  intervention  on  behalf  of  China 
affords  a  striking  illustration  of  the  purity  of  pohtical 
motives.  In  1897  certain  German  missionaries  were 
murdered  in  the  province  of  Shantung.  As  a  compensa- 
tion for  this  brutal  indignity,  Germany  demanded  and 
(5th  March,  1898)  obtained  a  ninety-nine  years'  lease  of 
Kiaochow  the  harbour  of  Kiaochow,  with  the  surrounding  territory, 
together  with  large  commercial  and  financial  privileges 
in  the  province  of  Shantung.  Germany  also  stipulated 
for  a  considerable  money  indemnity,  the  repayment  of  all 
her  expenses,  and  the  infliction  of  condign  punishment 
upon  the  actual  murderers  and  upon  the  officials  under 
whose  jurisdiction  the  murders  had  occurred.  Hardly 
was  the  German  lease  of  Kiaochow  signed,  when  Russia 
concluded  an  arrangement  with  China  by  which  Port 
Arthur  and  Talienwan  were  granted  to  her  on  a  twenty-five 
years'  lease.  It  was  further  agreed  between  the  two 
Powers  that  these  important  harl)ours  should  be  opened 


European 
Outposts 
in  China 


Port 
Arthur 


WEST  AND  EAST  177 

only  to  the  ships  of  war  of  Russia  and  China.  The  scramble 
for  C'hina  having  thus  begun,  Great  Britain  could  hardly 
look  on  unmoved.  Moreover,  the  Chinese  themselves 
intimated  to  Great  Britain  that  as  soon  as  the  Japanese 
evacuated  Wei-Hai-Wei  (still  held  as  security  for  the 
payment  of  the  indemnity)  Great  Britain  might  if  she 
chose  have  a  lease  of  it.  The  suggestion  was,  from  the 
Chinese  point  of  view,  a  shrewd  one  ;  for  Japan  was  still 
in  possession  of  Wei-Hai-Wei,  and  in  view  of  the  Russian  Wei-Hai- 
and  German  acquisitions  so  flagrantly  defiant  of  the  con-  ^®^ 
siderations  which  had  prompted  the  demand  that  Japan 
should  surrender  her  acquisitions  on  the  Chinese  mainland, 
Japan  might  be  disposed  to  stay  where  she  was.  Great 
Britain  agreed  to  take  Wei-Hai-Wei  on  lease  for  so  long  a 
period  as  Port  Arthur  should  remain  in  the  hands  of 
Russia.  Accordingly,  Wei-Hai-Wei  was  evacuated  by  the 
Japanese  on  24th  May,  1898,  and  on  the  25th  it  was  taken 
over  by  Great  Britain. 

Nor  was  foreign  penetration  in  China  by  any  means  Russian 
Hmited  to  those  territorial  acquisitions.  Russia  was  ^oS^fn^' 
gradually  fastening  a  financial  mihtary  and  commercial  Manchuria 
grip  upon  the  celestial  Empire.  In  October,  1896,  she  had 
concluded  with  China  the  "  Cassini  "  Treaty  by  which  she 
undertook  to  help  China  to  fortify  the  peninsula  of  Liao- 
Tung,  and  at  the  same  time  obtain  the  right  of  concen- 
trating her  own  troops  there  in  time  of  war,  and  of  estab- 
Hshing  there  in  time  of  peace  coal  depots  and  arsenals. 
About  the  same  time  Russia  founded,  with  the  aid  of  French 
capital,  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank,  and  obtained  concessions 
for  the  diversion  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway  through 
Manchuria  to  Port  Arthur,  and  for  the  construction  of  a 
branch  fine  to  Pekin.  France  and  other  European  Powers 
also  obtained  for  their  several  nations  rights  of  railway 
construction  in  China.  Nothing,  however,  did  more 
to  alarm  the  Conservative  party  in  China  than  the 
pubHcation  of  an  edict  by  the  Chinese  Government  con- 
ferring at  the  instance  of  France  considerable  privileges 
upon  the  French  CathoHc  Missions  in  that  country.  The 
Catholic  Bishops  were,   under  this  edict,   placed  on  an 

12 


178  EUROPE  AND   BEYOND 

equality  with  the  native  Viceroys  and  Governors  of  Pro- 
vinces. So  large  a  concession  to  the  Catholic  Church 
raised  a  suspicion  that  it  might  have  been  made  by  the 
Chinese  Government  actually  in  order  to  provoke  hostiUty 
against  all  foreigners. 
Anti-  Be  that  as  it  may,  such  was  unquestionably  the  result, 

foreign  ;^q|^^  Qf  course,  that  these  concessions  were  the  sole  cause 
in  China  of  that  hostility.  The  events  of  the  last  few  years  naturally 
tended  to  create  in  the  minds  of  a  conservative  and 
suspicious  people  profound  resentment  against  those  who 
seemed  to  be  bent  at  once  upon  the  dismemberment  of  the 
Empire,  and  upon  a  transformation  of  its  social,  religious, 
and  industrial  life.  Such  feelings  led  to  the  explosion 
ThejBoxer  known  to  foreigners  as  the  rising  of  the  Boxers.  Early  in 
Rising  ,  jQQQ  ^]^g  situation  became  so  menacing  that  the  Foreign 
Ministers  at  Pekin  made  a  formal  demand  to  the  Chinese 
Government  for  the  immediate  dissolution  of  all  secret 
societies.  As  the  Chinese  Government  did  nothing  in  the 
matter,  the  Foreign  Ministers  requested  their  own  Govern- 
ments to  dispatch  naval  squadrons  to  China.  The  arrival 
of  their  squadrons  at  Taku,  merely  served  to  increase  the 
exasperation  against  the  foreigners.  In  June,  massacres 
on  a  large  scale  began  in  Pekin,  and  on  the  20th  of  that 
month  the  German  Ambassador,  Baron  Von  Ketteler,  was 
assassinated  at  Pekin.  Thereupon  his  colleagues  fortified 
their  several  Legations  as  best  they  could,  and  appealed  for 
protection  to  the  European  squadrons  at  Taku.  The  fleets 
attacked  the  Tal-oi  forts  at  the  end  of  June  and  captured 
them.  The  Chinese  Government  then  threw  off  the  mask 
and  published  an  edict  for  the  enrolment  of  the  Boxers 
and  the  declaration  of  war  against  "  the  foreign  devils." 
Interna-  Tientsin  and  the  Pekin  Legations  were  now  entirely  isolated, 
^'^^A\l-  ^^t  ^^^  ^^^  ^^^^  months  the  British  Embassy,  in  which  the 
Pekin  other  Ministers  and  their  suites  had  taken  refuge,  was 
besieged.  Meanwhile  an  international  relief  force  was 
organised  in  which  Great  Britain,  France,  Russia,  and 
Germany  were  joined  by  the  United  States  and  Japan. 
The  relief  column  reached  Pekin  in  August,  and  raised 
the  siege  of  the  British  Embassy.     Condign  punishment 


WEST   AND   EAST  179 

was  meted  out  to  the  ringleaders,  a  large  indemnity  was 
imposed  upon  China,  but  the  territorial  integrity  of  China 
was  specifically  guaranteed  by  the  Powers.  These  terms 
were  embodied  in  a  definitive  treaty  which  was  signed 
in  September,  1901. 

Events  in  the  Far  East  had  moved  with  tremendous  The  Atigio- 
rapidity ;    how   rapidly  the   world   had   hardly   perhaps  TrS"^^ 
realised,  when,  in  1902,  it  learnt  to  its  astonishment  that  1902  ^' 
the  island  Empire  of  the  West  had  emerged  from  the 
splendid  isolation   which   had   so   long   characterised   its 
foreign  policy  only  to  conclude  an  actual  treaty  with  the 
island  Empire  of  the  Far  East.     On  30th  January,  1902, 
the  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  was  signed.     The  event  was  so 
important  in  the  history  of  international  relations  that  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  shall  be  quoted  textually. 

"  The  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  actuated 
solely  by  a  desire  to  maintain  the  status  quo  and  general 
peace  in  the  extreme  East,  being,  moreover,  especially 
interested  in  maintaining  the  territorial  integrity  of  the 
Empire  of  China  and  the  Empire  of  Corea,  and  in  securing 
equal  opportunities  in  those  comitries  for  the  commerce 
and  industry  of  all  nations,  hereby  agree  as  follows  : — 

"  Art.  I.  The  High  Contracting  Parties,'^having  mutu- 
ally recognised  the  independence  of  China  and  of  Corea, 
declare  themselves  to  be  entirely  uninfluenced  by  any 
aggressive  tendencies  in  either  country.  Having  in  view, 
however,  their  special  interests,  of  which  those  of  Great 
Britain  relate  principally  to  China,  while  Japan,  in  addition 
to  the  interests  which  she  possesses  in  China,  is  interested 
in  a  peculiar  degree  politically,  as  well  as  commercially 
and  industrially,  in  Corea,  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
recognise  that  it  will  be  admissible  for  either  of  them  to 
take  such  measures  as  may  be  indispensable  in  order  to 
safeguard  those  interests  if  threatened  either  by  the 
aggressive  action  of  any  other  Power,  or  by  disturbances 
arising  in  China  or  Corea,  and  necessitating  the  inter- 
vention of  either  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  for  the 
protection  of  the  lives  and  property  of  its  subjects. 

"  Art.  II.  If  either   Great   Britain  or  Japan,   in  the 


180  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

defence  of  their  respective  interests  as  above  described, 
should  become  involved  in  war  with  another  Power,  the 
other  High  Contracting  Party  will  maintain  a  strict 
neutrality,  and  use  its  efforts  to  prevent  other  Powers  from 
joining  in  hostilities  against  its  ally. 

"  Art.  III.  If,  in  the  above  event,  any  other  Power  or 
Powers  should  join  in  hostilities  against  that  ally,  the 
other  High  Contracting  Party  will  come  to  its  assistance, 
and  mil  conduct  the  war  in  common,  and  make  peace  in 
mutual  agreement  with  it. 

"  Art.  IV.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that 
neither  of  them  will,  without  consulting  the  other,  enter 
into  separate  arrangements  with  another  Power  to  the 
prejudice  of  the  interests  above  described. 

"  Art.  V.  Whenever,  in  the  opinion  of  either  Great 
Britain  or  Japan,  the  above-mentioned  interests  are  in 
jeopardy,  the  two  Governments  will  communicate  with  one 
another  fully  and  frankly. 

"  Art.  VI .  The  present  Agreement  shall  come  into 
effect  immediately  after  the  date  of  its  signature,  and 
remain  in  force  for  five  years  from  that  date. 

"  In  case  neither  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  should 
have  notified  twelve  months  before  the  expiration  of  the 
said  five  years  the  intention  of  terminating  it,  it  shall  remain 
binding  until  the  expiration  of  one  year  from  the  day  on 
which  either  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  shall  have 
denounced  it.     But  if,  when  the  date  fixed  for  its  expiration 
arrives,  either  ally  is  actually  engaged  in  war,  the  alliance 
shall,  ipso  facto,  continue  until  peace  is  concluded."  ^ 
Sigiiiticance      The  significance  of  this  treaty  can  hardly  be  exaggerated 
of  the         —more  particularly  from  the  point  of  view  of  Japan.     At 
^^^  ^        one  stride  Japan  was  admitted  to  terms  of  equality  by  the 
greatest  of  the  world  empires,  and  she  was  assured  that,  in 
the  event  of  an  attack  upon  her  by  Kussia,  the  British 
Fleet  would  keep  the  ring  and  would  intercept  any  pos- 
sible intervention  on  the  side  of  her  antagonist.     Great 

1  The  treaty  is  printed  by  Sir  R.  K.  Douglas  in  his  Europe  and  the  Far 
East  (pp.  418-420),  a  work  to  which  this  chapter  owes  much. 


WEST  AND   EAST  181 

Britain,  on  her  part,  secured  a  powerful  naval  ally  in  the 
Pacific,  and  converted  into  a  friend  a  Power  which  her 
Australasian  Colonies  were  beginning  to  dread.  The  Anglo- 
Japanese  Treaty  was  concluded  for  five  years  ;  but  before 
the  period  expired  it  was  revised  in  two  important  particu- 
lars. It  was  agreed  that  each  country  should  come  to  the 
assistance  of  the  other  if  attacked  even  by  a  single  Power, 
and  the  scope  of  the  alliance,  which  was  officially  described 
as  aiming  at  "  the  consolidation  and  maintenance  of 
general  peace  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia  and  of  India," 
was  thus  definitely  extended  to  embrace  British  India. 
The  alliance  was  to  last  for  ten  years.  In  1911,  however, 
the  agreement  was,  at  the  instance  of  Great  Britain,  again 
revised  in  order  to  remove  any  danger  of  England  being 
involved  in  a  war  between  the  United  States  and  Japan. 
To  meet  this  possible  danger  the  4th  Article  of  the  revised 
Treaty  of  1911  was  to  run  as  follows  :  "  Should  either 
High  Contracting  Party  conclude  a  treaty  of  general 
arbitration  with  the  third  Power,  it  is  agreed  that  nothing 
in  this  agreement  shall  entail  upon  such  contracting  party 
an  obligation  to  go  to  war  with  the  Power  with  whom  such 
treaty  of  arbitration  is  enforced." 

Before  the  first  revision  of  this  famous  treaty,  Japan  Russo- 
was  involved  in  a  war  of  the  first  magnitude  with  Russia,  ^l^^^^^ 

Towards  that  end  things  had  been  tending  for  at  least  1904-5 
a  quarter  of  a  century.  The  potential  antagonism  of 
Russia  to  Japan  was  plainly  announced  when  in  the 
year  1875  Russia  in  high-handed  fashion  seized  the  island 
of  Sakhalin,  loftily  conceding  to  Japan  the  Kurile  Islands, 
which  indisputably  belonged  to  the  latter  Power.  Japan 
did  not  forget ;  still  less  did  she  forgive  Russia  for  the 
intervention  by  which  she  had  in  1895  deprived  Japan  of 
the  fruits  of  her  victory  over  the  Chinese  Empire.  When, 
in  1898,  Russia  had  herself  seized  Port  Arthur  and  had 
immediately  begun  to  convert  into  a  strong  fortress  and  to 
utiHse  as  a  naval  station  the  port  which  in  the  hands  of 
Japan  she  had  denounced  as  a  menace  to  Pekin,  the  in- 
dignation of  the  Japanese  knew  no  bounds.  Japan,  how- 
ever, knew  well  how  to  wait  until  her  mihtary  and  naval 


182  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

reorganisation  was  complete.  Meanwhile  Russia  was 
pushing  forward  with  hot  haste  her  mihtary  and  railway 
penetration  in  Manchuria.  In  1900  the  Russian  Viceroy, 
Admiral  Alexeieff,  concluded  an  agreement  with  the 
Chinese  Commander  at  Mukden,  providing  that  China 
should  resume  her  authority  in  Manchuria  only  under  a 
Russian  Protectorate.  By  1903  it  became  evident  that 
Russia  intended  to  extend  her  occupation  from  Manchuria 
to  Korea.  Between  August,  1903,  and  February,  1904, 
continuous  negotiations  proceeded  on  these  and  other 
disputed  points  between  Tokio  and  St.  Petersburg,  until 
at  last,  when  all  her  preparations  were  complete,  Japan 
required  Russia  to  name  a  specific  date  for  her  withdrawal 
from  Manchuria.  Negotiations  were  finally  broken  off 
on  5th  February.  By  8th  February,  Admiral  Togo,  in 
command  of  the  Japanese  Fleet,  was  on  his  way  to  Port 
Arthur,  and  on  the  night  of  8th-9th  February,  the  Japanese 
torpedoed  the  Russian  Fleet  off  Port  Arthur,  and  proceeded 
straightway  to  invade  Korea.  The  first  Japanese  Army 
under  General  Kuroki,  having  safely  landed  at  Chemulpo, 
pushed  on  to  the  line  of  the  Yalu,  and  cleared  Korea  of 
Russian  troops.  General  Oku  with  the  second  Japanese 
Army  landed  on  the  Liao-Tung  Peninsula,  cut  off  the 
communications  of  Russia  with  Port  Arthur,  and  having 
opened  up  that  fortress  to  the  attack  of  a  third  Japanese 
Army  under  General  Nogi,  again  turned  north  and  drove 
the  Russians  back  towards  Mukden.  On  1st  January, 
1905,  Port  Arthur,  after  suffering  a  terrible  bombardment, 
on  the  top  of  a  ten  months'  siege,  surrendered  to  the  com- 
bined attacks  of  the  Japanese  forces  on  sea  and  land.  Oku, 
now  reinforced  by  the  army  which  had  been  besieging 
Port  Arthur,  resumed  the  advance  on  Mukden,  and  after 
tremendous  fighting,  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat  upon  the 
Russian  forces  at  the  Battle  of  Mukden  (6th-10th  March). 
In  the  three  day./  battle,  120,000  men  were  killed  and 
wounded.  As  a  result,  Russian  forces  evacuated  Mukden, 
leaving  40,000  prisoners  in  Oku's  hands. 

Two  months  later  the  Rassian  Baltic  Fleet,  under  the 
command  of   Admiral   Rodjestvensky,  made  its  belated 


WEST   AND   EAST  1S3 

appearance  in  Japanese  waters.     It  had  sailed  from  tlie  Tho  Baltic 
Baltic  in  October,  and  on  the  21st  of  that  month,  finding  Sroogger 
itself  in  the  midst  of  a  flotilla  of  British  fishing  smacks  Bank 
and  trawlers  off  the  Dogger  Bank,  had  opened  fire  upon  2isu>fc! 
them   with  fatal   results.     The   incident  created  intense  1904 
excitement  in  England,  and  might  easily  have  led  to  the 
outbreak   of    war.     The    British    Government,   however, 
behaved  with  admirable  restraint,  and  the  incident  was 
referred  to  an  international  commission,  by  whom  it  was 
estabhshed  that  the  Russian  admiral  had  mistaken  the 
British  trawlers  for  Japanese  torpedo  boats,  and  had  fired 
upon  them  in  panic.     Russia  was  required  to  apologise 
to  Great  Britain  and  to  compensate  the  fishermen. 

Hardly  had   Rodjestvensky's    fleet    reached    Japanese  Battle  of 
water  when  Togo  fell  upon  it  and  annihilated  it  in  the  J^"'^^^"^* 
Straits   of  Tsushima   (27th  May,    1905).     The   Battle   of  27t.h  May 
Tsushima  finished  the  war.     Through  the  friendly  ofl&ces  ^^^ 
of  the  United  States,  negotiations  between  the  belligerents 
were   opened  at  Portsmouth   (New  Hampshire),  and  on 
23rd  August,  1905,  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  was  concluded.  Treaty  of 
Russia  agreed  to  restore  to  Japan  the  Island  of  Sakhahn  ^^^{^ 
which  she  had  seized  in  1875  ;   to  surrender  to  Japan  her 
lease  of  the  Liao-Tung  Peninsula  and  of  Port  Arthur, 
to  evacuate  Manchuria,  and  to  recognise  Korea  as  falling 
within  the  Japanese  sphere  of  influence.     Korea,  however, 
was  declared  to  be  independent,  and  Russia  and  Japan 
mutually    agreed    to    evacuate    Manchuria.     Five    years 
later,  Japan  put  an  end  to  ambiguities  in  Korea  by  a 
definite  annexation  (1910). 

The  Russo-Japanese  War  was  an  event  of  resounding  Results  of 
significance,  and  its  reactions  were  far-reaching.  In  Asia  tht'-^^yaf 
the  victory  of  Japan  imposed  a  definite  check  upon  the 
advance  of  Russia,  and  placed  Japan  herself  in  a  position 
of  unquestioned  pre-eminence.  It  also  exercised  a  powerful 
effect  upon  the  domestic  politics  of  China.  China  hurriedly 
began  to  Europeanise  her  institutions  in  the  Japanese 
mode,  established  a  parliamentary  government  in  1911, 
and  in  1912  overthrew  the  ancient  Manchu  dynasty,  and 
embarked  upon  the  hazardous  experiment  of  a  republic. 


184  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Results  of       Even  more  significant  were  the  reactions  of  the  Russo- 
the^War      Japanese  War  upon  Europe — primarily,  of  course,  upon 
urope    j^^gg-g^   herself.     The    Russian   autocracy   had    long   ago 
appreciated  the  fact  that  for  them  it  was  a  race  between 
brilhant  prestige  acquired  from  success  abroad,  and  an 
internal  movement  which,  beginning  with  reform,  might 
easily  develop  into  revolution. 
Changes  in       During  the  previous  thirty  years  Russia  had  been  the 
Russia,       subject  of  three  great  movements,  any  one,  or  all,  of  which 
might  be  properly  described  as  revolutionary.     One  was 
industrial,  a  second  intellectual,  and  a  third  constitutional 
or   pohtical.     Russia   was   almost   the   last  of   European 
countries  to  pass  under  the  dominion  of  modern  industrial- 
ism.    But  from   1870  onwards  Russia  has  been  moving 
in  an  industrial  sense  in  the  same  direction,  if  not  at  the 
same  pace,  as  the  countries  of  Western  Europe.    Curiously 
Industrial    enough  a  strong  impulse  was  given  to  the  industrial  move- 
Revolution  nient  by  the  emancipation  of  the  serfs.     Not  a  few  of 
those  who  had  subsisted  in  comparative  comfort  as  serfs 
found   it   impossible   to    make  a  living  as   free  peasant 
proprietors.     They  got  deeper  and  deeper  into  debt,  and 
at  last,  as  the  only  solution  of  their  difficulties,  sought  and 
found  work  in  the  cities. 

The  progress  of  industrialisation  was  followed  in  Russia, 
as  elsewhere,  by  symptoms  of  intellectual,  social,  and 
political  restlessness.  Owing  to  the  autocratic  form  of 
government  and  the  severely  restrictive  measures  taken  by 
the  Russian  police,  the  reform  movement  assumed  from 
the  first  a  revolutionary  character.  Consequently,  many 
of  the  most  brilliant  Russian  intellectuals  found  themselves 
in  exile.  Among  them  was  Bakiinin,  the  prophet  of 
anarchy,  who  in  1868  pubHshed  at  Geneva  his  People's 
Business,  which  was  followed  in  1873  by  his  Statecraft  and 
Anarchy.  The  pubhcation  of  these  works  may  be  taken 
as  having  initiated  the  movement  which  reached  fruition 
in  1917. 
The  Con-  Side  by  side  with  the  Revolutionary  movement  there 
stitutional  ^^g  ^  Constitutional  movement  which  found  a  focus  in 
the  Zemstva.     One  of  the  great  reforms  effected  by  Alex- 


WEST  AND  EAST  185 

ander  II.  was  the  reorganisation  of  Local  Government. 
In  1864  there  was  established  a  system  of  local  elected 
councils,  representing  the  Nobles,  the  Burghers,  and  the 
Peasants.  These  Zemstva  were  established  in  each  dis- 
trict, and  the  District  Zenistva  elected  Provincial  Zemstva. 
They  were  charged  with  such  duties  as  the  maintenance 
of  pubHc  highways  and  bridges,  the  relief  of  the  poor, 
public  health,  and  elementary  education,  but  their  main 
significance  lay  in  the  fact  that  they  trained  large  bodies 
of  the  people  in  habits  of  local  self-government,  and 
formed  the  starting-point  for  larger  schemes  of  constitu- 
tional reorganisation.  In  1878  a  Conference  of  Zemstva 
met  at  Kieff  and  drafted  a  programme  of  reform  which 
included  the  restoration  and  reorganisation  of  local 
government,  reform  of  judicial  administration,  and 
freedom  of  the  press  ;  and  during  the  next  few  years 
numberless  schemes  of  reform  were  discussed.  On 
13th  March,  1881,  however,  Alexander  11. ,  whose  life 
had  been  more  than  once  attempted,  was  assassinated  in 
the  streets  of  St.  Petersburg. 

For  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century  reaction  reigned  Reaction, 
supreme  in  Russia.  Not  until  the  Japanese  War  revealed  ' 
the  entire  incompetence  and  the  gross  venality  of  the 
Autocracy  did  the  reform  party  venture  to  resume  the 
movement  which  had  progressed  so  favourably  under 
Alexander  II.  In  July,  1904,  Plehve,  the  reactionary 
Minister  of  the  Interior,  was  assassinated.  The  first 
step  taken  by  his  successor.  Prince  Sviatopolk-Mirsky,  was 
to  suspend  the  press  censorship ;  the  second  was  to 
summon  a  conference  of  Zemstva,  which  met  in  St.  Peters- 
burg in  November,  1904.  This  conference  not  only 
drafted  a  programme  of  political  reform,  but  gave  a  power- 
ful impulse  to  political  agitation  throughout  the  country. 
An  incident  which  took  place  on  2nd  January,  1905,  added 
fuel  to  the  flame.  On  that  day  a  procession  of  workmen 
in  St.  Petersburg  was  fired  on  by  the  troops,  with  results 
which  caused  the  day  to  be  known  as  "  Red  Sunday." 
Disturbances  continued,  and  culminated  in  the  summer 
of  1905  in  a  general  strike.     Meanwhile  the  Government 


186  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

had  already  decided  to  summon  a  Representative  Assembly, 
or  Duma,  endowed  with  merely  Consultative  Powers. 
After  the  general  strike,  however.  Count  Witte,  who 
had  given  proof  of  statesmanlike  qualities  when  appointed 
to  the  Ministry  of  Finance  in  1892,  was  recalled  to  power. 
Witte,  who  had  just  negotiated  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth, 
promptly  decided  that  the  proffered  concessions  must  be 
enlarged,  and  a  Duma  endowed  with  legislative  powers, 
and  elected  on  a  simpler  and  extended  franchise,  was 
summoned. 
Dunr''*  The  Duma  met  in  May,  1906.  There  were  two  legis- 
lative Chambers,  an  Upper  House,  consisting  of  the  old 
Council  of  the  Empire  in  a  reorganised  form,  and  an 
elected  Lower  House.  The  majority  of  the  Lower  Chamber 
belonged  to  the  party  known  as  the  Constitutional  Demo- 
crats or  Cadets,  led  by  men  like  Struve  and  Milukov  ; 
there  was  also  a  considerable  party  of  strong  Conservatives  ; 
a  Right  Centre,  known  as  the  Octobrists,  and  a  small 
Labour  representation.  The  meeting  of  this  first  Russian 
Parliament  was  hailed  with  the  utmost  enthusiasm  through- 
out the  Empire  ;  a  new  day  of  liberty  had  dawned,  it 
was  believed,  for  Russia.  Never  were  high  hopes  destined 
to  more  bitter  disillusionment.  On  the  eve  of  the  opening 
of  the  Duma  there  was  issued  by  the  Government  a  Funda- 
mental Law  which  reaffirmed  in  the  most  unequivocal 
terms  that  in  the  Emperor  alone  supreme  and  autocratic 
power  was  vested.  Of  his  grace  he  was  prepared  to  share 
with  the  Duma  his  legislative  functions,  but  in  him  and 
him  alone  sovereignty  was  to  reside. 

No  sooner,  however,  was  the  Duma  opened  than  the 
Cadets  formulated  their  demands  :  universal  suffrage ; 
reconstruction  of  the  Second  Chamber  ;  freedom  of  person, 
of  speech,  of  public  meeting,  of  combination,  of  the  press, 
of  conscience ;  compulsory  and  gratuitous  education ; 
fiscal  reform  ;  redistribution  of  landed  property,  and  much 
else  ;  but  of  all  the  demands  the  most  fundamental  was 
that  Ministers  should  be  responsible  to  the  Duma,  that  the 
Legislature  should  control  the  Executive. 

The  formulation  of  such  a  programme  recalls  for  English- 


WEST   AND   EAST  187 

men  the  days  of  the  early  Stuarts.  The  essential  point 
at  issue  was  identical.  Where  was  sovereignty  hence- 
forward to  reside,  in  the  Crown  or  in  the  King-in-Parlia- 
ment  1 

Neither  side  would,  or  perhaps  could,  recede  from  the 
position  it  had  taken  up.  Goremykin,  who  had  replaced 
Count  Witte  as  Prime  Minister  before  the  Duma  met, 
was  faced  by  a  vote  of  censure,  carried  with  only  eleven 
dissentients.  Would  the  Czar  give  way  and  accept  a  Duma 
Ministry  ?  For  some  two  months  acrimonious  debates 
proceeded  ;  but  in  July,  Gorem;fkin  was  dismissed,  only, 
however,  to  be  succeeded  by  Stolypin,  a  younger  and 
stronger  man,  who  was  charged  with  the  duty  of  dissolving 
the  recalcitrant  Duma.  On  21st  July  it  was  dissolved 
by  proclamation,  and  the  members  were  excluded  by  a 
body  of  troops  from  their  accustomed  place  of  meeting. 

A  second  Duma  was  promptly  summoned  to  meet  in  the  The 
ensuing  March,  and  in  the  meantime  Stolypin  made  it  ^^'^^ 
clear  that  while  inflexibly  opposed  to  revolution,  he  was  5th  March, 
not  merely  wilKng,  but  anxious  to  carry  through  far-reach-  Jgth'june 
ing  reforms.     The  condition  of  Kussia  was  at  this  time 
critical  in  the  extreme  :    reeling  under  the  shock  of  her 
recent  defeat ;    scandalised  by  successive  revelations  of 
the   incompetence    of   generals,    admirals,    and    officials ; 
dissolved  in  anarchy  on  the  one  side  by  strikes  and  in- 
surrections, on  the  other  by  savage  reprisals  ; — such  were 
the  conditions  under  which  the  elections  for  the  second 
Duma  took  place.     Out  of  470  seats  the  Cadets  and  their 
allies   secured   about   200 ;    the   Radicals   and    Socialists 
about  170  ;  the  Conservatives,  100. 

Stol;^in  met  the  new  Chamber  with  a  programme  of 
comprehensive  reform,  but  on  two  points,  eagerly  demanded 
by  the  majority,  he  was  adamant  :  he  would  neither 
expropriate  the  landlords  nor  put  the  Executive  under 
the  heel  of  the  Legislature.  A  deadlock  ensued,  and  the 
Minister  proposed  to  solve  it  by  a  sort  of  "  Pride's  Purge  " 
— by  the  exclusion  of  fifty  of  the  extreme  Socialists  and  the 
arrest  of  their  leaders  ;  but  on  16th  June  the  Czar  dissolved 
the  Duma. 


188  EUEOPE   AND   BEYOND 

The  Third  A  iiew  electoral  law  was  promptly  promulgated  ;  the 
Nov\  m7^  franchise  was  varied  and  restricted,  and  a  considerable 
redistribution  of  seats  was  effected.  The  result  was  much 
more  favourable  to  the  Government,  and  when  in  November 
the  third  Duma  met,  Stol;fpin  found  himself  at  the  head 
of  a  good  working  majority  which  settled  down  to  carry 
through,  quietly  and  steadily,  a  comprehensive  programme 
of  sorely  needed  administrative  reform. 

Thus  did  the  Japanese  victory  react  upon  the  domestic 
politics  of  Russia.  The  following  chapter  will  show  that 
it  reacted  not  less  powerfully  upon  the  international 
situation. 

AUTHORITIES 

P.  Leroy  Beaulieu  :  La  Renovation  de  VAsie. 

Krahmer  :  Russland  in  Asien. 

Albrecht  :   Das  Russische  Central- Asien. 

Meadows  :  The  Chinese  and  their  Rebellions. 

Hake  :  Events  in  the  Taiping  Rebellion. 

Lord  C.  Beresford  :  The  Break-up  of  China. 

Ravenstein  :  Russians  on  the  Amur. 

V.  Chirol  :   The  Far  Eastern  Question. 

A.  R.  CoLQUHOUN  :  The  Mastery  of  the  Pacific,  China  in  Transformation, 

English  Policy  in  the  Far  East,  and  The  Truth  about  Tonquin. 
Lord  CuRZON  :  Problems  of  the  Far  East. 
F.  H.  Serine  and  E.  D.  Ross  :  The  Heart  of  Asia. 
Sir  R.  K.  Douglas  :  China,  and  Europe  and  the  Far  East. 

C.  B.  Norman  :  Tonquin,  or  France  in  the  Far  East. 
J.  L.  de  Lanessan  :  UEmpire  de  VAnnam. 

H.  C.  Potter  :  The  East  of  To-day  and  To-morrow  (N.  Y.,  1902). 

D.  Murray  :  The  Story  of  Japan. 

W.  E.  Griffts  :   The  Mikado's  Empire. 

H.  Norman  :  The  Story  of  Japan. 

Sir  R.  P.  Porter  :  Japan. 

Sir  Ian  Hamilton  :  A  Staff  Officer\<i  Scrap-book  during  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War. 

Ariga  :  La  Guerre  Russo-Japonaise. 

GoocH  and  Masterman  :  A  Century  of  English  Foreigv  Policy,  1815- 
1915. 

Beazley,  Forbes,  and  Birkett  :  Russia  from  the  Varangians  to  the 
Bolshevists. 

E.  BujAC  :  La  Guerre  russo-japonaise. 

Bernard  Pares  :  ap.  Cambridge  Modern  History,  vol.  xii.,  and  Russia 
and  Reform  {1901). 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  DIPLOMATIC  REVOLUTION  (1890-1911) 

German  World-Policy — The  Triple  Alliance  and 
THE  Triple  Entente 

The  wave- beat  knocks  powerfully  at  our  gates  and  calls  us  as  a  great 
nation  to  maintain  our  place  in  our  world — in  other  words,  to  pursue 
world-policy.  The  ocean  is  indispensable  for  Germany's  greatness  ; 
but  the  ocean  also  reminds  us  that  neither  on  it  nor  across  it  in  the 
distance  can  any  great  decision  be  again  arrived  at  without  Germany 
and  the  German  Emperor. — ^Emperor  William  II. 

Our  world-policy  is  based  upon  the  successes  of  our  European  policy. 
The  moment  the  firm  foundation  constituted  by  Germany's  position  as 
a  Great  European  Power  begins  to  totter,  the  whole  fabric  of  our  world- 
l^olicy  will  collapse. — Prince  Bernhard  von  Bulow. 

WHEN  Bismarck,  in  1890,  yielded  power  if  not  Alliances 
place  to  the  young  Emperor,  Germany  had  already  Ententes 
forfeited  the  friendship  of  Russia,  but  France  had  not 
yet  gained  it ;  Austria  was  united  by  the  closest  ties 
mth  Germany ;  Italy  was  estranged  from  France, 
France  from  England,  and  England  from  Russia.  Bis- 
marck had  with  amazing  skill  concihated  his  friends 
and  divided  his  potential  enemies.  Within  twenty  years 
from  his  fall  the  Triple  AlHance — itself  none  too  firmly 
cemented  as  regards  the  third  partner — found  itself  con- 
fronted by  a  Triple  Entente,  consisting  of  France,  Russia, 
and  Great  Britain.  It  is  true  that  the  Ottoman  Sultan 
Abdul  Hamid  had  become,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  a 
member  of  the  Central  Europe  group,  and  that  Germany 
was  connected  by  close  dynastic  ties  with  Roumania, 
Bulgaria,  and  Greece.     Against  this,  however,  must  be  set 

189 


190  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

the  fact  that  the  conclusion  of  a  firm  aUiance  between 
Great  Britain  and  Japan  had  introduced  a  new  and  signifi- 
cant factor  into  the  problem  of  world-diplomacy.  But 
the  outstanding  fact  of  the  diplomatic  situation  was  that, 
whereas  in  1890  Germany  was  surrounded  by  Powers 
severally  and  mutually  isolated,  and  at  least  as  friendly 
to  her  as  to  each  other,  by  1911  she  was  confronted  by  an 
Entente,  equal  in  strength  and  hardly  inferior  in  cohesion 
to  that  which  Bismarck  had  laboriously  created. 

It  is  the  purpose  of  the  present  chapter  to  describe 
and  account  for  this  transformation. 
The  Plainly  the  time  has  not  yet  arrived  for  an  impartial 

^TiUam  II.  estimate  of  the  character,  or  even  the  achievement,  of 
the  Sovereign  who  for  a  quarter  of  a  century  was  the 
most  conspicuous  figure  in  the  world,  and  who  is  now 
(1921)  an  exile,  a  fugitive  from  justice,  bankrupt  in  re- 
putation, a  ruined  political  gambler.  But  it  is  not  yet 
possible  to  pronounce  with  any  approach  to  historical 
accuracy  whether  the  ex-Kaiser  was  in  truth  the  architect 
of  his  own  misfortunes  or  the  slave  of  circumstances 
which  he  was  powerless  to  control.  Probably  he  would 
prefer  the  former  interpretation  of  his  character  and 
reign.  Who  that  has  occupied  a  throne  would  not  prefer 
the  imputation  of  wickedness  to  that  of  weakness, 
the  picture  of  foiled  ambition  to  that  of  subservient 
acceptance  of  a  policy  which  he  knew  to  be  fraught  with 
disaster  to  himself  and  his  people  ?  These  are  questions 
which  only  posterity,  with  full  access  to  documents  and 
with  complete  knowledge  of  the  facts,  can  decide.  Con- 
temporaries are  confronted  by  two  contradictory  explana- 
tions :  on  the  one  hand,  a  strong-willed,  clear-sighted 
ambitious  ruler,  a  true  scion  of  the  stock  which  produced  a 
Great  Elector,  a  Frederick  WiUiam  I.  (unfairly  dismissed 
by  EngUsh  historians  as  a  mere  "  drill-sergeant  "), 
above  all,  a  Frederick  II.  ;  on  the  other,  a  man 
impetuous  rather  than  strong,  of  curiously  mixed  im- 
pulses ;  generous  and  crafty ;  pious  and  yet  essentially 
unprincipled ;  a  fervent  believer  in  Divine  right,  and  a 
regular  worshipper  at  the  shrine  of  Moloch ;  the  captain 


THE   DIPLOMATIC   REVOLUTION    (1890-1911)      101 

of  great  armies  and  the  creator  of  a  great  navy,  yet 
devoted  to  a  policy  of  peace ;  a  proud,  unbending 
autocrat,  but  the  slave  of  a  military  clique  and  a 
Court  camarilla  ;  the  scion  of  Frederick  III.  rather  than 
Frederick  II.,  and  in  particular  of  Frederick  William  IV. ; 
au  fond  a  "  double-minded  "  man,  and  therefore  in  all 
his  ways  unstable. 

The  verdict  and  interpretation  must  be  left  to  those 
who  come  after ;  a  contemporary  historian  must  concern 
himself  solely  with  the  facts  as  thus  far  revealed. 

William  II.  ascending  the  throne,  after  his  father's 
brief  and  tragic  reign,  at  the  age  of  thirty,  proclaimed 
himself  at  once  and  pointedly  as  the  successor  of  his 
grandfather.  He  had  reason  for  the  emphasis  he  em- 
ployed. Germany  at  the  moment  of  his  accession  was 
seething  with  bitter  animosity  against  the  two  august 
EngUshwomen  who,  in  German  opinion,  had  conspired, 
out  of  mingled  affection  and  ambition,  to  bring  to  the 
German  throne  a  man  whom  every  German  physician 
declared  to  be  suffering  from  an  incurable  disease,  and 
to  be  thereby  disqualified  from  the  succession.  The 
atmosphere  which  he  first  breathed  as  sovereign  was 
impregnated  with  anti-English  prejudice. ^ 

Nevertheless,  the  first  inchnations  of  the  young  Emperor  Genuany 
seemed  to  be  towards  a  good  understanding  with  England,  g"*^,     , 
and  England  was  by  no  means  indisposed  to  respond.    "^'^^ 
The  Emperor's  indignation  may  have  been  due  simply 
to  the  fact  that  he  needed  time  to  organise  his  new  scheme 
of  world-policy,  to  foster  German  trade,  and,  above  all,  to 
create  a  German  Navy.     But  be  this  as  it  may,  he  seemed 
at  the   outset   no    less    bent    upon  the  maintenance  of 
European  peace  than  his  predecessor  in  power.     England, 
then  as  always,  was  equally  pacific  in  its  disposition,  nor 
was  it  quick  to  take  alarm  or  offence.     True  it  was  that 
the  Kaiser  had  in  set  terms  announced  that  the  future  of 
Germany  was  on  the  sea.     But  to  most  Enghshmen  in 
1890  that  future  seemed  a   distant  one.     True  it  was 

1  The  present  writer  was  in  Germany  in  1888,  and  can  personally 
attest  the  accuracy  of  this  analysis. 


192  EUROPE   AND  BEYOND 

that,  since  1884,  German  colonial  expansion  had  been 
extraordinarily  rapid  both  in  Africa  and  in  the  Pacific. 
Nevertheless,  Gladstone  welcomed  Germany  "  as  a  friend 
and  ally  "in  the  spread  of  civilisation,  and  Lord  Salisbury 
did  not  hesitate  to  cede  Heligoland  in  exchange  for  con- 
cessions in  East  Africa.  The  Berlin  Conference  of  1890 
witnessed  to  nothing  but  goodwill  on  both  sides,  and 
three  years  later  another  Anglo -German  agreement 
defined  the  frontiers  of  the  two  Powers  in  Nigeria  and  the 
Cameroons,  and  generally  negotiated  a  settlement  of  out- 
standing difficulties  in  West  Africa. 

The  explanation  of  this  friendliness  is,  of  course,  to  be 
found  in  the  fact  that  the  antagonism  between  England 
and  Russia  in  the  Near  and  Middle  East  was,  as  we  have 
seen,  unabated,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  differences 
between  England  and  France  were  never  more  acute 
than  during  the  last  two  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
It  is  not  remarkable  that,  under  these  circumstances, 
England  and  Germany  should  have  been  disposed  towards 
friendhness.  The  telegram  addressed  by  the  Emperor 
Wilham  to  President  Kruger  in  January,  1896,  came 
indeed  as  an  unpleasant  reminder  of  latent  hostihty  at 
Berhn,  but  it  is  understood  that  explanations  were 
privately  offered,  and  there  was  no  interruption  in  the 
cordiahty  of  the  relations  between  the  two  countries 
down  to  the  end  of  the  century.  On  the  contrary,  it 
seemed  not  impossible  that  friendship  might  deepen  into 
formal  alliance,  and  that  such  an  alhance  might  be  ex- 
tended so  as  to  include  the  great  Anglo-Teutonic  Power 
Aiigio-  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  In  1898,  there  was  a 
German  further  treaty  between  England  and  Germany  in  regard 
islflnV^  to  Central  Africa,  and  another  in  1899  which  estabhshed 
1899  Germany   at    Samoa.     To    this    latter   agreement.    Lord 

Sahsbury  alluded  at  the  Lord  Mayor's  banquet  of  1899. 
"  This  morning,"  he  said,  "  you  have  learned  of  the 
arrangement  concluded  between  us  and  one  of  the  con- 
tinental States  with  whom,  more  than  with  others,  we 
have  for  years  maintained  sympathetic  and  friendly 
relations.     The  arrangement  is,  above  all,  interesting,  as 


THE   DIPLOMATIC   EEVOLUTION  (1890-1911)      193 

an  indication  that  our  relations  with  the  German  nation 
are  all  that  we  could  desire." 

The  English  Colonial  Secretary  went  even  further  than 
the  Prime  Mnister.  Mr.  Chamberlain  appeared  to  cherish 
the  hope  that  there  might  come  into  being  a  triple  Anglo- 
Teutonic  alliance.  "  At  bottom,"  he  said,  "  the  main 
character  of  the  Teutonic  race  difiers  very  little  from  the 
character  of  the  Anglo-Saxon,  and  the  same  sentiments 
which  bring  us  into  close  sympathy  with  the  United  States 
of  America  may  also  be  evoked  to  bring  us  into  close 
sympathy  and  alliance  with  the  Empire  of  Germany.  .  .  . 
If  the  union  between  England  and  America  is  a  powerful 
factor  in  the  cause  of  peace,  a  new  Triple  Alliance  between 
the  Teutonic  race  and  the  great  two  branches  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  race  will  be  a  still  more  potent  influence  in 
the  future  of  the  world."  Lord  Eosebery,  in  his  un- 
official situation,  could  be  even  more  specific.  "  The 
Government,"  he  said,  in  February,  1900,  "  made  pressing 
overtures  to  Germany  and  the  United  States  for  an 
alliance  last  December."  To  such  a  result  the  extreme 
friendliness  exhibited  by  Great  Britain  towards  the  United 
States  in  the  Spanish- American  War,  combined  with  the 
abrogation  (5th  February,  1900)  of  the  distasteful  clauses 
of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  might  well  have  contri- 
buted. An  American  publicist  certainly  does  not  ex- 
aggerate, therefore,  when  he  says,  writing  of  this  period : 
"  There  was  a  dream  of  a  sort  of  Tugendhund,  an  alliance 
of  the  supposedly  Teutonic  and  virtuous  countries  against 
the  decadent  nations  whose  heritage  might  arouse  conflict- 
ing ambitions  amongst  the  strong  States."  ^ 

At  the   opening  of  the  twentieth  century,   therefore.  Prince 
the  relations  between  England  and  Germany  were,   as  ^o^^J^^ 
Lord  SaUsbury  said,  all  that  could  be  desired.     In  1900,  Gennan 
however,  a  new  Chancellor  came  into  power  in  Germany.  $^9(5?^^"°^' 
Count  Capri vi,  who  in  1890  had  succeeded  Bismarck  in 
that  office,  was  nothing  more  than  a  superior  clerk.    Prince 
Hohenlohe,  who  was  in  office  from  1894-1900,  occupied  a 

1  These  passages  are  all  quoted  by  Seymour  :  Diplomatic  BacJcground 
of  the  TFar,  pp.  137-138. 

13 


194  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

rather  different  position.  But  during  liis  tenure  of  power 
there  was  no  interruption  in  the  friendly  relations  between 
Germany  and  England.  In  1900,  Hohenlohe  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Prince  Bernhard  von  BiHow.  Biilow  has 
himself  indited  his  own  political  testament.^  Billow's 
first  act  was  a  deliberate  rejection  of  English  advances 
towards  Germany  (1901).  Nor  does  he  leave  us  in  any 
doubt  as  to  his  motive.  Germany,  in  his  view,  would 
under  such  an  arrangement  have  become  "the  sword  of 
England  upon  the  European  continent."  "  In  the  event 
of  a  general  conflict,"  he  writes,  "  we  Germans  would  have 
had  to  wage  strenuous  war  on  land  in  two  directions 
(France  and  Russia,  of  course),  while  to  England  would 
have  fallen  the  easier  task  of  further  extending  her  Colonial 
Empire  without  much  trouble,  and  of  profiting  by  the 
general  weakening  of  the  continental  Powers.  Last,  but 
certainly  not  least,  while  mihtary  operations  were  going 
forward  on  the  Continent  and  for  a  long  time  after,  we 
should  have  found  neither  strength  nor  means  nor  leisure 
to  proceed  with  the  building  of  our  navy  as  we  have  been 
able  to  do."  2  In  even  plainer  English  it  would  have 
admirably  suited  England's  book  that  her  German  ally 
should  fight  France  and  Russia,  diverting  the  attentions 
of  both  opponents,  not  less  effectually  than  her  own,  from 
colonial  enterprises,  while  England  was  comfortably  pick- 
ing up  unconsidered  trifles  in  Africa  and  Asia.  In  his 
view,  German  progress,  colonial,  commercial,  and  naval, 
was  "  bound  to  inconvenience  England,  and,  though  the 
consequences  of  this  development  '  could  be  mitigated  by 
diplomacy,'  they  could  not  be  prevented."  In  other 
words,  a  struggle  between  Germany  and  England  was 
sooner  or  later  bound  to  come. 
German  "  With   regard   to   international    politics,"    he    wtes. 

Sea  Power  u  jjj^gland  is  the  only  country  with  which  Germany  has 
an  account."  The  struggle  might  well  have  come,  as  we 
have  seen,  during  the  South  African  War.  But  Biilow.  is 
deliberately  of   opinion  that  Germany  was  right  not  to 

1  Imperial  Germany  (Eng.  trans.),  1914. 

2  Imperial  Germany,  pp.  33-34. 


THE   DIPLOMATIC   REVOLUTION   (l890-191l)      195 

seize  an  opportunity  which  was  so  superficially  favourable 
to  her.  "  Even  if,"  he  writes,  "  by  taking  action  in  Europe 
we  had  succeeded  in  forcing  England's  South  African 
policy,  our  immediate  national  interests  would  not  have 
benefited  thereby  .  .  .  our  neutral  attitude  during  the 
Boer  War  had  its  origin  in  weighty  considerations  of  the 
national  interests  of  the  German  Empire."  Nor  was  the 
reason  far  to  seek  :  the  German  Navy  was  not  yet  ready  ;  a 
premature  trial  of  strength  might  have  ruined  German 
sea  power  for  ever.  But  in  naval  development  Germany 
was  coming  on  apace.  In  1895  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal 
had  been  completed,  an  achievement  which  at  once  doubled 
the  effective  naval  force  of  Germany.  In  1897  Admiral 
von  Tirpitz  was  called  to  the  control  of  German  naval 
policy.  In  1898  the  first  German  Navy  Law  was  passed, 
and  a  second,  on  a  far  more  ambitious  scale,  in  1900.  From 
that  time  onwards,  the  Navy  became  not  less  definitely 
than  the  Army  "  a  constituent  part  of  our  national  defence  " 
(Billow).  The  Kaiser  had  long  since  announced  his  policy 
in  this  matter.  "  I  will  never  rest,"  he  said,  "  until  I 
have  raised  my  Navy  to  a  position  similar  to  that  occupied 
by  my  Army.  German  colonial  aims  can  only  be  gained 
when  Germany  has  become  master  on  the  ocean."  Such 
sentiments  frequently  reiterated  could  not  fail  to  produce 
an  efiect  upon  public  opinion  in  England,  however  well 
disposed  that  opinion  was  towards  Germany,  and  however 
reluctant  it  might  be  to  traverse  the  old  tradition  which 
maintained  enmity  between  England  and  France  and, 
still  more  persistently  in  recent  years,  between  England 
and  Russia. 

A  personal  change  in  France  contributed  powerfully  Deicasse, 
to  the  same  end.     In  1898  Gabriel  Hanatoux  was  succeeded  ^j^nisSr 
at  the  French  Foreign  Office  by  Deicasse.     Deicasse  took  of  France, 
office,  firmly  convinced,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  activity  ^^^^ 
of   France    should   be   concentrated   upon   the   Western 
Mediterranean,   and  on  the   other,   that  the   diplomatic 
independence  of  his  country  could  be  estabhshed  only  by 
means  of  a  reconcihation  with  Italy  and  with  Great  Britain. ^ 

^  Seymour  :  op.  cit.  p.  142. 


196  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

France  and  Relations  between  France  and  Italy  had  long  been 
Italy  strained.  Italy,  no  less  essentially  tban  France,  is  a 
Mediterranean  Power  and  vitally  concerned  in  tbe  fate  of 
Northern  Africa.  Down  to  the  year  1871,  and  indeed  for 
some  time  afterwards,  Italy  was  far  too  busily  engaged 
in  effecting  her  ^own  political  unification,  to  have 
much  leisure  for  oversea  enterprise.  The  Unification 
movement  in  Italy  left  behind  it,  somewhat  paradoxi- 
cally, deep-seated  resentment  against  France.  In  1859 
Napoleon  III.  had  rendered  an  incomparable  service  to 
the  Italian  movement.  But  ItaUans  felt  that  he  had  been 
more  than  amply  rewarded  by  the  cession  of  Savoy  and 
Nice,  and  the  hard  bargain  which  he  had  struck  with 
Cavour  was  never  forgiven  in  Italy.  Still  less  could  Italy 
forget  that,  in  order  to  serve  the  ends  of  domestic  politics, 
Napoleon  had  vetoed  the  advance  of  Italy  on  Rome,  that 
French  chassepots  had  frustrated  Garibaldi's  dash  on  Rome 
in  1866,  and  that  French  troops  had  continued  to  garrison 
Rome  in  the  interests  of  the  Papacy  until  they  had  to  be 
withdrawn  to  meet  the  German  advance  on  the  Rhine. 
Colonial  The  seeds  of  rivalry  between  Italy  and  France  in  North 

Enterprise  Africa  had  been  sown  by  the  French  occupation  of  Algeria 
°  *^  in  1830,  and  that  rivalry  was  immensely  accentuated 
when  in  1881  France  occupied  Tunis.  That  occupation, 
as  we  have  seen,  was  cordiaUy  encouraged  by  Bismarck, 
who,  with  similar  motives,  encouraged  Italy  to  embark 
upon  African  adventure.  Consequently  in  1882,  the  port 
of  Assab  on  the  Abyssinian  coast  was  transferred  from  a 
private  trading  company,  which  had  purchased  it  in  1870, 
to  the  Itahan  State.  In  1885  Massowah  was  occupied  by 
Italy,  and  was  developed  into  the  colony  of  Eritrea.  Four 
years  later,  Italy  added  to*  her  possessions  in  East  Africa 
a  strip  of  Somaliland.  But  "  these  hot  and  barren  lands 
were  in  themselves  of  httle  value,  and  it  was  in  the  fertile 
upland  hinterland  of  Abyssinia  that  Italy  looked  for  her 
real  compensations."  Her  enterprise  in  East  Africa  was, 
however,  attended  by  consistent  and  unreheved  disaster ; 
her  troops  were  roughly  handled  by  the  Abyssinians  in 
the  Massowah  campaign,  and  though  Abyssinia  accepted 


THE   DIPLOMATIC    REVOLUTION   (1890-1911)      19  V 

the  nominal  suzerainty  of  Italy,  little  came  of  it,  and  in 
1891  tlie  Emperor  Menelik  tore  up  the  Treaty  of  1887,  and 
warned  the  Italians  that  any  attempt  to  penetrate  into  the 
interior  of  Abyssinia  would  be  resisted  with  aU  his  forces. 
The  border  warfare  which  for  some  years  ensued,  brought 
to  Italy  nothing  but  embarrassment,  and  towards  the 
close  of  the  century  Italy  was  in  a  mood  therefore  to  respond 
to  the  advances  of  France.  In  1896  Italy  formally  re-  Franco- 
cognised  the  French  Protectorate  in  Tunis,  and  two  years  q^^^^^_ 
later,  Delcasse  was  successful  in  negotiating  with  Italy  tions, 
a  treaty  of  navigation  and  commerce.  Italy  definitely  1896-1902 
renounced  her  ambitions  on  the  side  of  Morocco  and  Tunis, 
and  turned  her  attentions  in  full  accord  with  France  to- 
wards Tripoh.  Personal  changes  contributed  to  an  im- 
provement of  Franco-ItaHan  relations.  Crispi  had  died 
in  1897,  and  in  July  1900  the  assassination  of  King  Humbert 
placed  young  Victor  Emmanuel  III.  upon  the  throne,  and 
opened  the  door  still  wider  to  friendly  negotiations  with 
France.  Two  Conventions  were  signed  in  1900  and  1902 
under  which  France  definitely  engaged  not  to  frustrate 
the  ambitions  of  Italy  on  the  side  of  Tripoli,  while  Italy 
assured  to  France  a  free  hand  in  Morocco.  These  Con- 
ventions rendered  the  renewal  of  the  Triple  AUiance  in 
1903  a  hollow  formahty. 

Even  more  important  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Anglo- 
European  equihbrium  was  the  conclusion  of  an  Entente  InteSe, 
Cordiale  between  France  and  Great  Britain.    This  reversal  1904 
of  a  long  and  persistent  political  tradition  was  partly  the 
result  of  circumstances  already  detailed  in  this  volume, 
and  in  part  was  due  to  the  efforts  of  four  outstanding 
personalities.     Delcasse  was,  as  we  have  seen,  convinced 
of  the   necessity  of   Franco- British  friendship,   and  his 
efforts  were   cordially  seconded  by  one  of  the  greatest 
ambassadors  whom  France  has  ever  sent  to  England — 
Paul  Cambon.      On  the   English  side  the  Entente  was 
primarily  the  work  of  King  Edward  VII.,  who  succeeded 
to  the  EngUsh  throne   in  1901,  but  he  was  powerfully 
aided  by  Lord  Lansdowne,  who  in  the  previous  autumn 
had  taken  Lord  Sahsbury's  p^ace  at  the  Foreign  Office. 


198  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Fashoda  Fashoda  also  played  its  part  in  preparing  the  way  for 
a  closer  accord  between  England  and  France.  The  effect, 
though  paradoxical,  was  not  unforeseen  by  Frenchmen. 
Prince  von  Billow  repeats  a  conversation  which  took  place 
between  a  French  ambassador — "  one  of  the  best  political 
intellects  of  France " — and  an  Italian  colleague.  The 
latter  asked  "  What  effect  Fashoda  would  have  on  French 
relations  with  England  ?  "  The  Frenchman  rephed,  "  An 
excellent  one.  Once  the  difference  about  the  Soudan  is 
settled,  nothing  stands  in  the  way  of  a  complete  Entente 
with  England."  Von  Billow's  own  comment  is  singularly 
acute.  "  There  was,"  he  writes,  "  disappointment  in 
Paris  because  England  would  not,  for  the  sake  of  French 
friendship,  sacrifice  any  of  her  interests  in  the  Soudan  and 
on  the  Nile.  But  France  was  ready  in  any  case,  though 
with  clenched  teeth,  to  pay  this  price  or  even  a  higher  one 
for  England's  friendship.  The  defeat  in  the  Fashoda 
affair  was  set  down  in  the  debit  account  of  the  French 
policy  of  revenge,  and  finally  resulted  in  renewed  hatred 
of  Germany  rather  than  in  hostihty  towards  England." 

Morocco  That   is   profoundly  true  ;    but   France   would   not   so 

lightly  have  surrendered  her  interests  on  the  Nile  had 
she  not  been  increasingly  interested  elsewhere.  Morocco, 
almost  the  last  remnant  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  Africa, 
had  long  been  in  a  very  disturbed  condition.  Its  prox- 
imity to  Algiers  rendered  this  a  matter  of  special  interest 
to  France,  and  Delcasse  perceived  the  opportunity  of  a 
deal  with  England  on  this  basis.  In  1901  the  Sultan  of 
Morocco,  conscious  of  his  danger,  had  offered  a  Protectorate 
over  Morocco  to  England.  England,  however,  was  in  no 
mood,  at  the  moment,  for  further  African  adventure,  and 
declined  the  offer.  France  had  other  ideas,  and  in  1902  an 
arrangement,  known  as  the  Convention  of  Algiers,  was 
concluded  between  the  Sultan  and  France,  under  which 
France,  with  the  complete  assent  of  England,  undertook 
certain  responsibilities  for  the  maintenance  of  order  on 
the  Algerian-Morocco  frontier. 

The  improved  relations  between  England  and  France 
were  further  manifested  in  the  course  of  1903  by  an  ex- 


THE   DIPLOMATIC   KEVOLUTION   (1890-1911)      199 

change    of   visits   between   Edward   VII.    and   President  Edward 
Loubet.     In  May,   1903,  King  Edward  paid  an   official  ^^i-.^^^, 

•  ',     1       -rt     '         T-^        •!  T  •  •      ^        '  1  1        President 

Visit  to  raris.  Keceived  on  ms  arrival  with  somewhat  Loubet 
cold  politeness,  he  succeeded  in  a  few  days'  sojourn  in 
completely  captivating  his  hosts.  "  I  have  known  Paris," 
he  said,  in  a  speech  at  the  Elysee  (2nd  May),  "  since  my 
childhood.  I  have  frequently  visited  it,  and  I  have  always 
been  full  of  admiration  for  the  unique  beauty  of  the  city, 
and  for  the  spirit  of  its  citizens.  I  shall  never  forget, 
M.  le  President,  the  welcome  which  I  have  received  at  the 
hands  of  yourself,  your  Government,  and  the  people,  and 
it  is  to  me  a  cause  of  happiness  to  believe  that  my  visit 
will  renew  the  bonds  of  friendship,  and  will  facilitate  such 
a  rapprochement  between  our  two  countries  as  will  conduce 
to  the  interests  of  both."  President  Loubet  returned  the 
King's  visit  in  July,  and  was  received  with  the  utmost 
enthusiasm  in  London. 

In  the  course  of  the  year  1904,  Russia,  as  we  have  England 
seen,  became  involved  in  a  struggle  with  Japan.  The  ^"^  France 
preoccupation  of  Russia  in  the  Far  East  left  France  in  an 
exposed  position  on  the  western  flank  of  Germany.  It 
became  therefore  a  matter  of  supreme  importance  that 
France  should  find  a  new  ally.  Great  Britain,  on  her  side, 
was  becoming  increasingly  alarmed  by  the  development 
of  German  sea  power.  This  was  clearly  recognised  in 
Germany,  but  Germany  drew  a  sharp  distinction  between 
the  rising  suspicion  of  England  and  the  deep-seated  hostility 
of  France.  "  England,"  wrote  Von  Biilow,  "  is  certainly 
seriously  disquieted  by  our  rising  power  at  sea,  and  our 
competition  which  incommodes  her  at  many  points.  .  .  . 
But  between  such  sentiments  in  England  and  the  funda- 
mental feeling  in  France  there  is  a  marked  difference 
which  finds  corresponding  expression  in  politics.  France 
would  attack  us  if  she  thought  she  was  strong  enough ; 
England  would  only  do  so  if  she  thought  she  could  not  defend 
her  vital,  economic,  and  political  interests  against  Germany 
except  by  force.  The  mainspring  of  English  policy  towards 
us  is  national  egoism ;  that  of  French  policy  is  national 
idealism.     He  who  foUows  his  interest  will,  however,  mostly 


200  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

remain  calmer  than  lie  who  pursues  an  idea."  ^  The 
observation  is  an  acute  one,  but  "  egoism  "  and  "  ideal- 
ism "  concurred  to  bring  about  the  Anglo-French  Con- 
vention which  was  concluded  on  8th  April,  1904.  By  a 
series  of  Conventions  and  Declarations,  England  and  France 
not  only  came  to  terms  in  regard  to  Morocco  and  Egypt, 
but  also  cleared  up  a  number  of  outstanding  points  in 
reference  to  West  Africa,  Siam,  Madagascar,  and  the  New 
Hebrides.  French  fishing  rights  in  Newfoundland  had 
been  a  matter  of  dispute  between  England  and  France  ever 
since  the  Treaty  of  tJtrecht  in  1713.  By  mutual  concession 
which  left  to  France  certain  fishing  rights,  but  deprived 
her  of  any  sort  of  monopoly,  this  tiresome  question  was 
settled,  it  may  be  hoped,  for  ever.  In  West  Africa, 
England  made  important  concessions  to  France  on  the 
Gambia,  in  Guinea,  and  on  the  Niger.  Boundary  questions 
in  Siam  and  tariff  difficulties  in  Madagascar  and  Zanzibar 
respectively,  not  to  mention  various  small  points  in  regard 
to  the  New  Hebrides,  were  also  included  in  the  general 
settlement.  The  central  point  of  the  arrangement  was, 
however.  North  Africa.  Briefly,  France  recognised  for 
the  first  time  the  actual  position  of  Great  Britain  in 
Egypt,  while  Great  Britain  recognised  the  predominant 
claims  and  interests  of  France  in  Morocco.  Both  Govern- 
ments declared  that  they  had  no  intention  of  altering  the 
political  status  of  Egypt  and  Morocco  respectively,  but  by 
a  secret  article  attached  to  the  Convention  it  was  admitted 
that  Great  Britain  and  France  might  find  themselves 
"  constrained  by  force  of  circumstances  to  modify  this 
poUcy  in  respect  to  Egypt  or  Morocco."  There  was  also 
a  secret  article  in  reference  to  Spanish  claims  in  Morocco. 
Franco-  A  pendant  to  the  Anglo-French  agreement  is  found  in  a 

Spanish  Franco-Spanish  treaty  signed  on  6th  October,  1904.  Under 
Oct?  1^04  ^^^  latter  agreement,  France  and  Spain  arrived  at  a  com- 
plete understanding  in  regard  to  their  respective  rights  and 
interests  in  Morocco,  and  Spain  formally  adhered  to  the 
Anglo-French  Convention  of  8th  April,  thereby  acknow- 
ledging the  predominant  interest  of  France  in  Morocco, 
1  Op.  cit.  pp.  89-90. 


THE   DIPLOMATIC   REVOLUTION   (1890-1911)      201 

while  accepting  from  France  and  England  a  guarantee  of 
Moroccan  independence. 

The  conclusion  of  the  Anglo-French  Entente  was  an  Germany 
event  of  first-rate  importance  in  the  history  of  European  Entente 
diplomacy.  Had  Germany  been  in  pacific  mood,  it  might 
well  have  inaugurated  a  long  period  of  European  and 
world  peace.  Such  was  undoubtedly  the  intention  of 
King  Edward  VII.  But  the  actual  and  immediate  result 
of  the  Entente  was  seen  in  the  words  and  actions  of  the 
German  Emperor.  Three  wrecks  after  the  signature  of  the 
Anglo-French  agreement,  the  Kaiser  used  these  ominous 
words  at  Karlsruhe  :  "  You  have  rightly  suggested  that 
the  task  of  the  German  people  is  a  heavy  one.  Let  us  think 
of  the  great  epoch  when  German  Unity  was  created,  of 
the  battles  of  Worth,  Weissenburg,  and  Sedan.  ...  I 
hope  that  peace  will  not  be  disturbed,  and  that  the  events 
which  we  see  taking  place  before  our  eyes  tend  to  fix 
feelings  in  one  direction,  to  clear  the  eye,  to  steel  the 
courage,  and  to  make  us  united,  if  it  should  be  necessary 
for  us  to  interfere  in  the  policy  of  the  world,  so  that  peace 
will  not  be  disturbed."  A  few  days  later,  on  the  occasion 
of  the  opening  of  a  bridge  at  Mainz,  the  Kaiser  gave  an 
even  clearer  indication  of  the  thoughts  which  were  moving 
him  :  "I  wish  from  my  heart,"  he  said,  "  that  peace,  which 
is  necessary  for  the  further  development  of  industry  and 
trade,  may  be  maintained  in  the  future.  But  I  am  con- 
vinced that  this  bridge  will  prove  completely  adequate 
if  it  has  to  be  used  for  more  serious  transport  purposes." 
Yet  almost  simultaneously  Prince  von  Biilow  declared  in 
the  Reichstag  (12th  April,  1904)  that  Germany  had  no 
reason  to  object  to  the  Anglo-French  Entente.  "  We  have 
no  cause  to  apprehend  that  this  agreement  is  levelled 
against  any  individual  power.  It  seems  to  be  an  attempt 
to  eliminate  the  points  of  difierence  between  France  and 
Great  Britain  by  means  of  an  amicable  understanding. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  German  interests  we  have  no 
objection  to  make  to  it."  The  German  Ambassador  in 
Paris,  Prince  von  Radolin,  took  a  similar  view.  On  being 
informed  by  M.  Delcasse  of  the  conclusion  of  the  arrange- 


202  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

ment,  he  observed  that  he  found  it  "  very  natural  and 
perfectly  justified."  Meanwhile  the  busy  mind  of  the 
Kaiser  was  already  at  work  on  a  new  European  combina- 
tion. Two  methods  of  nullifying  the  Anglo-French 
Entente  seem  to  have  occurred  to  him.  "  The  first  was  a 
secret  intrigue  with  the  Czar,  which  would  draw  Kussia 
over  into  the  orbit  of  German  policy ;  this  would  result 
either  in  drawing  France  also,  and  in  establishing  a  German- 
Russian-French  combination  directed  against  England,  or 
it  would  result  in  rupturing  the  dual  alliance  and  leave 
England  and  France  face  to  face  with  the  old  Triple 
Alliance,  now  reinsured  again  as  in  Bismarck's  day  on 
the  Russian  side.  To  Germany  it  did  not  make  a  great 
difierence  which  of  these  consequences  would  result,  for 
in  either  case  Germany's  position  would  be  strengthened, 
and  she  would  win  the  prestige  of  a  diplomatic  success. 
The  second  method  of  dislocating  the  Entente  Cordiale 
was  by  some  diplomatic  triumph  over  France,  backed  up 
by  a  policy  of  force  which  would  make  patent  to  all  the 
world  the  essential  hollo wness  of  the  Entente  Cordiale, 
and  proclaim  that  important  arrangements  in  the  world 
still  could  not  be  made  without  consulting  Germany. 
These  two  methods,  the  one  secret  and  the  other  open, 
used  alternately  and  in  combination  during  the  next 
fiiteen  months  in  a  series  of  manoeuvres  of  extraordinary 
interest  and  intricacy,  are  the  true  explanation  of  the 
Kaiser's  secret  interview  at  Bjorko  and  his  public  speech 
at  Tangier."  ^  With  the  intrigues  which  at  this  time 
took  place  between  the  Kaiser  and  the  Czar  we  shall  deal 
presently.  For  the  moment  we  will  follow  the  course  of 
the  open  diplomacy  which  culminated  in  the  Algeciras 
Conference. 
The  On  31st  March,  1905,  the  German  Emperor,  in  accordance 

iw^or'^'^  with  Billow's  advice,"^  visited  Tangier,  and  in  a  some- 
what menacing  speech  ostentatiously  took  under  his 
protection  the  independence  of  Morocco  and  the  sove- 
reignty of  its  Sultan.     "  The  demand  of  Germany,"  says 

i^S.  B.  Fay  :  The  Kaiser's  Secret  Negotiations  with  the  Tsar,  pp.  52-53. 
2  Imperial  Germany,  p.  81. 


Tangier 


THE   DIPLOMATIC   REVOLUTION   (1890-1911)      203 

Biilow,  to  be  consulted  about  Moroccan  a^airs,  "  was  thus 
announced  to  the  world."  .Morocco,  however,  was 
primarily  a  symbol.  No  one  proposed  to  interfere  with 
the  commercial  rights  of  Germany  in  Morocco,  and  other 
rights  she  had  none.  The  true  inwardness  of  German  inter- 
vention is  revealed  by  the  German  historian  Rachfahl. 
"  Because,"  he  writes,  "  under  the  surface  of  the  Morocco 
affair  lurked  the  deepest  and  most  difficult  problems  of 
power  {Macht-Prohleme),  it  was  to  be  foreseen  that  its 
course  would  prove  to  be  a  trial  of  strength  of  the  first 
order."  ^  The  visit  of  the  Emperor  to  Tangier  was 
followed,  on  the  one  hand  by  a  demand  for  the  summoning 
of  an  international  conference,  and  on  the  other  by  a 
demand  that  France  should  repudiate  her  Foreign  Minister, 
Delcasse.  In  the  summer  of  1905,  Prince  Henckel  von 
Donnersmarck  was  sent  as  a  special  envoy  from  BerHn  to 
Paris.  He  declared  in  a  newspaper  interview  that  "  it  had 
now  become  clear  that  the  Anglo-French  Entente  had  been 
framed  for  the  isolation  and  humihation  of  Germany.  .  .  . 
The  policy  of  Delcasse  was  aimed  at  the  Germans  who 
would  not  wait  until  it  was  completed.  It  was  the  policy 
of  England  to  destroy  the  fleet  of  every  rival,  or  better 
still  to  prevent  its  construction ;  but  could  the  British 
Fleet  help  France  ?  .  .  .  Let  France  think  better  of  it, 
give  up  the  Minister  v/ho  had  made  the  trouble  and  adopt 
towards  Germany  a  loyal  and  open  policy  such  as  would 
guarantee  the  peace  of  the  world."  - 

Before  this  arrogant  threat,  France,  conscious  that  she  Resigna- 
was  not  ready  for  immediate  war,  momentarily  gave  way.  JJ^JJ^^gg^ 
Delcasse  resigned  on  12th  June,  1905  ;    France  immedi- 
ately set  to  work  to  improve  her  army  organisation,  and  the 
Government  got  a  vote  of  sixty  millions  for  this  purpose 
and  for  the  construction   of   strategic   railways.     About 
the  same  time  a  preliminary  arrangement  between  France  The 
and  Germany  was  concluded  for  the  conduct  of  a  Con-  cmfferelice 
ference  which  was  to  meet  at  Algeciras  in  January,  1906.  Jan.  1906  ' 

^  F.  Racliiahl :  Kaiser  und  ReicJi,  p.  233 ;  quoted  by  Rose  :  The  Origins 
of  the  War,  p.  74. 

-  Ap.  Rose  :  op.  cit.  p.  76. 


204  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

At  that  Conference,  in  addition  to  Germany,  France,  and 
Great  Britain,  the  following  Powers  were  represented  : 
Spain,  Portugal,  Italy,  Austria-Hungary,  Belgium,  the 
United  States,  the  Netherlands,  Eussia,  Sweden,  and 
Morocco.  The  mere  meeting  of  this  international  Con- 
ference was  undoubtedly  a  diplomatic  triumph  for  Germany. 
It  would  never  have  been  held  if,  on  the  one  hand,  France 
had  been  ready  for  war,  and  if,  on  the  other,  Russia  had 
not  been  temporarily  knocked  out  by  her  crushing  defeat 
at  the  hands  of  Japan.  The  results  of  the  Conference  were 
regarded  in  Germany  as  satisfactory.  "  We  succeeded,'* 
says  Biilow,  "  in  preserving  the  sovereignty  of  the  Sultan, 
and  in  securing  international  control  of  the  police  organ- 
isation and  the  Moroccan  National  Bank,  thus  ensuring 
the  open  door  in  Morocco  for  German  economic  interests 
as  well  as  for  those  of  all  other  countries.  .  .  .  The  decisions 
of  the  Algeciras  Conference  bolted  the  door  against  the 
attempts  of  France  to  compass  the  '  Tunification '  of 
Morocco.  They  also  provided  a  bell  we  could  ring  at 
any  time,  should  France  show  any  similar  tendencies 
again."  Biilow  admits,  however,  that  Germany  did  not 
attain  all  she  wished.  Less  partial  opinion  incHnes  to  the 
view  that  the  results  of  the  Algeciras  Conference  marked 
a  decided  diplomatic  rebuff  for  Germany.  The  Conference 
was  held  with  the  definite  intention  of  destropng  in 
the  eyes  of  the  world  the  significance  of  the  Anglo-French 
Entente.  It  served  actually  to  demonstrate  its  strength, 
and  Biilow  admitted  as  much  in  a  speech  in  the  Reichstag 
on  14th  November.  "  We  have  no  thought,"  he  said,  "  of 
attempting  to  separate  France  and  England.  We  have 
absolutely  no  idea  of  attempting  to  disturb  the  friendship 
of  the  Western  Powers.  .  .  .  Cordial  relations  between 
Germany  and  England  are  in  perfect  consonance  with  the 
Entente,  if  the  latter  combination  follows  pacific  purposes." 
Germany  111  ^^^  Auglo -French  Entente  there  was,  however,  one 
and  Russia  weak  spot — the  continued  estrangement  of  England  and 
Russia.  This  weakness  Germany  was  not  unnaturally 
determined  to  exploit  to  the  fuUest  possible  extent.  The 
Kaiser  hoped  for  something  more  :   to  detach  Russia  from 


THE   DIPLOMATIC   REVOLUTION   (1890-1911)      205 

the  French  Alliance  and  to  reopen  the  wire  between  Berlin 
and  St.  Petersburg.     To  this  end  the  secret  diplomacy 
of  the  Kaiser  was  persistently  directed  from  1904  to  1906. 
There  has  lately  been  brought  to  light  a  series  of  remarkable 
telegrams  exchanged  during  this  period  between  the  Kaiser 
and  the  Czar,  known  as  the  "Willy-Nicky Correspondence."  ^  The 
The  Kaiser  manifested  the  closest  interest  in  the  fortunes  Nicw^r- 
of  Russia  in  her  contest  with  Japan.     He  also  insinuated  respond- 
that  Enghsh  neutrahty  was  far  from  friendly  to  Russia.  ^^^® 
Thus,  on  27th  October,  1904,  the  Kaiser  telegraphed  to  the 
Czar  :  "  For  some  time  Enghsh  Press  has  been  threatening 
Germany,  on  no  account  to  allow  coals  to  be  sent  to  Baltic 
Fleet  now  on  its  way  out.     It  is  not  impossible  that  the 
Japanese  and  British  Governments  may  lodge  a  joint 
protest  against  coahng  our  ships.  .  .  .  The  naval  battles 
fought  by  Togo  are  fought  with  Cardiff  coal."     The  Kaiser 
further    suggested    a   Franco-Russo-German    understand- 
ing against  England  and  Japan.     The  Czar  promptly  re- 
sponded :    "  The  only  way,  as  you  say,  would  be   that 
Germany,  Russia,  and  France  should  at  once  unite  in  an 
arrangement   to   abohsh   Anglo -Japanese   arrogance   and 
insolence.    Would  you  hke  to  lay  down  and  frame  the 
outhne  of  such  a  treaty  and  let  me  see  it.     As  soon  as 
accepted  by  us,  France  is  bound  to  join  her  ally.     This 
combination  has  often  come  to  my  mind ;  it  will  mean 
peace  and  rest  for  the  world."     The  Czar,  it  will  be  ob- 
served, was  determined  to  keep  faith  with  France.     The 
Kaiser,  on  the  other  hand,  was  most  anxious  that  his 
alHance  with  the  Czar  should  be  first  concluded  and  then 
that  France  should  be  informed  of  the  accomphshed  fact. 
On  23rd  July,  1905,  the  Kaiser  met  the  Czar  in  the  Bjorko  The  Secret 
Sound,  and  on  the  following  day  a  secret  treaty  was  signed  Bj5rk6,^ 
between  the  two  autocrats.     The  treaty  provided  that  if  July,  1905 
any  European  Power  should  attack  either  of  the  two 
Empires,  the  other  should  come  to  its  assistance  with  all 

1  These  telegrams  were  published  in  the  New  York  Herald  in  Septem- 
ber, 1917,  and  re-issued  in  book  form  in  January,  1918,  as  the  Willy- 
Nicky  Correspondence.  On  the  whole  question,  rp.  a  valuable  article 
by  S.  B.  Fay  in  The  American  Historical  Beview,  vol.  xxiv.  No.  1, 
October,  1918. 


Norway 


206  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

its  military  and  naval  forces.  The  treaty  was  to  become 
effective  on  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  with  Kussia  and 
Japan.  Peace,  as  we  have  seen,  was  concluded  between 
these  Powers  at  Portsmouth  (U.S.A.)  on  5th  September, 
1905,  and  thereupon  the  Czar  informed  his  Foreign 
Minister  of  the  secret  obligations  into  which  he  had  entered. 
Count  Lamsdorf  immediately  protested,  and,  reinforced 
by  the  opinion  of  Count  Witte,  compelled  the  Czar  to  annul 
the  treaty.  Its  conclusion  throws,  however,  a  peculiar 
and  significant  light  upon  German  diplomacy  at  this 
period  of  European  tension. 
Sweden  The    "  Willy-Nicky   Correspondence  "    also    throws   an 

N^liwnTT  interesting  sidelight  upon  the  relations  between  Germany 
''^''^  and  Russia  on  the  one  side,  and  the  Scandinavian  countries 
on  the  other.  In  1905  a  crisis  was  reached  in  the  affairs 
of  Scandinavia.  For  many  years  past  the  relations 
between  Norway  and  Sweden  had  been  far  from  easy. 
Norway  had  been  unceremoniously  handed  over  to  Sweden 
as  part  of  the  European  Settlement  of  1814  ;  but  from 
the  first  the  Norwegians  had  disliked  the  connection. 
Consequently,  the  Norwegian  Storthing  made  repeated 
efforts  to  get  an  alteration  of  the  fundamental  law  which 
defined  the  relations  of  the  two  countries.  King  Oscar 
on  each  occasion  refused  his  sanction.  Finally,  however, 
in  1884  the  Norwegians  took  the  reins  into  their  own 
hands,  displaced  the  King's  Government  and  installed 
in  power  a  Government  responsible  to  the  Storthing. 
From  that  moment  the  only  question  was  how  soon  the 
Home  Rule,  virtually  attained  in  1884,  would  issue  in 
independence.  In  1892  the  Storthing  took  the  further  step 
of  calling  for  the  establishment  of  a  separate  Norwegian 
Consular  Service.  King  Oscar,  however,  refused  his 
assent,  and  not  until  1903  was  the  claim  virtually  conceded. 
The  Norwegians  were  still  unsatisfied,  and  after  protracted 
and  unhappy  negotiations  the  Storthing  declared  that 
King  Oscar,  having  failed  to  form  a  new  Government 
in  Norway,  had  ceased,  ipso  facto,  to  reign,  and  that  the 
union  ^^dth  Sweden  was,  therefore,  dissolved.  Sweden 
ultimately   agreed   to    withdraw   its   opposition,   and   in 


THE   DIPLOMATIC   EEVOLUTION   (1890-1911)      207 

October,  1905,  the   constitutional   tie    between  the   two 
countries  was  finally  severed. 

Norway  having  resolved  to  remain  a  monarcbical  State,  The 
was  compelled  to  find  a  new  king.  Tlie  cboice  of  the  ^^o^way 
Storthing  fell  upon  Prince  Charles  of  Denmark,  a  younger 
son  of  the  Crown  Prince  Frederick  of  Denmark ;  and  the 
new  king,  who  was  married  to  the  youngest  daughter 
of  King  Edward  VII.,  ascended  the  Norwegian  throne 
with  the  title  of  Haakon  VII.  The  election  gave  great 
offence  at  Berlin,  and  was  not  welcomed  at  St.  Petersburg ; 
the  idea  being  that  it  must  necessarily  enhance  the 
influence  of  England  in  the  Scandinavian  kingdoms ; 
consequently  among  the  questions  discussed  at  Bjorko 
was  the  position  of  Denmark  in  the  event  of  a  European  Denmark 
War.  In  the  following  communications  to  Biilow,  the 
Kaiser  purports  to  give  the  views  of  the  Czar  Nicholas : 
"If  it  is  to  be  Charles,  England  by  fair  means  or  foul 
will  stick  her  finger  in  Norwegian  affairs,  gain  influence, 
begin  intrigues,  and  finally  by  the  occupation  of  Christian- 
sund  close  the  Skager  Eack  and  shut  us  all  out  from 
the  Baltic  ...  a  declaration  of  neutrality  {i.e.,  on  the 
part  of  Denmark)  would  do  us  no  good,  if  at  the  same 
time  the  Danes,  according  to  their  views,  considered  it 
right  to  pilot  enemy  vessels  straight  into  the  Baltic  before 
our  ports.  The  enemy,  in  case  he  does  not  respect  the 
neutrality  of  Denmark  (which  is  to  be  assumed,  con- 
sidering the  great  weakness  of  the  little  country),  would 
lay  hands  on  it  and  it  would  be  compelled  to  take  sides 
with  the  enemy  and  furnish  him  with  an  excellent  base 
for  operations  against  our  coast.  Denmark  is  now  only 
a  Baltic  State  and  not  a  North  Sea  Power."  It  is  im- 
possible to  be  certain,  as  Mr.  Fay  comments,  how  far  the 
Czar  was  here  giving  original  views  of  his  own,  and  how 
far  was  merely  echoing  the  ideas  which  the  Kaiser  put 
into  his  head.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  Kaiser  and  the 
Czar  agreed  that :  "In  case  of  war  and  impending 
attack  on  the  Baltic  from  the  foreign  Power  (obviously 
England),  Russia  and  Germany  will  immediately  take 
steps  to   safeguard  their  interests   by  laying  hands   on 


208  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Denmark,  and  occupying  it  during  tlie  war."  The  Kaiser 
further  undertook  on  liis  way  back  from  Bjorko  "  to  call 
in  at  Copenhagen  and  inform  King  Christian  of  the  dis- 
positions made  in  reference  to  his  country."  On  arriving 
at  Copenhagen,  however,  the  Kaiser  decided,  in  view  of 
*'  the  great  number  of  channels  leading  from  Copenhagen 
to  London,  and  the  proverbial  want  of  discretion  at  the 
Danish  Court,"  that  it  would  be  better  not  to  "  let  any- 
thing be  known  about  our  alliance."  He  ascertained, 
however,  that  the  Danes  fully  anticipated  that  Russia 
and  Germany  would  safeguard  Danish  interests. 
The  Anglo-  So  the  Kaisei,  and  perhaps  the  Czar,  proposed.  Not 
A^eement  ^^^^  did  events  dispose  themselves.  Russian  statesmen, 
1907  '  less  imprudent  than  their  Sovereign,  and  less  under  the 
personal  influence  of  the  Kaiser,  refused,  as  we  have  seen, 
to  sacrifice  the  friendship  of  France  for  an  alliance  with 
Germany.  There  still  remained,  however,  the  original 
flaw  in  the  new  European  Entente,  the  continued  estrange- 
ment between  England  and  Russia.  In  1907  the  difficulty 
was  at  last  overcome,  and  the  Dual  Alliance  was  expanded 
into  the  Triple  Entente.  The  foundation  of  the  Anglo- 
Russian  Entente  was  really  laid  at  the  Algeciras  Con- 
ference, where  Great  Britain  was  represented  by  Sir 
Arthur  Nicholson,  her  accomplished  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  who  had  come  into 
Office  at  the  end  of  1905,  threw  himself  with  ardour  into 
the  task  of  improving  relations  between  the  two  countries. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  started  from  this  principle  :  "  When 
the  interests  of  two  Powers  are  constantly  touching  and 
rubbing  against  one  another,  it  is  hard  to  find  a  half-way 
house  between  constant  liability  to  friction  and  cordial 
friendship."  The  interests  of  England  and  Russia  had, 
as  we  have  seen,  been  rubbing  against  one  another  in 
{a)  Thibet.  Central  Asia  for  the  best  part  of  a  century.  During  1906 
and  1907,  however,  there  was  a  frank  interchange  of  views 
between  London  and  St.  Petersburg,  and  at  last,  on  31st 
August,  1907,  the  momentous  treaty  was  concluded. 
The  treaty  covered  all  the  outstanding  questions  between 
the  two  Powers  in  Central  Asia,  and  in  particular  dealt 


THE   DIPLOMATIC   REVOLUTION  (1890-1911)      209 

with  Thibet,  Afghanistan,  and  Persia.  In  regard  to  the 
first,  both  parties  pledged  themselves  to  respect  the 
integrity  of  Thibet,  to  abstain  from  all  interference  in 
internal  affairs,  to  seek  no  concessions  for  railways,  roads, 
telegraphs,  and  mines,  or  other  rights  in  Thibet ;  not  to 
send  representatives  to  Lhassa,  and  to  deal  with  Thibet 
only  through  the  intermediary  of  its  suzerain,  the  Chinese 
Government.  As  regards  Afghanistan  a  still  more  [b)  Afghan- 
important  arrangement  was  concluded.  Subject  to  the  ^^^^^ 
consent  of  the  Ameer  (which  has  never,  be  it  observed, 
been  obtained),  the  Russian  Government  recognised 
Afghanistan  "  as  outside  the  sphere  of  Russian  influence  ; 
they  engaged  that  all  their  political  relations  with 
Afghanistan  should  be  conducted  through  the  inter- 
mediary of  Great  Britain,  and  undertook  not  to  send  any 
agents  into  Afghanistan."  Great  Britain,  on  its  side, 
declared  that  there  was  no  intention  of  changing  the 
poHtical  status  of  Afghanistan ;  that  British  influence 
would  be  exercised  in  a  pacific  sense,  and  that  no  steps 
were  contemplated,  or  would  be  encouraged,  against 
Russia.  Finally,  there  was  to  be  complete  equality  of 
commercial  opportunity  in  Afghanistan  for  both  countries. 

Most  important  of  all  was  the  agreement  concerning  (c)  Persia 
Persia.  The  two  Powers  engaged  to  respect  the  integrity 
and  independence  of  Persia,  and  to  keep  the  door  open 
to  the  trade  and  industry  of  all  other  nations.  Persia 
was,  however,  mapped  out  into  three  spheres  of  influence. 
The  Russian  sphere  embraced  the  north  and  centre,  in- 
cluding the  chief  Persian  cities  of  Tabriz,  Teheran,  and 
Ispahan.  The  British  sphere  was  in  the  south  and  east ; 
it  included  the  coastal  district  of  the  Persian  Gulf  and  of 
the  Indian  Ocean  to  the  frontiers  of  Baluchistan.  Be- 
tween the  two  spheres  of  influence  was  interposed  a  neutral 
zone,  in  which  both  Powers  were  free  to  obtain  political 
or  commercial  concessions,  while  renouncing  any  such 
freedom  in  the  spheres  assigned  respectively  to  Russia  and 
Great  Britain.  The  details  of  this  arrangement  were 
sharply  criticised  in  both  Houses  of  Parliament  and  in 
certain  sections  of  the  Press.  Sir  Edward  Grey  retorted 
14 


210 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


The  Basis 
of  the 
Triple 
Entente 


that  the  treaty  must  be  judged  as  a  whole  ;  and  while 
not  admitting  that  it  was  unduly  favourable  to  Russia  as 
regards  Persia,  pointed  conclusively  to  the  substantial 
concession  made  by  Russia  to  us  as  regards  Afghanistan. 

In  a  retrospective  view,  attention  is  properly  con- 
centrated less  upon  the  detail  either  of  the  Anglo-Russian 
or  of  the  Anglo-French  agreement,  and  more  upon  the  fact 
that  at  a  critical  moment  in  the  history  of  European 
diplomacy  it  was  possible  to  reach  agreements  at  all. 
Adverse  criticism,  whether  in  France  or  in  Russia  or  in 
England,  might  possibly  justify  itself  at  the  time,  and  yet 
stand  utterly  condemned  in  view  of  the  events  of  the  suc- 
ceeding years.  For  France,  most  of  all,  the  conclusion  of 
the  Anglo-Russian  agreement  was  plainly  an  event  of  the 
highest  significance  ;  at  last  the  flaw  in  the  French  system 
of  alhances  was  removed  ;  not  only  could  France  be  the 
friend  at  once  of  Russia  and  of  England,  but  Russia  and 
England  could  cordially  shake  hands. 

Both  these  agreements  were  obviously  defensive  in 
character  and  pacific  in  intention  ;  yet  candour  compels  the 
admission  that  even  defensive  treaties  might  cause  alarm 
to  a  Power  which  itself  is  wont  to  interpret  "  defensive  " 
in  a  peculiar  sense.  Germany  felt  herself  to  be,  and  in  a 
sense  w^as,  encircled  by  the  Triple  Entente.  In  1908, 
how^ever,  events  occurred  in  the  Balkans  which  gave  her 
the  opportunity  of  reasserting  her  unrivalled  position 
on  the  Continent,  and  of  inflicting  a  severe  diplomatic 
humihation  upon  Russia.  With  these  events  it  wiU  be 
more  convenient  to  deal  in  the  next  chapter  ;  but  it  may 
be  said  at  once  that  the  net  result  was  to  give  a  vigorous 
impulse  to  the  ascendancy  of  3Iitteleuropa  in  the  Balkans, 
and  immensely  to  improve  the  position  of  Pan-Germanism 
as  oj^posed  to  Pan-Slavism  in  Europe.  Omitting  further 
reference  for  the  present  to  the  Bosnian  crisis,  w^e  may 
pass  on  to  notice  the  events  which  logically  complete  the 
subject  of  the  present  chapter. 

Confronted  by  the  Triple  Entente,  the  Kaiser  attempted 
sSFeh''^'  in  1909  and  1910  to  revive  the  Reinsurance  Policy  of 
1909     *      Bismarck.     On  8th  February,   1909,   an  agreement  was 


Germany 
and  the 
Entente 


Franco- 
German 


THE   DIPLOMATIC   KEVOLUTION  (l  890-1911)      211 

concluded  between  France  and  Germany  on  the  Moroccan 
Question.  France  recognised  the  principle  of  the  integrity 
and  independence  of  the  Shereefian  Empire,  while  Germany 
admitted  that  France  occupied  an  exceptional  position 
in  respect  of  the  maintenance  of  order  in  the  interior  of 
Morocco  ;  but  the  language  of  the  agreement  was  so  vague 
that  it  might  sustain  the  interpretation  of  something  in 
the  nature  of  a  condominimn.  It  was,  however,  two  years 
before  matters  became  really  critical  in  Morocco.  Mean- 
while the  Czar  Nicholas  had,  in  November,  1910,  visited 
Potsdam  and  reached  an  imderstanding  with  the  Kaiser  russo- 
in  reference  to  their  respective  interests  in  Mesopotamia  German 
and  Persia.  The  Czar  undertook  that  Kussia  would  not  i|io^^"^^  ' 
oppose  the  Baghdad  Railway  scheme  ;  Germany  recog- 
nised the  special  interests  of  Russia  in  Persia,  and  the  two 
Powers  mutually  agreed  to  abstain  from  any  engagement 
which  might  injuriously  aft'ect  the  other. 

These  "  reinsurances  "  were  clearly  intended  to  effect  France  and 
a  rupture  in  the  Triple  Entente.  The  stirring  events  of  ^^*^^o*^^o 
1911  served  only  to  consolidate  it.  Another  crisis  in 
Moroccan  afiairs  reproduced,  in  that  year,  with  redoubled 
intensity  the  situation  of  1905-6.  For  a  full  and  critical 
analysis  of  the  Moroccan  Question  the  time  has  hardly 
come  ;  we  must  be  content  with  a  summary  of  events. 

The  terms  of  the  Act  of  Algeciras  were  sufficiently 
vague  to  give  either  France  or  Germany  a  specious  plea 
for  divergent  interpretations.  Nor  did  the  agreement  of 
8th  February,  1909,  do  much  to  clear  up  the  ambiguities. 
That  France  had  the  right  to  maintain  order  in  Morocco 
was  unquestionable  ;  equally  certain  was  it  that  the 
Sultan  Moulay-Hafid  was  either  unable  or  unwilling  to 
enforce  it.  Consequently,  in  April,  1911,  the  French 
landed  troops  in  Morocco,  and  on  21st  May  the  Moroccan 
capital,  Fez,  was  occupied. 

The  strictest  injunctions  were  given  to  General  Monier,  The  coup 
who  commanded  the  French  Expedition,  to  abstain  from  °^  •'^gadir 
any  act  which  might  seem  to  menace  the  sovereign  authority 
of  the  Sultan  or  the  integrity  of  his  Empire ;  yet  with 
every  advance  of  French  troops,  Germany  became  more 


212  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

and  more  suspicious.  "  Should  France  find  it  necessary 
to  remain  at  Fez,"  said  Kiderlin-Waechter,  the  German 
Foreign  Secretary,  "  the  whole  Moroccan  Question  will  be 
raised  afresh,  and  each  signatory  of  the  Act  of  Algeciras 
will  resume  entire  liberty  of  action."  In  June  the  French 
troops  commenced  their  retirement  from  Fez  ;  but  with 
each  stage  of  the  retirement  the  attitude  of  Germany 
became  more  menacing. 

The  heightened  tone  of  German  communications  to 
France  may  perhaps  be  explained  by  the  domestic  situa- 
tion both  in  France  and  England.  In  France  every  six 
months  saw  a  new  Ministry,  while  industry  was  dislocated 
by  a  series  of  syndicalist  strikes  ;  in  England  the  con- 
stitutional struggle  over  the  "  veto  "  of  the  House  of 
Lords  reached  its  zenith  in  the  summer  of  1911,  while  a 
profound  upheaval  in  the  industrial  world  culminated,  in 
August,  in  a  serious  railway  strike.  With  her  opponents 
seemingly  paralysed  by  domestic  difficulties,  the  oppor- 
tunity seemed  to  Germany  too  good  to  be  missed,  and  on 
1st  July  the  French  Government  was  officially  informed 
that  the  Panther,  a  German  gunboat,  had  been  dispatched 
to  Agadir,  an  open  roadstead  on  the  west  coast  of  Morocco, 
in  order  to  protect  the  lives  and  interests  of  German  sub- 
jects in  that  disorderly  country. 

As  in  1905,  so  again  in  1911,  the  motive  which  inspired 
German  policy  was  twofold  :  to  impose  upon  France,  in 
the  eyes  of  the  whole  world,  a  diplomatic  humiliation ; 
and  to  drive  a  wedge  into  the  Triple  Entente.  In  both 
obj  ects  she  conspicuously  failed.  To  a  thinly  veiled  demand 
for  the  partition  of  Morocco  between  Germany,  France, 
and  Spain,  France  hotly  retorted  that  she  was  the  para- 
mount Power  behind  Morocco,  and  had  been  recognised  as 
such  ;  but  while  willing  to  negotiate  on  details,  would 
concede  nothing  that  would  touch  the  honour  of  France. 
Attitude  of  England  ranged  herseK  solidly  behind  France.  Speaking 
^^?^^.  at  the  Mansion  House  on  21st  July,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  used 
the  following  words  (previously  agreed  upon  with  the 
Prime  Minister  and  Sir  Edward  Grey)  :  "  I  am  bound  to 
say  this,  that  I  believe  it  is  essential  in  the  higher  interests, 


THE   DIPLOMATIC   REVOLUTION   (1890-1911)      213 

not  merely  of  this  country,  but  of  the  world,  that  Britain 
should  at  all  hazards  maintain  her  place  and  her  prestige 
amongst  the  Great  Powers  of  the  world.  If  a  situation 
were  to  be  forced  on  us  in  which  peace  could  only  be 
preserved  by  the  surrender  of  the  great  and  beneficent 
position  Britain  has  won  by  centuries  of  heroism  and 
achievements,  by  allowing  Britain  to  be  treated,  where 
her  interests  were  vitally  affected,  as  if  she  were  of  no 
account  in  the  Cabinet  of  Nations,  then  I  say  emphatically 
that  peace  at  that  price  would  be  a  humiliation  intolerable 
for  a  great  country  like  ours  to  endure." 

Mr.  Balfour  warned  Germany  that  she  could  not  cal- 
culate upon  party  strife  to  paralyse  England's  right  arm  : 
"  If,"  he  said,  "  there  are  any  who  suppose  that  we  shall 
allow  ourselves  to  be  wiped  from  the  map  of  Europe 
because  we  have  difficulties  at  home,  it  may  be  worth 
while  saying  that  they  utterly  mistake  the  temper  of  the 
British  people  and  the  patriotism  of  the  Opposition." 

This  opportune  reminder  checked  the  warlike  ardour 
of  official  Germany,  while  it  diverted  the  attack  of  the 
fire-eaters  from  France  to  England.  Mr.  Lloyd  George's 
speech,  they  declared,  had  revealed,  as  by  a  flashlight,  the 
real  enemy  of  Germany.  England  will  brook  no  rival ; 
she  claims  to  dominate  the  world.  "It  is  not  by  con- 
cessions that  we  shall  secure  peace,  but  by  the  German 
sword."  So  spake  a  Reichstag  orator  with  the  unconcealed 
approval  of  the  Crown  Prince.  "  England,"  wrote  a 
German  paper,  "  poses  as  the  arbiter  of  the  world.  It 
cannot  go  on.  The  conffict  between  us,  so  far  from  being 
settled,  is  now  more  than  ever  inevitable."  ^ 

Meanwhile,    prolonged   negotiations   between   the   two  Franco- 
principals  resulted  (4th  November)  in  the  conclusion  of  a  ^Sy^ 
comprehensive  treaty,  divided  into  two  parts  :  the  Accord  4th  Nov. 
Marocain    and    the    Accord   Congolais:^    By   the  former  ^^^^ 
Germany  virtually  acknowledged  a  French  Protectorate 

1  The  Germania  (29th  November),  quoted  ap.  Debidour  :  Op.  cit. 
ii.  176. 

2  For  the  full  text  of  these  treaties,  cf.  P.  Albin  :  Les  Grands  Traitis 
Politiques,  pp.  562-579. 


214  EUROPE   AND  BEYOND 

over  Morocco  ;  by  the  latter  France  ceded  to  Germany 
lialf  the  French  Congo.  So  the  acute  crisis  of  1911  was 
temporarily  resolved.  The  German  Emperor  had,  at  the 
last  moment,  recoiled  from  the  war  which  the  Pan-Germans 
were  eager  to  provoke. 
Italy  and  jjis  prudence  was  justified,  if  it  was  not  inspired,  by  a 
^'^°  ^  sinister  development  in  the  Near  East.  On  29th  September 
Italy,  after  a  brief  period  of  negotiation,  declared  war 
upon  Turkey.  The  threatened  equilibrium  in  the  Medi- 
terranean was  to  be  rectified  by  an  Italian  occupation  of 
Tripoli.  But  Italy's  move  had  more  than  local  significance. 
An  important  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance  had  suddenly 
launched  an  attack  upon  one  of  the  sleeping  partners  of 
the  same  firm.     What  might  her  action  not  portend  ? 

AUTHORITIES 

Debidour  :  op.  cit. 

J.  H.  Rose:  Origins  of  the  War.     (Cambridge,  1915.) 

GoocH  and  Masterman  :  British  Foreign  Policy. 

Seymour  :  Diplomatic  Background  of  the  War  (especially  C.'s). 

E.  zu  Reventlow:  Deutschland's  Auswdrtige  Politik  {\^^%-\^\^). 

Prince  von  Bulow  :  Imperial  Germany. 

A.  Tardieu  :  France  and  the  Alliances  and  La  Conference  d'Algesiras. 

K.  Feiling  :  Italian  Policy  since  1871-     (Clarendon  Press  Pamphlets, 

1914.) 
Morgan   and   Davis  :    French  Policy  since   1871.     (Clarendon  Press 

Pamphlets,  1914.) 
S.  B.  Fay  :  The  Kaiser's  Secret  Negotiations  unth  the  Tsar,  1904  5. 
P.  Albin  :  Le  Coup  d'Agadir. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  NEAR  EAST  (1888-1911) 

A  New  Factor.     "  Mitteleuropa  "  and  the 
Ottoman  Empire 

The  attempt  to  dominate  the  East  forms  the  keystone  of  German 
Weltjyolitit—G.  W.  Prothero. 

Ce  qui  modifie  revolution  de  la  question  d' Orient,  ce  qui  bouleverse 
completement  les  donnees  du  probleme  et  par  consequent  sa  solution 
possible,  c'est  la  position  nouvelle  prise  par  I'Allemagne  dans  I'Empire 
ottoman.  .  .  .  Hier,  I'influence  de  I'empereur  allemand  k  Constantinople 
n'etait  rien,  aujourd'hui  elle  est  tout ;  silencieusement  ou  avec  eclat, 
elle  joue  un  role  preponderant  dans  tout  ce  qui  se  fait  en  Turquie. — 
Andre  Cheradame  (1903). 

We  have  carefully  cultivated  good  relations  with  Turkey.  .  .  .  These 
relations  are  not  of  a  sentimental  nature.  .  .  .  For  many  a  year  Turkey 
was  a  useful  and  important  link  in  the  chain  of  our  political  relations. — 
Prince  Bernhard  von  Bulow. 

1"^HE  Italian  expedition  to  Tripoli  opened  a  new  phase  The  itaio- 
in  the  development  of  the  Eastern  Question.  The  ^^^^^^'''^ 
Balkan  kingdoms  were  encouraged  by  the  embarrassments 
of  the  Sultan  first  to  combine  against  and  then  to  attack 
him.  On  the  day  that  the  Sultan  signed  a  Treaty  of 
Peace  with  Italy  at  Lausanne  (18th  October,  1912),  Greece 
declared  war  upon  the  Porte.  The  Balkan  Wars  had  begun. 
Ere  they  were  ended  a  still  greater  conflict  was  in  sight. 

We  broke  off  our  review  of  Near  Eastern  affairs  at  the  New 
"  Thirty  Days'  War  "  of  1897.i    In  order  to  make  clear  l^^^l^"" 
the  sequence  of  events,  a  somewhat  prolonged  retrospect  Problem 
is,  therefore,  essential.     In  the  year  1889  there  entered 
into  the  problem  of  the  Near  East  a  new  factor.     Down  to 
that  time  the  Eastern  Question  had  hardly  come  within 

^  Cf. ,  supra.  Chapter  III. 

2\5 


216  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

the  orbit  of  Prussian  or  German  diplomacy,  though  Austria, 
as  was  natural,  had  long  been  interested  in  the  Balkans. 
Bismarck's  attitude  was  one  of  ostentatious  aloofness 
and  professed  impartiality.  ''  I  never,"  he  was  wont  to 
say,  "  take  the  trouble  even  to  open  the  mail-bag  from 
Constantinople."  "  The  whole  of  the  Balkans,"  he  con- 
temptuously asserted,  "  is  not  worth  the  bones  of  a  single 
Pomeranian  Grenadier."  At  the  Berlin  Congress  Bismarck 
played,  as  we  have  seen,  the  role  of  the  honest  broker. 
For  aught  he  cared,  Kussia  might  go  to  Constantinople, 
a  move  which  would  have  the  advantage  of  embroiling 
her  with  England.  Only  on  one  point  was  he  resolute. 
Austria  must  not  come  out  of  the  business  empty-handed. 
Austria  therefore,  to  the  intense  disgust  of  Russia,  was 
charged  with  the  administration  of  Bosnia  and  the  Herze- 
govina. Prince  Gortchakoff  never  forgave  his  pupil  for 
this  affront ;  Russia  and  Germany  drifted  further  apart ; 
the  Dreikaiserbund  collapsed,  and  its  place  was  taken  by 
the  Triple  Alliance.  In  1883  the  Hohenzollern  King  of 
Roumania  was  introduced  into  the  firm  as  a  sleeping 
partner,  and  in  1887  the  election  of  a  Coburg  to  the  Bul- 
garian throne  decidedly  strengthened  Teutonic  influence 
in  the  Balkans. 
A  Vacancy  To  the  end,  however,  Bismarck  maintained  his  attitude 
tinopi?^'^"'  ^^  aloofness.  The  change  came  with  the  accession  of  the 
Emperor  WiUiam  II.  Count  Hatzfeld,  who  had  been 
German  Ambassador  to  the  Sublime  Porte  in  the  early 
'eighties,  persuaded  his  master  that  there  was  a  vacancy 
at  Constantinople.  From  the  sixteenth  century  to  the  nine- 
teenth, France  had  occupied  a  unique  position  at  the  Porte. 
But  from  the  days  of  Canning  to  those  of  Beaconsfield, 
England  was  a  constant  and  fairly  successful  competitor 
for  the  heaux  yeux  of  the  Sultan.  England's  popularity 
at  Constantinople  did  not,  however,  long  survive  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Cyprus  Convention  (1878)  ;  it  was  further 
impaired  by  Mr.  Gladstone's  policy  (1880-81 ) ;  and  was 
finally  shattered  by  the  British  occupation  of  Egypt. 
Hence  the  vacancy  at  Constantinople.  The  Kaiser  deter- 
mined to  fill  it. 


TEE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  NEAR  EAST  (1888-1911)   217 

Tke  first  ceremonial  visit  paid  by  the  Emperor  William  The  ^ 
II.  and  his  Empress  to  a  European  sovereign  was  paid  in  vStM889 
1889.  The  ruler  selected  for  this  honour  was  the  Sultan  and  1898 
Abdul  Hamid.  The  visit  was  repeated  in  1898  at  a  moment 
when  the  hands  of  Abdul  Hamid  were  red  with  the  blood 
of  the  massacred  Armenians.  The  Turkish  Army,  thanks 
to  the  training  which  for  twelve  years  it  had  received 
under  Baron  von  der  Goltz,  had  lately  inflicted  a  crushing 
defeat  upon  the  Greeks.  The  success  of  von  der  Goltz' s 
pupils  in  Thessaly  afforded  a  natural  excuse  for  a  con- 
gratulatory visit  on  the  part  of  von  der  Goltz's  master. 
The  visit  of  1898  -was  extended  from  Constantinople  to  the 
Holy  Land.  At  Jerusalem  the  Kaiser  inaugurated  with 
great  pomp  a  Protestant  Church  ;  favour  was  also  shown 
to  the  Koman  Catholics ;  while  at  Damascus  the  Kaiser 
ostentatiously  took  under  his  protection  the  Moslem  peoples 
of  the  world.  "  His  Majesty  the  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid 
and  the  three  hundred  million  Mohammedans  who  re- 
verence him  as  Kaliph  may  rest  assured  that  at  all  times 
the  German  Emperor  will  be  their  friend."  Well  might 
those  who  listened  to  the  Kaiser's  audacious  utterance 
hold  their  breath.  Was  it  intoxication  or  cool  calcula- 
tion ?  One  auditor,  Dr.  Friedrich  Naumann,  the  author 
of  Mitteleuropa,  discerned  in  his  Emperor's  speech  a  secret 
calculation  of  grave  and  remote  possibilities.  "It  is 
possible,"  he  wrote  in  1899,  "  that  the  World- War  will 
break  out  before  the  disintegration  of  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
Then  the  Kaliph  of  Constantinople  would  once  more  uplift 
the  standard  of  a  holy  war,  the  sick  man  would  raise 
himself  for  the  last  time  to  shout  to  Egypt,  the  Soudan, 
East  Africa,  Persia,  Afghanistan,  and  India,  '  War  against 
England.'  ...  It  is  not  unimportant  to  know  who  will 
support  him  on  his  bed  when  he  rises  to  utter  this  cry." 
But  the  Kaiser's  tour  not  only  opened  out  remote  possi- 
bilities, but  yielded  immediate  profit.  During  his  sojourn 
in  the  East,  the  German  Company  of  Anatolian  Railways 
received  from  the  Sultan  the  concession  of  the  port  of 
Haidar  Pasha. 

The    concession    was    supremely    significant.    German 


218  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Germany    diplomacy  in  the  Near  East  lias  been  from  first  tc  last 
^o?amfr"   ^^^g^^y  railway  diplomacy,  and  Asia  Minor  and  Mesopo- 
tamia have  provided  its  most  fruitful  soil.     For  many 
years  past,  German  savants  and  publicists  had  been  calling 
the   attention    of   their   countrymen   to    the   favourable 
opening  for  German  enterprise  in  those  regions.     In  1896 
the  Pan-German  League  published  a  brochure  with  the 
suggestive  title,  Germany^ s  Claim  to  the  Turkish  Inheritance. 
The  field  in  Asia  Minor  and  Mesopotamia  was  virtually 
open  to  Germany.     There  had  indeed  been  various  pro- 
jects launched  in  England  for  the  exploitation  of  those 
regions,  and  in  1880  an  Anglo-Greek  S3mdicate  had  ob- 
tained from  the  Porte  certain  rights  for  railway  construc- 
tion in  Asia  Minor.    After  1880,  however,  England  con- 
centrated her  energies  upon  Egypt  and  the  Suez  Canal ; 
in  1888  the  rights  of  the  Anglo-Greek  Syndicate  were 
transferred  to  two  German  banks,  and  in  the  following  year 
The        the  Ottoman  Company  of  Anatolian  Railways  was  promoted 
bah^'^'  ^^^^^  ^^®^^  auspices.    Between   1889   and   1902  further 
concessions  were  obtained,  and  finally  a  Convention  was 
concluded  for  the  construction  of  a  railway  from   Con- 
stantinople to  Baghdad.     This  railway  was  to  form  one 
link  in  the  long  chain  stretching  from  Hamburg  to  Vienna, 
and  thence  by  way  of  Budapest,  Belgrade,  and  Nish  to 
Constantinople,  with  the  possibility  of  ultimate  extension 
from  Baghdad  to  Basra.     Thus  would  Berlin  be  connected 
by  virtually  continuous  rail  with  the  Persian  Gulf.    The 
conception   was   one  not   unworthy  of   a   scientific   and 
systematic  people.    Had  it  materialised,  it  would  have 
turned  the  flank  of  the  great  Sea-Empire,  just  as  in  the 
fifteenth  century  Portugal,  by  the  discovery  of  the  Cape 
route  to  India,  turned  the  flank  of  the  Ottoman  Turks. 
The  Young     Eor  the  first  twenty  years  of  his  reign  all  went  well 
Turks,  1908  ^ith  the  policy  of  the  Kaiser  in  the  Near  East.    But  every- 
thing depended  upon  the  personal  friendship  of  the  Sultan, 
Abdul  Hamid,  and  upon  the  stability  of  his  throne.     It  was 
an  unsafe  foundation.     For  some  years  past  the  party  of 
reform  had  been  gaining  ground  at  Constantinople.     In 
1891  a  committee,  afterwards  known  as  the  Young  Turks^ 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  NEAR  EAST  (1888-1911)   219 

was  formed  at  Geneva,  whence  it  was  ultimately  transferred 
to  Salonika.  To  transform  the  Ottoman  Empire  into 
a  modern  European  State  ;  to  give  to  Turkey  a  genuine 
Parliamentary  Constitution ;  to  proclaim  the  principle  of 
religious  and  intellectual  liberty  ;  to  emancipate  the  Press  ; 
to  promote  intercourse  with  the  progressive  nations  of 
the  world  ;  to  encourage  education ;  to  promote  trade  ;  to 
eradicate  the  last  relics  of  Medisevalism — such  was  the 
programme  with  which  the  Young  Turks  astonished  and 
deluded  Europe  in  the  summer  of  1908. 

On  23rd  July  the  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress 
suddenly  raised  the  standard  of  revolt  at  Salonika,  and 
demanded  the  restoration  of  the  abortive  Turkish  Constitu- 
tion of  1876.  Abdul  Hamid  rendered  the  application  of 
force  superfluous  by  conceding  everything  demanded  of 
him.  He  protested  that  the  Committee  had  merely  antici- 
pated the  wish  dearest  to  his  heart ;  he  promptly  pro- 
claimed the  Constitution  in  Constantinople ;  summoned  a 
Parliament;  guaranteed  personal  liberty  and  equality 
of  rights  to  all  his  subjects,  irrespective  of  race,  creed,  or 
origin  ;  abolished  the  censorship  of  the  Press,  and  dismissed 
his  army  of  40,000  spies. 

The  Turkish  Revolution  was  welcomed  with  cordiality  in  Revolution 
all  the  liberal  States  of  Europe,  and  with  peculiar  efiusive-  counter- 
ness  in  Great  Britain.     But  the  brightness  of  a  too  brilliant  Revolution 
dawn  quickly  faded.     The  Yoimg  Turks  soon  learnt  that  '"Turkey 
the  introduction  of  European  institutions  into  an  Empire 
essentially  Asiatic  is  less  easily  accomplished  than  they 
had  supposed.    The  Sultan,  Abdul  Hamid,  was  even  more 
acutely  conscious  of  this  truth,  and  on  13th  April,  1909, 
he  felt  himself  strong  enough  to  effect  a  counter-revolution. 
But  his  triumph  was    shortlived.     The   Young  Turkish 
troops  promptly  marched  from  Salonika,  and  on  24th 
April    occupied    Constantinople.      On    the    27th,    Abdul 
Hamid  was  formally  deposed  by  a  unanimous  vote  of  the 
Turkish  National  Assembly,  and  his  younger  brother  was 
proclaimed  Sultan  in  his  stead,  with  the  title  of  Mohamed  V. 
On  the  28th  the  ex-Sultan  was  deported  to  Salonika  and 
interned  there. 


220 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


1908 


Austria- 
Hungary 
and  the 
Balkans 


The  new 
Departure 
in  Habs- 
burg 
Policy 


Meanwhile  events  of  great  moment  had  been  taking 
place  in  other  parts  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  On  5th 
October,  1908,  Prince  Ferdinand  proclaimed  the  inde- 
pendence of  Bulgaria ;  on  the  7th,  the  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph  announced  the  formal  annexation  of  Bosnia  and 
the  Herzegovina  to  the  Habsburg  Empire ;  on  the  12th,  the 
Cretan  Assembly  voted  the  union  of  the  island  with  the 
kingdom  of  Greece.  All  these  events  were  directly  attri- 
butable to  the  success  achieved  by  the  Young  Turks  in 
Constantinople.  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria  had,  indeed,  long 
entertained  the  ambition  to  renounce  the  suzerainty  of  the 
Sultan  and  himself  to  assume  the  ancient  title  of  Czar  of 
Bulgaria.  The  Young  Turk  Revolution  precipitated  his 
resolution  and  gave  him  the  opportunity  of  carrying  it  out, 
and  on  19th  April,  1909,  the  Turkish  Government  formally 
recognised  the  independence  of  Bulgaria. 

Much  more  serious,  alike  in  its  immediate  and  its  remoter 
consequences,  was  the  action  taken  by  Austria-Hungary 
in  regard  to  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina. 

Of  all  the  Great  European  Powers,  Austria-Hungary 
was  most  closely,  if  not  most  vitally,  concerned  in  the 
solution  of  the  Balkan  problem.  England's  interest  is 
vital,  but  remote,  and  may  be  deemed  to  have  been 
secured  by  the  annexation  of  Egypt  and  Cyprus,  and  by 
her  financial  control  over  the  Canal.  Russia's  interest  also 
is  vital.  On  no  account  must  any  Power,  potentially 
hostile,  be  in  a  position  to  close  the  Straits  against  her. 
But  the  interests  of  Austria-Hungary  while  not  less  vital 
were  even  more  direct. 

The  Habsburgs  had,  in  Bismarck's  phrase,  been  gravi- 
tating towards  Budapest  ever  since  the  virtual  destruc- 
tion of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  in  the  Thirty  Years  War 
(1618-48).  As  a  fact,  gravitation  was  for  many  years 
equally  perceptible  towards  the  Adriatic  and  the  Lombard 
plain.  But  the  new  departure  in  Habsburg  policy  really 
dates,  not  from  the  Treaty  of  Westphalia,  but  from  the 
Treaty  of  Prague  (1866).  When  Bismarck  turned  Austria 
simultaneously  out  of  Germany  and  out  of  Italy,  he  gave 
her  a  violent  propulsion  towards   the  south-east.     The 


THE  PKOBLEM  OF  THE  NEAR  EAST  (1888-1911)   221 

calculated  gift  of  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina,  supple- 
mented by  the  military  occupation  of  the  Sanjak  of  Novi- 
Bazar,  increased  the  momentum.  Novi-Bazar  not  only 
formed  a  wedge  between  the  Slavs  of  Serbia  and  those  of 
Montenegro,  but  seemed  to  invite  the  Habsburgs  towards 
the  Vardar  valley  and  so  on  to  Salonika. 

For  twenty-five  years  Serbia  appeared  to  be  acquiescent.  Position 
Had  Serbia  been  in  a  position  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin  to  °^  ^^^^^^ 
claim  Bosnia,  or  even  Novi-Bazar,  Balkan  politics  would 
have  worn  a  very  difierent  aspect  to-day.  But  Serbia  had 
not  yet  found  her  soul,  nor  even  her  feet.  Her  geo- 
graphical position  as  defined  in  1878  was  a  hopeless  one. 
And  she  had  other  troubles.  Prince  Milan  assumed  a 
royal  crown  in  1882,  but  his  policy  was  less  spirited  than 
his  pretensions  ;  he  took  his  orders  from  Vienna,  a  fact 
which  widened  the  breach  between  himself  and  the  Queen 
Natalie,  who,  being  a  Kussian,  had  strong  Pan-Slavist 
sympathies.  But  Queen  Natalie  had  grievances  against 
Milan  as  a  husband  no  less  than  as  a  king,  and  Court 
scandals  at  Belgrade  did  not  tend  to  enhance  the  reputation 
of  Serbia  in  European  society. 

The  disastrous  war  with  Bulgaria  (1885)  still  further 
lowered  her  in  public  estimation.  The  grant  of  a  more 
liberal  Constitution  in  1888  did  little  to  improve  the 
situation  of  a  country  not  yet  qualified  for  self-government, 
and,  in  1889,  King  Milan  abdicated. 

His  son.  King  Alexander,  was  a  child  of  thirteen  at  his 
accession,  and  though  not  devoid  of  will  he  could  not  give 
Serbia  what  she  needed,  a  strong  ruler.  In  1893  he  suddenly 
declared  himself  of  age,  arrested  the  regents  and  ministers, 
and  abrogated  the  prematurely  liberal  Constitution  of  1888. 
This  act,  not  in  itself  unwise,  threw  the  country  into 
worse  confusion,  which  was  stiU  further  increased  when, 
in  1900,  the  headstrong  young  man  married  his  mother's 
lady-in-waiting,  a  beautiful  woman  but  a  divorcee,  and 
known  to  be  iacapable  of  child-birth.  The  squalid  story 
reached  a  tragic  conclusion  in  1903,  when  the  king,  Queen 
Draga,  and  the  queen's  male  relations  were  aU  murdered  at 
Belgrade  with  every  circumstance  of  calculated  brutality. 


222  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

This  ghastly  crime  sent  a  thrill  of  horror  through  the 
Courts  and  countries  of  Europe.  Politically,  however,  it 
did  not  lack  justification.  Serbia  gained  immeasurably 
by  the  extinction  of  the  decadent  Obrenovic  dynasty, 
and  the  reinstatement  of  the  more  virile  descendants 
of  Karageorgevic ;  the  pro-Austrian  bias  of  her 
policy  was  corrected ;  and  under  King  Peter  she 
regained  self-respect  and  resumed  the  work  of  national 
regeneration. 
Austria-  That  work  was  watched  with  jealous  eyes  at  Vienna,  and 

SiTth7  ^^i^^  more  at  Budapest;  and  not  without  reason.  The 
Southern  development  of  national  seK-consciousness  among  the 
Slavs  Southern  Slavs  seriously  menaced  the  whole  structure  of 
the  Dual  Monarchy.  Expelled  from  Germany  in  1866,  the 
Emperor  Francis  Joseph  came  to  terms  with  his  Magyar 
subjects  in  the  Ausgleich  of  1867.  Henceforward  the 
domestic  administration  of  Austria  and  her  dependencies 
was  to  be  entirely  separate  from  that  of  Hungary  ;  even 
the  two  monarchies  w^ere  to  be  distinct,  but  certain  matters 
common  to  the  Austrian  Empire  and  the  Hungarian 
kingdom — foreign  policy,  army  administration,  and 
finance — were  committed  to  a  joint  body  known  as  the 
"  Delegations."  But  the  essential  basis  of  the  formal 
reconcfliation  thus  effected  between  Germans  and  Magyars 
was  a  common  hostility  to  the  third  racial  element  in  the 
Dual  Monarchy,  the  element  which  outnumbers  both 
Magyars  and  Germans,  that  of  the  Slavs. 

Out  of  the  51,000,000  subjects  of  the  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph,  about  10,000,000  were  Magyars — these  forming  a 
compact  mass  in  Hungary ;  about  11,000,000  were  German ; 
about  26,000  were  Slavs.  Of  the  latter,  about  7,000,000 
belonged  to  the  Serbo-Croatian  or  Southern  Slav  branch 
of  the  great  Slav  family. 

Since  1867  it  had  been  the  fixed  policy  of  the  leading 
statesmen  of  both  Vienna  and  Budapest  to  keep  the 
Slav  majority  in  strict  subordination  to  the  German- 
Magyar  minority.  The  inclusion  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, with  a  compact  population  of  nearly  2,000,000 
Slavs,  rendered  this  policy  at  once  more  difficult,  and,  at 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  NEAR  EAST  (1888-1911)   223 

least  in  the  eyes  of  the  timorous  minority,  more  abso- 
lutely imperative.  In  proportion,  however,  as  Habsburg 
methods  became  more  drastic,  the  annexed  provinces 
tended  to  look  with  more  and  more  approbation  upon 
the  Jugo-Slav  propaganda  emanating  from  Belgrade.  To 
meet  this  danger  the  Austrian  Government  promoted 
schemes  for  the  systerdatic  German  colonisation  of  Bosnia 
in  much  the  same  way  as  Prussia  encouraged  colonisation 
in  Poland.  But  neither  the  steady  progress  of  colonisation 
nor  the  material  benefits  unquestionably  conferred  upon 
Bosnia  by  Austrian  administration  availed  to  win  the  hearts 
of  the  Bosnian  Serbs,  nor  to  repress  the  growing  intimacy 
between  Serajevo  and  Belgrade. 

This  fact,  too  obtrusive  to  be  ignored,  led  some  of  the  Triaiism  v. 
more  thoughtful  statesmen  of  the  Ballplatz  to  advocate 
a  new  departure  in  Habsburg  policy.  To  maintain,  in 
perpetuity,  the  German-Magyar  ascendancy  over  the 
Slavs  seemed  to  them  an  impossibility.  But  was  there  any 
alternative,  consistent,  of  course,  with  the  continued 
existence  of  the  Habsburg  Empire  ?  Only,  it  seemed  to 
them,  one ;  to  substitute  a  triple  for  the  dual  foundation 
upon  which  for  half  a  century  the  Habsburg  Empire  had 
rested  ;  to  bring  in  the  Slav  as  a  third  partner  in  the  exist- 
ing German-Magyar  firm. 

On  one  detail  of  their  programme  the  "  Trialists  "  were 
not  unanimous.  Some  who  favoured  "  triaiism "  in 
principle  wished  to  include  only  the  Slavs  who  were  already 
subject  to  the  Dual  Monarchy  ;  others,  with  a  firmer  grip 
upon  the  nationality  idea,  advocated  a  bolder  and  more 
comprehensive  policy.  To  them  it  seemed  possible  to 
solve  by  one  stroke  the  most  troublesome  of  the  domestic 
difficulties  of  the  Habsburg  Empire,  and  the  most  danger- 
ous of  their  external  problems.  The  Jugo-Slav  agitation 
had  not,  at  that  time,  attained  the  significance  which  since 
1912  has  attached  to  it.  Serbo-Croat  unity  was  then  a 
distant  dream.  While  the  nationality  sentiment  was 
still  comparatively  weak,  the  religious  barriers  between 
Orthodox  Serbs  and  Koman  Catholic  Croats  were  pro- 
portionately formidable.    Whether,  even  then,  the  Slavs 


224  EUROPE   AND  BEYOND 

could  have  been  tempted  by  generous  terms  to  come  in 
as  a  third  partner  in  the  Habsburg  Empire  it  is  impossible 
to  say  ;  but  from  the  Habsburg  point  of  view  the  experi- 
ment was  obviously  worth  making,  and  its  success  would 
have  been  rightly  regarded  as  a  great  political  achieve- 
ment. With  Serbia  and  Montenegro  added  to  Bosnia, 
and  the  Herzegovina  to  Dalmatia  and  Croatia-Slavonia, 
the  Habsburgs  would  not  only  have  been  dominant  in 
the  Adriatic  ;  the  valley  of  the  Morava  would  have  been 
open  to  them,  and  Salonika  would  have  been  theirs  when- 
ever they  chose  to  stretch  out  their  hands  and  take  it. 
Greece  would  certainly  have  protested,  and  might  have 
fought,  but  at  that  time  there  would  have  been  Crete 
and  Epirus,  and  even  western  Macedonia  to  bargain  with. 
Bulgaria  might  easily  have  been  conciliated  by  the  cession 
of  western  Macedonia,  including,  of  course,  Kavala,  and 
perhaps  the  vilayet  of  Adrianople.  The  Macedonian 
problem  would  thus  have  been  solved  with  complete 
satisfaction  to  two  out  of  the  three  principal  claimants, 
and  to  the  incomparable  advantage  of  the  Habsburg 
Empire. 
The  Arch-  If  it  be  true  that  the  heir  to  the  throne,  the  late  Arch- 
Franz  <iuke  Franz  Ferdinand,  had  identified  himself  with  this 
Ferdinand  large  scheme  of  policy,  it  would  go  far  to  stamp  him  as  a 
great  statesman ;  it  would  also  go  far  to  explain  the 
relentless  hostility  with  which  he  was  pursued  by  the 
party  of  Magyar-German  ascendancy. 
1903  Things  seemed  to  be  shaping,  in  the  first  years  of  the 

present  century,  in  that  direction.  Serbia,  distracted  by 
domestic  broils,  was  in  the  slough  of  despond  ;  a  generous 
ofier  from  the  Habsburgs  might  well  have  seemed  to 
patriotic  Serbs  the  happiest  solution  of  an  inextricable 
tangle.  Austria,  on  the  other  hand,  had  reached  at  that 
moment  the  zenith  of  her  position  in  the  Balkans.  The 
year  which  witnessed  the  palace  revolution  at  Belgrade 
witnessed  also  the  brilliant  culmination  of  Habsburg 
diplomacy  in  the  conclusion  of  the  Miirzteg  Agreement.^ 

1  By  this  the  Czar  Nicholas  II.  and  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  agreed 
(1903)  upon  a  comprehensive  scheme  of  reform  in  Macedonia. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  NEAR  EAST  (l888-191l)   225 

Russia  was  on  the  brink  of  the  Japanese  War.  Great 
Britain  had  just  emerged  with  damaged  prestige  from  the 
war  in  South  Africa.  The  brilliant  diplomacy  of  King 
Edward  VII.  had  not  yet  succeeded  in  bringing  England 
and  France  together,  still  less  in  laying  the  foundation 
for  the  Triple  Entente  between  the  Western  Powers  and 
Russia. 

The  moment  was  exceptionally  favourable  for  a  bold 
con/p  on  the  part  of  the  Habsburgs  in  the  Balkans.  The 
Miirzteg  Agreement  seemed  almost  to  imply  an  inter- 
national invitation  to  attempt  it.  But  the  opportunity 
was  lost.  What  were  the  forces  which  were  operating 
against  the  Trialists  ?  At  many  of  them  we  can,  as  yet, 
only  guess.  But  there  are  some  indications  which  are 
as  sinister  as  they  are  obscure.  In  1909  a  corner  of  the 
curtain  was  lifted  by  a  cause  celebre.  In  December  of 
that  year  the  leaders  of  the  Serbo-Croat  Coalition  brought 
an  action  for  Libel  against  a  well-known  Austrian  historian, 
Dr.  Fried]  ung  of  Vienna.  Dr.  Fried] ung  had  accused 
the  Croatian  leaders  of  being  the  hireliiigs  of  the  Serbian 
Government,  but  the  trial  revealed  the  amazing  fact 
that  a  false  accusation  had  been  based  upon  forged 
documents  supplied  to  a  distinguished  publicist  by  the 
Foreign  Office.  Dr.  Fried] ung  was  perhaps  the  innocent 
victim  of  his  own  nefarious  Government ;  the  real  culprit 
was  Count  Forgach,  the  Austrian  Minister  at  Belgrade, 
a  diplomatist  whose  ingenuity  was  rewarded  by  an  im- 
portant post  at  the  Ballplatz.  Incidents  of  this  kind 
showed  to  the  world  the  direction  of  the  prevailing  wind. 
The  archduke  was  already  beaten.  Baron  von  Aerenthal 
was  in  the  saddle. 

During  six  critical  years  the  direction  of  the  external  Baron  von 
policy  of  the  Habsburg  Empire  lay  in  the  hands  of  this  ^^^{2^^' 
masterful  diplomatist.  The  extinction  of  the  Obrenovic 
dynasty  in  Serbia  was  a  considerable  though  not  a  fatal 
blow  to  Habsburg  pretensions.  The  tragedy  itself  was 
one  of  several  indicative  of  the  growth  of  an  anti- Austrian 
party.  The  bad  feeling  between  the  two  States  was 
further   accentuated   by   the   economic   exclusiveness   of 

15 


226  EUROPE   AND  BEYOND 

the  Habsburg  Government,  which  threatened  to  strangle 
the  incipient  trade  of  Serbia,  and  in  particular  to  impede 
the  export  of  swine  upon  which  its  commercial  prosperity 
mainly  depended.  The  friction  thus  generated  culminated 
in  the  so-called  "  Pig-war  "  of  1905-6,  which  convinced 
even  the  most  doubting  of  Serbian  politicians  that  no  free 
economic  development  was  possible  for  the  inland  State 
until  she  had  acquired  a  coast-line  either  on  the  Adriatic 
or  on  the  ^gean.  The  latter  was  hardly  in  sight ;  only 
two  alternatives  were  really  open  to  Serbia.  The  Albanian 
coast  is  with  reference  to  the  hinterland  of  little  economic 
value.  Besides,  the  Albanians  are  not  Serbs  ;  nor  have 
they  ever  proved  amenable  to  conquest.  Unless,  there- 
fore, Serbia  were  content  to  resign  all  hope  of  attaining 
the  rank  even  of  a  third-rate  European  State,  one  of  two 
things  was  essential,  if  not  both.  Either  she  must  have 
some  of  the  harbours  of  Dalmatia,  pre-eminently  a  Slav 
country,  or  she  must  obtain  access  to  the  Adriatic  by 
union  with  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina. 
Annexa-  All  hope  of  the  latter  solution  was  extinguished  by 
B^'^n^a  and  ^erenthal's  abrupt  annexation  of  these  Slav  provinces  in 
theHerze-  1908.  Austria-Hungary  had  been  in  undisputed  occupa- 
govina  ^[q^  since  1878,  and  no  reasonable  person  ever  supposed 
that  she  would  voluntarily  relax  her  hold.  But  so  long 
as  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  remained  intact,  so  long  as  the 
Habsburg  occupation  was  technically  provisional,  a 
glimmer  of  hope  remained  to  the  Pan-Serbians.  A^yen- 
thal's  action  was  a  declaration  of  war.  In  the  following 
year  he  did  indeed  throw  a  sop  directly  to  the  Turks, 
indirectly  to  the  Serbs,  by  the  evacuation  of  Novi-Bazar. 
He  took  to  himself  great  credit  for  this  generosity,  and 
the  step  was  hailed  with  delight  in  Serbia.  We  now 
know  that  it  was  dictated  by  no  consideration  for  either 
Turkish  or  Serbian  susceptibilities  ;  it  was  taken  partly 
to  conciliate  Italy,  the  third  and  most  restless  member 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  ;  but  mainly  because  the  Austrian 
general  staff  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Morava 
valley  offered  a  more  convenient  route  than  the  Sanjak 
to  Salonika. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  THE  NEAR  EAST  (1888-191 1)      227 

Could  Serbia  hope  to  shut  and  lock  both  these  doors  Feeling  in 
against  the  intruding  Habsburgs  ?  That  was  the  question  ^^^^^^ 
which  agitated  every  Chancellory  in  Europe  at  the  opening 
of  the  year  1909.  In  Belgrade  the  action  of  Austria- 
Hungary  excited  the  most  profund  indignation,  and  the 
whole  Serbian  people,  headed  by  the  Crown  Prince, 
clamoured  for  war.  Feeling  in  Montenegro  was  hardly 
less  unanimous.  The  Serbian  Government  made  a  formal 
protest  on  7th  October,  and  appealed  to  the  Powers  for 
"  justice  and  protection  against  this  new  and  flagrant 
violation,  which  has  been  effected  unilaterally  by  force 
majeure  to  satisfy  selfish  interests  and  without  regard  to 
the  grievous  blows  thus  dealt  to  the  feelings,  interests, 
and  rights  of  the  Serbian  people."  Finally,  in  default 
of  the  restoration  of  the  status  quo,  they  demanded  that 
compensation  should  be  given  to  Serbia  in  the  Sanjak  of 
Novi-Bazar. 

The  Powers  were  not  unsympathetic,  but  urged  Serbia 
to  be  patient.  Upon  the  most  acute  of  English  diplo- 
matists the  high-handed  action  of  Austria  had  made  a 
profound  impression.  No  man  in  Europe  had  laboured 
more  assiduously  or  more  skilfully  for  peace  than  King 
Edward  VII.  Lord  Redesdale  has  recorded  the  effect 
produced  upon  him  by  the  news  from  the  Balkans.  "  It 
was  the  8th  of  October  that  the  King  received  the  news 
at  Balmoral,  and  no  one  who  was  there  can  forget  how 
terribly  he  was  upset.  Never  did  I  see  him  so  moved. 
.  .  .  Every  word  that  he  uttered  that  day  has  come  true."  ^ 
The  Great  War  of  1914  was  implicit  in  the  events  of  1908. 

Meanwhile,  the  peace  of  Europe  depended  upon  the 
attitude  of  Russia.  Her  Balkan  partnership  with  Austria- 
Hungary  had  been  dissolved,  and  in  1907  she  had  con- 
cluded an  agreement  respecting  outstanding  difficulties 
with  Great  Britain.  That  agreement  virtually  completed 
the  Triple  Entente,  the  crown  of  the  diplomacy  of  Kint^ 

1  Lord  Redesdale  :  Memories,  i.  178-179.  Cf.  also  The  Bec4)llections 
(ii.  277)  of  John,  Viscount  Morley,  who  was  Minister  in  attendance  at 
Balmoral  at  the  time,  and  formed  a  similar  opinion  as  to  the  knowledge 
and  shrewdness  of  Kinsj  Edward  VII 


228  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Edward  VII.  In  June,  1908,  King  Edward  and  the 
Czar  Nicholas  met  at  Reval,  and  a  further  programme 
for  the  pacification  of  Macedonia  was  drawn  up.  Whether 
the  R6val  programme  would  have  succeeded  in  its  object 
any  better  than  the  Miirzteg  agreement,  which  it  replaced, 
the  Young  Turks  did  not  permit  Europe  to  learn.  But 
at  least  it  afforded  conclusive  evidence  that  a  new 
era  in  the  relations  of  Russia  and  Great  Britain  had 
dawned. 
Russia  and  In  the  Balkan  question  Russia  was,  of  course,  profoundly 
Germany  interested.  To  her  the  Serbians  naturally  looked  not 
merely  for  sympathy  but  for  assistance.  Russia,  however, 
was  not  ready  for  war.  She  had  not  regained  her  breath 
after  the  contest  with  Japan.  And  the  fact  was,  of  course, 
well  known  at  Potsdam.  All  through  the  autumn  and 
winter  (1908-9)  Serbia  and  Montenegro  had  been  feverishly 
pushing  on  preparations  for  the  war,  in  which  they  believed 
that  they  would  be  supported  by  Russia  and  Great  Britain. 
Austria,  too,  was  steadily  arming.  With  Turkey  she  was 
prepared  to  come  to  financial  terms  :  towards  Serbia  she 
presented  an  adamantine  front.  Towards  the  end  of 
February,  1909,  war  seemed  inevitable.  It  was  averted, 
not  by  the  British  proposal  for  a  conference,  but  by  the 
*'  mailed  fist "  of  Germany.  In  melodramatic  phrase  the 
German  Emperor  announced  that  if  his  august  ally  were 
compelled  to  draw  the  sword,  a  knight  "  in  shining  armour  " 
would  be  found  by  his  side.  At  the  end  of  March,  Russia 
was  plainly  informed  that  if  she  went  to  the  assistance  of 
Serbia  she  would  have  to  fight  not  Austria-Hungary  only 
but  Germany  as  well.  Russia,  conscious  of  her  unpre- 
paredness,  immediately  gave  way.  With  that  surrender 
the  war  of  1914  became  inevitable.  Germany  was  intoxi- 
cated by  her  success  ;  Russia  was  bitterly  resentful.  The 
Serbs  were  compelled  not  merely  to  acquiesce,  but  to 
promise  to  shake  hands  with  Austria.  The  Powers  tore 
up  the  twenty-fifth  Article  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  Turkey 
accepted  £2,200,000  from  Austria-Hungary  as  compensa- 
tion for  the  loss  of  the  Serbian  provinces,  and  in  April, 
1909,    formally    assented    to    their    alienation.     Bulgaria 


THE  PROBLEM  OE  THE  NEAR  EAST  (1888-1911)   229 

compounded  for  her  tribute  by  the  payment  of  £5,000,000. 
Thus  were  the  "  cracks  papered  over,"  and  Europe  emerged 
from  the  most  serious  international  crisis  which  had 
confronted  her  since  the  Russo-Turkish  War  (1877-78). 

AUTHORITIES 

Paul  Dehn  :  Deutschland  und  der  Orient  (1884)  and  Deutschland  nach 

Osten  (1888). 
Paul  Rohrbach  :  DerdeutscheGedankeinder  Welt :  die  Bagdadbahn. 
Count  von  Reventlow  :    Die  auswcirtige  Politik  Deutschlands,  1888- 

1913  (Berlin). 
J.  L.  DE  Lanessan  :    VEmpire  Germanique  sous  Bismarck  et  Guil- 

laume  II. 
G.  W.  Prothero  :  GermanPolicy  before  the  War  {191Q). 
J.  A.  R.  Marriott:  The  Eastern  Question.     (Oxford,  1917.) 
Sir  W.  R.  Ramsay:  Revolution  in  Turkey  and  Constantinople  (1909). 
R.  PiNON  :  U  Europe  et  la  J euneTurquie  {1911). 
V.  Gayda  :  Modern  Austria.     (Eng.  trans.  ;  London,  1911.) 
H.  W.  Steed  :   The  Hapsburg  Monarchy. 
R.  W.  Seton  Watson  :    The  Future  of  Austria-Hungary  (1907),  and 

other  works. 
A.  Cheradame  :  UEurope  et  la  Question  d'Autriche,  and  other  works. 


CHAPTER  XII 
THE  BALKAN  Lb^AGUE  AND  THE  BALKAN  WARS 

Italy  will  not  draw  the  sword  because  she  knows  that,  if  she  does 
attack  us,  all  Europe  will  eventually  be  drawn  into  the  greatest  struggle 
of  history. — Hakki  Pasha,  Turkish  Grand  Vizier,  in  1911  (conversation 
related  by  H.  A.  Gibbons,  New  Map  of  Europe), 

The  problem  now  is  not  how  to  keep  the  Turkish  Empire  permanently 
in  being  .  .  .  but  how  to  minimise  the  shock  of  its  fall,  and  what  to 
substitute  for  it. — Viscount  Beyce. 

The  War  of  the  Coalition  can  claim  to  have  been  both  progressive  and 
epoch-making.  The  succeeding  War  of  Partition  was  rather  predatory 
and  ended  no  epoch,  though  possibly  it  may  have  begun  one  :  it  is 
interesting  not  as  a  settlement  but  as  a  symptom. — "  Diplomatist," 
Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near  East. 

The  Turks,  who  have  always  been  strangers  in  Europe,  have  shown 
conspicuous  inability  to  comply  with  the  elementary  requirements  of 
European  civilisation,  and  have  at  last  failed  to  maintain  that  military 
efficiency  which  has,  from  the  days  when  they  crossed  the  Bosphorus, 
been  the  sole  mainstay  of  their  power  and  position. — Lord  Cromer. 

Italy  in  the  ^  I  ^HE  cracks  papered  over  in  the  spring  of  1909  re- 
ranean'^  1    vealed  themselves  again  in  the  autumn.     In  October 

the  diplomatic  world  was  startled  to  learn  that  the  Czar 
Nicholas  was  about  to  pay  a  ceremonial  visit  to  the  King 
of  Italy.  That  visit  proved  to  be  the  prologue  to  the  last 
act  in  the  drama  of  the  Near  East.  Russia  was,  at  the 
moment,  smarting  under  the  humiliation  imposed  upon 
her  by  the  Paladin  of  Potsdam.  Italy  was  looking  with 
unconcealed  uneasiness  at  the  advance  of  the  Habsburgs 
in  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  Consequently,  after  1909, 
Italy  and  Russia  tended  to  draw  together.  Italy  was  also, 
as  we  have  seen,  drawing  closer  to  France.  As  far  back 
as  1901,  France,  in  return  for  the  concessions  made  to  her 
in  Tunis,  had  agreed  to  give  Italy  a  free  hand  in  Tripoli ; 
and  from  that  time  onwards  there  was  a  general  under- 

230 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  BALKAN  WARS   231 

standing  among  the  European  Chancellories  that  when  the 
final  liquidation  of  the  Ottoman  Estates  was  effected, 
TripoH  would  fall  to  the  share  of  Italy.  Her  reversionary 
rights  were  tacitly  recognised  in  the  Anglo-French  agree- 
ment of  1904,  and  again  at  Algeciras  in  1906. 

Those  rights  were  now  menaced  from  an  unexpected  Tripoli 
quarter.  The  scientific  interest  which  German  geologists 
and  archaeologists  had  lately  developed  in  Tripoli  aroused 
grave  suspicion  at  Rome  ;  and  the  descent  of  the  Panther 
upon  Agadir  convinced  Italy  that  unless  she  was  prepared 
to  forgo  for  all  time  her  reversionary  interests  in  North 
Africa,  the  hour  for  claiming  them  had  struck. 

For  many  years  past  Italy  had  pursued  a  policy  of 
economic  and  commercial  penetration  in  Tripoli,  and  had 
pursued  it  without  any  obstruction  from  the  Turks.  But 
there,  as  elsewhere,  the  revolution  of  1908  profoundly 
modified  the  situation.  The  Young  Turks  were  as  much 
opposed  to  Christians  in  Tripoli  as  elsewhere.  At  every 
turn  the  Italians  found  themselves  thwarted.  It  might 
be  merely  the  Moslem  fanaticism  characteristic  of  Young 
Turk  policy.  But  the  suspicion  deepened  that  between 
the  fanaticism  of  the  Moslem  and  the  scientific  enthusiasm 
of  Teutonic  researches  there  was  more  than  an  accidental 
connection.  Be  this  as  it  might,  Italy  deemed  that  the 
time  had  come  for  decisive  action. 

That  action  fell,  nevertheless,  as  a  bolt  from  the  blue.  Turco- 
On  27th  September  Italy  suddenly  presented  to  Turkey  ^y^f^^^gt^i^ 
an  ultimatum  demanding  the  consent  of  the  Porte  to  an  September, 
Italian  occupation  of  Tripoli  under  the  sovereignty  of  the  Jgth  Octo- 
Sultan,  and  subject  to  the  payment  of  an  annual  tribute,  bar,  1912 
A  reply  was  required  within  forty-eight  hours,  but  already 
the  Itahan  transports  were  on  their  way  to  Tripoli,  and 
on  29th  September  war  was  declared. 

Italy  found  in  Tripoli  no  easy  task.     She  occupied  the  Italy  and 
coast  towns  of  TripoH,  Bengazi,  and  Derna  without  diffi-  ^^®  ^^^^^ 
culty,  but  against  the  combined  resistance  of  Turks  and 
Arabs  she  could  make  little  progress  in  the  interior.     The 
Turks,  trusting  that  the  situation  would  be  relieved  for 
them  by  international  complications,  obstinately  refused 


232  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

to  make  any  concessions.  But  between  her  two  allies 
Germany  was  in  a  difficult  position.  Slie  was  indignant 
that  Italy  should,  without  permission  from  Berlin,  have 
ventured  to  attack  the  Turks  ;  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
she  had  no  wish  to  throw  the  third  partner  in  the  Triple 
Alliance  into  the  arms  of  the  Triple  Entente.  Italy, 
however,  was  determined  to  wring  consent  from  the 
Porte,  and  in  the  spring  of  1912  her  navy  attacked  at 
several  points  ;  a  couple  of  Turkish  warships  were  sunk 
ofi  Beirut ;  the  forts  at  the  entrance  to  the  Dardanelles 
were  bombarded  on  18th  April ;  Khodes  and  the  Dode- 
canese Archipelago  were  occupied  in  May.  To  the  bombard- 
ment of  the  Dardanelles  Turkey  retorted  by  closing  the 
Straits.  This  proved  highly  inconvenient  to  neutrals,  and 
after  a  month  they  were  reopened.  Throughout  the  summer 
the  war  went  languidly  on,  entailing  much  expense  to 
Italy  and  very  little  either  of  expense  or  even  inconveni- 
ence to  the  Turks. 

In  two  ways  the  war  was  indeed  advantageous  to  the 
policy  of  the  Young  Turks.  On  the  one  hand,  "  by 
reconciling  Turk  and  Arab  in  a  holy  war  in  Africa,  the 
Tripoli  campaign  healed  for  a  time  the  running  sore  in 
Arabia  which  had  for  years  drained  the  resources  of  the 
Empire."  ^  On  the  other,  the  naval  operations  of  Italy 
in  the  ^gean  aroused  acute  friction  between  the  Italians 
and  the  Greeks,  whose  reversionary  interests  in  the  islands 
were  at  least  as  strong  as  those  of  Italy  upon  the  African 
littoral.  That  friction  would  be  likely  to  increase,  and 
in  any  case  could  not  be  otherwise  than  advantageous  to 
the  Turk. 
Treaty  of  But  suddenly  a  new  danger  threatened  him.  The 
Lausanne  Tripoli  Campaign  was  still  dragging  its  slow  length  along, 
and  seemed  as  though  it  might  be  protracted  for  years, 
when  the  conflagration  blazed  up  to  which  Tripoli  had 
applied  the  first  match.  In  view  of  the  more  immediate 
danger  the  Porte  at  last  came  to  terms  with  Italy,  and  the 
Treaty  of  Lausanne  was  hastily  signed  at  Ouchy  on  18th 
October.  The  Turks  were  to  withdraw  from  Tripoli ; 
1  Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near  East,  p.  159. 


THE   BALKAN   LEAGUE   AND  BALKAN  WARS      233 

Italy  from  the  ^Egean  Islands  ;  the  Khalifal  authority  of 
the  Sultan  in  TripoK  was  to  remain  intact ;  he  was  to  grant 
an  amnesty  and  a  good  administration  to  the  islands  ; 
Italy  was  to  assume  responsibility  for  Tripoli's  share  of 
the  Ottoman  debt.  The  cession  of  Tripoli  was  assumed 
sub  silentio.  The  withdrawal  of  the  Italian  troops  from 
the  islands  was  to  be  subsequent  to  and  consequent 
upon  the  withdrawal  of  the  Turkish  troops.  Italy  has 
contended  that  the  latter  condition  has  not  been  fulfilled, 
and  she  remains,  therefore,  in  Rhodes  and  the  Dodecanese. 
Her  continued  occupation  has  not  injured  the  Turks,  but 
it  has  kept  out  the  Greeks. 

On  the  same  day  that  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne  was  signed, 
Greece  declared  war  upon  the  Ottoman  Empire.  This 
time  she  was  not  alone.  The  miracle  had  occurred.  The 
Balkan  States  had  combined  against  the  common  enemy. 

The  idea  of  a  permanent  alliance  or  even  a  confedera-  The 
tion  among  the  Christian  States  of  the  Balkans  was  fre-  Lelaue 
quently  canvassed  after  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  But  the 
aggrandisement  of  Bulgaria  in  1885,  and  the  war  which 
ensued  between  Bulgaria  and  Serbia,  shattered  the  hope 
for  many  years  to  come.  M.  Tricoupis,  at  that  time  Prime 
Minister  of  Greece,  made  an  effort  to  revive  it  in  1891, 
and  with  that  object  paid  a  visit  to  Belgrade  and  Sofia. 
The  Serbian  statesmen  welcomed  his  advances,  but  Stam- 
buloff,  who  was  then  supreme  in  Bulgaria,  was  deeply 
committed  to  the  Central  Powers  and  through  them  to  the 
Porte,  and  frowned  upon  the  project  of  a  Balkan  League. 

The  real  obstacle,  however,  to  an  entente  between  the  Difficulties 
Balkan  Powers  was  their  conflicting  interests  in  Mace-  Jj"  jJJa'^®' 
donia.  Bulgaria,  as  we  saw,  consistently  favoured  the 
policy  of  autonomy,  in  the  not  unreasonable  expectation 
that  autonomy  would  prove  to  be  the  prelude  to  the  union 
of  the  greater  part  if  not  the  whole  of  Macedonia  with 
Bulgaria.  Neither  Serbia  nor  Greece  could  entertain  an 
equally  capacious  ambition,  and  from  the  first,  therefore, 
advocated  not  autonomy  but  partition. 

Between  1910  and  1912  there  were  various  indications 
of   some   improvement   in   the   mutual   relations   of   the 


234  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Tiie  En-  Balkan  States.  In  1910  the  Czar  Ferdinand,  the  shrewdest 
fiTika'ns^^^  of  all  the  Balkan  diplomatists,  paid  a  visit  to  Cettigne  to 
take  part,  together  with  the  Crown  Prince  of  Serbia  and 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Greece,  in  the  celebration  of  King 
Peter's  jubilee.  At  Easter,  1911,  some  three  hundred 
students  from  the  University  of  Sofia  received  a  cordial 
welcome  at  Athens.  In  October,  M.  Gueshoff,  Prime 
Minister  of  Bulgaria,  had  a  confidential  interview  with 
M.  Milanovanic,  the  Prime  Minister  of  Serbia. ^  In 
February,  1912,  the  several  heirs  apparent  of  the  Balkan 
States  met  at  Sofia  to  celebrate  the  coming  of  age  of 
i^rince  Boris,  heir  to  the  Czardom  of  Bulgaria. 

All  these  things — the  social  gatherings  patent  to  the 
world,  the  political  negotiations  conducted  in  profoundest 
secrecy — pointed  in  the  same  direction,  and  were  designed 
to  one  end. 
Serbo-  A   favourable   issue   was  not  long  delayed.     On   13th 

Aiiilnce^"  March,  1912,  m  definite  treaty  was  signed  between  the 
13th  March,  Idngdoms  of  Serbia  and  Bulgaria.  This  was  in  itself  a 
^^^^  marvel  of  patient  diplomacy.     Not  since  1878  had  the 

relations  between  the  two  States  been  cordial,  nor  were 
either  their  interests  or  their  antagonisms  identical.  To 
Serbia,  Austria-Hungary  was  the  enemy.  The  little  land- 
locked State,  which  yet  hoped  to  become  the  nucleus 
of  a  Jugo-Slav  Empire,  was  in  necessary  antagonism  to 
the  Power  which  had  thrust  itself  into  the  heart  of  the 
Balkans,  and  which,  while  heading  the  Slavs  ofi  from 
access  to  the  Adriatic,  itself  wanted  to  push  through  Slav 
lands  to  the  iEgean.  Bulgaria,  on  the  other  hand,  had 
no  special  reason  for  enmity  against  Vienna  or  Buda- 
pest. The  "  unredeemed  "  Bulgarians  were  subjects  not 
of  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  but  of  the  Ottoman  Sultan. 
And  if  the  antagonisms  of  the  two  States  differed  their 
mutual  interests  clashed.  To  Thrace  and  eastern  Mace- 
donia Serbia  could  of  course  make  no  claim.  Bulgaria 
could  not  dream  of  acquiring  Old  Serbia.  But  there  was 
a  considerable  intermediate  zone  in  Macedonia  to  which 
both    could    put    forward    substantial    pretensions.     The 

^  See  Gueshoff  :  op.  cit,  pp.  15  sq. 


THE   BALKAN    LEAGUE   AND   BALKAN   WARS      235 

treaty  concluded   in  March,    1912,   reflected  these  con- 
ditions. 

By  that  treaty  the  two  States  entered  into  a  def en-  Serbo- 
sive    alUance ;    they   mutually   guaranteed   each   other's  ^1^*7^*" 
dominions  and  engaged  to  take  common  action  if  the  March,' 
interests  of  either  were  threatened  by  the  attack  of  a  ^^^^ 
Great  Power  upon  Turkey  ;   at  the  same  time  they  defined 
their  respective  claims  in  Macedonia  should  a  partition  be 
effected. 

Two  months  after  the  signature  of  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  Greco- 
Treaty  an  arrangement  was  reached  between  Greece  and  Treaty)*" 
Bulgaria.     It  differed  from  the  former  in  one  important  loth  May, 
respect.     Between   Greeks   and   Bulgarians   nothing  was  ^ 
said  as  to  the  partition  of  Macedonia.     Further,  it  was 
expressly  provided  that  if  war  broke  out  between  Turkey 
and  Greece  on  the  question  of  the  admission  of  the  Cretan 
deputies  to  the  Greek  Parliament,   Bulgaria,  not  being 
interested  in  the  question,  should  be  bound  only  to  bene- 
volent neutrality. 

There  was  good  reason  for  this  proviso.     The  Cretan  The  Cretan 
difficulty  had  become  acute,  and,  indeed,  threatened  to  Question 
involve  revolution  in  Greece.     The  situation  was,  however, 
saved  by  the  advent  of  a  great  statesman.     M.  Venizelos  Eleutherios 
had  already  shown  his  capacity  for  leadership  in  Crete.  ^'®"^^®^^^ 
When,  in  February,  1910,  he  arrived  in  Athens  to  advise 
the  Military  League,   he  remained   to   advise  the  King. 
When,  in  October,  the  League  overturned  the  Dragoumis 
Ministry,  King  George  invited  the  Cretan  statesman  to 
form  a  Cabinet.     M.  Venizelos  accepted  the  difficult  task, 
effected    a    much-needed    revision    of    the   Constitution, 
and    propounded   an   extensive  programme   of    domestic 
reforms. 

But  the  execution  of  such  a  programme  predicated 
peace,  internal  and  external,  and  in  addition  a  certain 
basis  of  financial  stability  and  commercial  prosperity. 

The  Young  Turks  were  quite  determined  that  neither 
condition  should  be  satisfied  ;  and  repeated  manifestations 
of  the  extreme  and  persistent  hostility  of  the  "  New 
Moslems,"  combined  with   their  refusal  to  acquiesce  in 


286  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

the   alienation   of   Crete,  at  last  compelled  Greece  to  the 
"  impossible  "  alliance  with  Bulgaria. 
Greco-  The  defensive  alliance  signed  in  May  was  followed  in 

M^ary  "    September,  as  in  the  case  of  Serbia,  by  a  detailed  military 
Conven-      convention.     Bulgaria  was  to  supply  at  least  300,000  men 
September  ^^   Operate  in  the  vilayets   of   Kossovo,   Monastir,   and 
1912        '  Salonika.     If,  however,  Serbia  should  come  in,  Bulgaria 
was  to  be  "  allowed  to  use  her  forces  in  Thrace."     Greece 
was  to  supply  at  least  120,000  men  ;   but  the  real  gain  to 
the  alliance  was  of  course  the  adhesion  of  the  Greek  fleet, 
whose  "  chief  aim  will  be  to  secure  naval  supremacy  over 
the  -^gean  Sea,  thus  interrupting  all  communications  by 
that  route  between  Asia  Minor  and  European  Turkey." 
J^®   .  The  crisis  was  now  at  hand.     It  was  forced  generally 

Factor  by  the  condition  of  Macedonia,  and  in  particular  by  the 
revolt  of  the  Albanians.  Both  Greece  and  Serbia  were 
becoming  seriously  alarmed  by  the  unexpected  success 
achieved  by  the  Albanians,  who  now  openly  demanded 
the  cession  to  them  of  the  entire  vilayets  of  Monastir  and 
Uskub.  Unless,  therefore,  the  Balkan  League  promptly 
interposed,  Greece  and  Serbia  might  alike  find  the  ground 
cut  from  under  their  feet  in  Macedonia.  Bulgaria  was 
less  directly  interested  than  her  allies  in  the  pretensions 
put  forward  by  the  Albanians,  but  she  was  far  more  con- 
cerned in  the  terrible  massacres  of  Macedonian  Bulgars 
at  Kotchana  and  Berana.  In  the  midst  of  the  excitement 
aroused  by  these  massacres  there  arrived  from  Cettigne 
a  proposal  for  immediate  action.  None  of  the  Balkan 
States  was  more  whole-hearted  in  the  Balkan  cause  than 
Montenegro,  and  none  was  so  eager  for  a  fight.  In  April 
an  arrangement  had  been  concluded  between  her  and 
Bulgaria ;  the  proposal  which  now  reached  Sofia  was 
the  outcome  of  it.  On  26th  August  the  die  was  cast ; 
Bulgaria  agreed  that  in  October  war  should  be  declared. 
The  While  the  Turks  and  the  Balkan  States  were  mobilising, 

and  the      ^^^  Powers  put  out  all  their  efiorts  to  maintain  the  peace. 
Balkans      They   urged   concession   upon   the    Porte    and    patience 
upon  the  Balkan  League.      It  was  futile  to  expect  either. 
Nothing    but    overwhelming    pressure    exerted    at    Con- 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  BALKAN  WARS   287 

stantinople  could  at  this  moment  have  averted  war. 
Instead  of  exerting  that  pressure,  the  Powers  presented 
an  ultimatum  simultaneously  at  Sofia,  Belgrade,  Athens, 
and  Cettigne.  In  brief,  the  Powers  would  insist  upon  the 
reforms  adumbrated  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  ;  but  the 
Balkan  States  must  not  fight ;  if  they  did,  the  Powers 
would  see  that  they  get  nothing  by  it. 

This  masterpiece  of  European  diplomacy  was  presented  Outbreak 
at  the  Balkan  capitals  on  8th  October,  1912.  On  the  same  "^  ^^^ 
day  King  Nicholas  of  Montenegro  declared  war  at  Con- 
stantinople. The  other  three  States  presented  their 
ultimatum  on  the  14th.  On  the  18th  the  Porte  declared 
war  upon  Bulgaria  and  Serbia  ;  and  on  the  same  day 
Greece  declared  war  upon  the  Porte. 

Then,  as  M.  Gueshofi  writes,  "  a  miracle  took  place.  ...  The  War 
Within  the  brief  space  of  one  month  the  Balkan  AUiance  '^  ^^.^. 
demolished  the  Ottoman  Empire,  four  tiny  countries  with  Oct.-Dec'. 
a  population  of  some  10,000,000  souls  defeating  a  Great  ^^^^ 
Power  whose  inhabitants   numbered  25,000,000."     Each 
of  the  allies  did  its  part,  though  the  brunt  of  the  fighting 
fell  upon  the  Bulgarians. 

The  success  of  the  Bulgarians  in  the  autumn  campaign  Bulgaria's 
was,  indeed,  phenomenal.  On  22nd  October  the  Bulgarian  ^^^^' 
Army  attacked  at  Kirk  Kilisse,  a  position  of  enormous 
strength  to  the  north-east  of  Adrianople.  After  two  days' 
fighting  the  Turks  fled  in  panic,  and  Kirk  Kilisse  was  in 
the  hands  of  their  enemies.  Then  followed  a  week  of  hard 
fighting,  known  to  history  as  the  Battle  of  Lule  Burgas, 
and  at  the  end  of  it  the  Turks  were  in  full  retreat  on 
Constantinople.  One  Bulgarian  army  was  now  in  front 
of  the  Tchataldja  lines,  another  was  investing  Adrianople. 
On  4th  November,  the  Porte  appealed  to  the  Powers  for 
mediation.  Bulgaria  refused  to  accept  it ;  but  no  progress 
was  thereafter  made,  either  towards  Constantinople  or 
towards  the  taking  of  Adrianople.  Bulgaria  had  shot  its 
bolt ;  it  had  won  an  astonishing  victory  over  the  Turks, 
but  politically  had  already  lost  everything  which  it  had  set 
out  to  attain.  On  19th  November  orders  came  from  Sofia 
that  the  attack  upon  the  Tchataldja  lines  must  be  sus- 


Part 


238  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

pended.     What  did  that  order  import  ?     Before  we  seek 
an  answer  to  this  question,  we  must  turn  to  the  achieve- 
ments of  Serbia. 
Serbia's  Hardly  less  astonishing,  though  on  a  smaller  scale  than 

the  victories  of  Bulgaria,  were  those  of  the  Serbs.  The 
Serbian  forces,  which  were  about  150,000  strong,  were 
divided  into  three  armies.  One  marched  into  Novi- 
Bazar,  and,  after  a  week's  stiff  fighting,  cleared  the  Turks 
out  of  that  no  man's  land.  Having  done  that,  a  portion  of 
it  was  dispatched  down  the  Drin  valley  into  Albania. 
A  second  army  occupied  Pristina  (23rd  October),  while  the 
third  and  main  army,  under  the  Crown  Prince,  made  for 
Uskub.  The  Turks  barred  the  way  to  the  ancient  capital 
of  the  Serbs  by  the  occupation  of  Kumanovo,  and  there  on 
the  22nd  of  October  the  two  armies  met.  Three  days  of 
fierce  fighting  resulted  in  a  complete  victory  for  the  Serbs. 
At  last,  on  that  historic  field,  the  stain  of  Kossovo  was 
wiped  out.  Patiently,  for  five  hundred  years,  the  Serbs 
had  waited  for  the  hour  of  revenge  ;  that  it  would  some 
day  come  they  had  never  doubted  ;  at  last  it  was  achieved. 
Two  days  later  the  Turks  evacuated  Uskub,  and  on  26th 
October  the  Serbs  entered  their  ancient  capital  in  triumph. 
Now  came  the  supreme  question.  Should  they  press  for 
the  Mgean  or  the  Adriatic  ?  Europe  had  already  an- 
nounced its  decision  that  under  no  circumstances  should 
Serbia  be  allowed  to  retain  any  part  of  the  Albanian  coast. 
But  was  the  will  of  diplomacy  to  prevail  against  the  in- 
toxicating military  successes  of  the  Balkan  League  ? 

Meanwhile  the  main  body  of  the  Serbs  flung  themselves 
upon  the  Turks  at  Prilep,  and  drove  them  back  upon 
Monastir,  and  from  Monastir  they  drove  them  in  utter 
confusion  upon  the  guns  of  the  advancing  Greeks.  The 
capture  of  Ochrida  followed  upon  that  of  Monastir. 
Serbia,  having  thus  cleared  the  Sanjak  of  Novi-BtiSar,  old 
Serbia,  and  western  Macedonia,  now  turned  its  attention 
to  Albania,  and,  with  the  aid  of  the  Montenegrins,  occupied 
Alessio  and  Durazzo  before  the  end  of  November. 
Armistice  On  3rd  December  the  belligerents  accepted  an  armistice 
of  3rd  Dec.  proposed  to  them  by  the  Powers ;  but  from  this  armistice 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  BALKAN  WARS   239 

the  Greeks  were,  at  the  instance  of  the  League,  expressly- 
excluded.  The  League  could  not  afford  to  permit  the 
activity  of  the  Greek  Fleet  in  the  iEgean  to  be,  even 
temporarily,  interrupted. 

On  land  the  part  played  by  the  Greeks,  though  from  The  Greek 
their  own  standpoint  immensely  significant,   was,   in   a  ^^^'' 
military  sense,  relatively  small,  and   on   6th  November 
the  Greeks  entered  Salonika. 

Hardly  had  the  Greek  troops  occupied  Salonika  when  the  Salonika 
Bulgarians  arrived  at  the  gates.  Only  after  some  demur 
did  the  Greeks  allow  their  allies  to  enter  the  city,  and  from 
the  outset  they  made  it  abundantly  clear,  not  only  that  they 
had  themselves  come  to  Salonika  to  stay,  but  that  they 
would  permit  no  divided  authority  in  the  city,  which 
they  claimed  exclusively  as  their  own.  From  the  cmtset  a 
Greek  governor-general  was  in  command,  and  the  whole 
administration  was  in  the  hands  of  Greeks.  In  order  still 
further  to  emphasise  the  situation,  the  King  of  the  Hellenes 
and  his  Court  transferred  themselves  to  Salonika. 

Meanwhile  the  Greek  Fleet  had,  from  the  outset  of  war.  The  Greek 
established  a  complete  supremacy  :  practically  all  the  ^^^^^ 
islands,  except  Cyprus  and  those  which  were  actually 
in  the  occupation  of  Italy,  passed  without  resistance  into 
Greek  hands.  But  Greece  looked  beyond  the  Mgeam  to 
the  Adriatic.  On  3rd  December  the  Greek  Fleet  shelled 
Valona,  where  its  appearance  caused  grave  concern  both 
to  Italy  and  to  Austria-Hungary.  Both  Powers  firmly 
intimated  to  Greece  that  though  she  might  bombard 
Valona,  she  would  not  be  permitted  to  retain  it  as  a  naval 
base. 

Austria-Hungary  had  already  made  similar  representa-  The 
tions  to  Serbia  in  respect  to  the  northern  Albanian  ports.  coSf  ^ 
It  was  obvious,  therefore,  that  the  forces  of  European 
diplomacy  were  beginning  to  operate.  But  the  military 
situation  of  the  Turks  was  desperate,  and  when  the  armis- 
tice was  concluded  on  3rd  December,  the  Turks  remained 
in  possession  only  of  Constantinople,  Adrianople,  Janina, 
and  the  Albanian  Scutari.  Outside  the  walls  of  those  four 
cities  they  no  longer  held  a  foot  of  ground  in  Europe. 


240  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

TheLon-        The  centre  of  interest  was   now  transferred  from  the 

^erenS"     Balkans  to  London.     Ten  days  after  the  conclusion  of 

Dec.  I9i2-  the  armistice  delegates  from  the  belligerent  States  met  in 

Jan.  1913    London.     Negotiations    between    the    representatives    of 

the  Ottoman  Turk  and  those  of  the  Balkan  allies  were 

exceedingly  difficult,  but  by  22nd  January,  1913,  Turkey 

had  agreed  to  accept  as  the  boundary  between  herself 

and  Bulgaria  a  line  drawn  from  Midia  on  the  Black  Sea  to 

Enos  at  the  mouth  of  the  Maritza  on  the  ^gean,  thus 

surrendering    Adrianople.     On    the    following    day    the 

Enver's      Young  Turks  effected  a  cowp  (Vetat  which  brought  the 

23*5  J  ^^^'  London  negotiations  to  an  abrupt  conclusion,  and  on  1st 

February  the  Conference  broke  up.     The  armistice  had 

Resump-     already  been  denounced  by  the  allies  (29th  January),  and 

tion  of  War  q^   ^^\^   February    the    Bulgarians    resumed   the   attack 

upon  Adrianople.     Not,  however,  until  26th  March  did 

the  great  fortress  fall,  and  the  Bulgarians  had  to  share 

the  credit  of  taking  it  with  the  Serbians.     Meanwhile  the 

Greeks  had  won  a  brilliant  and  resounding  victory.     On 

6th  March  the  great  fortress  of  Janina,  the  lair  of  the 

*'  Lion,"  and  hitherto  deemed  impregnable,  fell  to  their 

assault ;     the   Turkish   garrison,    33,000   strong,    became 

prisoners    of    war,    and   200   guns   were   taken   by   the 

victors. 

Scutari  Adrianople  and  Janina  gone,  there  remained  to  the  Turks, 

outside  the  walls  of  Constantinople,  nothing  but  Scutari 

in  Albania.     Already  (2nd  March)  the  Porte  had  made  a 

formal  request  to  the  Powers  for  mediation.     On  the  16th 

the  Balkan  League  accepted  "  in  principle  "  the  proposed 

mediation  of  the  Powers,  but  stipulated  for  the  cession  of 

Scutari  and  all  the  ^Egean  islands  as  well  as  the  payment 

of  an  indemnity. 

Albania  Scutari  was  indeed  the  key  of  the  diplomatic  situation. 

Montenegro  was  determined  to  take  Scutari,  whatever  the 

decision  of  the  European  Powers.     The  latter  had,  indeed, 

decided,   as  far  back  as  December,   1912,   that  Scutari 

must  remain  in  the  hands  of  Albania.     The  latter  was  to 

be  an  autonomous  State  under  a  prince  selected  by  the 

Great  Powers,  assisted  by  an  international  commission  of 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  BALKAN  WARS  '24:1 

control  and  a  gendarmerie  under  the  command  of  officers 
selected  from  one  of  the  smaller  neutral  States. 

Whence  came  this  interest  in  the  affairs  of  Albania  ? 
On  the  part  of  Austria  and  Italy  it  was  no  new  thing. 
An  autonomous  Albania  was  an  essential  feature  of  Count 
Aerenthal's  Balkan  policy,  and  upon  this  point  Austria- 
Hungary  was  supported  by  Italy  and  Russia.  Italy's 
motives  are  obvious,  and  have  been  already  explained ; 
those  of  Russia  are  more  obscure. 

There  was,  however,  another  Power  supremely  inter-  Germany 
ested,  though  in  a  different  way,  in  the  future  of  Albania.  ^^^^^ 
Nothing  which  concerned  the  future  position  of  Austria-  League 
Hungary  on  the  Adriatic  could  be  a  matter  of  indifference 
to  Berlin.  But  Germany  had  a  further  interest  in  the 
matter.  If  the  argument  of  the  preceding  chapter  be 
accepted  as  sound,  little  pains  are  needed  to  explain  the 
action  of  Germany.  The  Young  Turk  revolution  of  1908 
had  threatened  to  dissipate  the  carefully  ganjered  influence 
of  Germany  at  Constantinople.  That  danger  had,  however, 
been  skilfully  overcome.  Not  Abdul  Hamid  himself  was 
more  esteemed  at  Berlin  than  Enver  Bey.  Far  more 
serious  was  the  set  back  to  German  ambitions  threatened 
by  the  formation  of  the  Balkan  League,  and  still  more 
by  its  rapid  and  astonishing  victories  in  the  autumn  of 
1912. 

Hardly  had  the  League  entered  upon  the  path  of 
victory  when  Serbia  received  a  solemn  warning  that  she 
would  not  be  permitted  to  retain  any  ports  upon  the 
Adriatic.  This  was  a  cruel  blow  to  her  national  ambitions ; 
but  it  was  something  more.  It  was  a  diplomatic  move  of 
MachiavelKan  subtlety  and  skill.  If  Serbia  could  be  effec- 
tually headed  off  from  the  Adriatic ;  if  the  eastern 
boundaries  of  an  autonomous  Albania  could  be  drawn  on 
sufficiently  generous  lines,  Serbia  would  not  only  be 
deprived  of  some  of  the  accessions  contemplated  in  her 
partition  treaty  with  Bulgaria  (March,  1912),  but  would 
be  compelled  to  seek  access  to  the  sea  on  the  shores  of  the 
-^gean  instead  of  the  Adriatic.  A  conflict  of  interests 
between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  would  almost  certainly  ensue 
i6 


242  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

in  Macedonia  ;  conflict  between  Serbia  and  Greece  was 
not  improbable.  Thus  would  the  solidarity  of  the 
Balkan  League,  by  far  the  most  formidable  obstacle 
which  had  ever  intervened  between  Mitteleurojxi 
and  the  Mediterranean,  be  effectively  broken.  How 
far  this  motive  did  actually  inspire  the  policy  of 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  at  this  momentous 
crisis  cannot  yet  be  decided ;  but  the  subsequent 
course  of  events  has  rendered  the  inference  almost 
irresistible. 

To  return  to  Scutari.  With  or  without  the  leave  of 
the  Powers,  Montenegro  was  determined  to  have  it,  and 
on  6th  February,  1912,  the  town  was  attacked  with  a  force 
of  50,000  men,  of  whom  Serbia  contributed  12,000-14,000. 
But  Scutari  resisted  every  assault  and  inflicted  heavy 
losses  upon  its  assailants.  On  24th  March  the  Mon- 
tenegrins so  far  yielded  to  the  representations  of 
the  Powers  as  to  alloAV  the  civil  population  to  leave 
the  town ;  but  as  for  the  possession  of  the  town  and  the 
adjoining  territory,  that  was  a  matter  between  Montenegro 
and  the  Porte,  with  which  the  Powers  had  no  right  to 
interfere. 
Fall  of  The  Powers,  however,  were  not  to  be  denied.     On  4th 

April  an  international  squadron  appeared  ofE  Antivari  and 
proceeded  to  blockade  the  Montenegrin  coast  between 
Antivari  and  the  Drin  River.  Still  Montenegro  maintained 
its  defiance,  and  at  last,  after  severe  fighting,  Scutari  was 
starved  into  surrender  (22nd  April).  The  Turkish  garrison, 
under  Essad  Pasha,  was  allowed  to  march  out  Avith  all  the 
honours  of  war  and  to  take  with  them  their  arms  and  stores, 
and  on  26th  April,  Prince  Danilo,  Crown  Prince  of  Monte- 
negro, entered  the  town  in  triumph.  But  his  triumph  was 
brief.  The  Powers  insisted  that  the  town  should  be  sur- 
rendered to  them  ;  King  Peter  at  last  yielded,  and  Scutari 
was  taken  over  by  an  international  force  landed  from  the 
warships.  The  pressure  thus  put  upon  Montenegro  in  the 
interests  of  an  autonomous  Albania  had  an  ugly  appearance 
at  the  time,  and  subsequent  events  did  not  tend  to  render 
it  less  unattractive. 


THE   BALKAN   LEAGUE   AND   BALKAN   WARS      243 

A  few  days  before  the  fall  of  Scutari  an  armistice  was  Treaty  of 
concluded  between  Turkey  and  the  Balkan  League,  and  3oS?May 
the  next  day  (21st  April)  the  League  agreed  to  accept  1913 
unconditionally  the  mediation  of  the  Powers,  but  reserved 
the  right  to  discuss  with  the  Powers  the  questions  as  to  the 
frontiers  of  Thrace  and  Albania,  and  the  future  of  the 
iEgean  islands.     Negotiations  were  accordingly  reopened 
in  London  on   20th  May,  and  on   the   30th   the   Treaty 
of   London   was  signed.     Everything   beyond  the   Enos- 
Midia  line  and  the   island   of   Crete   was   ceded  by  the  • 
Porte    to    the    Balkan    allies,    while    the    questions    of 
Albania  and  of  the   islands   were  left   in  the   hands  of 
the  Powers. 

The  European  Concert  congratulated  itself  upon  a 
remarkable  achievement :  the  problem  which  for  centuries 
had  confronted  Europe  had  been  solved  ;  the  clouds  which 
had  threatened  the  peace  of  Europe  had  been  dissipated  ; 
the  end  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  long  foreseen  and  long 
dreaded  as  the  certain  prelude  to  Armageddon,  had  come, 
and  come  in  the  best  possible  way  ;  young  nations  of  high 
promise  had  been  brought  to  the  birth  ;  the  older  nations 
were  united,  as  never  before,  in  bonds  of  amity  and  mutual 
goodwill.  Such  was  the  jubilant  tone  of  contemporary 
criticism. 

Yet  in  the  midst  of  jubilation,  notes  of  warning  and  of  The  Victors 
alarm  were  not  wanting.  Nor  were  they,  unfortunately,  g^^j^^® 
without  justification.  Already  ominous  signs  of  profound 
disagreement  between  the  victors  as  to  the  disposal  of  the 
spoils  were  apparent.  As  to  that,  nothing  whatever  had 
been  said  in  the  Treaty  of  London.  \Vhether  the  temper 
which  already  prevailed  at  Sofia,  Belgrade,  and  Athens 
would  have  permitted  interference  is  very  doubtful :  the 
Treaty  of  London  did  not  attempt  it.  In  efiect  the  be- 
lauded treaty  had  done  nothing  but  affix  the  common  seal 
of  Europe  to  a  deed  for  the  winding-up  of  the  afiairs  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire  in  Europe.  How  the  assets  were 
to  be  distributed  among  the  creditors  did  not  concern 
the  official  receivers.  Yet  here  lay  the  real  crux  of  the 
situation. 


244  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

The  problem  was,  in  fact,  intensified  by  the  sudden 
collapse  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  the  miexpected  success 
achieved  by  each  of  the  allies.  The  Balkan  League  might 
have  held  together  if  it  had  been  compelled  to  fight  rather 
harder  for  its  victory.  Greece  and  Serbia,  in,  particular, 
were  intoxicated  by  a  success  far  greater  than  they  could 
have  dared  to  anticipate.  Bulgaria's  success  had  been  not 
less  emphatic ;  but  it  had  been  achieved  at  greater  cost,  and 
in  the  wrong  direction.  The  Bulgarians  were  undisputed 
masters  of  Thrace  ;  but  it  was  not  for  Thrace  they  had  gone 
to  war.  The  Greeks  were  in  Salonika  ;  the  Serbs,  in  Uskub 
and  Monastir.  For  the  victorious  and  war-worn  Bulgarians 
the  situation  was,  therefore,  peculiarly  exasperating. 

Dissensions     Bulgaria's    exasperation   was    Germany's    opportunity. 

AUiS^^^^  To  fan  the  fires  of  Bulgarian  jealousy  against  her  allies 
was  not  difficult,  but  Germany  spared  no  efiort  in  the 
performance  of  this  sinister  task.  The  immediate  sequel 
will  demonstrate  the  measure  of  her  success.  Bulgaria 
and  Greece  had  appointed  a  joint  commission  to  delimit 
their  frontiers  in  Macedonia  on  7th  April ;  it  broke  up 
without  reaching  an  agreement  on  9th  May.  Roumania, 
too,  was  tugging  at  Bulgaria  in  regard  to  a  rectification 
of  the  frontiers  of  the  Dobrudja.  On  7th  May  an  agree- 
ment was  signed  by  which  Bulgaria  assented  to  the  cession 
of  Silistria  and  its  fortifications,  together  with  a  strip  of 
the  Dobrudja.  Notwithstanding  this  agreement  a  military 
convention  was  concluded  between  Serbia,  Greece,  and 
E-oumania,  and  on  28th  May,  Serbia  demanded  that  the 
treaty  of  partition  concluded  between  herself  and  Bulgaria 
in  March,  1912,  should  be  so  amended  as  to  compensate 
her  for  the  loss  of  territory  due  to  the  formation  of  an 
autonomous  Albania.  The  demand  was  not  in  itself 
unreasonable.  It  was  impossible  to  deny  that  the  forma- 
tion of  an  autonomous  Albania  had  profoundly  modified 
the  situation,  and  had  modified  it  to  the  detriment  of 
Serbia  in  a  way  which  had  not  been  foreseen  by  either 
party  to  the  treaty  of  March,  1912.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  demand  was  peculiarly  irritating  to  Bulgaria,  who  found 
herself  bowed  out  of  Macedonia  by  Greece. 


THE   BALKAN   LEAGUE   AND   BALKAN   WARS      245 

The  situation  was  highly  critical  when,  on  8th  June,  the  interven- 
Czar  of  Russia  offered  his  services  as  arbitrator.     Taking  ^^^^^°^  ^^*^ 
advantage  of  the  position  assigned  to  and  accepted  by  him  Nicholas 
in  the  treaty  of  March,  1912,  the  Czar  appealed  to  the 
Kings  of  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  not  to  ''  dim  the  glory  they 
had  earned  in  common  "  by  a  fratricidal  war,  but  to  turn 
to  Russia  for  the  settlement  of  their  differences  ;    and, 
at  the  same  time,  he  solemnly  warned  them  that  "  the 
State  which  begins  war  would  be  held  responsible  before 
the  Slav  cause,"  and  he  reserved  to  himself  "  all  liberty  as 
to  the  attitude  which  Russia  will  adopt  in  regard  to  the 
results  of  such  a  criminal  struggle." 

Serbia  accepted  the  Czar's  offer  ;  but  Bulgaria,  though 
not  actually  declining  it,  made  various  conditions  ;  attri- 
buted all  the  blame  for  the  dispute  to  Serbia,  and  reminded 
the  Czar  that  Russia  had  long  ago  acknowledged  the  right 
of  Bulgaria  to  protect  the  Bulgarians  of  Macedonia. 

Events  were  plainly  hurrying  to  a  catastrophe.  Greece  The  War 
had  made  up  its  mind  to  fight  Bulgaria,  if  necessary,  o^  Partition 
for  Salonika ;  Serbia  demanded  access  to  the  ^gean. 
"  Bulgaria  is  washed  by  two  seas  and  grudges  Serbia  a 
single  port. ' '  So  ran  the  order  of  the  day  issued  at  Belgrade 
on  1st  July.  Meanwhile,  on  2nd  June,  Greece  and  Serbia 
concluded  an  offensive  and  defensive  alUance  against 
Bulgaria  for  ten  years.  Serbia  was  to  be  allowed  to  retain 
Monastir.  The  Greeks  did  not  hke  the  surrender  of  a 
town  which  they  regarded  (as  did  the  Bulgarians)  as  their 
own  in  reversion,  but  Venizelos  persuaded  them  to  the 
sacrifice,  on  the  ground  that  unless  they  made  it  they 
might  lose  Salonika.  Bulgaria,  in  order  to  detach  Greece 
from  Serbia,  offered  her  the  guarantee  of  Salonika,  but 
M.  Venizelos  had  already  given  his  word  to  Serbia,  and 
he  was  not  prepared  to  break  it. 

On  the  night  of  29th  June  the  rupture  occurred.  Acting, 
according  to  M.  Gueshoff,^  on  an  order  from  headquarters, 
the  Bulgarians  attacked  their  Serbian  allies.  M.  Gueshoff 
himself  describes  it  as  a  "  criminal  act,"  but  declares  that 
the  military  authorities  were  solely  responsible  for  it ; 

1  Guesholf  :  op.  cit.  p.  92. 


246  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

that  the  Cabinet  was  ignorant  that  the  order  had 
been  issued,  and  that  as  soon  as  they  learnt  of  it 
they  begged  the  Czar  to  intervene.  We  cannot  yet 
test  the  truth  of  this  statement,  but  M.  Gueshoff  is  a 
man  of  honour,  and  it  is  notorious  that  the  army  was 
in  a  warlike  mood.  But  wherever  the  fault  lay  the 
allies  were  now  at  each  other's  throats  ;  the  War  of 
Partition  had  begun. 

It  lasted  only  a  month  ;  but  the  record  of  that  month  is 
full  both  of  horror  and  of  interest.  The  Serbs  and  Greeks, 
attacking  in  turn  with  great  ferocity,  drove  the  Bulgarians 
before  them.  Serbia  wiped  out  the  stain  of  Slivnitza  ; 
the  Greeks,  who  had  not  had  any  real  chance  for  the  displa)^ 
of  military  qualities  in  the  earlier  war,  more  than  redeemed 
the  honour  tarnished  in  1897.  In  the  course  of  their 
retreat  the  Bulgarians  inflicted  hideous  cruelties  upon  the 
Greek  population  of  Macedonia  ;  the  Greeks,  in  their 
advance,  retaliated  in  kind.  But  the  Bulgarians  had  not 
only  to  face  Serbs  and  Greeks.  On  9th  July  Roumania 
intervened,  seized  Silistria,  and  marched  on  Sofia. 
Bulgaria  could  offer  no  resistance  and  wisely  bowed  to  the 
inevitable.  Three  days  later  (12th  July)  the  Turks  came 
in,  recaptured  Adrianople  (20tli  July),  and  marched 
towards  Tirnova.  Bulgaria  had  the  effrontery  to  appeal 
to  the  Powers  against  the  infraction  of  the  Treaty  of 
London  ;  King  Carol  of  Roumania  urged  his  allies  to  stay 
their  hands  ;  on  31st  July  an  armistice  was  concluded,  and 
on  10th  August  peace  was  signed  at  Bucharest. 
Treaty  of  Bulgaria,  the  aggressor,  was  beaten  to  the  earth  and 
loth^AT^'  c^^l^  ^^^  hoi^e  for  mercy.  By  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest 
1913  she  lost  to  Roumania  a  large  strip  of  the  Dobrudja,  includ- 

ing the  important  fortress  of  Silistria  ;  she  lost  also  the 
greater  part  of  Macedonia  which  she  would  almost  certainly 
have  received  under  the  Czar's  award,  and  had  to  content 
herself  with  a  narrow  strip  giving  access  to  the  iEgean 
at  the  inferior  port  of  Dedeagatch.  Serbia  obtained 
central  Macedonia,  including  Ochrida  and  Monastir, 
Kossovo,  and  the  eastern  half  of  Novi-Bazar  ;  the  western 
half    going    to    Montenegro.       Greece    obtained    Epirus, 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  BALKAN  WARS   247 

southern  Macedonia,  Salonika,  and  the  seaboard  as  far 
east  as  the  Mesta,  thus  including  Kavala. 

But  the  cup  of  Bulgaria's  humiliation  was  not  yet  full.  Bulgaria 
She  had  still  to  settle  with  the  Porte,  and  peace  was  not  ^"^'^"^'^^y 
actually  signed  between  them  until  29th  September.  The 
quarrel  between  the  allies  put  the  Ottoman  Empire  on  its 
feet  again.  The  Turks  were  indeed  restricted  to  the 
Enos-Midia  line,  but  lines  do  not  always  run  straight  even 
in  Thrace,  and  the  new  line  was  so  drawn  as  to  leave  the 
Ottoman  Empire  in  possession  of  Adrianople,  Demotica, 
and  Kirk  Kilisse.  Having  been  compelled  to  surrender 
a  large  part  of  Macedonia  to  her  allies,  Bulgaria  now  lost 
Thrace  as  well.  Even  the  control  of  the  railway  leading 
to  her  poor  acquisition  on  the  iEgean  was  denied  to  her.^ 
The  terms  dictated  by  the  Porte  were  hard,  and  Bulgaria 
made  an  attempt  by  an  appeal  to  the  Powers  to  evade 
pa3m[ient  of  the  bill  she  had  run  up.  The  attempt  though 
natural  was  futile.  The  Powers  did  go  so  far  as  to  present 
a  joint  note  to  the  Porte,  urging  the  fulfilment  of  the 
Treaty  of  London,  but  the  Sultan  was  well  aware  that  the 
Powers  would  never  employ  force  to  compel  Turkey  to 
satisfy  a  defeated  and  discredited  Bulgaria,  and  the  joint 
note  was  ignored. 

For  the  loss  of  Adrianople,  Demotica,  and  Kirk  Kilisse,  Bulgaria 
Bulgaria  blamed  the  Powers  in  general  and  England  f"n1i^"^' 
in  particular.  It  was  believed  at  Sofia  that  England 
was  induced  to  consent  to  a  variation  of  the  Enos-Midia 
line  by  Turkish  promises  in  regard  to  the  Baghdad 
Railway.  There  was  no  ground  for  the  suspicion,  but  it 
was  one  of  several  factors  which  influenced  the  decision  of 
Bulgaria  in  1915. 

We  may  now  briefly  summarise  the  results  of  the  two  ^^^'^^IJ** 
Balkan  Wars.  The  two  wars  were  estimated  to  have  cost,  wars 
in  money,  about  £245,000,000,  and  in  killed  and  wounded, 
348,000.  The  heaviest  loss  in  both  categories  fell  upon 
Bulgaria,  who  sacrificed  140,000  men  and  spent  £90,000,000 ; 
the  Turks,  100,000  men  and  £80,000,000  ;  the  Serbians 
70,000,  and  £50,000,000  ;    while  the  Greeks,  whose  gains 

1  Gibbons  :  op.  cit.  p.  325. 


248  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

were  by  far  the  most  conspicuous,  acquired  them  at  the 
relatively  trifling  cost  of  30,000  men  and  £25,000,000. 

In  territory  and  population  Turkey  was  the  only  loser. 
Before  the  war  her  European  population  was  estimated  to 
be  6,130,200,  and  her  area  65,350  square  miles.  Of  popu- 
lation she  lost  4,239,200,  and  she  was  left  with  only  10,882 
square  miles  of  territory.  Greece  was  the  largest  gainer, 
increasing  her  population  from  2,666,000  to  4,363,000, 
and  her  area  from  25,014  square  miles  to  41,933.  Serbia 
increased  her  population  from  just  under  three  millions 
to  four  and  a  half,  and  nearly  doubled  her  territory, 
increasing  it  from  18,650  square  miles  to  33,891.  Rou- 
mania  added  286,000  to  a  population  which  was  and  is 
the  largest  in  the  Balkans,  now  amounting  to  about 
seven  and  a  half  millions,  and  gained  2,687  square  miles  of 
territory,  entirely,  of  course,  at  the  expense  of  Bulgaria. 
The  net  gains  of  Bulgaria  were  only  125,490  in  population 
and  9,663  square  miles  ;  while  Montenegro  raised  her 
population  from  250,000  to  480,000,  and  her  area  from 
3,474  to  5,603  square  miles. ^ 
Greece  The  significance  of  the  changes  effected  in  the  map 
of  "  Turkey  in  Europe  "  cannot,  however,  be  measured 
solely  by  statistics. 

The  settlement  effected  in  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  was 
neither  satisfactory  nor  complete.  Of  the  recent  belligerents 
Greece  had  most  cause  for  satisfaction.  To  the  north-east 
her  territorial  gains  were  not  only  enormous  in  extent, 
but  of  the  highest  commercial  and  strategic  importance. 
The  acquisition  of  Salonika  was  in  itself  a  veritable  triumph 
for  the  Greek  cause,  and  Greece  would  have  been  well 
advised  to  be  content  with  it.  The  insistence  upon 
Kavala,  whatever  her  ethnographic  claims  may  have  been, 
is  now  recognised  as  a  political  blunder.  To  have  con- 
ceded Kavala  to  Bulgaria  would  have  gone  some  way 
towards  satisfying  the  legitimate  claims  of  the  latter  in 
Macedonia,  without  in  any  way  imperilling  the  position  of 
Greece.  If  Greece  had  followed  the  sage  advice  of  Venizelos 
the  concession  would  have  been  made.     To  her  undoing 

*  Robertson  and  Bartholomew  :  Historical  Atlas,  p.  24. 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  BALKAN  WARS   249 

she  preferred  to  support  the  hot-headed  demands  of  the 
soldiers  and  the  King.  On  the  north-west  Greece  acquired 
the  greater  part  of  Epirus,  including  the  great  fortress  of 
Janina,  but  she  was  still  unsatisfied.  For  many  months 
she  continued  to  urge  her  claims  to  portions  of  southern 
Albania,  assigned  by  the  Powers  to  the  new  autonomous 
State.  But  to  press  them  would  have  brought  Greece 
into  conflict  with  Italy.  "  Italy,"  said  the  Marquis  di 
San  Giuliano,  "  will  even  go  to  the  length  of  war  to  prevent 
Greece  occupying  Valona  ;  on  this  point  her  decision  is 
irrevocable  "  ^  On  that  side  Greece,  therefore,  remained 
unsatisfied.  There  remained  the  question  of  the  islands. 
Of  these,  incomparably  the  most  important  was  Crete. 
Crete  was  definitely  assigned  to  Greece,  and  on  14th 
December,  1913,  it  was  formally  taken  over  by  King 
Constantine,  accompanied  by  the  Crown  Prince  and  the 
Prime  Minister,  M.  Venizelos.  Thus  was  one  long  chapter 
closed.  The  question  as  to  the  rest  of  the  islands  was 
reserved  to  the  Powers,  who  ultimately  awarded  to  Greece 
all  the  islands  of  which  the  Porte  could  dispose,  except 
Imbros  and  Tenedos,  which  were  regarded  as  essential 
for  the  safeguarding  of  the  entrance  to  the  Dardanelles, 
and  were,  therefore,  left  to  Turkey.  The  Sporades, 
including  Rhodes,  remained  in  the  occupation  of  Italy. 
Greece,  therefore,  had  reason  for  profound  satisfaction. 
Not  that  even  for  her  the  settlement  was  complete.  Some 
300,000  Greeks  still  remained  under  Bulgarian  rule  in 
Thrace  and  eastern  Macedonia,  while  in  the  Ottoman 
Empire — mainly,  of  course,  in  Asia — Greece  still  claimed 
some  3,000,000  "  unredeemed "  co-nationals.  But  no 
settlement  could  achieve  ethnographic  completeness,  least 
of  all  one  which  was  concerned  with  the  Balkans,  and 
Greece  had  little  cause  to  quarrel  with  that  of  1913. 

Nor  had  Roumania.     In  proportion  to  her  sacrifices  her  Roumania 
gains  were  considerable,  but  for  the  satisfaction  of  her 
larger  claims  the  Balkan  Wars  afforded  no  opportunity. 
The    "  unredeemed "    Roumanians    were    the    subjects 
either  of  Austria-Hungary  or  of  Russia.     Transylvania, 

*  Kerofilas  :   Venizelos,  p.  155. 


250  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

the  Bukovina,  and  Bessarabia  were  the  provinces  to  which 
Roumania  laid  claim. 
Bulgaria  Bulgaria's  position  in  1913  was  less  favourable  ;  but  her 
misfortunes  were  largely  of  her  own  making,  not  the  less 
so  if  her  shrewd  German  king  was  pushed  on  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  his  country  by  subtle  suggestions  from  Vienna  and 
Berlin.  When  the  Treaty  of  London  was  signed  in  May, 
fate  seemed  to  hold  for  Bulgaria  the  promise  of  a  brilliant 
future.  Despite  the  secular  hostility  of  the  Greeks  and 
the  rivalry  of  the  Latins,  Bulgaria  was  then  first  favourite 
for  the  hegemony  of  the  Balkans.  The  Bulgarians  lacked 
some  of  the  cultural  qualifications  of  their  neighbours  ; 
they  were  the  latest  comers  into  Balkan  society,  but  they 
had  given  proof  of  a  virile  and  progressive  temper,  and 
were  advancing  rapidly  in  the  arts  both  of  peace  and  war. 
Then  suddenly,  owing,  if  not  solely  to  their  own  intemperate 
folly,  then  to  their  inabihty  to  resist  subtle  temptation  or 
to  restrain  the  impatience  of  their  co-nationals,  they  flung 
away  in  a  short  month  the  great  position  secured  to  them 
by  the  patient  labours  of  a  generation.  Had  they  but 
been  able  to  resist  provocation  and  to  await  the  award  of 
the  Russian  Czar,  the  greater  part  of  central  as  well  as 
eastern  Macedonia  must  have  fallen  to  them.  As  it  was, 
they  got  an  area  relatively  circumscribed,  with  a  wretched 
coast-line  bounded  by  the  Mesta,  and  in  Dedeagatch  a 
miserable  apology  for  an  Mgesm  port ;  above  all,  they  lost 
the  coveted  districts  of  Ochrida  and  Monastir.  The  im- 
partial judgment  of  history  will  probably  incline  to  the 
view  that  in  defining  so  narrowly  the  share  of  Bulgaria, 
Greece  and  Serbia  alike  showed  shortsightedness  and 
parsimony.  Even  on  the  admission  of  Philhellenists 
Greece  blundered  badly  in  pressing  her  claims  against 
Bulgaria  so  far.  The  latter  ought  at  least  to  have  been 
allowed  a  wider  outlet  on  the  iEgean  littoral,  with  Kavala 
as  a  port.  Nothing  less  could  reconcile  Bulgaria  to  the 
retention  of  Salonika  by  Greece. 
Serbia  Serbia,  too,  showed  herself  lacking  in  prudent  generosity. 
But  while  Greece  was  without  excuse  Serbia  was  not. 
What  was  the  Serbian  case  ?     It  may  be  stated  in  the 


THE   BALKAN   LEAGUE   AND   BALKAN   WARS      251 

words  of  the  general  order  issued  by  King  Peter  to  his 
troops  on  the  eve  of  the  second  war  (1st  July,  1913). 
"  The  Bulgarians,  our  allies  of  yesterday,  with  whom  we 
fought  side  by  side,  whom  as  true  brothers  we  helped  with 
all  our  heart,  watering  their  Adrianople  with  our  blood, 
will  not  let  us  take  the  Macedonian  districts  that  we  won 
at  the  price  of  such  sacrifices.  Bulgaria  doubled  her 
territory  in  our  common  warfare,  and  will  not  let  Serbia 
have  land  not  half  the  size,  neither  the  birthplace  of  our 
hero  King  Marco,  nor  Monastir,  where  you  covered 
yourself  with  glory  and  pursued  the  last  Turkish 
troops  sent  against  you.  Bulgaria  is  washed  by  two 
seas,  and  grudges  Serbia  a  single  port.  Serbia  and  her 
makers — the  Serbian  Army — cannot  and  must  not  permit 
this."  1 

The  gains  of  Serbia  were,  as  we  have  seen,  very  con- 
siderable. The  division  of  Novi-Bazar  between  herself 
and  Montenegro  brought  her  into  immediate  contact  with 
the  Southern  Slavs  of  the  Black  Mountain,  while  the 
acquisition  of  Old  Serbia  and  central  Macedonia  carried 
her  territory  southwards  towards  the  iEgean.  But 
Serbia's  crucial  problem  was  not  solved.  She  was  still  a 
land-locked  country  ;  deprived  by  the  subtle  diplomacy 
of  the  German  Powers  of  her  natural  access  to  the  JCgean, 
and  pushed  by  them  into  immediate  conflict  with  the 
Bulgarians,  perhaps  into  ultimate  conflict  with  Greece. 
Disappointed  of  her  dearest  ambition,  flushed  with  victory, 
duped  by  interested  advice,  Serbia  can  hardly  be  blamed 
iov  having  inflicted  humiliation  upon  Bulgaria,  and  for 
having  yielded  to  the  temptation  of  unexpected  territorial 
acquisitions. 

Montenegro  shared  both  the  success  and  the  disappoint-  Montenegro 
ment  of  her  kinsmen,  now  for  the  first  time  her  neighbours. 
To  Scutari  Montenegro  could  advance  no  claims  consistent 
with  the  principles  either  of  nationality  or  of  ecclesiastical 
affinity.  But  King  Nicholas's  disappointment  at  being 
deprived  of  it  was  acute,  and  was  hardly  compensated  by 
the  acquisition  of  the  western  half  of  Novi-Bazar.     His 

1  Gueshoff  :  op.  cit.  p.  102. 


252  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

position  as  regards  seaboard  was  less  desperate  than  that 
of  Serbia,  but  he  too  had  an  account  to  settle  with  the 
European  Concert. 
The  To  have  kept  the  harmony  of  that  Concert  unbroken 

lowers  ^^g  ^  ygj.y  remarkable  achievement,  and  the  credit  of 
Albania  it  belongs  primarily  to  the  English  Foreign  Secretary. 
Whether  the  harmony  was  worth  the  trouble  needed  to 
preserve  it  is  an  open  question.  There  are  those  who 
would  have  preferred  to  see  it  broken,  if  necessary,  at  the 
moment  when  the  German  Powers  vetoed  the  access  of  the 
Serbs  to  the  Adriatic.  It  must  not,  however,  be  forgotten 
that  this  masterpiece  of  German  diplomacy  could  hardly 
have  been  achieved  had  it  not  appeared  to  coincide  with 
the  dominant  dogma  of  English  policy  in  the  Near  East, 
the  principle  of  nationality.  Macedonian  autonomy  had 
so  long  been  the  watchword  of  a  group  of  English  politicians 
and  publicists  that  little  pains  were  needed  to  excite  them 
to  enthusiasm  on  behalf  of  an  autonomous  Albania; 
Albania  If  Macedonia  was  a  hard  nut  to  crack,  Albania  was,  in 

a  sense,  even  harder.  That  the  idea  of  autonomy  was 
seductive  is  undeniable.  Such  a  solution  offered  obvious 
advantages.  It  might  stifle  the  incipient  pretensions  of 
Italy  and  Austria-Hungary  ;  it  might  arrest  the  incon- 
venient claims  of  Greece  upon  "  northern  Epirus  "  ;  it 
might  interpose  a  powerful  barrier  between  the  Southern 
Slavs  and  the  Adriatic  ;  it  might,  above  aU,  repair  the 
havoc  which  the  formation  of  the  Balkan  alliance  had 
wrought  in  German  plans  in  regard  to  the  Near  East. 
Nor  was  it  the  least  of  its  advantages  that  it  could  be 
commended,  without  excessive  explanation  of  details,  by 
democratic  Ministers  to  the  progressive  democracies  of 
Western  Europe. 

Of  the  conditions  which  really  prevailed  in  Albania  little 
was  or  is  accurately  known.  But  the  decree  issued  that 
it  should  be  autonomous,  and  on  23rd  November  a  Ger- 
man prince,  a  Russian  soldier,  a  nephew  of  the  Queen  of 
Roumania,  Prince  William  of  Wied,  was  selected  for  the 
difficult  task  of  ruling  over  the  wild  highlanders  of  Albania. 
On  7th  March,  1914,  he  arrived  at  Durazzo,  where  he  was 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  BALKAN  WARS   253 

welcomed  by  Essad  Pasha,  the  defender  of  Scutari,  and 
himself  an  aspirant  to  the  crown.  Prince  William  of  Wied 
never  had  a  chance  of  making  good  in  his  new  principality. 
The  ambitious  disloyalty  of  Essad  Pasha  ;  the  turbulence 
of  the  Albanian  tribesmen,  among  whom  there  was  entire 
lack  of  coherence  or  of  unity  ;  the  intrigues  of  more  than 
one  interested  Power,  rendered  his  position  from  the  j&rst 
impossible.  The  Prince  and  his  family  were  compelled 
to  take  refuge  temporarily  on  an  Italian  warship  on  24th 
May,  and  in  September  they  left  the  country.  The  govern- 
ment then  fell  into  the  hands  of  a  son  of  the  ex-Sultan  Abdul 
Hamid,  Bushan  Eddin  ESendi,  who  appointed  Essad 
Pasha  grand  vizier  and  commander-in-chief.  When  the 
European  War  broke  out  no  central  authority  existed  in 
Albania.  The  authority  of  Essad  Pasha  was  recognised 
at  Durazzo ;  the  Greeks  took  possession  of  southern 
Albania  or  northern  Epirus ;  the  Italians  promptly 
occupied  Valona.  For  the  rest,  there  were  as  many  rulers 
in  Albania  as  there  are  tribes. 

Besides  Albania  two  other  questions  were  left  out-  Armenia 
standing  after  the  Peace  of  Bucharest.  The  settlement 
of  the  iEgean  Islands  has  already  been  described.  That 
of  Armenia  demands  a  few  words.  If  "  autonomy  "  be 
a  word  to  conjure  with  in  regard  to  Albania,  why  not 
also  in  regard  to  Armenia  ?  But  the  former  has  at  least 
one  advantage  over  the  latter.  Albania  exists  as  a  geo- 
graphical entity ;  Armenia  does  not.  Nor  is  there,  as 
Mr.  Hogarth  has  pointed  out,  any  "  geographical  unit 
of  the  Ottoman  area  in  which  Armenians  are  the  majority. 
If  they  cluster  more  thickly  in  the  vilayets  of  Angora, 
Sivas,  Erzeroum,  Kharput,  and  Van,  i.e.,  in  easternmost 
Asia  Minor,  than  elsewhere,  .  .  .  they  are  consistently 
a  minority  in  any  large  administrative  district."  ^  Where, 
then,  as  he  pertinently  asks,  is  it  possible  to  constitute 
an  autonomous  Armenia  ?  The  question  has  never  been 
answered  quite  satisfactorily.  In  February,  1914,  the 
Porte  agreed  to  admit  to  the  Ottoman  Parliament  seventy 
Armenian  deputies,  who  should  be  nominated  by  the 
1  The  Balkans,  p.  384. 


254  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Armenian  Patriarcli,  and  to  carry  out  various  administra- 
tive and  judicial  reforms  in  the  Anatolian  vilayets  in- 
habited largely  by  Armenians.  But  the  outbreak  of  the 
European  War  afforded  the  Ottoman  Government  a  chance 
of  solving  a  secular  problem  by  other  and  more  congenial 
methods.  Massacres  of  Armenian  Christians  have  been 
frequent  in  the  past ;  but  the  Turks  have  been  obhged 
to  stay  their  hands  by  the  intervention  of  the  Powers. 
That  interference  was  no  longer  to  be  feared.  An  un- 
precedented opportunity  presented  itself  to  the  Turks. 
Of  that  opportunity  they  are  beheved  to  have  made  full 
use.  A  policy  of  extermination  was  deHberately  adopted, 
and  has  been  consistently  pursued.  It  is  at  least  simpler 
than  autonomy. 
Mittei-  For  the  conclusion  of  peace  at  Bucharest  one  Power  in 

europaand  Europe  took  special  credit  to  itself.  No  sooner  was  it 
^iAifnchl  signed  than  the  Emperor  WiUiam^  telegraphed  to  his 
real  cousiu,  King  Carol  of  Kouniania,  his  hearty  congratula- 

tions upon  the  successful  issue  of  his  "  wise  and  truly 
statesmanlike  pohcy."  "  I  rejoice,"  he  added,  "  at  our 
mutual  co-operation  in  the  cause  of  peace."  Shortly  after- 
wards King  Constantine  of  Greece  received  at  Potsdam, 
from  the  Emperor's  own  hands,  the  baton  of  a  Field- 
Marshal  in  the  Prussian  Army. 

If  the  Kaiser  had  been  active  in  the  cause  of  peace  his 
august  ally  at  Vienna  had  done  his  utmost  to  enlarge 
the  area  of  war.  On  9th  August,  1913,  the  day  before 
the  signature  of  peace  at  Bucharest,  Austria-Hungary 
communicated  to  Italy  and  to  Germany  "  her  intention 
of  taking  action  against  Serbia,  and  defined  such  action 
as  defensive,  hoping  to  bring  into  operation  the  casus 
foederis  of  the  Triple  Alhance."  ^  Italy  refused  to  recognise 
the  proposed  aggression  of  Austria -Hungary  against 
Serbia  as  a  casus  foederis.  Germany  also  exercised  a 
restraining  influence  upon  her  ally,  and  the  attack  was 
consequently  postponed  ;    but   only  for   eleven   months. 

1  Telegram  from  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  to  Signor  Giolitti  : 
quoted  by  the  latter  in  the  Italian  Chamber,  5th  December,  1914 
{Collected  Diplomatic  Docunieuls,  p.  401). 


THE  BALKAN  LEAGUE  AND  BALKAN  WARS   255 

Germany  was  not  quite  ready :  on  22nd  November, 
however,  M.  Jules  Cambon,  tbe  French  Ambassador  at 
Berhn,  reported  that  the  German  Emperor  had  ceased 
to  be  "  the  champion  of  peace  against  the  warUke 
tendencies  of  certain  parties  in  Germany,  and  had  come 
to  think  that  war  with  France  was  inevitable."  ^ 

France,  therefore,  would  have  to  be  fought :  but  the 
eyes  of  the  German  Powers,  and  more  particularly  of 
Austria -Hungary,  were  fixed  not  upon  the  west  but  upon 
the  south-east. 

Serbia  had  committed  two  unpardonable  crimes  :    she  Attack 
had  strengthened  the  barrier  between  Austria-Hungary  g^^bia 
and  Salonika  ;    and  she  had  enormously  enhanced  her 
own  prestige  as  the  representative  of  Jugo-Slav  aspira- 
tions.    Serbia,  therefore,  must  be  annihilated. 

But  Serbia  did  not  stand  alone.  By  her  side  were 
Greece  and  Roumania.  The  association  of  these  three 
Balkan  States  appeared  to  be  peculiarly  menacing  to  the 
Habsburg  Empire.  Greece,  firmly  planted  in  Salonika, 
was  a  fatal  obstacle  to  the  hopes  so  long  cherished  by 
Austria.  The  prestige  acquired  by  Serbia  undoubtedly 
tended  to  create  unrest  among  the  Slavonic  peoples  still 
subject  to  the  Dual  Monarchy.  And  if  Jugo-Slav 
enthusiasm  threatened  the  integrity  of  the  Dual  Monarchy 
upon  one  side,  the  ambitions  of  a  Greater  Roumania 
threatened  it  upon  another.  The  visit  of  the  Czar  Nicholas 
to  Constanza  in  the  spring  of  1914  was  interpreted  in 
Vienna  as  a  recognition  of  this  fact,  and  as  an  indication 
of  a  rafproohement  between  St.  Petersburg  and  Bucharest. 

If,  therefore,  the  menace  presented  to  "  Central  Europe  "  The 
by  the  first  Balkan  League  had  been  effectually  dissipated,  po™eiT 
the  menace  of  a  second  Balkan  League  remained.     One  and  the 
crumb  of  consolation  the  second  war  had,  indeed,  brought  ^mp^^e" 
to  the  German  Powers  :    the  vitahty  and  power  of  re- 
cuperation manifested  by  the  Ottoman  Turk.     So  long 
as  the  Turks  remained  in  Constantinople  there  was  no 
reason  for  despair.     The  key  to  German  pohcy  was  still  to 
be  found  upon  the  shores  of  the  Bosphorus. 
1  Collected  Diploinatic  Documents,  p.  142. 


256  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Constantinople  and  Salonika  were  the  dual  objectives 
of  Austro-German  ambition.  Across  the  path  to  both  lay 
Belgrade.  At  allf hazards  the  Power  which  commanded 
Belgrade  must  be'  crushed.  In  order  to  annihilate  the 
Serbs — to  displace' the  "  guardians  of  the  Gate  "^ — Europe 
was  to  be  involved  in  the  greatest  war  in  history. 

AUTHORITIES 

Bakclay  :  The  Turco-Ilalian  War  and  its  Problems. 

TiTTONi :  Italy's  Foreign  and  Colonial  Policy. 

J.  G.  Schurman:  The  Balkan  Wars.     (Oxford,  1915.) 

G.  Hanotaux  :  La  Guerre  des  Balkans  et  U Europe.     (Paris,  1914.) 

I.  E.  GuESHOFF  :    The  Balkan  League  (Eng.   trans.    1915 ;    contains 

important  documents). 
E.  Vbnizelos (and others) :  Cinq ansd'histoireGrecque,  1912-17.  (1917.) 
"  A  Diplomatist " :  Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near  East.     (Oxford, 

1915.) 
H.  A.  Gibbons  :  New  Map  of  Europe.     (London,  1915.) 
SoNGLON  :  Histoire  de  la  Bulgare,  486-1913.     (Paris,  1914.) 
Balcaericus  :  La  Bulgaria  {with  documents).     (Paris,  1915.) 
H.  Barby  :  Les  Victoires  Serbes.     (Paris,  1915.) 

Jean  Pelissier  :  Dix  Mois  de  Guerre  dans  les  Balkans.     (Paris,  1915. ) 
C.  Kerofilas  :  Elevtherios  Venizelos  {Eng.  tvsins.).     (London,  1915.) 
TAe  Annual  Register,  The  Edinburgh  Review,  the  Fortnightly,  The  Round 

Table,  and  other  reviews  and  innumerable  pamphlets,  among  the 

best  of  which  are  those  issued  bv  the  Oxford  Press. 


m 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  WORLD-WAR  (1914-18) 

Its  Antecedents  and  an  Outline  of  its  Course 

La  guerre  est  I'industrie  nationale  de  la  Prusse. — Mirabeatj. 

Just  as  the  greatness  of  Germany  is  to  be  found  in  the  governance  of 
Germany  by  Prussia,  so  the  greatness  and  good  of  the  world  is  to  be  found 
in  the  predominance  there  of  German  culture,  of  the  German  mind — 
in  a  word,  of  the  German  character. — Treitschke. 

All  wliich  other  nations  attained  in  centuries  of  natural  development — 
political  union,  colonial  possessions,  naval  power,  international  trade — 
was  denied  to  our  nation  imtil  quite  recently.  What  we  now  wish 
to  attain  must  be  fought  for,  and  won,  against  a  superior  force  of  hostile 
interests  and  Powers. — Bern^hardi. 

After  bloody  victories  the  world  will  be  healed  by  being  Germanised. — 
Professor  Lamprecht. 

§  1.  causes  and  antecedents  of  the  war 

THE  events  of  the  last  six  years  (1914-20)  are  too 
recent,  the  memories  they  evoke  are  too  poignant, 
to  permit  the  writing  of  impartial  history.  One  of 
the  most  briUiant  of  Enghsh  diplomatists  uttered  many 
years  ago  a  warning  which  we  shall  ignore  at  our  peril. 
"Do  not  allow  yourself  to  have  your  judgment  of  the 
W elthistorische  warped  by  the  accidental,  however  all- 
absorbing  and  terrible  that  accidental  may  be."  It  is 
easier  to  recaU  Sir  Robert  Morier's  caution  than  to  observe 
it.  The  safest  plan  is  to  set  down  a  plain  tale  and  let 
the  facts  speak  for  themselves.  Yet  those  who  have 
read  the  preceding  chapters  might  fairly  complain  if  no 
attempt  was  made  to  draw  the  moral  which  their  contents 
seem  to  suggest,  and  to  analyse  the  immediate  antecedents 


258  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

of  the  catastroplie  in  whicli  tlie  events  of  the  last  haK- 

century  have  culminated. 

The  Ante-      What  Aristotle  said  of  Revolution  is  true  also  of  War. 

cf^ents       "  It  is  not  the  causes  of  revolution  which  are  unimportant, 

World- War  but  Only  the  occasions."     The  "  occasion  "  of  the  Great 

War  is  doubtless  to  be  found  in  the  assassination  on  28th 

June   at   Serajevo    of   the   Archduke   Franz    Ferdinand, 

the  heir  to  the  Austrian  Empire  and  the  Kingdom  of 

Hungary.    What  were  the  causes  of  the  war  ? 

General  The  general  causes  are  writ  large  over  all  the  preceding 

Causes  of    pages  of  this  book.     If,  as  Bismarck  affirmed,  the  war 

the  War      ^^  ^g^^  ^^^  France  lay  in  "the  logic  of  history"  after 

the  war  of  1866  with  Austria,  if  Sedan  was  implicit  in 

Sadowa,  so  the  war  of  1914  followed  logically  from  that 

of   1870-71.     Not  solely  nor  mainly  by  reason  of  the 

disputed  borderlands  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine.     The  wound 

caused  by  the  dismemberment  of  France  had  never  indeed 

healed.     But   whether   France   would   ever  have   drawn 

the  sword  solely  for  the  recovery  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine, 

had   other   circumstances   made  for   peace,   is   doubtful. 

Had   Germany  not   shown   a   disposition   to   meddle   in 

Morocco,  Frenchmen  might  perhaps  have  found  at  least 

material  compensation  for  the   loss   of  those   provinces 

in  the  growth  of  a  North  African  Empire.     If  the  war 

of  1914-18  lay  in  the  womb  of  1870-71,  it  was  rather 

that  the  Franco-German  War  led  Germany  to  drink  too 

deeply  of  the  Prussian  spirit ;   that  it  justified  those  who 

taught  that  "  he  who  succeeds  is  never  in  the  wrong  " ; 

that  it  identified  morahty  with  victory. 

The  "  War,"  said  Mirabeau,   "  is  the  national  industry  of 

Spirit'^'^      Prussia."     That   is   the   literal   fact.     Prussia   has   been 

created  out  of  the  most  unpromising  materials  by  the 

genius  of  its  Hohenzollern  princes  and  by  their  persistence 

in  a  policy  of  war.     Modern  Prussia,  as  Lord  Salisbury 

pointed  out,  is  the  result  of  the  spoUation  of  its  neighbours. 

Poles,  Danes,  Germans,  Frenchmen  have  contributed  to 

its  territorial  growth,  and  to  its  strategic  solidarity.     But 

war  is  more  than  the  national  industry  of  Prussia  ;   it  is 

the  characteristic  ethos  in  which  the  genius  of  Prussia 


THE   WORLD-WAR   (1914-18)  259 

expresses  itself  ;  and  with,  this  ethos,  Prussia  has  since 
1870  impregnated  Germany.  Unified  not  by  parlia- 
mentary votes  and  parchments  but  by  blood  and  iron, 
Germany  has  yielded  herself  and  all  for  which  in  the 
period  of  Klemstaaterei  her  States  formerly  stood  to  the 
Moloch  set  up  by  Prussia.  The  State,  so  Treitschke 
taught,  is  Power.  "  To  care  for  its  power,"  he  wrote,  "  is 
the  highest  moral  duty  of  the  State.  Of  all  political 
weaknesses  that  of  feebleness  is  the  most  abominable  and 
despicable  ;  it  is  the  sin  against  the  Holy  Spirit  of  Politics." 
Nietzsche  taught  a  similar  doctrine  with  not  less  unflinch- 
ing logic.  "  Ye  say,  a  good  cause  will  hallow  even  war  ? 
I  say  unto  you  :  a  good  war  hallows  every  cause.  War 
and  courage  have  accomplished  greater  things  than  love 
of  your  neighbour."  Such  was  the  political  philosophy 
with  which  the  younger  generation  in  Germany  has  been 
indoctrinated  ;  and  History  set  herself  to  illustrate  the 
teachings  of  Philosophy.  A  long  succession  of  eminent 
historians, — ^the  so-called  Prussian  school, — Dahlmann, 
Haiisser,  Droysen,  Sybel,  above  all  Treitschke,  devoted 
unsurpassable  industry  and  learning  to  the  task  of  justify- 
ing to  Germans  the  ways  of  Prussia  and  the  HohenzoUern. 
Treitschke's  History  of  Gennany  in  the  Nineteenth  Century 
is  as  much  a  national  epic  as  was  Virgil's  Mneid.  Thus 
were  Philosophy  and  History  alike  prostituted  to  the  service 
of  Politics.  Science,  in  another  way,  was  pressed  into  the 
same  service  and  the  whole  educational  curriculum  was  based 
upon  a  syllabus  designed  to  suggest  a  similar  conclusion. 

Such  topics  may  seem  to  be  remote  from  the  World- 
War.  In  fact  they  are  strictly  relevant :  for  it  was  with 
an  "  armed  doctrine,"  as  Burke  phrased  it,  that  from 
1914-18  we  and  our  Allies  were  at  war.  Hence  the  im- 
perative necessity  for  a  conclusive  issue  ;  in  a  struggle 
for  territory  compromise  is  possible ;  in  a  conflict  between 
opposing  and  mutually  exclusive  principles  it  is  not.  It 
was  essential  to  the  future  peace  of  Europe  and  the  world 
that  a  nation  which,  had  learnt  to  worship  false  gods 
should  be  taught  to  know  them  for  what  they  were. 

The  root  cause  of  the  war  must  be  found  then  in  the 


260  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

permeation  of  Germany  by  the  Prussian  spirit,  and  her 

resolution  to  make  that  spirit  prevail  in  world-politics. 

Material         More    material     causes    were    not,    however,    lacking. 

Causes        Among  a  large  number  three  stood  out  prominent :    the 

race   for    armaments ;     the    grouping    of    the    European 

Powers  in  two  armed  and  opposing  camps  ;   and  the  rapid 

decay  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  Europe  and  its  satellites 

in  Africa.     Of  these  enough  has  been  said  in  preceding 

chapters.     It   only  remains  therefore  to  summarise  the 

immediate  antecedents  of  the  war. 

Immediate      At  the  end  of  June,  1914,  a  bolt  fell  from  a  sky  which. 

Causes        jf  j^^q^  cloudlcss,  was  clearer  than  it  had  been  of  late.     The 

news  circulated  throughout  Europe  that  the  heir  to  the 

Habsburg  Empire  had,  with  his  consort,  been  assassinated 

at  Serajevo.     What  was  the  motive  which  had  inspired 

The  Crime  "^his  dastardly  crime  ?     Could  we  answer  that   question 

of  Serajevo,  with  certainty  much  light  would  probably  be  thrown  on 

1914  the  origin  of  the  Great  War.     The  crime  was  committed 

in  the  Bosnian  capital.     The  assassins,  though  not  Serbian 

subjects,   were   Serbs,   and    the   attempt,   therefore,   was 

made    quite    naturally    to    fix   the    responsibility    upon 

Serbia.     Serbia   had   reasons   enough,    as   the   preceding 

pages  have  shown,  for  desiring  revenge  upon  the  Habs- 

burgs.     But   why  upon  this   particular   member   of  the 

house — a  man  who  was  notoriously  pro-Serb  in  sympathy  ? 

In  the  absence  of  positive  evidence  the  mystery  deepens — 

unless  one  hypothesis  be  adopted — ^the  more  it  is  considered. 

But  we  must  retrace  our  steps. 

The  On   12th   June,    1914,   the   German   Emperor,    accom- 

Em"iror     Ponied  by  Grand  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  visited  the  Arch- 

andthe       duke  Franz  Ferdinand  and  his  consort,  the  Duchess  of 

A^^hd^     Hohenberg,  at  their  castle  of  Konopisht  in  Bohemia.    What 

passed  between  the  august  visitor  and  his  host  must  be 

matter  for  conjecture.     Mr.  Wickham  Steed  has,  however, 

given  currency  to  a  story- — and  few  men  are  in  a  better 

position  to  unravel  the  mystery  which  surround  these 

events — ^that  the   object    of    the   Kaiser's   visft   was    to 

arrange  an  inheritance  for  the  two  sons  of  the  Duchess  of 

Hohenberg,  and  at  the  same  time  to  pave  the  way  for  the 


THE   WORLD-WAR   (1914-18)  261 

eventual  absorption  of  the  German  lands  of  the  house  of 
Habsburg  into  the  German  Empire.^ 

The  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  was  heir  to  the  Dual 
Monarchy,  but  his  marriage  was  morganatic,  and  his 
children  were  portionless.  Both  he  and  his  wife  were  the 
objects  of  incessant  intrigue  alike  at  Vienna  and  at  Buda- 
pest, where  the  Archduke  was  profoundly  mistrusted  by 
the  dominant  German-Magyar  oligarchy.  Ever  since  the 
Ausgleich  of  1867  the  Germans  and  Magyar  minority  in  the 
Habsburg  Empire  had,  as  we  have  seen,  united  against 
the  Slav  majority.  The  Archduke  was  popularly  credited 
with  the  intention  of  overthrowing  this  autocratic 
duaHsm  and  of  substituting  for  it  some  form  of 
federahsm  which  should  give  to  the  Slavs  and  other 
subject  races  of  the  Empire  a  real  voice  in  the  deter- 
mination of  its  policy.  To  the  autocrats  of  Vienna,  still 
more  to  those  of  Budapest,  above  all  to  Count  Tisza, 
the  masterful  and  unscrupulous  Premier  of  Hungary, 
such  a  policy  was  anathema.  The  man  who  could  enter- 
tain it,  the  man  who  during  the  Balkan  Wars  had 
manifested  his  sympathy  with  the  Serbs,  was  an  actual 
danger  to  the  Dual  Monarchy. 

On  28th  June  that  man  was  removed  by  the  hand  of  an  Assassina- 
assassin  in  the  streets  of  Serajevo.     None  of  the  usual  ^J^j^^^^^'j® 
precautions  for  the  safety  of  royal  visitors  had  been  taken.  Franz 
On  the  contrary,  the  poHce  of  Serajevo  received  orders  that  Ferdinand 
such   precautions   were   unnecessary,    since   the   mihtary 
authorities  were  to  be  responsible  for  all  arrangements. 
As  the  Imperial  visitors  drove  from  the  station  a  bomb 
was  thrown  at  the  carriage  by  the  son  of  an  Austrian  poHce 
official.     On  arriving  at  the  Town  Hall  the  Archduke  is 
said  to  have  exclaimed  :    "  Now  I  know  why  Count  Tisza 
advised  me  to  postpone  my  journey."  ^     Still  no   pre- 
cautions were  taken  to  safeguard  the  Archduke,  though  the 
town  was  known  to  be  full  of  conspirators.     On  their  way 

1  Of.  "The  Pact  of  Konopisht,"  by  H.  Wickham  Steed  :  Nineteenth 
Century  and  After,  Febraary,  1916 ;  but  other  stories  are  current. 

2  Stated  by  Mr.  Steed  on  the  authority  of  the  Times  correspondent  at 
Serajevo. 


262  EUKOPE  AND  BEYOND 

from  the  Town  Hall  to  the  hospital,  the  Archduke  and  his 
wife  were  mortally  wounded  by  three  shots  dehberately 
fired  by  a  second  assassin.  It  is  reported  that  the  Arch- 
duke, in  his  last  moments,  exclaimed  :  "  The  fellow  will 
get  the  Golden  Cross  of  Merit  for  this."  True  or  not,  the 
story  points  to  a  current  suspicion.  No  steps  were  taken 
to  punish  those  who  had  so  grossly  neglected  the  duty  of 
guarding  the  Archduke's  person,  though  the  canaille  of 
Serajevo  were  let  loose  among  the  Serbs,  while  the  Austrian 
police  stood  idly  by.  The  funeral  accorded  to  the  Archduke 
served  to  deepen  the  mystery  attending  his  death.  Prince 
Arthur  of  Connaught  was  appointed  to  represent  King 
George,  but  he  did  not  leave  London.  The  German 
Emperor  announced  his  intention  of  being  present,  but 
when  the  time  came  he  was  indisposed.  The  funeral  of  the 
heir  to  the  Dual  Monarchy  was  "  private."  The  satisfac- 
tion evoked  by  the  tragedy  in  certain  quarters  in  Vienna 
and  Budapest  was  hardly  concealed. 

Formal  responsibihty  was,   of  course,   fixed  upon  the 
Government  at  Belgrade.     The   latter  challenged   proof, 
never  yet  furnished,  of  its  comphcity  or  connivance  in  the 
crime.     It  also  pointed  out  that  it  had  previously  suggested 
the  arrest  of  the  assassins,  but  that  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment had  deprecated  the  precautionary  step.     Neverthe- 
less, Serbia  was  to  be  punished. 
Reopening      Meanwhile  on  23rd  June  the  Kiel  C^anal,  recently  re- 
Canai  ^^^^  Constructed  so  as  to  permit  the  passage  of  the  biggest 
Dreadnoughts,  was  reopened.     On  5th  July,  the  Kaiser's 
War  Council  met  at  Potsdam ;  immediately  afterwards  the 
Kaiser  went  off  on  a  yachting  cruise  to  the  Norwegian 
fiords.     On  the  23rd,  the  Austro -Hungarian  Government 
dispatched  its  ultimatum  to  Belgrade. 
Austrian         It  is  surmised  that  the  dispatch  of  the  ultimatum  was 
Ultimatum  delayed  in  order  to  enable  Germany  to  complete  her  pre- 
23rd  July    parations  for  war.     The  ultimatum  itseK  required  that  a 
humiliating  declaration  dictated  by  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment should  be  pubhshed  to  the  Serbian  Army  as  an  order 
of  the  day  by  the  king.     The  declaration  admitted  that 
the   Serajevo   assassinations   were   planned   in   Belgrade, 


■v^ 


THE   WORLD- WAR  (1914-18)  263 

and  that  tlie  arms  and  explosives  with  wluch  the  murderers 
were  provided  had  been  given  them  by  Serbian  officers. 
The  Serbian  Government  was  further  required  to  under- 
take to  suppress  all  propaganda  calculated  to  excite  the 
contempt  against  the  Habsburg  monarchy  ;  to  dismiss  all 
officers  and  functionaries  deemed  by  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  to  be  guilty  of  such  propaganda  ;  and  to 
permit  the  Austrian  Government  to  collaborate  with  that 
of  Serbia  for  the  suppression  of  the  agitation  for  a  greater 
Serbia.  There  were  various  other  matters  of  similar 
import.  Forty-eight  hours  only  were  permitted  for  a 
reply.  Serbia  did  its  utmost  to  avert  war.  It  accepted 
at  once  eight  out  of  the  ten  principal  points  ;  it  did  not 
actually  reject  the  other  two,  and  it  offered  to  submit  the 
whole  question  at  issue  between  the  two  Governments, 
either  to  the  Hague  tribunal  or  to  the  Great  Powers.  No 
submission  could  have  been  more  complete  or  even  abject. 
But  nothing  could  avail  to  avert  war.  The  Central  Powers 
were  convinced  that  the  hour  had  come  ;  they  were  ready 
for  war,  and  had  resolved  to  make  it. 

From  the  mass  of  diplomatic  correspondence,  two 
almost  casual  telegrams  may  be  unearthed.  On  25th  July 
the  British  Ambassador  at  Eome  telegraphed  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  "  There  is  reliable  information  that  Austria  intends 
to  seize  the  Salonika  Railway."  On  the  29th  a  telegram 
arrived  from  the  British  Embassy  at  Constantinople, 
"  I  understand  that  the  designs  of  Austria  may  extend 
considerably  beyond  the  Sanjak  and  a  punitive  occupation 
of  Serbian  territory."  Plainly  EngUsh  diplomacy  was 
awake  to  the  fact  that  Austria  was  looking  beyond  Serbia 
to  Salonika. 

§  2.    THE   WAR   ON   LAND 

Austria  declared  war  upon  Serbia  on  28th  July,  and  two  Outbreak 
days  later  Belgrade  was  occupied.     Even  so  late  as  the  ^^  ^^^^ 
30th  there  seemed,  however,  a  possibiHty  that  the  area 
of  the  war  might  be  confined  to  the  Balkans  by  means  of 
direct  negotiation  between  Vienna  and  St.   Petersburg. 


Britain 


264  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

That  possibility  was  quickly  ruled  out  by  the  delivery 
(31st  July)  of  a  German  ultimatum  to  Russia.  On  1st 
August,  Germany  declared  war  upon  Russia,  and  on  3rd 
August  upon  France. 

Russia  In  the  meantime   the   British   Government  had   been 

making  every  possible  effort,  in  the  first  place,  to  avert 
war,  and  failing  that,  to  circumscribe  the  conflict.  Russia 
was  willing  to  stand  aside  and  leave  the  question  in  the 
hands  of  England,  France,  Germany,  and  Italy.  That, 
however,  did  not  suit  Germany's  game.  She  was  deter- 
mined either  to  inflict  upon  Russia  through  Serbia  a  diplo- 
matic humiliation,  not  less  pronounced  than  that  of  1909, 
or  to  compel  her  to  fight.  The  Russian  autocracy  could 
not  afford  a  second  humihation,  and  the  alternative  was 
accepted. 

Great  Russiau  intervention  on  behalf   of   Serbia   necessarily 

brought  in  France.  But  what  of  England  ?  On  25th 
July,  St.  Petersburg  urged  that  war  could  be  averted  only 
if  Great  Britain  would  take  her  stand  firmly  with  Russia 
and  France.  Opinion  is  still  divided  as  to  whether  a  firm 
declaration  to  that  effect  would  at  that  late  hour  have 
averted  a  general  war.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  certain 
that  Germany  was  not  prepared  for  the  immediate  inter- 
vention of  England.  Had  she  been  assured  of  it,  it  might 
have  given  her  pause.  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia 
and  the  German  ultimatum  to  Russia  represented,  not  the 
first,  but  the  fourth  attempt  within  a  decade  on  the  part 
of  Germany  to  inflict  humiliation  upon  her  neighbours. 
In  1905,  France  had  been  compelled  at  her  bidding  to 
dismiss  one  of  the  most  brilliant  of  her  foreign  Ministers  ; 
in  1909,  Russia  had  recoiled  before  the  insolent  menace  of 
the  Knight  of  Potsdam  ;  in  1911,  only  the  firm  attitude  of 
England  had  prevented  the  humiliation  of  France  in 
Morocco.  Could  the  Kaiser  have  afforded  in  1914  a  second 
Agadir  ?  If,  as  was  freely  asserted,  the  Kaiser  in  1914 
was  pushed  on  to  war  by  domestic  forces  which  had  got 
beyond  his  own  control,  nothing  that  England  could  have 
done  would  have  averted  war. 


THE   WOULD-WAR   (1914-18)  265 

England's  attitude  was  finally  determined  by  another  violation 
consideration.  On  2nd  August,  Germany  announced  her  5^^^^^^^^.^ 
intention  to  march  through  Belgium,  and  if  her  advance 
were  opposed  to  treat  Belgium  as  an  enemy.  On  the 
following  day  the  King  of  the  Belgians  made  a  supreme 
appeal  to  Great  Britain,  one  of  the  signatories  by  whom  the 
independence  and  neutrality  of  Belgium  were  guaranteed, 
to  save  her  from  outrage  at  the  hands  of  another  co- 
signatory. Apart  from  "  the  scrap  of  paper,"  the  integ- 
rity and  independence  of  the  Low  Countries  have  been 
objects  of  profound  concern  to  England  for  at  least  five 
hundred  years.  Four  times  in  the  course  of  four  centuries 
has  the  equihbrium  of  Europe  and  the  national  inde- 
pendence of  the  several  States  been  menaced  by  the 
domination  of  a  single  Power  :  in  the  sixteenth  century 
by  the  Habsburgs  ;  in  the  late  seventeenth  by  the  French 
Bourbons  ;  a  century  later  by  Napoleon  Buonaparte  ; 
in  the  twentieth  by  the  Hohenzollern.  In  each  great 
crisis  the  European  equilibrium  was  preserved  by  the 
efforts  of  England ;  in  each  England's  intervention  was 
stimulated  by  an  attack  upon  the  Low  Countries  ;  in  each 
her  mihtary  operations  were  mainly  concentrated  upon  the 
Franco-Belgian  frontier. 

On  3rd  August,  England  announced  that  she  would  be  England 
faithful  to  her  phghted  word  and  to  her  traditional  poUcy.  g^'J^any 
An  ultimatum  was  presented  to  Germany  on  ith  August,  at  War, 
and  in  the  absence  of  a  reply  war  between  Great  Britain  '^^^  ^^• 
and  Germany  began  at  midnight  on  4th  August.     On  the 
same  day,   Germany  declared  war  on  Belgium,   and  in 
accordance   with    her    prearranged    plan    commenced   to 
"hack   her  way  through"    to  Paris.     The  British  Fleet 
had  already  (29th  July)  taken  up  its  war  stations  in  the 
North  Sea. 

Germany's  supreme  object  in  the  Great  War  was  to  German 
challenge  the  world   supremacy  of  the   British  Empire,  "'^"^^^ 
and  to  achieve  that  purpose  by  turning  the  flank  of  the 
great  sea  Empire  by  means  of  a  continuous  railway  from  the 
German  Ocean  to  the  Persian  Gulf.     "  The  war,"  wrote  a 
German  publicist  in  1916,  "  comes  from  the  East ;  the  war 


266 


EUEOPE   AND   BEYOND 


The 

German 

Plan 


Belgium's 
Stand 


is  waged  for  the  East ;  the  war  will  be  decided  in  the 
East."  1  This  view  is  not  unchallenged,  but  it  receives 
support  both  from  Russian  and  from  French  authorities. 
"  The  war,"  wrote  Paul  Milyoukov,  "  might  have  begim 
from  various  causes,  and  on  many  pretexts  on  the  part  of 
Germany.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  began  by  reason  of 
the  Eastern  Question  being  reopened."  "  The  Pan-German 
scheme,"  wrote  Andre  Cheradame,  "  constitutes  the  sole 
reason  for  the  war."  Of  that  scheme,  the  pivot  is  to  be 
found  in  the  Near  Eastern  policy  of  Germany,  and  in  her 
determination  to  connect  Berlin  not  only  with  Constanti- 
nople, but  with  Baghdad  and  Basra.  The  key  to  the  whole 
position  was  therefore  in  the  keeping  of  Belgrade.  To 
wrest  the  key  from  Serbia  and  to  secure  her  liie  of  com- 
munications, on  the  one  hand  with  Constantinople,  on 
the  other  with  Salonika,  was  for  Germany  not  merely  the 
pretext  but  the  reason  for  the  war. 

For  the  moment,  however,  the  Balkans  could  be  left  to 
her  ally.  The  German  plan  was  by  a  rapid  thrust  at  Paris 
to  overwhelm  France  before  slow-moving  Russia  could 
render  her  Western  ally  effective  assistance.  France 
once  humbled  in  the  dust,  deprived,  perhaps  of  her  Channel 
ports,  certainly  of  much  of  her  overseas  Empire,  Germany 
could  turn  to  meet  and  to  repel  the  onslaught  of  Russia. 
To  a  straight  fight  between  the  Central  Powers  and  Russia, 
with  France  laid  out  and  England  neutral,  there  could  be 
but  one  issue.  With  Russia  out  of  the  way,  the  Central 
Powers  could  work  their  will  upon  the  Balkans.  England 
might,  by  that  time,  have  awakened  to  the  danger,  but  it 
would  have  been  too  late.  The  whale  could  not  single- 
handed  have  opposed  the  progress  of  the  elephant. 

Germany's  precise  calculation  was  upset  by  the  resolution 
of  England  to  take  her  stand  beside  Belgium,  France, 
Serbia,  and  Russia. 

Paris,  it  was  hoped,  might  be  taken  in  a  month.  That 
could  have  only  been  done,  however,  if  the  way  through 
Belgium  was  rapidly  cleared.  Belgium,  to  her  eternal 
honour,  but  to  the  intense  chagrin  of  the  Germans,  made  an 

^  Ernst  Jackh  :  Deutsche  Politik,  22nd  December,  1916. 


THE   WORLD-WAR   (1914-18)  267 

heroic  resistance.  Liege  barred  the  way  for  nearly  a  week. 
The  city  itself  surrendered  on  7th  August,  but  not  until  the 
15th  was  the  last  of  its  forts  taken.  The  fall  of  Liege 
opened  the  way  to  Brussels,  and  the  Belgian  Government 
was  consequently  compelled  to  withdraw  to  Antwerp 
( 1 7th  August) .  On  the  20th  the  Germans  occupied  Brussels, 
and  on  the  24th  the  great  fortress  of  Namur,  on  which  many 
hopes  depended,  was  after  a  bombardment  of  twenty- four 
hours  surrendered.  The  fall  of  Namur  gravely  disarranged 
the  French  scheme  of  defence  ;  but  Joffre,  who  commanded 
the  French  Army,  was  not  to  be  diverted  from  his  main 
plan.  Instead  of  rushing  to  the  relief  of  Belgium  and  the 
defence  of  north-eastern  France,  he  attacked  the  Germans 
in  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  The  Germans,  meanwhile,  were 
giving  in  Belgium  an  example  of  the  calculated  frightfulness 
which  they  were  afterwards  to  exhibit  on  many  fields. 
Louvain,  Malines,  and  Termonde,  though  imdefended,  were 
ruthlessly  destroyed.     Then  came  the  turn  of  the  French. 

Trusting  confidently  in  the  Navy,  England  did  not  hesi-  England's 
tate  to  denude  herself  of  troops  and  to  throw  all  her  avail-  ^^^^^ 
able  forces  into  the  field.     Lord  Kitchener  was  appointed 
Secretary  of  State  for  War  on  5th  August,  and  two  days 
later  the  embarkation  of  British  troops  began.    In  ten  days 
the  whole  Expeditionary  Force,  consisting  of  one  cavalry 
and  six  infantry  divisions — less  than  110,000  men  in  all — 
had  been  landed  on  French  soil  without  accident  or  hitch 
of  any  kind.     The  disembarkation  was  concluded  on  16th 
August,  and  exactly  a  week  later  (23rd  August)  the  British  The 
troops  found  themselves  in  the  firing-line  at  Mons.     Then  Retreat 
began  the   famous   fortnight's   retreat.     Hopelessly   out-  "°"^    °^ 
numbered,  lacking  transport  and  supplies,  not  yet  estab- 
lished on  French  soil,  out  of  touch  with  their  allies,  the 
British  forces  were  compelled  to  faU  back  in  some  confusion. 
Nevertheless,  their  extrication  from  Mons  reflected  high 
credit  on  the  generals  in  command — Sir  John  French,  Haig, 
Smith-Dorrien,  and  AUenby — and  proved  again  and  to  all 
time  the  heroism  and  endurance  of  the  British  soldier.     Not 
until  5th  September  was  the  retreat  arrested.    In  the  mean- 
time the  Aisne  had  been  forced  by  the  Germans ;    the 


268  EUROPE  AND   BEYOND 

Frencli  had.  been  driven  out  of  Amiens,  and  Laon  occupied 
by  the  enemy  (30tli  August).     The  Germans  were  now 
within  striking  distance  of  Paris,  and  on  3rd  September 
the  French  Government  transferred  itself  to  Bordeaux. 
Meanwhile  the  German  commander,  Von  Kluck,  had  com- 
The  Battle  menced  his  critical  manoeuvre.     On  31st  August  instead  of 
of  the         continuinff   his  march  in   a   south-westerly  direction   he 
6th-i2'th     turned  sharp  to  the  left  across  the  British  front.     On 
Sept.  Qf]^  September  he  crossed  the  Marne,  and  on  that  same 

day  Joffre  issued  his  famous  order  that  the  retreat  was 
at  an  end,  that  "  no  man  must  go  back  any  further,  but  each 
be  killed  on  the  spot  rather  than  give  way  an  inch."  The 
order  was  obeyed,  and  for  a  week  (6th-12th  September) 
the  hosts  of  France,  England,  and  Germany  were  engaged  in 
one  of  the  decisive  battles  of  the  world — the  Battle  of  the 
Marne.  That  battle  marked  the  turn  of  the  tide  ;  on 
the  9th  the  British  crossed  the  Marne  ;  the  Germans  were 
driven  back  to  the  Aisne  and  there  dug  themselves  in. 
For  many  a  long  month  the  Germans  and  the  Allies  faced 
each  other  in  trenches,  attacking,  counter-attacking, 
but  virtually  immovable.  The  second  phase  of  the  War 
had  begun. 
Antwerp  The  Belgians  meanwhile  were  in  terrible  plight.  Ant- 
werp had  always  been  regarded  by  England  as  a  point  of 
supreme  importance  to  her.  That  Antwerp  should  be  in 
friendly  hands  has  been  always  one  of  the  traditional 
maxims  of  British  statesmanship.  But  for  Antwerp, 
so  Napoleon  declared,  he  need  never  have  gone  to  St. 
Helena.  Antwerp  was  now  in  imminent  danger  from  the 
Germans.  On  5th  October  we  landed  in  Antwerp  a 
miserably  equipped  and  miscellaneous  force  of  some 
8,000  sailors  and  marines,  with  a  large  admixture  of  un- 
trained civilians.  About  the  same  time  a  7th  division  of 
the  Expeditionary  Force — under  the  command  of  General 
Rawlinson — was  landed  at  Ostend.  The  idea  was  that 
at  all  costs  the  enemy  must  be  headed  off  from  the  coasts 
of  France  and  Flanders,  and  for  this  purpose  the  British 
force  was  transferred  from  the  Aisne  to  the  Lys  and  Yser. 
Antwerp,  however,  fell  on  9th  October  and  the  Belgian 


THE.  WORLD-WAR   (1914-18)  269 

Government  was  transferred  to  Havre.    A  few  days  later 

tlie  great  battle  began  around  Ypres.     It  lasted  until 

the  middle  of  November.    When  it  ended  the  British  pirstBattie 

Expeditionary  Force  had  almost  ceased  to  exist,  but  Ypres  of  Ypres, 

had   been  held,  and  the   holding   of   Ypres   denied  the  ^^^■~^^^- 

Germans  access  to  the  Channel  ports.     Had  Ypres  fallen, 

the  Germans  would  have  been  within  striking  distance 

of  Dover.     No  words,  therefore,  can  estimate  the   debt 

which  England  and  the  world  owes  to  the  heroes  who  laid 

down  their  lives  in  the  long-drawn-out  battle  of  October 

and  November,  1914. 

The  services  of  Russia  at  this  juncture  of  the  war  must  Rmsia 
not  be  forgotten.  Russia,  mobilising  with  unexpected 
rapidity,  gave  ear  to  the  call  for  help  from  Belgium  and 
France,  and  thrust  forward  a  force  into  East  Prussia  in 
the  first  days  of  August,  and  so  gave  a  great  fright  to  the 
citizens  of  Berlin.  On  26th  August,  however,  Hindenburg 
— a  "  dug-out "  of  70 — inflicted  a  crushing  defeat  upon 
the  Russians  on  the  historic  field  of  Tannenberg.^  The 
Russian  invaders  were  cleared  out  of  East  Prussia,  and 
before  the  end  of  the  first  week  of  September  the  Prussians  in 
their  turn  were  on  Russian  soil.  The  main  Russian  attack, 
however,  was  dehvered  in  Poland.  Lemberg  was  captured 
on  1st  September  by  the  Russians,  who  quickly  made 
themselves  masters  of  GaHcia  ;  then  Hindenburg,  having 
cleared  East  Prussia,  attacked  in  Poland  and  thus  relieved 
the  Russian  pressure  upon  Austria  and  Hungary.  Austria 
herself  was  cutting  a  very  poor  figure  in  the  war.  Even 
against  Serbia  her  success  was  evanescent.  In  the  autumn 
of  1914  she  launched  a  terrific  attack  upon  Serbia,  and 
after  four  months  of  sanguinary  fighting  succeeded  (2nd 
December)  in  capturing  Belgrade ;  but  her  triumph  was 
shorthved.  By  an  heroic  eSort  the  Serbians  three  days 
later  recaptured  their  capital ;  the  Habsburg  assault 
was  repelled,  and  for  the  first  haK  of  1915,  Serbia  enjoyed 
a  respite  from  the  attack  of  external  enemies.  An 
epidemic  of  typhus  fever  wrought  terrible  havoc,  however, 
upon  an  exhausted,  ill-fed,  and  in  places  congested  popula- 

1  Where,  in  1410,  the  Poles  had  defeated  the  Teutonic^EJiights. 


270  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

tion.  From  this  danger  Serbia  was  rescued  by  the  heroism 
of  English  doctors  and  Enghsh  nurses.  Had  the  methods 
of  diplomacy  been  as  energetic  and  effective  as  those  of 
the  Medical  Service,  Serbia  might  still  have  escaped  the 
terrible  fate  in  store  for  her.  Judged  by  results,  nothing 
could  have  been  more  inept  than  the  efforts  of  EngHsh 
and  alUed  diplomacy  in  the  Balkans  throughout  the  year 
1915. 

To  resume  and  recapitulate :  by  the  end  of  1914  the 
position  may  be  summarised  thus  :  The  Germans  instead 
of  finding  themselves  comfortably  in  Paris,  dictating 
humihating  terms  to  a  defeated  France,  were  entrenched 
on  the  Aisne.  Instead  of  shelling  Dover  and  Folkestone 
from  the  Channel  ports,  they  were  still  pinned  behind 
Ypres.  Instead  of  invading  Russia,  Prussia  had  herself 
suffered  invasion,  and  her  help  was  sorely  needed  to  save 
her  Austrian  aUy  from  annihilation  at  the  hands  of  Russia. 
Above  all,  not  a  single  German  merchantman  remained 
at  sea. 
The  The  Western  front  witnessed  during  1915  few  incidents 

Western      ^f  ^luch  a  narrative  so  brief  as   the   present  can  take 
1915    "      account.    During  the  whole  year  the  AlHed  and  German 
hosts  were  confronting  each  other  in  long  lines  of  entrench- 
ments, stretching  almost  from  the  Channel  to  the  frontier 
Second        of  Switzerland.     A  great  battle  raged  in  the  spring  from 
BatUe  of     22nd  April  to  11th  May  round  the  devoted  city  of  Ypres. 
In  the  result  Ypres  was  held.     In  the  autumn  there  were 
terrific  battles  between  the  British  and  the  Germans  at 
Loos,  and  between  the  French  and  Germans  in  Champagne. 
The  losses  on  both  sides  were  enormous,  but  the  mihtary 
results  were  not  commensurate  with  the  shedding  of  blood. 
The  Germans  on  the  Western  front  were  undoubtedly 
weakened    by    the    tremendous    effort    directed    against 
Russia  on  the  Eastern  front,  as  a  result  of  which  Warsaw 
was  captured  on  4th  August,  Kovno  (17th),  Brest-Li  to  vsk 
(25th  August),  Grodno  (2nd  September),  and  Vilna  (18th). 
At  the  end  of  the  second  year  of  war,  Germany  un- 
questionably found  herself  in  a  strong  position.     By  a 
series  of  shattering  blows  the  morale,  even  more  than  the 


THE    WORLD-WAR   (1914-18)  271 

military  strength,  of  Russia  had  been  gravely  impaired  ; 
two  spirited  enterprises  initiated  by  England,  the  one  on 
the  Gallipoli  peninsula,  tbe  other  in  Mesopotamia,  bad 
been  frustrated  by  the  Turks  ;  true,  the  Turks  had  suffered 
defeat  at  the  hands  of  Russia  in  the  Caucasus,  but  the 
Russian  effort  had  not  availed  to  save  their  English  alHes, 
and  the  Caucasus  campaign  had  little  effect  on  the  ultimate 
issue  of  the  war.  England  still  held  command  of  the  sur- 
face of  the  sea,  and  in  the  more  distant  theatres  of  war  the 
Dominion  forces  were  clearing  the  Germans  out  of  every 
colony  they  had  ever  acquired  ;  but,  nearer  home,  the  sub- 
marines were  doing  their  deadly  work,  and  on  the  Western 
front  the  Allies,  despite  the  weakening  of  the  German  forces 
opposed  to  them,  had  definitely  failed  to  break  through. 

The  year  1916  was  remarkable  on  the  Western  front  for  1916 
the  terrific  battle  waged  between  the  Germans  and  the 
French  round  the  great  fortress  of  Verdun.  Opening  in  Verdun 
February,  the  battle  lasted  until  July ;  by  that  time  the 
German  attack  was  definitely  repulsed,  and  at  the  very 
end  of  the  year  (15th  December)  French  arms  won  a 
brilHant  victory  over  the  Germans  on  that  historic  field. 
Meanwhile  in  July  the  British,  aided  by  the  French,  had 
taken  the  offensive  on  the  Somme.  The  Somme  battle  TheSomme 
raged  from  July  until  November,  and  in  respect  of  men 
engaged  was  up  to  that  date  the  greatest  battle  in  recorded 
history.  But  the  end  of  the  fighting  of  1916  seemed  to 
have  resulted  on  the  Western  front  in  stalemate.  It  is 
not,  therefore,  surprising  that  Germany  should  (12th 
December)  have  made  certain  "  Peace  Proposals,"  or  that 
Mr.  Wilson,  the  President  of  the  United  States,  should 
have  been  moved  to  formulate  a  Peace  Note  (20th 
December). 

We  must  now  turn,  however,  from  the  West  to  follow 
the  course  of  events  in  the  more  distant  theatres  of  the 
World-War. 

First  we  turn  to  the  Near  East.     The  war  in  that  Turkey  and 
theatre    presents    many    problems    and    suggests    many  ^^®  ^^^ 
questions.     Whether  by  a  timely  display  of  force  the  Turk 
could  have  been  kept  true  to  his  ancient  connection  with 


272  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Great  Britain  and  France  ;  whether  by  more  sagacious 
diplomacy  the  hostility  of  Bulgaria  could  have  been 
averted,  and  the  co-operation  of  Greece  secured  ;  whether 
by  the  military  intervention  of  the  Entente  Powers  the 
cruel  blow  could  have  been  warded  ofi  from  Serbia  and 
Montenegro ;  whether  the  Dardanelles  expedition  was 
faulty  only  in  execution  or  unsound  in  conception  ;  whether 
Roumania  came  in  too  tardily  or  moved  too  soon,  and  in 
a  wrong  direction  :  these  are  questions  of  high  significance, 
but  the  time  for  a  final  answer  has  not  yet  come. 

Meanwhile,  it  must  suffice  to  summarise  events. 

On  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War  (August,  1914) 
the  Porte  declared  its  neutrality — a  course  which  was 
followed,  in  October,  by  Greece,  Roumania,  and  Bulgaria. 
The  Allies  gave  an  assurance  to  the  Sultan  that,  if  he 
maintained  neutrality,  the  independence  and  integrity 
of  his  Empire  would  be  respected  during  the  war,  and 
provided  for  at  the  peace  settlement.  That  many  of  the 
most  responsible  statesmen  of  the  Porte  sincerely  desired 
the  maintenance  of  neutrality  cannot  be  doubted  ;  but 
the  forces  working  in  the  contrary  direction  were  too 
powerful.  The  traditional  enmity  against  Russia ;  the 
chance  of  recovering  Egypt  and  Cyprus  from  Great  Britain  ; 
the  astute  policy  which  for  a  quarter  of  a  century  the 
Kaiser  had  pursued  at  Constantinople ;  the  German 
training  imparted  to  the  Turkish  Army ;  above  all,  the 
powerful  personality  of  Enver  Bey,  who,  early  in  1914, 
had  been  appointed  Minister  of  War — all  these  things 
impelled  the  Porte  to  embrace  the  cause  of  the  Central 
Empires.  Nor  was  it  long  before  Turkey  gave  unmis- 
takable indications  of  her  real  proclivities.  In  the  first 
week  of  the  war  the  German  cruisers,  the  Goehen  and  the 
Breslau,  having  eluded  the  pursuit  of  the  alhed  fieet  in 
the  Mediterranean,  reached  the  Bosphorus,  were  purchased 
by  the  Porte,  and  commissioned  in  the  Turkish  Navy. 
Great  Britain  and  Russia  refused  to  recognise  the  transfer 
as  valid,  but  the  Porte  took  no  notice  of  the  protest. 
Meanwhile,  Germany  poured  money,  munitions,  and  men 
into  Turkey  ;   German  officers  were  placed  in  command  of 


THE   WORLD-WAR  (1914-18)  273 

the  forts  of  the  Dardanelles  ;  a  German  General,  Liman 
Pasha,  was  appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Turkish 
Army,  and  on  28th  October  the  Turkish  Fleet  bombarded 
Odessa  and  other  unfortified  ports  belonging  to  Russia 
on  the  Black  Sea.  To  the  protest  made  by  the  ambassadors 
of  the  allied  Powers  the  Porte  did  not  reply,  and  on 
1st  November  the  ambassadors  demanded  their  passports 
and  quitted  Constantinople.  A  few  days  later  the  Dar- 
danelles forts  were  bombarded  by  English  and  French 
ships,  Akaba  in  the  Red  Sea  was  bombarded  by  H.M.S. 
Minerva,  and  on  5th  November  Cyprus  was  formally 
annexed  by  Great  Britain.  For  the  first  time  Great 
Britain  and  the  Ottoman  Empire  were  really  at  war. 

The  German  anticipation  was  that  by  means  of  the  The  Pan- 
Turkish  alliance  she  would  be  able  to  exploit  Mesopotamia,  pf™*" 
to  penetrate  Persia  commercially  and  politically,  to  deliver 
a  powerful  attack  upon  the  British  position  in  Egjrpt,  and 
to  threaten  the  hegemony  of  Great  Britain  in  India.  For 
all  these  ambitious  schemes  Constantinople  was  an  indis- 
pensable base.^ 

Nothing,  therefore,  would  have  done  so  much  to  frustrate  The  Dar- 
German  diplomacy  in  south-eastern  Europe  as  a  successful  Ex^^^i^tion 
blow  at  Constantinople.  In  February,  1915,  an  English 
fleet,  assisted  by  a  French  squadron,  bombarded  the  forts 
of  the  Dardanelles,  and  high  hopes  were  entertained  in  the 
allied  countries  that  the  passage  of  the  Straits  would  be 
quickly  forced.  But  the  hopes  aroused  by  the  initiation 
of  the  enterprise  were  not  destined  to  fulfilment.  It  soon 
became  evident  that  the  Navy  alone  could  not  achieve  the 
task  entrusted  to  it.  Towards  the  end  of  April  a  large 
force  of  troops  was  landed  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula  ; 
but  the  end  of  May  came,  and  there  was  nothing  to  show 
for  the  loss  of  nearly  40,000  men.  On  6th  August  a 
second  army,  consisting  largely  of  Australians,  New 
Zealanders,  and  EngHsh  Territorials,  was  thrown  on  to  the 
Peninsula.  The  troops  displayed  superb  courage,  but  the 
conditions  were  impossible  ;    Sir  Ian  Hamilton,  who  had 

^  Cf.  a  powerful  speech  by  Earl  Curzon  of  Kedleston  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  20th  February,  1917. 
i8 


274  EUROPE   AND  BEYOND 

commanded,  was  succeeded  by  Sir  C.  C.  Munro,  to  whom 
was  assigned  the  difl&cult  and  ungrateful  task  of  evacuating 
an  untenable  position.  To  the  amazement  and  admiration 
of  the  world  the  feat,  deemed  almost  impossible,  was  accom- 
plished before  the  end  of  December,  without  the  loss  of  a 
single  man.  How  far  the  expedition  to  the  Dardanelles 
may  have  averted  dangers  in  other  directions  it  is  impossible 
to  say  ;  but,  as  regards  the  accomplishment  of  its  imme- 
diate aims,  the  enterprise  was  a  ghastly  though  a  gallant 
failure. 

The  failure  was  apparent  long  before  it  was  proclaimed 
by   the    abandonment   of    the   attempt.     Nor   was   that 
failure  slow  to  react  upon  the  situation  in  the  Balkans. 
Greece  On  the   Outbreak  of  the   European  War   Greece   pro- 

claimed its  neutrality,  though  the  Premier,  M.  Venizelos, 
at  the  same  time  declared  that  Greece  had  treaty  obligations 
in  regard  to  Serbia,  and  that  she  intended  to  fulfil  them. 
But  in  Greece,  as  elsewhere  in  the  Near  East,  opinions  if 
not  sympathies  were  sharply  divided.  The  Greek  kingdom 
owed  its  existence  to  the  Powers  comprising  the  Triple 
Entente  ;  the  dynasty  owed  its  crown  to  their  nomination  ; 
to  them  the  people  were  tied  by  every  bond  of  historical 
gratitude.  No  one  realised  this  more  clearly  than  M. 
Venizelos,  and  no  one  could  have  shown  himself  more 
determined  to  repay  the  debt  with  compound  interest. 
Moreover,  M.  Venizelos  believed  that  the  dictates  of  policy 
were  identical  with  those  of  gratitude.  The  creator  of  the 
Balkan  League  had  not  abandoned,  despite  the  perfidious 
conduct  of  one  of  his  partners,  the  hope  of  realizing  the 
dream  which  had  inspired  his  policy  in  1912.  The  one 
solution  of  a  secular  problem  at  once  feasible  in  itself 
and  compatible  with  the  claims  of  nationality  was  and  is  a 
Balkan  Federation.  A  German  hegemony  in  the  Balkans, 
an  Ottoman  Empire  dependent  upon  Berlin,  would  dissi- 
pate that  dream  for  ever.  To  Greece,  as  to  the  other 
Balkan  States,  it  was  essential  that  Germany  should  not 
be  permitted  to  establish  herself  permanently  on  the 
Bosphorus.  If  that  disaster  was  to  be  averted  mutual 
concessions  would  have  to  be  made,  and  Venizelos  was 


THE   WORLD-WAR   (1914-18)  275 

statesman  enough  to  make  them.  Early  in  1915  he  tried 
to  persuade  his  sovereign  to  offer  Kavalla  and  a  slice  of 
"  Greek  "  Macedonia  to  Bulgaria.  He  was  anxious  also 
to  co-operate  in  the  attack  upon  the  Dardanelles  with 
allies  who  had  offered  to  Greece  a  large  territorial  con- 
cession in  the  Smyrna  district.  To  neither  suggestion 
would  King  Constantine  and  his  HohenzoUern  consort 
listen.     Venizelos  consequently  resigned. 

If  Venizelos  desired  harmony  among  the  Balkan  States,  Pohcy  of 
so  also,  and  not  less  ardently,  did  the  Allies.     Macedonia  the  Aihes 
still  remained  the  crux  of  the  situation.     Had  his  advice  Balkans 
been  followed  Bulgaria  would  have  gained  a  better  outlet 
to  the  ^gean  than  that  afforded  by  Dedeagatch.     Serbia 
possessed  no  statesman  of  the  calibre  of  Venizelos.     But 
the  situation  of  Serbia  was  in  the  last  degree  hazardous, 
and  under  the  pressure  of  grim  necessity  Serbia  might  have 
been  expected  to  listen  to  the  voice  of  prudence. 

Not,  however,  until  August,  1915,  was  Serbia  induced  to  Bulgaria 
offer  such  concessions  to  Bulgaria  in  Macedonia  as  might 
possibly  have  sufficed,  in  May,  to  keep  Bulgaria  out  of  the 
clutches  of  the  Central  Empires.  In  Bulgaria,  as  elsewhere, 
opinion  was  sharply  divided.  Both  groups  of  Great  Powers 
had  their  adherents  at  Sofia.  Had  the  Russian  advance  been 
maintained  in  1915  ;  had  the  Dardanelles  been  forced ;  had 
pressure  been  put  by  the  Entente  upon  Serbia  and  Greece  to 
make  reasonable  concessions  in  Macedonia,  Bulgaria  might 
not  have  yielded  to  the  seductions  of  German  gold  and  to 
the  wiles  of  German  diplomacy.  But  why  should  a  German 
king  of  Bulgaria  have  thrown  in  his  lot  with  Powers  who 
were  apparently  heading  for  mihtary  disaster  ;  whose  di- 
plomacy was  as  inept  as  their  arms  were  feeble  ?  What 
more  natural  than  that  when  the  German  avalanche  de- 
scended upon  Serbia  in  the  autumn  of  1915  Bulgaria  should 
have  CO -operated  in  the  discomfiture  of  a  detested  rival  ? 

Yet  the  Entente  built  their  plans  upon  the  hope,  if  not 
the  expectation,  that  Bulgaria  might  possibly  be  induced 
to  enter  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Allies  against  Turkey.^ 

1  Cf.  speech  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  House  of  Commons,  14th  October, 
1915. 


276  EUROPE   AND  BEYOND 

Serbia  was  anxious  to  attack  Bulgaria  in  September, 
wbile  ber  mobilisation  was  still  incomplete.  It  is  generally 
believed  that  the  Allies  intervened  to  restrain  the  Serbians, 
hoping  against  hope  that  a  concordat  between  the  Balkan 
States  might  still  be  arrived  at.  To  that  hope  Serbia  was 
sacrificed.^ 
TheChas-  A  great  Austro-German  army,  under  the  conamand  of 
SeS"^  ®^  Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen,  concentrated  upon  the 
Serbian  frontier  in  September,  and  on  the  7th  of  October  it 
crossed  the  Danube.  Two  days  later  Belgrade  surrendered, 
and  for  the  next  few  weeks  von  Mackensen,  descending 
upon  the  devoted  country  in  overwhelming  strength,  drove 
the  Serbians  before  him,  until  the  whole  country  was  in  the 
occupation  of  the  Austro-German  forces.  The  Bulgarians 
captured  Nish  on  5th  November  and  effected  a  junction  with 
the  army  under  von  Mackensen ;  Serbia  was  annihilated ; 
a  remnant  of  the  Serbian  Army  took  refuge  in  the  mountains 
of  Montenegro  and  Albania,  while  numbers  of  deported 
civihans  sought  the  hospitality  of  the  Allies.  On  28th 
November  Germany  officially  declared  the  Balkan  campaign 
to  be  at  an  end.  For  the  time  being  Serbia  had  ceased  to 
exist  as  a  Balkan  State. 
Balkan  What  had  the  AlHes  done  to  succour  her  ?     Russia  was 

oUhe         ^^^'  ^^  ^^^  moment,  in  a  position  to  afford  any  effective 
Entente      assistance,  but  on  4th  October  she  dispatched  an  ultimatum 
Powers       ^^  Bulgaria,  and  a  few  days  later  declared  war  upon  her.    On 
5th  October  the  advance  guard  of  an  Anglo-French  force, 
under  General  Sarrail  and  Sir  Bryan  Mahon,  began  to  dis- 
embark at  Salonika.     The  force  was  miserably  inadequate 
in  numbers  and  equipment,  and  it  came  too  late.     Its 
King  Cop-   arrival  precipitated  a  crisis  in  Greece.     As  a  result  of  an 
anTn^^      appeal  to  the  country  in  June,  King  Constantine  had  been 
Venizeios     reluctantly  compelled  to  recall  Venizelos  to  power  in  Septem- 
ber.    Venizelos  was  as  determined  as  ever  to  respect  the 
obUgations  of  Greece  towards  Serbia,  and  to  throw  the 
weight  of  Greece  into  the  scale  of  the  Alhes.    But  despite 

\Cf.  the  Times,  22nd  November,  1915  ;  but  for  a  contrary  view  cf. 
Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon — ^no  apologist  for  English  diplomacy — ap.  Fortnightly 
Review,  January,  1916. 


THE   WORLD-WAH   (1914-18)  277 

his  parliamentary  majority  lie  was  no  longer  master  of  the 
situation.  The  failure  of  the  Dardanelles  expedition,  the 
retreat  of  Russia,  the  impending  intervention  of  Bulgaria 
on  the  Austro-German  side,  the  exhortations  and  warnings 
which  followed  in  rapid  succession  from  BerUn,  above  all, 
the  knowledge  that  von  Mackensen  was  preparing  to 
annihilate  Serbia,  had  stiffened  the  back  of  King  Constan- 
tine.  Technically  the  landing  of  an  Anglo-French  force 
at  Salonika  looked  hke  a  violation  of  Greek  neutrality,  and 
Venizelos  was  compelled  by  his  master  to  enter  a  formal 
protest  against  it.  But  the  protest  was  followed  by  an 
announcement  that  Greece  would  respect  her  treaty  with 
Serbia,  and  would  march  to  her  assistance  if  she  were 
attacked  by  Bulgaria.  That  announcement  cost  Venizelos 
his  place.  He  was  promptly  dismissed  by  King  Constan- 
tine,  who,  flouting  the  terms  of  the  Constitution,  effected 
what  was  virtually  a  monarchical  coup  d'etat. 

The  King's  violation  of  the  Hellenic  Constitution  was  the 
opportunity  of  the  protecting  Powers.  They  failed  to  seize 
it,  and  King  Constantine  remained  master  of  the  situation. 
From  an  attitude  of  neutrahty  professedly  *' benevolent" 
he  passed  rapidly  to  one  of  hostility  almost  openly  avowed. 
That  hostihty  deepened  as  the  year  1916  advanced.  On 
25th  May,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  an  agreement 
secretly  concluded  between  Greece,  Germany,  and  Bulgaria, 
King  Constantine  handed  over  to  the  Bulgarians  Fort  Rupel, 
an  important  position  which  commanded  the  flank  of  the 
French  Army  in  Salonika.  A  few  weeks  later  a  whole 
division  of  the  Greek  Army  was  instructed  to  surrender 
to  the  Germans  and  Bulgarians  at  KavaUa.  Ka valla 
itself  was  occupied  by  King  Constantine's  friends,  who 
carried  off  the  Greek  division,  with  all  its  equipment,  to 
Germany.  Nearly  the  whole  of  Greek  Macedonia  was  now  in 
the  hands  of  Germany  and  her  allies,  and  the  Greek  patriots, 
led  by  Venizelos,  were  reduced  to  despair.  In  September 
a  Greek  Committee  of  National  Defence  was  set  up  at 
Salonika,  and  in  October  Venizelos  himseK  arrived  there. 

By  this  time  the  Balkan  situation  had  been  further 
comphcated  by  the  mihtary  intervention  of  Roumania  on 


278  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Roumanian  the  side  of  the  Allies.  In  Roumania,  as  elsewhere,  opinion 
tion^^^'^'  ^^^'  ^^  *^®  outbreak  of  the  war,  sharply  divided.  The 
sympathies  of  King  Carol  were,  not  unnaturally,  with  his 
Hohenzollern  kinsmen,  and,  had  he  not  been,  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  term,  a  constitutional  sovereign,  his  country 
would  have  been  committed  to  an  Austro- German  alhance. 
Nor  was  the  choice  of  Roumania  quite  obviously  dictated 
by  her  interests.  If  the  coveted  districts  of  Transylvania 
and  the  Bukovina  were  in  the  hands  of  the  Habsburgs, 
Russia  still  kept  her  hold  on  Bessarabia.  A  "  Greater 
Roumania,"  corresponding  in  area  to  the  ethnographical 
distribution  of  population,  would  involve  the  acquisition 
of  all  three  provinces.  Could  Roumania  hope,  either  by 
diplomacy  or  by  war,  to  achieve  the  complete  reunion  of 
the  Roumanian  people  ? 

In  October,  1914,  the  two  strongest  pro-German  forces 
in  Roumania  were  removed,  almost  simultaneously,  by 
death  :  King  Carol  himself,  and  his  old  friend  and  con- . 
fidant  Demetrius  Sturdza.  Roumania  had  already 
declared  her  neutrality,  and  that  neutraHty  was,  despite 
the  natural  affinities  of  the  Roumanians  towards  France 
and  Italy,  scrupulously  observed  until  August,  1916.  But 
on  the  27th  of  that  month  Roumania  declared  war,  flung 
a  large  force  into  Transylvania,  and  in  a  few  weeks  a 
considerable  part  of  Transylvania  had  passed  into  Rou- 
manian hands.  But  the  success,  achieved  in  defiance  of 
sound  strategy,  and  also,  it  is  said,  in  disregard  of  warnings 
addressed  to  Roumania  by  her  alhes,  was  of  brief  duration. 
In  September  Mackensen  invaded  the  Dobrudja  from  the 
south,  entered  Silistria  on  lOtb  September,  and,  though 
checked  for  a  while  on  the  Rasova-Tuzla  hne,  renewed  his 
advance  in  October  and  captured  Constanza  on  the  twenty- 
second. 

Meanwhile,  a  German  army,  under  General  von  Falken- 
hayn,  advanced  from  the  west,  and  on  26th  September 
inflicted  a  severe  defeat  upon  the  Roumanians  at  the  Rothen 
Thurm  Pass.  The  Roumanians,  though  they  fought 
desperately,  were  steadily  pressed  back  ;  at  the  end  of 
November  von  Mackensen  joined  hands  with  Falkenhayn, 


THE   WORLD-WAR   (1914-18)  279 

and    on    6tii    December    the    German    armies    occupied 
Bucharest. 

Thus  another  Balkan  State  was  crushed.  Throughout 
the  year  1917  there  was  Httle  change  in  the  situation.  The 
Central  Empires  remained  in  occupation  of  Roumanian 
territory  up  to  the  hne  of  the  Sereth,  including,  therefore, 
the  Dobrudja  and  Wallachia,  and  from  this  occupied 
territory  Austria-Hungary  obtained  much-needed  suppHes 
of  grain.  Meanwhile,  the  Roumanian  Government 
remained  estabhshed  in  Jassy,  and  from  its  ancient  capital 
the  affairs  of  Moldavia  were  administered.  Into  Moldavia 
the  Central  Powers  made  no  attempt  to  penetrate,  being 
content  to  await  events.  Nor  was  it  long  before  their 
patience  was  rewarded. 

The  military  collapse  of  Russia  in  1917  sealed  the  fate  Treaty  of 
of  Roumania.  From  no  other  ally  could  succour  reach  ^th^Mayf ' 
her.  Perforce,  therefore,  Roumania  was  compelled  to  1918 
concur  in  the  suspension  of  hostilities  to  which  the  Russian 
Bolsheviks  and  the  Central  Empires  agreed  in  December, 
1917.^  Roumania,  nevertheless,  announced  that  though 
she  agreed  to  suspend  hostilities  she  would  not  enter  into 
peace  negotiations.  But  the  logic  of  events  proved  irre- 
sistible ;  on  9th  February,  1918,  Germany  concluded  peace 
with  the  Ukraine,  and  on  5th  March  the  preliminaries  of 
a  peace  were  arranged  with  Roumania.  The  definitive 
Treaty  of  Peace  was  signed  at  Bucharest  on  7th  May. 
The  terms  of  that  treaty  were  humiliating  and  disastrous 
to  Roumania.  The  Dobrudja,  except  a  corner  of  the 
Danube  delta,  was  surrendered  to  Bulgaria,  and  the  whole 
of  the  economic  resources  of  Roumania,  in  particular  her 
grain  and  oil,  were  to  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  conquerors, 
who  were  further  to  enjoy  the  right  of  military  transport 
through  Moldavia  and  Bessarabia  to  Odessa.  Germany 
acquired,  by  means  of  this  corridor,  command  of  two  of 
the  most  important  ports  in  the  Black  Sea,  giving  her 
alternative  routes  to  the  Middle  East.  Roumania  was 
prostrate  at  the  feet  of  Germany  and  her  allies. 

Meanwhile,  the  German  victories  in  the  north-east  of 
1  Cf.  infra,  p.  288. 


280  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

Tiie  the  peninsula  naturally  reacted  upon  the  situation  in  the 

Ki^^'con-  south-west.  Towards  the  end  of  November,  1916,  a 
stantine  Serbian  army,  re-formed  and  re-equipped,  had  the  gratifica- 
tion of  turning  the  Bulgarians  out  of  Monastir,  and  the 
Allies  still  held  a  corner  of  Greek  Macedonia.  For  the  rest, 
Germany  and  her  allies  were  in  undisputed  command  of 
the  Balkan  peninsula  from  Belgrade  to  Constantinople, 
from  Bucharest  to  the  valley  of  the  Vardar.  Even  the 
hold  of  the  Allies  on  Salonika  was  rendered  precarious  by 
the  increasing  hostility  of  Constantine  and  his  friends  at 
Athens.  The  patience  with  which  his  vagaries  were 
treated  by  the  allied  governments  tended  to  evoke  contempt 
rather  than  gratitude  in  Athens.  Whatever  the  nature  of 
the  obstacles  which  impeded  the  dealings  of  the  Allies 
with  the  Hellenic  Government,  the  results  were  disastrous. 
We  discouraged  our  friends  and  put  heart  into  our  enemies. 
King  Constantine,  obviously  playing  for  time,  was  allowed 
to  gain  it.  The  attitude  of  his  partisans  in  Athens  towards 
the  Allies  grew  daily  more  insolent,  until  it  culminated 
(lst-2nd  December,  1916)  in  a  dastardly  attack  upon  a 
small  Franco-British  force  which  Admiral  de  Fournet 
landed  at  the  Piraeus.  To  this  step  there  may  have  been 
no  alternative,  but  its  results,  as  Venizelos  pointed  out, 
were  singularly  unfortunate.  Momentarily  there  was 
some  improvement  in  the  relations  between  Constantine 
and  the  "  protecting  "  Powers.  An  apology  for  the  insult 
to  the  French  and  British  flags  was  tendered  and  accepted, 
and  the  King  withdrew  his  army  from  Thessaly,  where  it 
plainly  menaced  the  security  of  the  allied  forces  at  Salonika. 
Essentially,  however,  the  situation  was  an  impossible 
one.  The  authority  of  Venizelos,  firmly  estabhshed  at 
Salonika,  was  gradually  extended  in  the  spring  of  1917 
to  Corfu  and  the  other  islands ;  while  in  Athens  the  King's 
position  was  apparently  unassailable.  The  Allies  for  a  while 
looked  on  helplessly,  but  on  1st  May  an  Hellenic  Congress 
in  Paris  called  upon  them  to  facilitate  the  summoning  of 
a  constituent  assembly  in  Athens  and  to  recognise  a  re- 
public which  it  was  believed  the  Assembly  would  proclaim. 
Almost  simultaneously  the  Venizelists  at  Salonika  demanded 


THE   WOELD-WAR  (1914-18)  281 

the  immediate  deposition  of  King  Constantine.  At  last 
the  Allies  resolved  to  take  action.  On  11th  June  King 
Constantine  was  required  to  abdicate  and  to  hand  over 
the  government  to  his  second  son,  Alexander ;  Constantine 
and  his  Prussian  Queen,  with  the  Crown  Prince,  were 
deported  to  Switzerland;  Venizelos  returned  to  Athens, 
and  on  30th  June,  1917,  the  Hellenic  kingdom  broke  off 
its  relations  with  the  Central  Empires  and  at  last  took  its 
place  in  the  G-rand  Alliance. 

The  adhesion  of  Greece  greatly  improved  the  military  Salonika, 
situation  in  Macedonia.  The  allied  army  at  Salonika  was  ^^^^ 
reinforced  by  the  Greeks,  who  gained  some  important  ground 
on  the  Vardar.  Matters  still  tarried,  however,  on  the 
Salonika  front  until  in  June,  1918,  the  command  was 
taken  over  by  General  Franchet  d'Esperey.  By  September 
his  preparations  were  complete;  after  a  week's  brilliant 
fighting  the  Bulgarian  Army  was  routed,  and,  after  a 
harrying  retreat  in  which  the  Serbs  played  a  foremost 
part,  Bulgaria  sued  for  peace.  On  30th  September, 
barely  a  fortnight  after  the  commencement  of  the  advance, 
Bulgaria  made  unconditional  surrender  and  handed  over 
her  troops,  her  railways,  her  stores,  and  her  government 
into  the  hands  of  the  Allies.  On  12th  October  the  Serbians 
occupied  their  old  capital,  Nish,  and  so  cut  the  Berlin- 
Constantinople  railway  at  one  of  its  most  vital  points. 
The  Allies  were  on  the  point  of  advancing  on  Constantinople 
itself  when  the  Sultan  sued  for  peace  and  an  armistice  was 
concluded  (October  30th). 

From  the  Near  East  we  may  pass  to  the  Middle  East.  Meso- 
Early  in  the  war  (21st  November,  1914)  Basra,  at  the  p°*'^'"^^ 
head  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  was  occupied  by  the  6th  Indian 
Division.  From  Basra,  the  force  advanced  up  the  Tigris  ; 
Kuma,  at  a  confluence  of  the  two  rivers,  was  occupied 
in  December,  and  in  April,  1915,  a  heavy  defeat  was 
inflicted  on  the  Turks  at  Shaiba.  Keinforced  from  India, 
the  troops  again  advanced,  captured  Amara,  and  from 
Amara  advanced  on  Kut,  which  was  taken  on  28th 
September,  1915.  Against  his  own  better  judgment, 
General  Townshend,  who  was  in  command,  continued  his 


Maude 


282  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

marcli  towards  BagMacl,  but  after  a  brilliant  attack  at 
Ctesipbon  (22nd-25th  November)  was  compelled  by  lack 
of  ammunition  to  withdraw  with  a  loss  of  nearly  half  his 
force  to  Kut.  There  he  was  besieged  for  five  months 
(3rd  December,  1915,  to  29th  April,  1916).  Three  efforts 
were  made  to  relieve  Townshend  and  his  gallant  garrison, 
but  in  vain,  and,  on  29th  April,  1916,  Kut  was  surrendered, 
and  some  8,000  survivors,  of  whom  6,000  were  Indian 
troops,  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Turks.  The  British 
prisoners  were  shamefully  maltreated,  and  more  than  half 
of  them  died  in  captivity. 
Sir  Stanley  The  British  Government  took  prompt  measures  to  re- 
trieve this  grave  disaster.  Sir  Stanley  Maude  was  ap- 
pointed to  the  command  in  Mesopotamia  ;  the  force  was 
reorganised  and  re-equipped,  and  after  a  skilful  advance 
Kut  was  recovered  on  24th  February,  1917.  Advancing 
rapidly  from  Kut,  Maude  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat  upon 
the  Turks,  and  on  11th  March  entered  Baghdad.  On 
18th  April  the  Turks  suffered  a  further  defeat,  and  the 
British  Army  took  possession  of  the  Baghdad  Kailway  as 
far  as  Samarra,  nearly  seventy  miles  north  of  Baghdad. 
In  November  Maude  died  of  cholera,  but  the  campaign 
was  successfully  carried  on  by  Sir  William  Marshall,  who 
finally  reached  Mosul  on  3rd  November,  1918.  By  that 
time,  however,  the  Turk  had  been  utterly  defeated  and 
had  sued  for  an  armistice. 
Egypt  and  Not  Only  in  the  Balkans  and  in  Mesopotamia  were  British 
the  Canal  ^^^^  victorious  over  the  Turk.  From  the  opening  of  the 
war  it  was  realised  that  of  all  the  vital  points  in  our  "  far- 
flung  battle  line  "  the  most  vital,  perhaps,  was  the  Suez 
Canal.  After  the  Porte  had  definitely  thrown  in  its  lot 
with  the  Central  Empires  it  was  deemed  wise  to  depose 
the  Khedive  of  Egypt,  Abbas  II.  (November,  1914). 
Turkish  sovereignty  was  denounced ;  Egypt  was  declared 
a  British  Protectorate  ;  and  the  Sultanate  was  conferred 
(18th  December,  1914)  on  Hussein  Kamel.  At  the  same 
time  Cyprus  was  formally  annexed  to  the  British  Crown. 
In  February,  1915,  the  Turks  made  the  first  of  several 
attacks  upon  the  Suez  Canal,  but  they  were  all  repulsed 


THE   WOELD-WAR   (1914-18)  283 

with  heavy  loss.  Stirred  up  by  German  intrigue,  the 
Senussi  gave  us  some  trouble  in  Western  Egypt,  though 
they  were  heavily  punished  in  several  actions  at  the  end  of 
1915  and  the  beginning  of  1916. 

In  March,  1916,  another  phase  of  the  war  opened  :  Sir  Palestine, 
Archibald  Murray  began  hi  advance  on  the  eastern  side  ^^^^^^ 
of  the  Canal.  A  patient  march  through  the  desert  brought 
him  into  Palestine  at  the  beginning  of  1917,  but  in  April 
he  was  heavily  repulsed  by  the  Turks  at  Gaza.  In  the 
summer,  Murray  was  relieved  of  his  command  and  suc- 
ceeded by  Sir  Edmund  Allenby,  who,  reinforced  from 
India  and  Salonika,  inflicted  a  tremendous  defeat  upon 
the  Turks  at  Beersheba,  which  he  captured  on  31st  October. 
He  stormed  Gaza  (7th  November),  Askalon  a  few  days 
later,  Jafia  surrendered  to  him  on  16th  November,  and  on 
9th  December  a  brilliant  campaign  was  crowned  by  the 
capture  of  Jerusalem.  Early  in  1918  General  Allenby 
estabhshed  communications  with  the  Arabs  and  the  King 
of  the  Hedjaz,  whose  allegiance  had  been  secured  to  us  by 
Colonel  Lawrence,  and  on  21st  February  captured  Jericho. 
Owing  to  the  success  of  the  German  offensive  in  France 
he  was  then  compelled  to  dispatch  his  best  troops  to  the 
Western  front,  and  it  was  not  until  September  that  he  was 
ready  to  make  his  final  assault  upon  the  enemy  opposed 
to  him.  On  the  19th,  however,  he  fell  upon  the  Turks 
and  broke  them,  and  on  the  following  day  Nazareth  was 
occupied.  Having  effected  his  junction  with  the  Arabs, 
Allenby  then  advanced  on  Damascus,  which  surrendered 
on  1st  October.  At  Damascus  60,000  prisoners  and  300 
guns  were  taken.  Advancing  from  Damascus,  Beirut 
was  taken  on  8th  October,  and  in  rapid  succession  Sidon, 
Tripoh,  Homs,  and  Aleppo  (26th  October).  The  anni- 
hilation of  the  Turkish  forces  was  now  complete,  and 
Palestine  and  Syria,  Uke  Mesopotamia,  passed  into  Enghsh 
keeping. 

It  is  time  to  retrace  our  steps  and  return  to  Europe.  The  Irish 
We  have  already  followed  the  course  of  the  war  on  the  fgi^g^^'^"' 
Western  front  down  to  the  close  of  1916.     Certain  pohti- 
cal  events  must,  however,  be  briefly  noticed.     Early  in 


284  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

December  of  that  year  Mr.  Asquith  resigned  tlie  Premier- 
sliip  in  England  and  was  replaced  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George. 
Mr.  Asquitb's  position  bad  been  shaken  by  the  rebellion 
which  at  Easter,  1916,  had  broken  out  in  Ireland.  At  the 
outbreak  of  war,  Irish  feehng  was  keenly  aroused  on  behalf 
of  the  Belgian  Roman  Catholics,  and  it  seemed  not  im- 
possible that  the  Cathohc  South  might  fling  itseK  into  the 
struggle  against  Germany  with  not  less  ardour  than  the 
Protestant  North.  During  1915  that  hope  faded.  The 
disloyal  section  of  the  Irish  Catholics  gained  the  ascendant, 
entered  into  treasonable  correspondence  with  Germany, 
and,  relying  upon  the  promised  assistance  of  England's 
enemies,  raised  the  standard  of  rebellion  in  April,  1916. 
Unhappily,  the  episode  was  not  without  precedent. 
England's  difficulty  had  always  been  Ireland's  opportunity. 
But  the  rebellion  of  1916  came  as  a  shock  to  those  in 
England  who  had  complacently  imagined  that  the  passing 
of  a  Home  Rule  BiU  for  Ireland  would  suffice  to  heal  the 
secular  discord  between  the  two  countries.  The  rebeUion 
was  of  course  crushed,  but  its  eruption  added  to  the 
anxieties  of  the  British  Government.  It  could  not 
paralyse  their  activities. 
Compui-  In  May,  1916,  Great  Britain  had  tardily  adopted  com- 
sorySer-  pulsorv  servicc  for  all  able-bodied  men  between  the  ages 
England,  of  18  and  41.  Hardly  was  the  new  Act  on  the  Statute 
May,  1916  book  when  the  great  soldier  who  had  reorganised  the  whole 
military  system  of  his  country  and  had,  in  the  language  of 
the  street,  given  his  name  to  the  new  army,  met  his  doom 
amid  the  storms  and  shadows  of  the  North  Sea.  On  June  5, 
1916,  the  Hampshire,  bound  for  Archangel,  went  down 
with  Lord  Kitchener  and  every  soul  on  board.  Deep 
called  to  deep,  but  not  one  echo  ever  reached  the  shore. 
In  1918,  the  age-limit  for  conscripts  was  raised  to  51. 
The  new  recruits  were  badly  needed.  In  1917  a  strenuous 
and  sustained  effort  was  made  to  bring  the  war  on  the 
Western  front  to  an  end.  The  effort  was  not  unattended  by 
The  brilliant  miUtary  successes.     On  9th  April  a  terrific  attack, 

ofm?^    launched  at  Arras,  resulted  in  the  capture  of  Vimy  Ridge, 
and  two  months  later  a  second  victory  not  less  brilliant  was 


THE  WORLD-WAK  (1914-18)  285 

won  at  Messines  Ridge.  A  further  advance  was  timed  to 
begin  at  the  end  of  July.  On  the  day  it  began  (31st  July) 
the  weather  broke,  and  the  operation  was  conducted  under 
impossible  conditions.  Some  ground  was  gained,  but  at 
an  enormous  sacrifice  of  life,  and  the  objective — to  clear 
the  Flanders  coast  of  Germans — was  not  attained. 

Events  remote  from  the  Western  front  were  powerfully 
reacting  upon  the  war  in  France  and  Flanders.  Of 
these  the  most  direct  were  the  outbreak  of  revolution  in 
Russia  (12th  March) ;  the  intervention  of  the  United  States 
in  the  World- War  (6th  April) ;  and  the  defeat  of  the  Italians 
at  Caporetto  (24th  October).  To  these  events  we  must 
now  turn  :  deahng  first  with  the  last. 

In  August,  1914,  Italy,  though  a  member  of  the  Triple  Italy  in 
Alliance,  dechned  to  regard  the  Austro-Cxerman  attack  ^^®  ^^^ 
upon  their  neighbours  as  a  casus  foederis,  and  declared  her 
neutrahty.  In  February,  1915,  she  informed  Austria  that 
any  further  action  in  the  Balkans  on  the  part  of  Austria- 
Hungary  would  be  regarded  by  Italy  as  an  unfriendly  act. 
Germany  was  very  anxious  to  avoid  a  rupture  with  Italy, 
and  offered  her  large  concessions — at  the  expense  of  Austria ; 
but  early  in  May  Italy  denounced  the  Triple  Alliance  and 
on  23rd  May  declared  war  on  Austria-Hungary. 

Italy  was  determined  to  seize  the  opportunity  for  com- 
pleting the  work  of  the  Risorgimento,  for  rectifying  her 
frontier  on  the  side  of  the  Trentino,  for  securing  her  naval 
ascendancy  in  the  Adriatic,  and  for  "  redeeming  "  the  islands 
of  the  Dalmatian  archipelago  and  those  districts  on  the 
eastern  httoral  of  the  Adriatic  which  had  for  centuries 
formed  part  of  the  Repubhc  of  Venice.  Her  quarrel, 
therefore,  was  not  primarily  with  the  Hohenzollern,  but 
with  the  Habsburgs,  who  since  1797  had  been  in  almost 
continuous  occupation  of  these  portions  of  the  Venetian 
inheritance.  But  the  pretensions  of  Italy,  however  well 
justified  pohtically  and  historically,  introduced  a  consider- 
able comphcation  into  the  diplomatic  situation.  In 
particular  they  aroused  grave  perturbation  among  the 
Southern  Slavs,  and  especially  in  Serbia.  In  the  eastern 
part  of  the  Istrian  Peninsula,  and  along  the  whole  coast 


286  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

from  Fiume  to  Albania,  the  population  is  predominantly 
Slav.  The  dream  of  a  Greater  Serbia  would  be  frustrated 
were  Italy  to  acquire  the  Dalmatian  coast  and  islands. 
Rather  than  see  Italy  estabhshed  there,  the  Serbs  would  pre- 
fer to  leave  Austria -Hungary  in  occupation.  The  situation 
was  an  embarrassing  one  for  the  Triple  Entente.  Southern 
Slav  opinion  was  strongly  roused,  and  became  still  more 
acute  when  the  rumour  spread,  in  May,  1915,  that  in  order 
to  secure  the  adhesion  of  Italy  the  Powers  of  the  Entente 
had  conceded  her  claims  to  northern  Dalmatiaand  to  several 
of  the  islands  of  the  archipelago.  Still,  Italy  adhered  to 
the  alliance  of  which  Serbia  formed  an  integral  part.^ 

For  Italy,  as  for  other  belligerents,  sunshine  alternated 
with  shadow  during  the  next  three  years.  On  the  whole 
she  somewhat  improved  her  position  during  the  campaign 
of  1916  ;  she  tasted  triumph  in  the  summer  of  1917,  but 
in  the  autumn  of  that  year  it  was  her  fate  to  learn  the 
bitterness  of  defeat.  Neither  politically  nor  in  a  military 
sense  could  Italy  present  a  united  front  to  the  enemy. 
Not  only  had  she  to  count  on  the  hardly  disguised  hostility 
of  the  Papacy,  but  there  was  a  considerable  pro-German 
party  among  the  upper  classes,  and  a  very  strong  section 
of  "  internationals "  among  the  sociaUsts  of  the  cities. 
Italy  went  into  the  war,  as  we  have  seen,  with  definite 
territorial  aims  :  the  Trentino,  Trieste,  Istria,  and  the 
Dalmatian  coast  and  archipelago.  Her  enemy,  therefore, 
was  not  Germany  but  Austria.  Unaided  by  Germany, 
Austria  would  have  been  hardly  worthy  of  her  steel,  but 
in  August,  1916,  Italy  declared  war  upon  Germany,  Ger- 
many reorganised  the  Austrian  armies,  and,  in  October, 
1917,  the  Austro-German  attack  was  delivered. 
The  Defeat  Poltroonery  or  treachery  left  open  a  gap  in  the  Italian 
of  Capor-     J-         ^^Q  second  Italian  army  was  compelled  to  fall  back  ; 

etto,  Octo-     ,       '  ,  "^  .  ,       c   ,  1  1 

ber,  1917  the  retreat  became  a  rout ;  the  rout  ot  the  second  army 
involved  the  retreat  of  the  third,  and  within  three  weeks 
the  enemy  had  captured  2,300  guns  and  taken  nearly 
200,000  prisoners.     The  fourth  army  then  made  a  stand 

1  The  rumour,  as  we  now  know,  was  substantially  accurate.     Cf. 
infra,  p.  309. 


THE  WORLD-WAR  (1914-18)  287 

on  the  line  of  the  Piave,  and  on  the  holding  of  that  line  the 
safety  of  Venice,  Verona,  and  Vicenza  depended.  The 
moment  was  intensely  critical,  but  England  and  France 
realised  the  danger  to  the  common  cause,  and  large  rein- 
forcements were  promptly  dispatched  from  the  Western 
front.  The  arrival  of  French  and  English  troops,  com- 
manded by  General  FayoUe,  Sir  Herbert  Plumer,  and  Lord 
Cavan,  stiffened  the  Italian  defence,  and  when  the  Austrians  Italian 
again  attacked,  somewhat  tardily,  in  June,  1918,  they  were  fg^s^*^^^' 
gallantly  repulsed.  Lord  Cavan  in  command  of  a  mixed 
British  and  Italian  force,  and  General  Diaz  in  command  of  a 
re-equipped  Italian  army,  took  the  offensive  in  their  turn 
in  October,  and,  in  a  brief  but  brilliant  campaign,  chased 
the  Austrians  out  of  Italy.  On  4th  November,  Austria 
begged  for  an  armistice. 

The  Anglo-French  assistance  so  spontaneously  given  to  The 
Italy  had  a  fine  moral  as  weU  as  material  effect.  Mean-  ^^\y^ion 
while  a  terrible  blow  had  fallen  upon  the  Grand  Alliance  March, 
by  reason  of  the  defection  of  Russia.  In  the  first  months  ^^^'^ 
of  the  war,  Russia  had  rendered  invaluable  service  to  the 
cause  of  the  Allies,  but  her  troops  were  badly  equipped  ; 
she  lacked  guns  and  munitions  ;  above  all,  her  effort  in  the 
field  was  paralysed  if  not  by  actual  treachery,  at  least 
by  gross  mal-administration.  Under  the  Grand  Duke 
Nicholas,  Russia  won  a  succession  of  victories  against  the 
Turks  in  the  Caucasus  in  1916,  and  the  capture  of  Erzerum 
(16th  February,  1916),  of  Trebizond  (7th  April),  and 
Erzinjan  (25th  July)  raised  the  hope  that  she  might  render 
effective  assistance  to  our  own  hard-pressed  forces  in 
Mesopotamia.  Early  in  1917,  however,  the  domestic 
situation  became  very  threatening,  and  on  13th  March 
the  long-delayed  Revolution  actually  broke  out.  That 
resounding  event  cannot  be  adequately  treated  in  a  brief 
summary  of  the  war,  nor  indeed  has  the  time  come  for 
a  critical  analysis  ;  it  must  suflQ.ce  to  say  that  the  Czar 
Nicholas  was  compelled  to  abdicate  on  15th  March,  and 
after  being  held  captive  for  some  time  was  with  his  ^vife  and 
children  f  ouUy  murdered  by  his  captors.  With  the  overthrow 
of  Czardom,  the  whole  structure  of  Russian  autocracy  fell 


288  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

with  a  crash  to  the  ground ;  a  Eepublic  was  proclaimed,  and 
a  real  effort  was  made  by  the  moderate  Progressives  to  re- 
organise the  Republic  at  home  and  to  wage  war  at  the  front. 
The  effort  was  wholly  in  vain.  Power  was  quickly  usurped 
by  the  extreme  Communist  party  led  by  a  German  agent 
and  generously  supported  by  German  gold ;  the  Russian 
sailors  mutinied  and  murdered  their  officers  ;  the  Russian 
soldiers  flung  down  their  arms  and  raced  home  with  all  speed 
to  secure  the  loot  which  the  social  revolution  promised. 

On  the  military  results  of  the   Russian  revolution  it 

is  superfluous  to  dwell.     Germany  was  able  to  withdraw 

great  armies  from  the  East,  and  fling  them  into  the  line 

against  the  Allies  on  the  West ;    Austria  was,  as  we  have 

seen,  free  to  concentrate  on  the  Italian  front.     It  ought, 

however,  to  be  said  that,  with  or  without  the  Revolution, 

similar  results  might  have  ensued,  for  there  is  reason  to 

suspect  that  the  Autocracy  was  already  contemplating  a 

separate  and  therefore  a  shameful  peace.     Such  a  peace 

was   actually   concluded   by  the    Bolshevik  Government 

Treaty  of    at  Brest-Litovsk  in  February,  1918.     The  terms  imposed 

Litov'sk,      by   Germany  upon  Lenin  and   Trotsky  possess   only  a 

othFebVu-  passing  interest,   and  need  not  detain  us.     Russia  was 

ary,  1918    (jg^j^^^jy  ^^^  ^f  j^-^q  ^ar,  and  France  and  England  were 

left  to  encounter  the  full  iEorce  of  the  German  hurricane, 
interven-  Not  however  alonc.  Almost  at  the  moment  that  Russia 
iT°s  A^  ^^®  failed  us,  a  new  ally,  morally  if  not  militarily  worth  a  dozen 
April,  1917  Russias,  came  into  the  field  against  Germany.  The  attitude 
of  the  United  States  during  the  first  two  years  of  the  war 
had  been  gravely  disappointing  not  only  to  the  Allies, 
but  to  vast  numbers  of  their  own  citizens.  President 
Wilson  essayed  to  play  a  mediating  pari)  in  the  world-con- 
flict. Not  even  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  could  drive  him 
from  the  position  he  had  assumed.  But  the  more  doggedly 
President  Wilson  persisted  in  the  policy  of  neutrality, 
the  more  daring  became  the  German  attacks  upon  neutral 
shipping.  At  last,  in  February,  1917,  Germany  pro- 
claimed "  imrestricted  submarine  warfare  "  :  any  ship 
trading  with  Great  Britain  was  to  be  sunk  at  sight.  This 
culminating  insult  was  too  much  even  for  the  patience 


THE   WORLD-WAR   (1914-18)  289 

of  the  American  President,  and  on  6tli  April,  1917,  the 
United  States  declared  war  on  Germany.  "  With  the 
entrance  of  the  United  States  into  this  war,  a  new  chapter 
opened  in  world  history."  So  spake  Lord  Bryce.  "  The 
entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  war  was  the  greatest 
mental  effort  and  spiritual  realisation  of  truth  which  has 
occurred  in  the  whole  course  of  secular  history."  The 
words  are  Mr.  Churchill's,  and  they  anticipate  the  verdict 
of  posterity.  That  America  should  so  far  abandon  her 
traditional  policy  and  fling  all  her  weight,  moral  and 
material,  into  the  World- War  was,  in  truth,  an  event  of 
solemn  significance.  The  military  effect  of  her  inter- 
vention was  not,  however,  felt  until  the  closing  months  of 
the  war,  when  it  did  much  to  turn  the  scale  against  Ger- 
many ;  the  moral  effect  was  felt  from  the  moment  when 
President  Wilson  made  his  famous  speech  to  Congress  on 
2nd  April.  The  American  point  of  view  is  admirably 
expressed  by  an  American  historian  in  words  reminiscent 
of  Abraham  Lincoln.  ''  The  world  was  too  small  to  con- 
tain two  fundamentally  hostile  principles  of  life  .  .  .  the 
world  cannot  permanently  exist  or  longer  live  half-slave 
and  half -free."  ^  Others  quoted,  somewhat  tardily  it  is 
true,  Mazzini's  famous  aphorism,  "  Neutrality  in  a  war  of 
principles  is  mere  passive  existence,  forgetfulness  of  all 
which  makes  a  people  sacred,  the  negation  of  the  common 
law  of  nations,  political  atheism."  The  pity  was  that 
America  had  not  heeded  Mazzini  two  years  earlier. 

How  badly  American  help  was  needed,  the  story  of  The 
1918  will  tell.     Between  March  and  July  the  Germans  g^™^/^^ 
on  the  Western  front  launched  four  terrific  attacks.     The  ini9i8 
first  (21st  March)  opened  near  St.  Quentin,  and  resulted 
in  the  defeat  of  the  5th  British  Army  under  Sir  Hubert 
Gough.     Six   hundred   thousand   Germans   attacked  the 
weakest  point  in  the  Anglo-French  fine,  and  by  the  mere 
weight  of  numbers  pierced  it.     Bapaume  and  Peronne, 
Albert,    Montdidier,    Noyon  —  all    the    expensive    fruits 
of  the  sacrifices  on  the  Somme  were  lost ;    but  in  front  of 
Amiens  the  German  advance  was  stayed.     The  crisis  was 

1  Professor  McLaughlin. 
19 


290 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


The 

Counter- 
offensive, 
Aug.- 
Nov. 


Germany 
"  Cracks' 


valiantly  met.  Foch  was  invested  with  supreme  command 
of  the  allied  forces  ;  all  the  available  British  reserves 
were  hurried  across  the  Channel ;  troops  were  summoned 
from  Palestine ;  America  was  urged  to  expedite  the 
dispatch  of  her  forces.  Thanks  in  large  measure  to  the 
British  Navy,  the  Americans  soon  began  to  pour  across 
the  Atlantic.  Over  80,000  were  sent  off  in  March, 
nearly  120,000  in  April,  over  245,000  in  May,  nearly 
280,000  in  June,  over  300,000  in  July,  over  285,000  in 
August,  and  257,000  in  September.  In  all,  forty-two 
American  divisions  were  landed  in  France.  51  per  cent, 
of  the  troops  were  carried  in  British,  46  per  cent,  in 
American  vessels  ;  and  out  of  the  vast  total,  only  two 
hundred  men  were  lost  through  the  attacks  of  enemy 
submarines.  Germany  was  astounded,  having  believed 
the  feat  to  be  impossible  of  accomplishment. 

Meanwhile,  on  9th  April,  Germany  launched  a  second 
attack  south  of  Ypres.  The  offensive  lasted  for  three 
weeks,  and  was  very  costly  both  to  the  Germans  and  to 
the  Allies.  A  third  attack,  opened  on  26th  May,  brought 
the  Germans  once  more  on  to  the  Marne,  but  at  Chateau- 
Thierry  their  advance  was  stayed  by  Foch  (11th  June). 
The  enemy  attacked  again  on  15th  July,  and  were  permitted 
by  the  great  French  soldier  to  cross  the  Marne.  But  on 
the  18th,  Foch  let  loose  his  reserves,  and  the  Germans 
were  driven  back  with  immense  slaughter. 

On  8th  August  the  British  counter-offensive  began. 
The  fierce  fighting  between  that  date  and  11th  November 
may  be  regarded  as  one  almost  continuous  battle,  in  the 
course  of  which  the  British  armies  captured  nearly 
200,000  prisoners  and  not  much  short  of  3,000  guns  ; 
140,000  prisoners  and  nearly  2,000  guns  fell  to  the  French  ; 
43,000  prisoners  and  1,400  guns  to  the  Americans  ;  while 
the  gallant  remnant  of  the  Belgian  Army  also  claimed 
its  modest  share  in  the  greatest  battle  of  all  recorded 
history.  The  details  of  the  fighting  must  be  sought 
elsewhere.  The  result  may  be  chronicled  in  a  sentence. 
The  great  military  machine  of  Germany  was  at  last  broken 
into  fragments  ;   the  German  people  turned  in  anger  upon 


THE   WORLD-WAE   (1914-18)  291 

the  dynasty,  and  William  of  HohenzoUem,  having  sur- 
rendered the  crown  of  Prussia  and  the  throne  of  Germany 
(9th  November),  fled  for  safety  to  Holland.  Already 
the  terms  of  an  armistice  had  been  agreed  upon  by  the 
Allies  at  Versailles  (4th  November),  and  on  11th  November 
they  were  accepted  by  the  accredited  envoys  of  Germany. 
The  Great  War  was  over. 

To  this  result  many  convergent  causes  had  contributed.  The  in- 
The  gallant  resistance  of  Liege  ;    the  superb  courage  and  ^"®"p^  °^ 
unyielding  tenacity  of  the  French  armies  and  the  French  ^^^ 
people ;  the  dogged  endurance  and  the  heroic  sacrifices  of 
Britons  from  many  lands  ;   the  tardy  but  effective  help  of 
America — all  these  were  factors  of  immense  significance  ; 
but  not  one  of  them  would  have  availed  had  Great  Britain 
lost  command  of  the  sea  ;  how  gravely  that  command  was 
imperilled  in  the  spring  of  1917  may  now  be  confessed. 

§  3.    THE    WAR   AT   SEA 

The  influence  of  sea  power  upon  the  issue  of  such  The 
a  war  can  be  demonstrated  only  by  a  detailed  analysis,  Capture  of 
impossible  in  this  place.  One  dramatic  result  may,  cobnS 
however,  be  summarily  indicated.  Before  the  end  of 
1917,  Germany  had  ceased  to  own  one  foot  of  territory 
beyond  the  confines  of  Europe.  Her  Pacific  possessions 
were  swept  up  in  the  first  months  of  the  war.  German 
Samoa  was  occupied  by  a  force  from  New  Zealand  on 
29th  August ;  the  Bismarck  Archipelago  and  German 
New  Guinea  fell  to  the  Australians  in  September  ;  the 
Japanese  took  the  Marshall  Islands,  and  on  7th  November 
Kiauchow  surrendered  to  the  combined  attack  of  Japanese 
and  British  forces.  In  West  Africa,  Togoland  was 
taken  by  British  and  French  forces  in  August,  1914,  and 
was  divided  between  the  captors.  The  Cameroons  was 
attacked  by  French  troops  from  the  French  Congo  and 
by  a  small  British  force  from  Nigeria  in  the  same  month. 
Not,  however,  until  February,  1916,  was  it  actually  taken. 
Meanwhile  General  Botha  had  been  busy  in  the  south 
of  the  continent.     His  first  business  was  to  suppress  an 


292 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


The 

Campaign 
in  East 
Africa 


The 
Victory 
at  Sea 


insurrection  headed  by  De  Wet  in  his  own  country.  That 
task  accomplished,  he  led  an  army  into  German  South-West 
Africa  and  captured  Windhuk,  its  capital,  on  12th  May, 
1915.  On  9th  July,  the  Germans  agreed  to  an  uncon- 
ditional surrender,  and  the  most  important  of  their 
African  Colonies  passed  into  the  keeping  of  the  Union  of 
South  Africa. 

Arduous  as  was  Botha's  campaign  in  South- West  Africa, 
it  was  neither  so  arduous  nor  so  prolonged  as  the  fight 
for  the  possession  of  German  East  Africa.  Strategically 
the  East  was  even  more  important  than  the  South-West. 
Could  Germany  have  held  it  with  adequate  naval  as  well 
as  military  forces,  she  would  have  threatened  the  British 
Empire's  line  of  communications  at  a  vital  point.  Our 
naval  supremacy  averted  this  danger ;  but  Germany  had 
made  elaborate  preparations  to  defend  her  own  Colony, 
and  if  occasion  offered  to  attack  British  East  Africa. 
General  von  Lettow-Vorbeck  commanded  a  force  of  3,000 
Europeans  and  12,000  well-equipped  and  well- disciplined 
Askaris.  A  British  attack  on  Tanga  was  repulsed  in 
November,  1914,  and  not  until  General  Smuts  took  over 
the  command  of  the  British  forces  at  the  beginning  of 
1916  was  any  effective  progress  made.  Dar-es-salaam 
was  captured  in  September,  1916,  but  another  fourteen 
months  of  hard  fighting  were  required  before  the  Germans 
were  cleared  out  of  the  Colony.  They  took  refuge  in 
Portuguese  East  Africa,  and  thence  in  the  autumn  of  1918 
made  their  way  into  Northern  Rhodesia ;  nor  did  they 
surrender  until  compelled  to  do  so  by  the  terms  of  the 
Armistice. 

To  return  to  the  war  at  sea.  No  attempt  can  be  made 
to  tell  the  heroic  story  in  detail,  even  were  details  as  yet 
available  ;  nor  indeed  in  outline  :  partly  from  lack  of  space, 
partly  because  in  the  history  of  naval  warfare  the  World- 
War  was  unique.  "  Barring  a  few  naval  actions  between 
surface  vessels,  such  as  the  battles  of  Jutland  and  of  the 
Falkland  Islands,  the  naval  war  was  for  the  most  part 
a  succession  of  contests  between  single  vessels  or  small 
groups  of  vessels."     So  writes  Admiral  Sims  of  the  United 


THE   WOKLD-WAR   (1914-18)  293 

States  Navy.^  The  English  victory  at  sea  was  won  for  the 
most  part  by  silent  but  unrelaxing  pressure  in  the  North 
Sea,  and  by  vigilant  watch  in  the  Channel,  the  Mediterranean 
and  the  Eastern  Atlantic.  On  28th  August,  three  German 
cruisers  had  indeed  been  sunk  in  an  engagement  in  the 
Bight  of  HeHgoland,  but  on  22nd  September  we  in  turn 
lost  three  fine  cruisers,  Aboukir,  Hogue,  and  Cressy,  by 
submarine  attack.  Further  afield,  two  British  cruisers, 
Good  Hope  and  Monmouth,  were  sunk  (1st  November) 
by  the  German  Pacific  Squadron,  commanded  by  Von 
Spec,  off  the  coast  of  Chile,  when  Admiral  Cradock  went 
down  with  fourteen  hundred  officers  and  men.  But  the 
German  triumph  was  shortlived.  A  squadron  was 
promptly  sent  out  from  England  under  the  command  of  Sir 
Doveton  Sturdee,  who,  making  all  possible  speed,  arrived  off 
the  Falkland  Isles  on  7th  December.  On  the  very  next 
day  Admiral  Sturdee  fell  in  with  Von  Spee,  and  Gneisenau, 
ScJiarnhorst,  Leipzig,  Nurenherg  were  sunk  after  a  gallant 
fight ;  only  the  Dresden  escaped.  The  British  loss  was 
only  seven  men  killed.  The  Dresden  was  caught  and 
s\mk  three  months  later.  Much  damage  to  British 
merchantmen  in  the  Far  East  had  meanwhile  been  done 
by  the  German  cruiser  Emden,  which  sailed  from  China 
early  in  August ;  but  she  was  at  last  hunted  down  and 
sunk  off  Cocos  Island  (10th  November)  by  the  AustraHan 
cruiser  Sydney. 

The  first  months  of  1915  were  marked  by  the  opening  The 
of  a  new  phase  in  the  war  at  sea.  On  15th  February  a  Submarine 
blockade  of  the  British  coasts  was  declared  by  Germany, 
and  was  to  some  extent  enforced  by  her  submarines. 
On  1st  March,  Great  Britain  retorted  by  Orders  in  Council 
which  established  a  blockade  of  the  (jrerman  coast ;  but 
partly  owing  to  a  desire  to  avoid  offence  to  neutrals, 
partly  owing  to  the  mischievous  provisions  of  the  "De- 
claration of  London  "  (1908),  the  blockade  did  not  become 
really  effective  until,  in  July,  1916,  the  Declaration  of 
London  was  denounced.  On  7th  May,  1915,  Germany 
committed  one  of  the  greatest  crimes  and  perhaps  the 
1  The  Victory  at  Sea,  p.  xii. 


294  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

greatest  blunder  of  which  even  she  has  ever  been  guilty. 
Her  submarines  torpedoed  the  great  Atlantic  liner  the 
Disitania,  with  the  loss  of  over  a  thousand  non-combatants, 
men,  women,  and  children.  Had  Germany's  ultimate 
fate  ever  been  in  doubt,  that  great  crime  had  sealed  it. 
From  that  moment  the  conscience  of  the  American  people 
was  aroused,  and  it  was  only  a  matter  of  time  how  soon 
outraged  moral  feelings  would  translate  themselves  into 
effective  military  action. 

The  only  action  of  the  war  in  which  great  fleets  were 
engaged  was  the  battle  of  Jutland.  Of  the  Grand  Fleet 
under  Admiral  Sir  John  Jellicoe  little  had  been  heard  during 
the  first  eighteen  months  of  the  war.  During  that  time  it 
was  mostly  at  sea  for  the  simple  though  almost  incredible 
reason  that  there  was  no  defended  east  coast  harbour  ready 
for  its  reception.  After  the  opening  of  war  the  defences  of 
Kosyth,  in  the  Firth  of  Forth,  abandoned  half-finished  in  a 
fit  of  penury,  and  those  of  Scapa  Flow  in  the  Orkneys, 
were  rapidly  pushed  forward  ;  before  the  end  of  the  war 
they  had  been  rendered  virtually  impregnable  against 
German  attacks.  But  not  only  were  defended  harbours 
lacking ;  the  Germans  had  the  superiority  in  guns  (save 
for  our  15-inch  guns),  in  mines,  in  Zeppelins  (incalculably 
useful  for  naval  scouting),  in  submarines,  and  in  high 
explosive  shells ;  nor  were  they  markedly  inferior  in 
gunnery  ;  but  the  Grand  Fleet  was  virtually  unassailed, 
and  the  German  Fleet  did  not  come  out. 
Battle  of  At  last,  howevcr,  it  resolved  to  try  conclusions,  and 
on  31st  May,  1916,  the  fleets  of  England  and  Germany 
met  in  the  mighty  conflict  which  to  all  time  will  be  known 
as  the  battle  of  Jutland.  One  hundred  and  forty-five 
British  ships  and  110  German  ships  were  engaged.  Of 
Dreadnoughts  we  had  28  against  16  ;  of  cruisers  of  various 
types,  40  against  16  ;  of  destroyers,  77  against  72  ;  but 
Germany  had  in  addition  6  pre-Dreadnought  battleships. 
As  to  the  result  of  the  battle,  experts  are  still  disputing  ; 
a  layman  can  only  note  the  fact  that  the  German  Fleet 
never  showed  itself  again  until  it  sailed,  under  custody, 
to  shameful  captivity.     When  ordered  to  put  out  in  the 


Jutland 


THE   WORLD-WAR   (1914-18)  295 

last  days  of  the  war,  the  crews  mutinied.  Yet  one  of  the 
greatest  of  the  allied  experts  holds  that  the  German 
Admiralty  were  entirely  right ;  that  in  harbour  the  German 
Fleet  was  doing  work  which  it  could  not  have  done  had 
it  come  out.  To  have  come  out  would  have  meant  almost 
certain  annihilation  for  itself,  and  the  setting  free  the 
liotilla  of  British  destroyers  for  convoy  work,  and  for  the 
hunting  do^vn  of  German  submarines.  The  German 
Fleet  in  harbour  was  effectually  protecting  German  sub- 
marines ;  so  long  as  it  was  in  being  the  British  destroyers 
urgently  needed  elsewhere  must  stay  to  screen  the  Grand 
Fleet.  Yet  there  is  a  converse  to  the  picture,  as  the  same 
expert  has  pointed  out :  "  In  April,  1917,  the  allied 
navies  while  they  controlled  the  surface  of  the  water  did 
not  control  the  sub-surface  .  .  .  yet  the  determining 
fact  .  .  .  was  that  their  control  of  the  surface  was  to 
give  us  the  control  of  the  sub-surface  also.  Only  the  fact 
that  the  battleships  kept  the  German  Fleet  at  bay  made 
it  possible  for  the  destroyers  and  other  surface  craft  to 
do  their  beneficent  (convoy)  work."  ^ 

Yet  in  the  spring  of  1917  the  allied  position  was  un-  The 
speakably  grave.  Literally,  everything  depended  on  f^J^ig^iP" 
British  sailors  and  British  ships.  On  31st  January  the  war 
at  sea  had  entered  upon  a  new  phase  :  Germany  carried 
out  her  threat  of  ''  unrestricted  "  submarine  warfare — the 
sinking  of  unarmed  merchantmen,  hospital  ships — any- 
thing afloat,  without  warning.  For  many  months  the 
new  method  proved  terribly  effective.  By  April,  1917, 
British  ships  had  carried,  in  comparative  safety,  no  less 
than  8,000,000  troops  over  sea  ;  they  had  kept  open  the 
allied  lines  of  communication  in  the  Channel,  in  the 
Atlantic,  in  the  Mediterranean  (with  the  help  of  French, 
Italian,  and  a  few  Japanese  ships),  in  the  Indian  Ocean,  and 
the  Pacific  ;  they  had  brought  to  the  Allies  food  and 
munitions.  But  they  had  accomplished  this  wonderful 
task  at  a  high  cost  in  lives  and  ships,  and  the  strain  upon 
their  resources  was  intense. 

In  the  early  summer  of  1917  the  strain  came  perilously 

1  Sims  :  op.  cit.  p.  98. 


296  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

near  the  breaking  point.  "  A  year  ago  it  was  supposed 
that  England  would  be  able  to  use  the  acres  of  the  whole 
world,  bidding  with  them  against  the  German  acres. 
To-day  England  sees  herself  in  a  situation  unparalleled 
in  her  history.  Her  acres  across  sea  disappear  as  a  result 
of  the  blockade  which  submarines  are  daily  maldng 
most  effective  around  England."  These  words,  uttered  by 
Dr.  Karl  Helferich,  the  German  Secretary  of  the  Interior, 
in  February,  1917,  were  no  idle  boast.  The  real  facts  were 
carefully  and  properly  concealed  from  the  British  and 
allied  peoples,  but  Helferich  spoke  truth.  The  total 
sinkings  of  British  and  allied  ships  amounted  to  536,000 
tons  in  February,  to  603,000  tons  in  March,  and  in  April 
to  nearly  900,000  tons.  The  facts  were  known  in  Germany, 
where  it  was  calculated  that  the  end  must  come  in  July 
or  at  latest  by  1st  August.  Unless  the  submarine  peril 
could  be  countered,  surrender,  according  to  the  British 
official  view,  could  not  be  postponed  beyond  November. 
The  Happily  for  the  world,  countered  it  was  by  the  adoption 

United  Qf  ^}^Q  "  convoy  "  system  and  the  advent  in  rapidly  in- 
Navyin  creasing  numbers  of  American  destroyers.  The  first 
the  War  American  flotilla  of  six  destroyers  reached  Queenstown  on 
4th  May,  1917  ;  by  5th  July,  thirty-four  had  arrived  and 
were  at  the  disposal  of  Admiral  Sir  Lewis  Bayly,  command- 
ing at  Queenstown.  In  all,  the  United  States  contributed 
to  the  naval  forces  of  the  Allies  some  70  destroyers, 
120  submarine  chasers,  20  submarines  and  other  small 
craft,  besides  mine-sweepers  (13),  mine-layers  (9),  and 
auxiliary  craft  of  various  descriptions.  The  aid  they 
rendered  to  the  allied  cause  came  at  a  critical  moment,  and 
its  value  can  hardly  be  overestimated.^ 

In  December,  1917,  four  American  Dreadnoughts  joined 
Admiral  Beatty  at  Scapa  Flow,  and  these,  mth  a  fifth 
which  arrived  later,  formed  the  6th  battle  squadron  of 
the  Grand  Fleet,  with  which  it  acted  during  the  remaining 
ten  months  of  the  war  as  an  integral  unit.  The  American 
ships  "  adopted  the  British  systems  of  tactics  and  fire 

1  The  part  played  by  the  American  Navy  is  described  most  vividly 
and  with  characteristic  modesty  by  Admiral  Sims  iu  The  Victory  at  Sea. 


THE   WORLD-WAR   (1914-18)  297 

control,  and  in  every  other  way  conformed  to  the  estab- 
lished practices  of  the  British."  The  fine  spirit  shown 
by  Admiral  Rodman  and  the  officers  and  men  under  his 
command  was  cordially  acknowledged  in  a  farewell  speech 
by  Sir  David  Beatty,  who  spoke  of  the  "  wonderful 
co-operation  and  the  loyalty  you  have  given  to  me  and 
to  my  admirals,"  and  thanked  them  "  again  and  again 
for  the  great  part  the  6th  battle  squadron  played  in 
bringing  about  the  greatest  naval  victory  in  history." 

Perhaps  the  most  notable  contribution  of  the  American 
Navy  to  the  ultimate  victory  at  sea  was  the  construction 
of  the  great  North  Sea  barrage.  The  idea  of  such  barrages 
to  catch  the  German  submarines  before  they  could  reach 
their  hunting  grounds  off  the  Irish  coasts  had  frequently 
been  mooted,  and  had  indeed  been  partially  carried  out. 
Not,  however,  until  America  came  in  was  the  appropriate 
mine  invented,  nor  could  it  before  then  have  been  manu- 
factured in  sufficient  quantities  ;  but  in  1917  the  Americans 
flung  themselves  into  the  work  with  marvellous  energy, 
and  in  the  summer  of  1918  they  laid  57,571  of  the  newly 
invented  mines  between  the  Orkneys  and  Norway,  while 
the  British  during  the  same  period  laid  13,546.  The 
barrage,  intended  to  cover  the  whole  distance  of  250 
nautical  miles,  was  not  completed  when  the  Armistice  was 
signed.  A  similar  though,  of  course,  much  smaller  barrage 
was  constructed  by  the  Americans  to  close  the  channel 
between  Scotland  and  Ireland.  How  far  these  barrages 
contributed  to  dispel  the  submarine  menace  can  never  be 
exactly  known  ;  but  the  mutiny  in  the  German  Navy 
(2nd  November)  is  commonly  accepted  as  an  eloquent 
testimony  to  the  terror  they  had  inspired  among  the 
crews.  The  actual  losses  of  the  American  Navy  were  few 
and  insignificant,  but  before  the  close  of  the  war  they  had 
in  all  about  380  ships  in  European  waters  with  a  personnel 
of  over  80,000  officers  and  men. 

Due  appreciation  of  the  American  effort  must  not, 
however,  be  permitted  to  disguise  the  plain  fact  that 
the  victory  at  sea  was,  in  the  main,  the  superb  achieve- 
ment of  the   British   Navy  and   the   British  Mercantile 


298  EUROPE   AND   P)EYOND 

Marine.  Words  cannot  express  the  debt  which  the  Allies 
owed  to  the  latter  no  less  tliaii  to  the  former.  The  losses 
suffered  by  the  Merchant  Service  were  relatively  the  highest 
in  the  war.  No  less  than  9,031,000  tons  of  British  mer- 
chant shipping  were  sunk,  and  more  than  44,500  men  were 
killed,  drowned,  or  severely  wounded  ;  of  whom  14,661 
were  killed  or  drowned.  The  naval  casualties  amounted 
to  27,175,  of  whom  no  fewer  than  22,258  were  killed  or 
drowned.  The  heroism  of  the  men  of  the  Mercantile 
Marine  is  attested  by  the  fact  that  before  the  close  of  the 
war  many  men  had  been  torpedoed  five  or  six  times,  and 
yet  there  is  no  single  instance  on  record  of  a  man  having 
refused  to  ship. 
The  When  all  did  such   magnificent   service   it   is   almost 

Patrol "  invidious  to  mention  particular  units  or  individual  exploits  ; 
but  a  French  admiral  has  not  hesitated  to  describe  the 
raid  on  Zeebrugge  as  "  the  finest  feat  of  arms  in  all  naval 
history  of  all  times  and  all  countries."  ^  This  was  the 
work  of  the  "  Dover  Patrol,"  and  was  accomplished  by  a 
flotilla — mostly  very  light  craft — of  142  ships,  under  the 
command  of  Sir  Koger  Keyes.  The  night  selected  for 
this  daring  exploit  was  St.  George's  Day  (23rd  April, 
1918) ;  the  object  of  it  was  to  seal  up  the  most  important 
of  the  German  submarine  bases.  In  the  case  of  Zeebrugge 
the  object  was  largely  attained ;  the  attack  on  Ostende 
for  the  moment  miscarried,  but  on  10th  May  it  was  renewed 
with  considerable  though  not  complete  success.  From 
that  moment  the  submarine  attacks  rapidly  decreased. 
Of  the  200  German  submarines  known  to  have  been  sunk 
or  captured  in  the  course  of  the  war,  90  per  cent,  fell  to 
British  seamen. 

The  defeat  of  the  submarines  was,  however,  only  a 
fraction  of  the  task  they  accomplished.  To  have  kept 
inviolate  (save  for  a  few  tip-and-run  raids  early  in  the 
war)  the  coasts  of  Great  Britain ;  to  have  transported 
across  thousands  of  miles  of  ocean  millions  of  men  from 
Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  India,  South  Africa, 
the  West  Indies,  and  the  United  States  ;  to  have  carried 
^  Quoted  by  Fletcher  :  op.  cit.  p.  125. 


THE   WORLD-WAR  (1914-18)  299 

them  to  aud  from  the  half-dozen  theatres  of  war  ;  to  have 
safeguarded  the  commercial  routes  and  to  have  kept 
Great  Britain  and  her  Allies  suppUed  with  food,  with  raw 
materials,  and  munitions  ;  to  have  kept  open  the  long  lines 
of  communication  in  the  Atlantic,  the  Pacific,  the  Indian 
Ocean,  and  the  Mediterranean — such  was  the  superb 
achievement,  largely  silent  and  half  unperceived,  of  the 
British  Naval  and  Merchant  Services. 

To  Britain,  therefore,  it  was  fitting  that  the  German 
Navy  should  be  surrendered.  The  first  batch  of  the 
surrendered  submarines  reached  Harwich  on  19th  No- 
vember ;  two  days  later  the  High  Seas  Fleet  was  handed 
over  at  Rosyth.  On  that  day  (21st  November)  Admiral 
Beatty  signalled  to  the  Fleet  :  "  The  German  flag  will  be 
hauled  down  at  sunset  to-day,  and  will  not  be  hoisted 
again  without  permission."     So  ended  the  war  at  sea. 

AUTHORITIES 

C.  R.  L.  Fletcher  :  The  Great  War  (1920). 

A.  F.  Pollard  :  A  Short  History  of  the  Great  War  (1920). 

J.  BucHAN  :  TAe  Dispatches  of  Lord  French  (1917). 

Viscount  French:  1914  {Vdl^). 

E.  VON  Falkenhayn  :   General  Headquarters,  1914-16,  and  its  Critical 

Decisions  (1919). 
(ed.  Boraston)  :    Sir  Douglas  Haig's  Dispatches,  Decemher,   1915,  to 

April,  1919  (1919). 
E.  LuDENDORFF  :  The  General  Staff  and  its  Problems  (1920). 
E.  LuDENDORFP  :   My  War  Memories,  1914-18  (2  vols.,  1919). 
Col.  Repington  :  The  First  World-War  (2  vols.,  1920). 
Viscount  Jellicoe  :  The  Grand  Fleet,  1914-16  (1919). 
Viscount  Jellicoe  :  The  Crisis  of  the  Naval  War  (1920). 
E.  R.  G.  R.  Evans  :   Keeping  the  Seas  (1920). 
Sir  H.  Newbolt  :  A  Naval  History  of  the  War,  1914-18. 
A.  S.  HuRD  :  A  Merchant  Fleet  at  War  (1920). 
C.  Bellairs  :  The  Battle  of  Jutland  (1920). 
Admiral  Sims  :   The  Victory  at  Sea  (1921). 
SirR.  H.  S.  Bacon  :  The  Dover  Patrol,  1915-17  (2  vols.,  1919). 
FiLSON  Young  :  With  the  Battle  Cruisers  (1921). 
E.  Hilton  Young,  M.P.  :  By  Sea  and  Land  (1920). 
Battle  of  Jutland  {1^10).     (Official  Dispatches.)     (Cmd.  1068.) 
Sir  G.  Arthur  :  Life  of  Lord  Kitchener  (3  vols.,  1920). 
Count  Gleichen  :  Chronology  of  the  War. 
"The  Times"  :  Documentary  History  of  the  War. 
J.  B.  Scott  :    Diplomatic  Documents  of  the    War.     (Carnegie  Trust, 

1916.) 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

The  Treaties  of  Versailles,  Rapallo,  and  Sevres, 
1919-20 

Quand  Dieu  efface  c'est  qu'il  se  prepare  k  ecrire. — Bossuet. 

The  time  will  come  when  treaties  shall  be  more  than  truces,  when  it 
will  again  be  possible  for  them  to  be  observed  with  that  religious  faith, 
that  sacred  inviolability,  on  which  depend  the  reputation,  the  strength, 
and  the  preservation  of  empires. — Preamble  to  the  Treaty  of 
Kalisch. 

What  we  seek  is  the  reign  of  law  based  upon  the  consent  of  the 
governed  and  sustained  by  the  organised  opinion  of  mankind. — Wood- 
Row  Wilson. 

The  Slate  /^~^  OD  has  wiped  the  slate  clean.  There  can  be  no 
Writin«  vj" question  as  to  the  completeness  of  the  process. 
Between  1914  and  1918  the  soldiers  were  doing  the  work  of 
Providence.  It  was  a  preliminary,  perhaps  haLE-uncon- 
scious,  but  none  the  less  essential  work.  It  is  often  so. 
The  sword  of  Napoleon,  ruthlessly  and  arrogantly  wielded, 
effected  a  work  of  destruction  which  was  a  necessary 
prehminary  to  the  constructive  work  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  The  rusty  sword  reluctantly  drawn  from  the 
scabbard  by  the  Allies  in  order  to  meet  the  deliberate  and 
long-prepared  attack  of  Germany  has,  we  may  reasonably 
beheve,  accomphshed  a  similar  task.  But  the  slate  has 
been  cleaned  in  the  hope  that  something  may  be  written 
upon  it.  What  that  something  shall  be  depends  not  upon 
the  sword  but  upon  diplomacy  ;  and,  as  the  world  now  is, 
less  upon  the  statesmanship  of  the  rulers  than  upon  that 
of  the  sovereign  peoples.     To  them  a  great  opportunity 

300 


Central  s^ South- Eastern  Europe:  \QZ\ 


BV-^OjUnSklY-C^ 


THE   WORLD   SETTLEMENT  301 

has  been  presented.  It  consists  in  tlie  overtlirow,  unex- 
pectedly complete,  of  tlie  three  great  dynastic  powers  of 
Central  Europe — the  Hohenzollern,  the  Habsburgs,  and 
the  Ottoman  Turks.  Those  Powers  originally  established 
themselves  and  for  centuries  continued  to  exist  in  defiance 
of  the  two  leading  principles  which  by  general  consent 
have  given  to  the  later  periods  of  European  history  their 
pecuHar  significance  :  the  idea  of  Liberty  and  the  idea  of 
Nationality.  To  the  advance  of  these  principles,  Prussia, 
Austria,  and  Turkey  presented  an  adamantine  front. 
And  not  unnaturally  ;  for  their  existence  depended  upon 
the  negation  of  these  principles.  In  this  connection,  it  is 
important  to  distinguish  between  Prussia  and  Germany  ; 
Prussia,  Uke  Austria  and  Turkey-in-Europe,  is  a  purely 
artificial  product  corresponding  to  no  vital  principle  of 
State  growth,  economic  or  ethnographic.  It  is  otherwise 
with  Germany.  Modern  Germany  was  indeed  brought 
into  being  by  Hohenzollern  statecraft  and  the  Prussian 
sword.  But  the  product  corresponds,  as  Prussia  did  not, 
to  vital  principles  quite  distinct  from  the  genius  of  a 
dynasty  or  the  power  of  an  army.  The  settlement  effected 
by  the  diplomatists  at  Versailles  respects  and  reflects  the 
distinction  here  drawn.  Prussia  has  been  destroyed ; 
Germany  remains  virtually  intact.  The  details  of  that 
settlement  we  must  now  proceed  to  analyse. 

Between  the  signature  of  the  Armistice  (1 1th  November,  The  Peace 
1918)  and  the  opening  of  the  Peace  Conference  in  Paris,  c^j^erence. 
two  months  were  unavoidably  but  unfortunately  permitted 
to  elapse.  The  Conference  had  to  wait  upon  the  arrival 
of  President  Wilson  from  America  and  upon  the  verdict 
of  a  general  election  in  Great  Britain.  Meanwhile,  a  most 
elaborate  machinery  was  set  up  in  Paris.  Not  less  than  a 
thousand  delegates  forgathered  in  the  French  capital ; 
the  British  Delegation  alone  occupied  five  hotels.  The 
vastness  of  the  machinery  was  not  perhaps  incommensurate 
with  the  range  of  the  war  or  the  scope  of  the  treaties,  but 
it  did  not  make  for  the  expeditious  settlement  which  was 
on  every  ground  much  to  be  desired.  The  Conference  itself 
when  in  plenary  session  consisted  of  seventy  delegates  ; 


302  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

of  these,  fourteen  represented  the  British  Empire ;  France, 
Italy,  United  States,  and  Japan  claimed  five  each ;  Belgium, 
Jugo-Slavia,  and  Brazil,  three  apiece ;  China,  Czecho- 
slovakia, Greece,  Portugal,  Roumania,  Poland,  Siam,  and 
the  Hedjaz,  two  each  ;  BoUvia,  Cuba,  Ecuador,  Guatemala, 
Hayti,  Honduras,  Liberia,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  Peru, 
Uruguay,  one  each.  The  Treaty  itself  was  signed  by 
sixty-eight  of  these,  China  alone  abstaining.  As  a  fact, 
the  ultimate  decisions  were  reached  by  four  men — the 
principal  representatives  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy, 
and  the  United  States  ;  some  of  the  most  important  by 
two  only — M.  Clemenceau  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  The 
writing  on  the  slate  was  largely  in  their  hands. 

The  settlement  falls  naturally  into  three  parts  :  (1)  the 
remaking  of  the  pohtical  map  of  Europe  ;  (2)  the  terri- 
torial readjustments  in  Africa,  Asia,  and  the  Pacific  ; 
and  (3)  the  regulation  of  future  international  relations 
by  means  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
The  New  The  territorial  resettlement  in  Europe  depended  upon 
Europe  ^^^  pivots  :  the  readjustment  of  the  eastern  frontiers  of 
France  ;  the  liberation  of  the  peoples  formerly  annexed 
by  Prussia,  mainly  Poles  and  Danes  ;  the  disintegration  of 
the  composite  Empire  of  the  Habsburgs  ;  the  redemption 
of  unredeemed  Italy ;  and  the  final  liquidation  of  the 
Turkish  estate  in  Europe. 
The  Rhine  The  question  as  to  the  frontier  between  France  and 
Frontier  Germany  has  formed  the  subject  of  diplomatic  controversy 
for  at  least  three  centuries.  Ever  since  the  seventeenth 
century,  it  has  been  the  declared  ambition  of  France  to 
reach  "  les  limites  naturelles  "  :  the  Rhine,  the  Alps,  and 
the  P3rrenees.  That  ambition  was  never  completely 
realised  by  the  old  Bourbon  Monarchy.  The  Pyrenees 
was  reached  in  1659  ;  Napoleon's  conquests  extended 
beyond  the  Rhine  and  the  Alps,  but  those  conquests  were 
not  permanently  retained  by  France.  Despite  the  protests 
of  Prussia,  France  did,  however,  retain  in  1815 — thanks 
mainly  to  the  advocacy  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington — 
Alsace-  Alsace  and  Lorraine  ;  she  lost  them,  as  we  have  seen,  in 
1871,  and  they  formed  the  first  subject  to  be  settled  in 


THE   WOELD   SETTLEMENT  303 

1919.  On  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  etlmography 
speaks  with  an  uncertain  voice  ;  nor  are  economic  con- 
siderations all  on  one  side  ;  but  the  matter  has  now  been 
decided  on  the  one  hand  by  the  sword,  on  the  other  by  the 
indubitable  wishes  of  the  great  mass  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  two  Provinces.  In  1871  Alsatians  and  Lorrainers 
cried  in  chorus  :  "  French  we  are  and  French  we  desire 
to  remain."  In  the  intervening  years,  Germany  did 
nothing  to  wean  them  from  that  allegiance.  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  are  now  restored  to  France  with  their  frontiers 
as  in  1870.  In  regard  to  the  Rhine  frontier,  France  has 
obtained  a  strong  military  guarantee  :  Germany  is  not 
permitted  to  maintain  or  construct  any  fortification  either 
on  the  left  bank  or  within  50  kilometres  of  the  right  bank 
of  the  Rhine  ;  within  this  area  she  may  maintain  no  armed 
forces,  either  permanent  or  temporary,  or  hold  any  man- 
oeuvres, or  maintain  any  works  for  facilitating  mobilisa- 
tion. As  to  the  Saar  Valley,  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  The  Saar 
are  elaborate  :  this  district  is  to  be  administered  for  ^^^^^ 
fifteen  years  by  a  Commission  nominated  by  the  League 
of  Nations,  and  at  the  close  of  that  period  a  plebiscite  is 
to  be  taken  in  order  to  ascertain  the  wishes  of  the  popula- 
tion. They  will  have  three  alternatives  to  choose  from  : 
continuance  of  the  regime  under  the  League  of  Nations  ; 
union  with  France ;  or  union  with  Germany.  Time  alone 
can  tell  whether  this  device  wiU  work.  The  valuable 
coalfield  of  the  district  becomes  the  absolute  property  of 
France — an  asset  which  represents  appropriate  though 
partial  reparation  for  the  wilful  and  wanton  destruction 
by  Germany  of  all  the  mineral  wealth  of  France  on  which 
during  the  war  she  could  lay  hands. 

Belgium  also  obtained  some  rectification  of  frontier, —  Belgium 
subject  in  parts  to  a  plebiscite  (already  decided  in  her 
favour), — the  districts  of  Eupen  and  Malmedy,  Moresnet- 
Neutre,  and  part  of  Prussian  Moresnet.  These  districts 
contain  only  about  400  square  miles  ;  they  carry  a  sparse 
population,  but  their  transference  adds  greatly  to  the 
reasonable  security  of  Belgium  against  attack  from  the 
east.     Belgium    also    attains,    in    accord    mth    her    own 


304  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

ambitions,  "  complete  independence  and  full  sovereignty  "  ; 
slie  is  no  longer  to  be  either  neutralised  or  protected, 
and  the  treaties  of  1839  are  entirely  abrogated.  As  regards 
Luxemburg  Luxemburg,  Germany  is  compelled  to  denounce  her 
various  treaties  with  the  Grand  Duchy,  to  recognise  that 
it  ceases  to  be  a  part  of  the  German  ZoUverein,  to 
renomice  all  rights  of  exploitation  of  the  railways,  and  to 
adhere  to  the  abrogation  of  its  neutrality. 
Schieswig-  Schleswig-Holstein  presented  a  problem  hardly  less 
Hoistein  difficult  than  that  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  In  no  respect, 
however,  did  the  Paris  Conference  show  more  scrupulous 
regard  for  the  rights  even  of  a  defeated  enemy  or  stricter 
adherence  to  its  own  avowed  principles.  In  filching  these 
duchies,  in  1863,  from  the  crown  of  Denmark,  Bismarck 
had  shown  himself  as  unscrupulous  as  he  was  shrewd. 
Still,  Hoistein  is  German,  and  Prussia  is  allowed,  therefore, 
to  retain  it,  together  with  southern  Schleswig ;  the  fate 
of  central  and  northern  Schleswig  was  to  be  determined 
by  plebiscite.  The  inhabitants  of  the  northern  zone  have 
plumped  for  Denmark ;  those  of  the  central  zone,  including 
Flensborg,  for  Prussia. 
The  Most  difficult  of  all  was  the  problem  of  Poland.    The 

Problem  independence  of  Poland  was  recognised  at  the  first  plenary 
^  ^^^  session  of  the  Peace  Conference  (18th  January,  1919), 
but  the  precise  delimitation  of  its  frontiers  proved  to  be 
no  easy  matter.  That  Poland  should  be  reconstituted  as 
a  Sovereign  State  was  from  August,  1914,  onwards  accepted 
as  one  of  the  cardinal  war-aims  of  the  Allies.  France,  in 
particular,  regarded  the  reconstitution  of  Poland  as  of 
vital  import,  not  merely  to  the  Poles  but  to  the  European 
equilibrium.  The  predominance  of  Prussia  dated  from, 
and  was  largely  dependent  on,  the  annihilation  of  Poland. 
Nothing  would  do  more  to  restore  the  European  equilibrium 
than  its  resurrection.  This  opinion  has  been  tenaciously 
held  by  French  statesmen  of  all  parties  for  at  least  a 
century.  "  La  question  la  plus  exclusivement  Europeenne 
est  celle-qui  concerne  la  Pologne."  Thus  wrote  Talleyrand 
to  Metternich  during  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  "  The 
future  of  Europe  really  depends  on  the  ultimate  destiny 


THE   WORLD   SETTLEMENT  305 

of  Poland."  Sucli  was  the  opinion  of  Napoleon  I.  On 
16th  August,  1914,  M.  Clemenceau  hailed  the  proclamation 
of  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  of  Russia  as  the  birthday  of 
a  new  Poland  :  "  Poland  will  live  again."  The  enthusiasm 
for  Poland  was  hardly  less  pronounced  though  more 
recent  and  less  informed  in  England  than  in  France.  But 
the  reconstitution  of  Poland,  as  some  of  these  enthusiasts 
had  apparently  forgotten,  necessarily  involved  the  dis- 
integration of  Prussia — ^though  not  of  Germany.  The  new 
Poland  includes  practically  all  that  was  taken  from  Poland 
by  Prussia  and  Austria  in  the  partitions  of  the  eighteenth 
century  :  Posen  and  West  Prussia  are  restored  to  her  by 
the  former,  Galicia  by  the  latter.  The  scrupulous  fairness 
of  the  Allies  was  shown  by  the  decision  that  parts  of  East 
Prussia  and  Upper  Silesia,  the  allegiance  and  nationality 
of  which  were  in  doubt,  was  to  be  decided  by  plebiscite. 
In  the  result.  East  Prussia  has  decided  for  Poland  ;  the 
plebiscite  in  Silesia  has  not  yet  been  taken.^  As  to  the 
city  of  Danzig  there  was  great  controversy.  Poland 
depends  on  the  Vistula,  and  the  Vistula  depends  on  Danzig, 
but  racially  Danzig  is  predominantly  Prussian  ;  to  give  it 
to  Poland  would  contravene  the  fashionable  formula ; 
to  give  it  to  Prussia  would  throttle  Poland.  The  city  of 
Danzig,  therefore,  with  the  district  immediately  around  it, 
has  reverted  to  the  position  assigned  to  it  in  the  Treaty 
of  Tilsit ;  it  becomes  a  free  city  under  the  guarantee  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  Poland,  however,  is  to  be  permitted 
to  include  it  within  the  Polish  Customs  frontier,  "  though 
with  a  free  area  within  the  port  "  ;  she  is  to  enjoy  the  use 
of  all  the  city's  waterways  and  docks  and  all  the  port's 
facilities,  the  control  and  administration  of  the  Vistula, 
and  the  whole  through  railway  system  within  the  city, 
and  postal,  telegraphic,  and  telephonic  communication 
between  Poland  and  Danzig  ;  precaution  is  also  taken 
against  discrimination  against  Poles  within  the  city,  and 
its  foreign  relations  and  the  diplomatic  protection  of  its 
citizens  abroad  are  committed  to  Poland.     The   device 

1  Since  these  words  were  written  it  has  been  decided  in  favour  of 
Germany  (21st  March,  1921). 

20 


306  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

adopted  is  clumsy,  and  may  in  practice  be  found  unwork- 
able, but  it  is  at  least  a  transparently  honest  attempt  to 
reconcile  awkward  facts  with  accepted  formulge,  and  to 
do  the  maximum  of  justice  with  the  minimum  of  violence 
to  the  susceptibilities  of  minorities.  Poland  thus  emerges 
from  the  war  an  important  State,  with  an  area  of  120,000 
square  miles  and  a  population  of  at  least  20,000,000. 
The  Of  the  three  Empires  affected  by  the  reconstruction  of 

Empire  ^^  Central  Europe,  that  of  the  Habsburgs  has  suffered  most 
severely  :  as  an  Empire,  as  a  State,  even  as  a  "  Power," 
it  has  been  hterally  wiped  out.  For  four  hundred  years 
that  empire  had  occupied  a  unique  place  in  the  Euro- 
pean polity.  With  none  of  the  conventional  conditions 
of  existence  had  it  ever  complied  :  it  had  no  obvious 
frontiers  ;  its  subjects  were  not  united  by  community  of 
race  or  creed  ;  geographically,  pohtically,  economically, 
and  ethnographically  it  consisted  of  a  congeries  of  antag- 
onistic atoms.  Yet  there  is  no  denying  the  fact  that  it 
has  been  a  convenience,  and  at  times  a  necessity,  to  Europe. 
Endowed  with  a  gift  of  pohtical  adroitness  almost  amount- 
ing to  genius,  proverbially  lucky  in  their  marriage  alhances, 
constantly  aided  by  fortune,  the  Habsburgs  have  for 
centuries  ruled  over  a  mosaic  of  nationalities — Germans, 
Magyars,  Czechs,  Slovaks,  Poles,  Ruthenians,  Roumanians, 
Croats,  Slavs,  ItaUans — with  conspicuous  skill  and  a  large 
measure  of  success. 

This  conglomerate  empire  has  now  by  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  been  dissolved  into  its  constituent  elements. 
Of  these,  Austria  proper  has  been  left  in  a  pitiable  phght. 
Reduced  by  the  creation  of  Czecho-Slovakia,  by  terri- 
torial concessions  to  Poland,  to  Italy,  to  Roumania,  and  to 
Jugo-Slavia,  and  by  separation  from  Hungary,  to  a  State 
with  only  6,000,000  people,  she  is  cut  off  from  access  to  the 
sea,  and  is  denied  the  possibiUty  of  union  with  Germany. 
The  recent  examples  of  Roumania  and  Bulgaria  (to  go 
no  farther  afield)  are  on  record  to  prove  that  this  prohibi- 
tion will  not  prevent  union  should  it  be  desired  by  both 
peoples,  but  in  the  meantime  Austria  presents  to  Europe 
a  peculiarly  perplexing  problem.     Encompassed  by  a  ring 


THE   WORLD   SETTLEMENT  307 

of  small  States,  self-contained,  liigUy  protective  ;  none  too 
friendly  ;  deprived  of  her  natural  sources  of  supply,  denied 
access  to  her  natural  markets,  the  little  State  has  still  to 
maintain  one  of  the  great  European  capitals,  a  city  of 
2,000,000  souls.  The  problem  would  seem  to  be  well- 
nigh  insoluble.  Yet  it  could  hardly  have  been  avoided,  if 
the  territorial  settlement  had  to  be  based  upon  the  pro- 
claimed principles  of  nationality  and  "  self-determina- 
tion." Of  those  principles,  the  Habsburg  Empire  was  the 
negation  incarnate.  If  they  were  to  stand,  the  "  ram- 
shackle "  empire  was  doomed  to  fall.  Nor,  if  moral  re- 
sponsibihty  for  a  stupendous  crime  was  to  be  brought  home 
to  the  guilty  perpetrators,  could  the  Habsburgs  be  per- 
mitted to  escape  the  consequences  of  their  misdeeds. 
True,  Vienna  had  been  for  some  time  past  the  creature  and 
catspaw  of  BerHn  ;  still,  the  match  to  inflammable  material 
was  actually  applied  if  not  by  Vienna,  by  Budapest. 
But  with  all  its  faults  and  crimes  the  Habsburg  Empire 
was  a  political  convenience,  and  it  has  yet  to  be  proved 
that  the  peace  of  Europe  will,  on  balance,  gain  by  its 
dissolution. 

The  first  of  the  new  States  to  arise  on  the  ruins  of  Austria-  Czecho- 
Hungary  was  Czecho-Slovakia,  which  now  consists  of  the  Slovakia 
historic  kingdom  of  Bohemia,  together  with  Moravia  and 
Ruthenian  territory  to  the  south  of  the  Carpathians.     This 
means  an  area  of  some  60,000  square  miles,  and  a  popula- 
tion of  about  eleven  millions.     The  new  Czecho-Slovakia 
proclaimed  its  independence  actually  before  the  Armistice 
was  signed,  and  on  15th  November,   1918,  elected  Dr. 
Masaryk  as   its   President.     Its   independence   was   con- 
firmed in  the  treaty  between  Austria  and  the  Allied  and 
Associated   Powers. ^     Hungary   proclaimed   itself   a   re-  The 
pubHc  on  17th  November,  but  since  the  readjustment  of  J^j^gJ^^^^^ 
frontiers  under  the  Peace  treaties  the  Hungarian  RepubUc 
represents  only  a  shrunken  fragment  of  the  historic  king- 
dom.     In  the  north  a  large  district  has  been  ceded  to 
Czecho-Slovakia,  another   in   the   south   to   Jugo-Slavia, 
and  a  third  in  the  east  to  Roumania.     Hungary  is  thus 
1  Part  III.,  Section  3,  pp.  53-58. 


308  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

reduced  in  population  to  eight  millions,  in  area  to  45,000 
jujr,,.  square  miles.  Jugo-Slavia  represents  the  union  of  the 
siavia  southern  Slav  peoples  as  Poland  and  Czecho-Slovakia 
represent  the  triumph  of  the  northern  Slavs.  The  new 
State  includes,  in  addition  to  Serbia  and  Montenegro,^ 
Bosnia,  the  Herzegovina,  Croatia-Slavonia,  parts  of  Styria, 
Carinthia,  Carniola,  and  practically  the  whole  of  Dalmatia. 
This  triune  kingdom  will  cover  an  area  of  some  75,000 
square  miles,  and  possess  a  population  of  perhaps  ten 
millions. 
Rouiuaiiia  Roumania  is  doubled  in  size  by  the  acquisition  of  Bess- 
arabia (from  Russia),  of  Transylvania,  a  large  part  of  the 
Bukovina,  and  half  the  Banat.-  Bulgaria,  with  whom  a 
Peace  treaty  was  signed  at  Neuilly  (27th  November,  1919), 
has  had  to  pay  the  penalty  of  its  adherence  to  the  Central 
Empires.  Strumnitza,  with  other  territory  on  the  west, 
has  gone  to  Jugo-Slavia,  and  Bulgarian  Macedonia  to 
Greece.  The  rest  of  the  Balkan  settlement  is  embodied 
The  Treaty  in  a  treaty  signed  with  Turkey  at  Sevres  ^  (10th  August, 
of  Sevres  ^^20).  In  the  Ottoman  Turk  the  HohenzoUern  and  the 
Habsburgs  had  found  a  natural  ally.  For  six  and  a  half 
centuries  an  army  of  Asiatic  nomads  had  been  encamped 
upon  European  soil,  but  the  nomads  had  never  absorbed 
the  aboriginal  inhabitants,  nor  even  made  any  serious 
attempt  to  do  so.  So  long,  indeed,  as  the  Turkish  armies 
were  advancing,  Turkish  rule  was  tolerable.  When  the 
Turk  ceased  to  conquer,  he  began  to  tyrannise.  For  the 
last  three  centuries  his  power  has  been  waning,  and  his 
empire  shrinking  with  extreme  rapidity :  more  particularly 
since  Europe  began  to  lisp  the  lessons  of  Nationahty  and 
Liberty.  In  1817  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  Europe  occupied 
an  area  of  218,600  square  miles,  and  included  a  population 
of  19,660,000  souls.  By  1878  the  area  had  contracted  to 
129,500  square  miles,  and  the  population  had  diminished 

1  The  future  status  of  Montenegro  is  still  (1921)  in  doubt. 

2  For  the  history  of  Roumania,  c/.  Marriott  :  Eastern  Questions,  cxi.; 
F.  Dame :  Histoire  de  la  Roumania  contemporaine  (Paris,  1900) ; 
C.  D.  Mavrodin  :  La  Roumania  contemporaine  (Paris,  1915) ;  Seton 
Watson  :  Roumania  and  the  Great  War  (London,  1915). 

^  At  the  moment  of  writing  the  terms  of  the  treaty  are  under  revision. 


THE   WORLD   SETTLEMENT  309 

to  9,600,000.  By  1914  tlie  Sultan  could  count  less  than 
2,000,000  subjects  in  Europe ;  while  his  domain  had 
shrunk  to  10,882  square  miles.  The  Treaty  of  Sevres 
had  virtually  inflicted  the  coup  de  grace.  Under  the  terms 
of  that  treaty,  Turkey  in  Europe  is  practically  reduced 
to  the  city  of  Constantinople  with  a  minimum  of  circum- 
jacent territory.  The  control  of  the  Straits — the  shores 
of  the  Bosphorus,  the  Dardanelles,  and  the  Sea  of  Marmora 
— has  been  confided  to  the  League  of  Nations,  but  it 
remains  to  be  seen  how  the  authority  of  the  League  is  to 
be  enforced.  Syria  has  been  assigned  under  mandate 
to  France,  Palestine  and  Mesopotamia  to  Great  Britain, 
in  each  case  as  mandatories  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
Greece  has  emerged  from  the  war,  thanks  wholly  to  Veni- 
zelos,  with  boundaries  enormously  enlarged ;  Macedonia 
and  Thrace  in  Europe,  Smyrna  and  a  large  strip  of  Asia 
Minor,  together  with  the  Dodecanese  Islands,  excepting 
Rhodes,  have  been  assigned  to  her. 

Rhodes  remains  in  the  possession  of  Italy.  Italy  Italy 
entered  the  war  with  clearly  defined  aims.  Her  object  ^^^^{ 
was  by  the  acquisition  of  Italia  Irredenta  to  complete  the 
work  of  the  Risorgimento.  When  Bismarck  sought  the 
aid  of  Italy  against  Austria  in  1866,  he  offered  Venetia 
as  the  price  of  it.  The  assistance  of  Italy  proved  less 
necessary  and,  to  say  the  truth,  less  valuable  than  Bismarck 
had  anticipated,  consequently  her  "  pound  of  flesh  "  was 
weighed  out  with  niggardly  precision.  She  did,  indeed, 
obtain  Venice,  but  even  the  Trentino  or  southern  Tyrol, 
constituting  her  natural  strategic  frontier,  was  denied  to 
her.  Nor  did  she  obtain  any  part  of  the  Venetian  inheri- 
tance on  the  east  of  the  Adriatic.  Italy  has  always  looked 
forward  to  a  final  reckoning  with  Austria.  Consequently, 
when  the  Great  War  broke  out  it  seemed  that  the  hour  had 
arrived.  Italy,  therefore,  demanded  Gorizia,  Trieste, 
Istria  (including  the  great  naval  harbour  of  Pola),  together 
with  the  Dalmatian  coast,  including  Fiume  and  the 
Dalmatian  Archipelago.  These  demands  not  only  meant 
the  exclusion  of  Austria  from  the  Adriatic,  but  the  denial  of 
some  of  the  essential  claims  of  Jugo-Slavia.      Hence  the 


and  the 
atic 


310  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

delicacy  and  difficulty  of  the  Adriatic  problem.  For  the 
first  nine  months  of  the  war  Italy,  as  we  have  seen,  main- 
tained her  neutrality,  but  in  May,  1915,  she  came  into  the 
war  on  the  side  of  the  Allies  on  terms  which  were  embodied 
in  a  treaty  concluded  between  herself.  Great  Britain,  and 
France  (26th  April,  1915).  The  terms  of  this  "  Pact  of 
London  "  have  never  been  officially  published,  but  it  is 
believed  that  Italy  was  promised  the  district  of  Trentino, 
the  entire  southern  Tyrol  up  to  the  Brenner  Pass,  the 
city  and  district  of  Trieste,  the  county  of  Gorizia  and 
Gradisca,  the  whole  of  Istria  up  to  the  Quarnero,  including 
Volasco  and  the  Istrian  archipelago,  the  "  province  of 
Dalmatia  in  its  present  frontiers,"  together  with  nearly 
all  the  Adriatic  islands  (including  Lissa),  and  the  retention 
of  Valona  and  the  Dodecanese.  The  Adriatic  coast  from 
Volusco  Bay  to  the  northern  frontier  of  Dalmatia,  including 
Fiume  and  the  whole  coast  then  belonging  to  Hungary  or 
Croatia,  together  with  the  ports  of  Spalato,  Kagusa, 
Cattaro,  Antivari,  Dulcigno  and  San  Giovanni  di  Medua, 
were  with  several  of  the  islands  assigned  to  the  future  Jugo- 
slavia. ^  Against  these  concessions  the  friends  of  Serbia 
protested  at  the  time,  and  have  never  ceased  to  protest, 
on  the  ground  that  Dalmatia  is  preponderatingly  Slav,  and 
that  the  possession  not  merely  of  its  hinterland  but  at  least 
some  portion  of  the  coast  and  the  archipelago  is  essential 
to  the  development  and  even  to  the  security  of  Jugo-Slavia. 

Italy  and        So  matters  stood  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Armistice. 

slSa  Italy  and  Serbia  were  alike  entitled  to  the  fullest  considera- 
tion at  the  hands  of  the  other  allies  ;  but  how  were  their 
claims  to  be  reconciled  ?  Flushed  with  a  victory  over 
Austria  to  which  the  Allies  had  largely  contributed,  Italy 
was  determined  to  assert  her  claims  to  the  very  last  island, 
not  only  as  against  Austria,  but  also  against  the  new  triune 
kingdom  of  Jugo-Slavia.  Jugo-Slavia,  on  the  other  hand, 
while  not  ignoring  the  enormous  accretions  of  territory 
secured  by  her  in  the  hinterland,  was  insistent  at  least  on 

^  These  terms  are  taken  from  the  translation  (published  in  the  Man- 
chester Giiardian  of  18th  January,  1918)  of  the  treaty  as  divulged  by  the 
Bolshevik  Government  in  Russia. 


THE   WORLD   SETTLEMENT  ^11 

reasonable  access  to  the  Adriatic,  and  in  particular  was 
immovable  on  the  subject  of  Fiume.  Without  Fiume, 
Croatia-Slavonia  is  virtually  landlocked,  and  with  Trieste 
and  Pola  in  Italian  hands  Fiume  affords  the  only  outlet  for 
the  trade  of  Carinthia,  Carniola,  and  Styria.  In  President 
Wilson  the  Serbs  found  an  ardent  champion  of  their  claims. 
Partly  out  of  genuine  sympathy  for  the  Serbs,  partly  by 
reason  of  a  pedantic  adherence  to  the  fashionable  formulae, 
partly  perhaps  as  a  protest  against  the  "  secret  diplomacy  " 
of  England  and  France,  President  Wilson  offered  through- 
out stout  opposition  to  the  claims  of  Italy.  England  and 
France  desired  not  only  to  deal  fairly  by  both  their  allies, 
but  also  to  procure  a  lasting  settlement  of  the  Adriatic 
problem.  Always,  however,  there  was  in  the  background 
the  Pact  of  London,  to  the  terms  of  which  they  were 
bound. 

Throughout  a  great  part  of  the  year  1919  the  Adriatic 
problem  proved  a  terrible  stumbling-block  in  the  path  of 
the  Allies,  and  more  than  once  it  threatened  to  dissolve 
the  accord  between  them.  Preference  was  given  to  the 
question  by  the  Supreme  Council  on  14th  April ;  but  a 
week  later  Mr.  Wilson  withdrew  from  the  discussion,  and 
on  the  23rd  he  published  a  formal  statement  on  the  question. 
That  statement  was  bitterly  resented  by  the  Italian 
representatives,  who  left  Paris  with  ominous  abruptness 
for  Rome  ;  the  French  Press  cordially  supported  Italy,  and 
an  open  rupture  was  averted  only  by  the  tact  of  Mr.  Lloyd 
George.  He  so  far  succeeded  that  in  December,  1919, 
England,  France,  and  the  United  States  agreed  on  terms 
which  were  presented  to  Italy  almost  in  the  form  of  an 
ultimatum.^  When  Italy  refused  to  accede  to  them, 
England  and  France  were  disposed  to  stand  aside  and  let 
Italy  and  Jugo-Slavia  settle  tilings  between  them. 

Meanwhile    another    grave    complication    had    entered  D'Annun- 
into    the    problem.     Early    in    September,    D'Annunzio  pj^^^g 
— one  of  the  most  romantic  figures  in  Italian  life,  a  great 
poet  and  an  ardent  patriot — had  with  a  body  of  enthusi- 

1  Cf.  Correspondence  relating  to  the  Adriatic  Question,  published  as  a 
"  White  Paper  "  (Cmd.  586  of  1920). 


312  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

astic  volunteers  occupied  Fiume,  and  had  defied  either 
the  Italian  Government  or  the  Jugo-Slavs  to  turn  him 
out.  The  Italian  Government  was  on  the  horns  of  a 
dilemma  :  they  were  threatened  with  revolution  if  they 
attempted  to  expel  D'Annunzio  ;  they  were  threatened 
by  the  wrath  of  the  Powers  if  they  did  not.  Nor  was  the 
position  much  easier  for  the  Jugo-Slav  Government. 
Their  claims  to  Fiume,  whether  based  on  geography, 
ethnography,  or  economics,  are  irresistible ;  it  had  ap- 
parently been  assigned  to  them  even  by  the  Pact  of  London  ; 
and  there  was  increasing  restlessness  among  the  people  at 
the  failure  of  the  Government  to  obtain  a  settlement  of 
this  and  other  outstanding  questions. 
San  Remo  So  matters  stood  when,  towards  the  end  of  April,  1920, 
Conference  ^j^^  English,  French,  and  Italian  Premiers  met  at  San 
Remo.  M.  Trumbitch,  the  Foreign  Minister  of  Jugo- 
slavia, was  invited  to  the  San  Remo  Conference,  but  was 
unable,  owing  to  a  political  crisis  at  home,  to  reach  it  in 
time,  and  proposed  that  the  matters  in  dispute  should  be 
settled  by  direct  negotiation  between  Italy  and  Jugo- 
slavia. Signor  Nitti  assented  to  the  suggestion,  and  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  and  M.  Millerand  cordially  concurred. 
Accordingly,  about  a  month  later,  M.  Pashitch  and  M. 
Trumbitch  met  Signor  Scialoja  at  Pollenza.  Italy  was 
in  a  complaisant  mood.  Signor  Nitti,  indeed,  was  hardly 
less  anxious  for  a  final  settlement  of  the  Adriatic  problem 
than  were  the  Jugo-Slavs  themselves  ;  and  negotiations, 
therefore,  proceeded  favourably  at  Pollenza.  Unfortu- 
nately, before  they  could  be  concluded  they  were  broken 
off  by  a  political  crisis  in  Rome,  and  although  Signor 
Nitti  weathered  the  storm  for  the  moment  his  Ministry 
foundered  on  the  nationalistic  rocks,  and  Signor  Giolitti 
took  office,  with  Count  Sforza  as  Foreign  Secretary. 
Treaty  of  No  government,  however,  could  ignore  a  situation  which 
nS'*^*r2  ^^ily  became  at  once  more  menacing  and  more  grotesque  ; 
1920)  '  early  in  November,  negotiations  were  resumed  at  Rapallo, 
and  there,  on  12th  November,  1920,  a  treaty  was  signed. 
Fiume  was  recognised  by  both  parties  as  independent, 
under  the  guardianship  of  the  League  of  Nations,  mth  the 


THE   WORLD   SETTLEMENT  313 

addition  of  a  narrow  strip  of  coast  territory  north-west- 
wards, towards  Yolusco,  thus  giving  Italy  direct  access  to 
the  independent  State  ;  but  Sushak  with  the  Barosport 
was  to  remain  in  the  hands  of  Jugo-Slavia.  Zara  and  its 
adjacent  communes  were  assigned  to  Italy,  together  with 
the  islands  of  Cherso,  Lussin,  Lagosta,  and  Pelagosa,  with 
the  adjacent  islets  and  rocks.  Lissa,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  given  to  Jugo-Slavia  with  the  rest  of  the  islands,  and 
Dalmatia.  The  frontier  line  between  the  two  States  in 
the  north-east  was  drawn  in  a  sense  favourable  to  Italy, 
but  leaving  under  the  Italian  flag  some  500,000  Slavs  who 
may  give  trouble.  On  the  whole,  a  reasonable  compromise 
was  reached.  "  Neither  a  fort,  nor  a  gun,  nor  a  submarine 
that  is  not  Itahan  ought  to  be  in  the  Adriatic.  Otherwise 
the  present  most  difficult  military  situation  will  be  per- 
petuated, and  will  inevitably  grow  worse  with  time." 
So  Baron  Sonnino's  organ,  the  Giornale  d' Italia,  had  written 
in  April,  1915.  With  Trieste,  Pola,  Lussin,  and  Valona 
in  her  own  hands,  and  with  Fiume  neutralised,  Italy  has 
not  come  far  short,  of  her  wildest  ambition.  The  new 
triune  kingdom,  on  the  other  hand,  will  have  ample 
commercial  access  to  the  Adriatic,  and  provided  it  does 
not  develop  naval  ambitions,  should  have  little  difficulty 
in  maintaining  good  relations  with  her  neighbour.^ 

The  Rapallo  Treaty  was  the  last  of  the  long  series  which 
dealt  with  the  remaking  of  the  map  of  Europe.  Not  less 
significant  were  the  readjustments  necessitated  or  facilitated 
by  the  downfall  of  the  HohenzoUern  and  the  Ottoman 
Turks  in  Africa,  Avsia,  the  Far  East,  and  the  Pacific. 

Of  the  African  settlement  the  broad  fact  is  that  Ger-  Re- 
many,  admitted  to  full  partnership  with  Great  Britain,  Partition 
France,  and  Belgium  in  1884,  no  longer  retains  a  foot  of 
territory  on  the  continent.     German  South- West  Africa 
was  conquered  in  1915  by  a  force  raised  in  the  Union  of 
South  Africa,  commanded  by  General  Botha,  to  whom  it 

^  On  the  Adriatic  question  generally,  c/.  Marriott  :  The.  European 
Commonwealth,  C.  xiv.  ;  Vellay  :  La  Question  d' Adriatique ;  Seton 
Watson  :  The  Adriatic,  Italy  and  the  Southern  Slavs,  and  articles  by 
A.  E.  H.  Taylor  and  others  in  the  Balkan  Review. 


314  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

surrendered  on  9th  July,  1915.  Now  known  as  the  South- 
West  Protectorate,  it  is  held  by  the  Union  of  South  Africa 
under  a  mandate  from  the  League  of  Nations. 
Mandate  By  Articles  118  and  119  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
Weft°"^^'  Gr^^^^^y  renounced  in  favour  of  the  Principal  Allied  and 
Africa  Associated  Powers  all  her  rights  over  her  overseas  posses- 
sions. Article  XXII.  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations  laid  down  that  "  to  those  colonies  and  territories 
which  as  a  consequence  of  the  late  war  have  ceased  to  be 
under  the  Sovereignty  of  the  States  which  formerly 
governed  them,  and  which  are  inhabited  by  peoples  not 
yet  able  to  stand  by  themselves  under  the  strenuous 
conditions  of  the  modern  world,  there  should  be  applied 
the  principle  that  the  well-being  and  development  of 
such  peoples  form  a  sacred  trust  of  civilisation."  It 
further  suggests  that  the  best  way  of  giving  efiect  to  this 
principle  is  that  "  the  tutelage  of  such  peoples  should  be 
entrusted  to  advanced  nations  who  by  reason  of  their 
resources,  their  experience,  or  their  geographical  position, 
can  best  undertake  this  responsibility,  and  who  are  willing 
to  accept  it,  and  that  this  tutelage  should  be  exercised  by 
them  as  mandatories  of  the  League."  The  character  of 
the  mandate  must,  however,  differ  "  according  to  the 
stage  of  the  development  of  the  people,  the  geographical 
situation  of  the  territory,  its  economic  conditions  and 
other  similar  circumstances." 

South- West  Africa  belongs  to  the  third  category  of 
mandates  which  "  can  be  best  administered  under  the 
laws  of  the  mandatory  as  integral  portions  of  its  territory, 
subject  to  the  safeguards  above  mentioned  in  the  interests 
of  the  indigenous  population."  The  mandate  was  offered 
to  and  accepted  by  the  Union  of  South  Africa  on  behalf 
of  Great  Britain  in  accordance  with  terms  laid  down  by 
the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations.  The  terms  enjoin 
upon  the  mandatory  the  duty  of  promoting  to  the  utmost 
*'  the  material  and  moral  well-being  and  the  social  progress 
of  the  inhabitants  "  ;  they  prohibit  slavery,  the  sale  of 
intoxicants  to  natives,  the  establishment  of  military  or 
naval    bases ;    and    provide    for    complete    freedom    of 


AFRICA.    POLITICAL  DIVISIONS  1921 


'BV'taAJ(>i5Wt 


THE   WORLD   SETTLEMENT  315 

conscience,  and  facilities  for  missionaries  and  ministers  of 
all  creeds.^ 

German  East  Africa  was  originally  assigned  to  Great  East 
Britain,  but  in  consequence  of  strong  protests  from  ^^"^^ 
Belgium  was  ultimately  divided  between  the  two  Powers. 
The  British  portion,  now  known  as  the  Tanganyika  Terri- 
tory, lies  inmiediately  to  the  south  of  the  Kenya  Colony 
(formerly  the  British  East  Africa  Protectorate)  ;  it  has  a 
coast-line  of  620  miles,  extending  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Umba  to  Cape  Delgado  ;  an  area  of  some  384,180  square 
miles,  and  an  estimated  pre-war  native  population  of  about 
7,600,000.  Tanganyika  Territory  is  to  be  held  under 
mandate,  but  the  terms  of  it  have  not  yet  been  published. 
The  mandate  for  the  rest  of  German  East  Africa — the 
Provinces  of  Rhuanda  and  Urandi,  together  with  the 
country  round  Lake  Kivu  — has  been  conferred  upon 
Belgium.  A  strip  on  the  east  of  the  Belgian  portion  has, 
however,  been  reserved  to  Great  Britain  to  facilitate  the 
construction  of  the  Cape  to  Cairo  Railway. 

Togoland,  which  surrendered  to  a  Franco-British  force 
in  the  first  month  of  the  war,  was  divided  between  them  : 
about  one-third  of  the  Colony  (some  12,500  square  miles) 
bordering  on  the  Gold  Coast  territories  being  assigned 
to  Great  Britain,  and  the  remainder  to  France.  The 
Cameroons  proved  a  somewhat  harder  nut  to  crack,  and 
did  not  surrender  until  February,  1916.  It  too  has  been 
divided  :  an  area  of  33,000  square  miles  (out  of  191,130), 
extending  from  the  coast  along  the  Nigerian  frontier  up 
to  Lake  Chad,  has  been  assigned  to  Great  Britain,  the  rest 
to  France. 

East  Africa,  Togoland,  and  tlie  Cameroons  are  all  held  West 
by  their  respective  assignees  under  mandate  from  the  "^* 
League  of  Nations.  These  mandates,  however,  will 
presmnably  belong,-  not,  like  that  for  the  South-West 
Protectorate,  to  Class  C,  but  to  Class  B.,  which  differs  in 
two  important  respects  from  the  former.  On  the  one  hand, 
the   "  mandated  Colony  "  does  not  become  an  integral 

1  The  mandate  is  now  officially  published.     (Cmd.  1204,  1921.) 

2  These  mandates  have  not  yet  (March,  1921)  been  published. 


316  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

portion  of  the  territory  of  the  mandatory  ;  on  the  other, 
the  mandates  secure  "  equal  opportunities  for  the  trade 
and  commerce  of  other  members  of  the  League."  No 
such  provision  is  contained  either  in  the  mandate  for 
South- West  Africa  or  in  those  for  the  Pacific  islands. 
The  insertion  of  such  a  provision  would  plainly  have 
proved  too  embarrassing  to  the  Union  of  South  Africa 
in  the  one  case  ;  to  Australia  and  New  Zealand  in  the 
other.  Hence  the  necessity  for  the  distinction  contained 
in  the  Covenant. 

Portugal  put  in  a  claim  to  a  share  in  the  re-partition  of 
Africa,  but  after  careful  consideration  it  was  disallowed. 

The  general  result  of  the  partition  may  be  summarised 
as  follows  :  out  of  the  12,500,000  persons  who  were  in  1914 
living  under  the  German  flag  in  Africa  42  per  cent,  have 
been  transferred  to  the  guardianship  of  the  British 
Empire,  33  per  cent,  to  that  of  France,  and  25  per  cent, 
to  Belgium.^  The  settlement  would  seem  in  the  main 
to  accord  with  the  principle  laid  down  by  Mr.  Wilson, 
who  insisted  that  there  should  be :  "A  free,  open- 
minded,  and  absolutely  impartial  adjustment  of  all  colonial 
claims,  based  upon  a  strict  observance  of  the  principle 
that  in  determining  all  such  questions  of  sovereignty  the 
interests  of  the  populations  concerned  must  have  equal 
weight  with  the  equitable  claims  of  the  Government  whose 
title  is  to  be  determined."  '^  If  there  was  one  point  upon 
which  every  African  native  who  had  ever  lived  under 
German  rule  was  resolved,  it  was  that  under  no  circum- 
stances would  he  voluntarily  remain  under  or  return  to  it. 
In  the  court  of  historic  judicature  Germany  had  plainly 
forfeited  the  kingdom  to  which,  with  the  general  assent 
of  her  European  neighbours,  she  had  succeeded  ;  it  was 
high  time  in  the  interests  of  the  native  peoples  that  an- 
other should  take  it.  For  the  protection  of  those  interests 
in  the  future,  every  possible  security  has  been  taken  in  the 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  :  should  that  Covenant 
be  broken,  a  grim  reckoning  will  await  the  offender. 

*  History  of  the  Peace  Conference  at  Paris,  ii.  244. 

-  Address  of  8th  January,  1918,  "  The  Fourteen  Points." 


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THE   AVORLD   SETTLEMENT  317 

In  regard  to  the  Pacific  settlement  there  was  some  The 
little  difficulty  at  Paris,  mainly  between  the  British  Im-  ^^^^ 
perial  authorities  and  those  who  represented  primarily 
Australasian  interests.  "  One  of  the  most  striking 
features  of  the  Conference,"  said  Mr.  Hughes,  the  Premier 
of  the  Australian  Commonwealth,  "  was  the  appalling 
ignorance  of  every  nation  as  to  the  affairs  of  every  other 
nation — its  geographical,  racial,  historical  conditions,  or 
traditions."  ^  The  safety  of  Australia,  so  her  sons  have 
consistently  maintained,  demands  that  the  great  rampart 
of  islands  stretching  around  the  north-east  of  Australia 
should  be  held  by  the  Australian  Dominion  or  by  some 
Power  (if  there  be  one  ?)  in  whom  they  have  absolute 
confidence.  At  Paris  Mr.  Hughes  made  a  great  fight  to 
obtain  the  direct  control  of  them  ;  worsted  in  that  by  the 
adherence  to  Mr.  Wilson's  formulas,  Australia  was  forced 
to  accept  the  principle  of  the  mandate,  but  her  representa- 
tives were  careful  to  insist  that  the  mandate  should  be  in  a 
form  consistent  not  only  with  their  national  safety  but 
with  their  "  economic,  industrial,  and  general  welfare." 

In  plain  English  that  meant  the  maintenance  of  a 
"  White  Australia  "  and  a  preferential  tariff.  On  both 
points  Australia  found  herself  in  direct  conflict  with  Japan, 
but,  despite  the  formal  protest  and  reservation  of  the 
latter,  the  mandates  for  the  ex-German  possessions  in  the 
Pacific  have  been  issued  in  the  form  desired  by  the  British 
Dominions  :  i.e.  in  the  same  form  ("  C")  as  that  accepted 
for  South-West  Africa.^ 

The  islands  north  of  the  Equator,  namely,  the  Marshall, 
Caroline,  Pelew,  and  Ladrone  Islands,  go  to  Japan,  as  does 
Kiaochow  ;  those  south  of  the  Equator  to  the  British 
Empire  or  its  Dominions  :  the  Bismarck  Archipelago, 
German  New  Guinea,  and  those  of  the  Solomon  Islands 
formerly  belonging  to  Germany,  to  Australia  ;  German 
Samoa  to  New  Zealand,  and  Nauru  to  the  British  Empire 
— in  all  cases  under  mandate.^ 

^  Commonwealth  of  Australia:  Parliamentary  Debates,  No.  87,  p.  12,173. 
»  Supra,  p.  314,  and  Cmd.  1201,  1202,  1203. 

^  For  the  British  mandates,  see  Times,  9th  February,  1921  ;  for 
the  Jap  (Caroline  Islands),  Times,  9th  March,  1921. 


potainia 


318  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

Conquered  by  British  forces  during  the  war/  Palestine 
remained  in  their  occupation  until  1st  July,  1920 ;  as  from 
that  date  the  country  passed  under  the  rule  of  a  British 
High  Commissioner,  Sir  Herbert  Samuel.  Under  the 
Treaty  of  Sevres,  Turkey  renounced  all  rights  and  title 
over  the  country  in  favour  of  the  Principal  AlUed  Powers, 
Palestine  who  Conferred  the  mandate  upon  Great  Britain.  In  ac- 
and  Meso-  cordauce  with  Mr.  Balfour's  declaration  of  2nd  November, 
1917,  Great  Britain  has  undertaken  to  place  the  country 
under  such  conditions,  political,  administrative,  and 
economic,  as  will  secure  the  establishment  of  "  a  national 
home  for  the  Jewish  people,"  will  develop  self-governing 
institutions,  and  will  safeguard  the  civil  and  religious 
rights  of  all  the  inhabitants  of  Palestine  irrespective 
of  race  and  reUgion.  English,  Arabic,  and  Hebrew 
are  to  be  the  official  languages  of  Palestine,  and 
the  most  stringent  precautions  are  taken  for  secur- 
ing freedom  of  conscience  and  equality  of  commercial 
privileges.^ 

In  the  case  of  Palestine  a  British  Protectorate  of  indefinite 
duration  would  seem  to  be  contemplated.     It  is  otherwise 
in  regard  to  Mesopotamia.     Like  Palestine  it  is  lost  to 
Turkey,  and  is  entrusted  to  the  guardianship  of  Great 
Britain,  but  specifically  with  a  view  to  the  "  progressive 
development  of  Mesopotamia  as  an  Independent  State.'* 
Mesopo-      To  that  end  the  Organic  Law,  to  be  framed  within  the 
tamia         shortest  possible  time  "  not  exceeding  three  years  "  from 
the  coming  into  force  of  the  mandate,  must  be  designed. 
For  the  rest,  the  draft  mandate  follows  the  same  lines  as 
that  for  Palestine. 
Syria  Syria  is,  under  the  Treaty  of  Sevres,  declared  independent 

of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  and  has  been  confided  under 
mandate  to  France  ;  but  the  local  situation  has  been  com- 
plicated by  the  proclamation  (March,  1920)  as  King  of  S3n:ia 
of  the  Emir  Feisul,  son  of  the  King  of  the  Hedjaz,  and  it 
is  not  possible  at  present  to  forecast  the  issue.    The  same 

1  Supra,  p.  283. 

2  The  mandate  (Cmd.  1176),  like  that  for  Mesopotamia,  has  not  yet 
been  confirmed  by  the  League  of  Nations. 


THE   WORLD   SETTLEMENT  319 

uncertaiuty  prevails  as  to  the  final  disposition  of  the  other 
provinces  formerly  belonging  to  the  Ottoman  Empire  in 
Asia. 

From  what  has  been  said  in  preceding  paragraphs  one  tuo 
point  seems  clearly  to  emerge  :  that  the  whole  of  the  nISs"^ 
cement  for  the  vast  edifice  erected  with  so  much  labour  by 
the  diplomatists  at  Paris  is  provided  by  the  Covenant  of 
the  League  of  Nations.  The  text  of  that  Covenant  is 
prefixed  to  all  the  principal  Treaties  concluded  between  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Powers  and  their  late  enemies.  The 
drafting  and  elaboration  of  its  provisions  occupied  much 
of  the  time  and  thought  of  some  of  the  leading  states- 
men of  the  world  at  the  Peace  Conference.  Whether  the 
procedure  adopted  was  the  best ;  whether  it  was  wise  to 
incorporate  the  Covenant  in  the  text  of  the  Treaties  of 
Peace  ;  whether  it  would  not  have  been  better  first  to 
formulate  the  terms  to  be  imposed  upon  Germany  and 
her  allies,  and  then  to  have  proceeded  to  elaborate  the 
Covenant,  are  questions  on  which  there  is  room  for  legiti- 
mate difierence  of  opinion.  But,  as  things  are,  the  whole 
structure  rests  to  a  large  extent  upon  the  observance 
of  the  Covenant. 

That  Covenant,  therefore,  demands  analysis.  Having  The 
proclaimed  that  the  purpose  of  the  High  Contracting  ^[^^"^"^ 
Parties  is  "to  promote  international  co-operation  and  to  League 
achieve  international  peace  and  security  by  the  acceptance 
of  obligations  not  to  resort  to  war,"  it  proceeds  to  lay  down 
rules  as  to  the  membership,  the  government,  and  the  pro- 
cedure of  the  League.  Membership  is  to  be  open  to  any 
fully  self-governing  State,  Dominion,  or  Colony,  which  is 
prepared  to  give  effective  guarantees  for  adherence  to  the 
priQciples  and  observance  of  the  rules  of  the  League, 
provided  its  admission  is  agreed  by  two-thirds  of  the 
Assembly.  The  government  of  the  League  is  vested  in 
an  Assembly  and  a  Council,  and  the  administration  of  its 
affairs  is  provided  for  by  the  establishment  of  a  permanent 
Secretariat.  The  Assembly  consists  of  representatives  of 
all  the  members  of  the  League  ;  each  member  has  one 
vote  and  may  have  not  more  than  three  representatives. 


320 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


The  First 
Assembly 
of  the 
I^eague, 
Geneva, 
15th  Nov. 
to  18th 
Dec.  1920 


The 
Council 


The  Assembly  must  meet  at  stated  intervals,  and  decisions 
must  be  unanimous. 

The  first  Assembly,  convoked,  in  accordance  with  Article 
XV.  of  the  Covenant,  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  met  at  Geneva — the  present  "  seat  "  of  the  League, 
on  15th  November,  1920,  and  sat  continuously  until  18th 
December.  Forty-one  countries  (including  the  British 
Dominions  and  India)  were  represented.  Much  useful 
work  was  accomplished.  Procedure  was  defined,  and  it 
was  decided  that  the  Assembly  should  meet  annually  on  the 
first  Monday  in  September,  and  normally  at  Geneva.  By 
far  its  most  important  work  was  the  creation  (in  accordance 
with  Article  XIV.  of  the  Covenant)  of  a  Permanent  Court 
of  International  Justice.  The  Court  is  to  consist  of  eleven 
judges  holding  office  for  nine  years,  and  to  sit  annually  at 
the  Hague.  A  point  keenly  discussed  was  whether  or  no  the 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  should  be  obligatory  upon 
any  nation  accepting  it.  Ultimately  it  was  decided  that 
no  nation  should  be  compelled  to  appear,  unless  it  had 
specifically  accepted  the  jurisdiction  as  obligatory.  On 
the  vital  question  of  the  reduction  of  armaments,  nothing 
very  definite  was  accomplished,  though  recommendations 
in  favour  of  the  estabhshment  of  commissions  to  explore 
difierent  aspects  of  the  problem  were  adopted.  The 
Assembly  itself  set  up  technical  organisations  to  deal  with 
Economics  and  Finance,  with  Transit  and  International 
Hygiene.  Other  questions  were  somewhat  inconclusively 
attacked,  but  six  new  States — including  Austria  and 
Bulgaria — were  admitted  to  membership  of  the  League. 

The  Council  is  to  consist  of  representatives  of  the 
Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  (that  is,  the  "  big 
Five  "),  together  with  four  other  members  of  the  League 
to  be  nominated  by  the  Assembly.  These  four  members 
were  in  the  first  instance  nominated  in  the  Covenant : 
Belgium,  Brazil,  Spain,  and  Greece.  In  place  of  the  last, 
the  Assembly  nominated  China.  On  the  Council  each 
member  may  have  only  one  representative  and  one  vote, 
and  decisions  must  be  unanimous. 

The  relation  of  the  Council  to  the  Assembly  was  purposely 


THE   AVOELD  SETTLEMENT  321 

left  undefined  in  the  Covenant,  but  formed  the  subject  of 
inquiry  and  discussion  at  Geneva,  where  it  was  decided 
that  the  Council  was  not  to  be  regarded  as  standing  to 
the  Assembly  in  the  relation  either  of  a  Second  Chamber  or 
an  Executive,  but  that  both  bodies  might  discuss  and 
examine  any  matter  which  is  within  the  competence  of 
the  League.  Plainly  this  is  a  question  which  only  time 
can  determine.  Over-precise  definition  would  lead  only 
to  ossification.  If  the  League  is  to  become  a  vital  force 
in  international  affairs  it  must  grow  into  and  up  to  its 
duties,  and  must  gradually  evolve  its  own  Constitution. 
The  Council,  which  must  meet  at  least  once  a  year,  held 
its  first  meeting  in  Paris  in  January,  1920,  and  in  the 
course  of  fifteen  months  has  held  twelve  sittings.  Its 
work,  therefore,  has  been  virtually  continuous. 

Apart  from  the  Council,  continuity  is  to  be  secured  by  a  Permanent 
permanent  Secretariat  established  at  the  seat  of  the '  ^^^®*'*"* 
League.  The  first  Secretary-General,  Sir  Eric  Drummond, 
was  named  in  the  Annex  of  the  Covenant.  Thereafter 
he  is  to  be  nominated  by  the  Council  and  approved  by  a 
majority  of  the  Assembly.  Upon  the  efficiency  of  the 
Secretariat  almost  everything,  it  is  obvious,  will  depend. 

Such  are  the  organs  of  the  League.  Its  primary  function  Functions 
is  to  maintain  peace  among  its  own  members ;  its  second,  LealSe 
to  maintain  it  in  the  world  at  large.  This  purpose  it  hopes 
to  achieve  (Articles  VllI.-XVII.)  by  a  limitation  of  arma- 
ments ;  a  mutual  guarantee  of  territorial  integrity  and 
independence  ;  a  mutual  agreement  not  to  resort  to  arms 
until  an  attempt  to  settle  a  dispute  by  peaceful  means 
has  been  made ;  the  provision  of  machinery  for  facilitating 
such  peaceful  settlement,  of  sanctions  for  the  breach  of 
the  agreement  mentioned  above  ;  and  for  settling  disputes 
in  which  States,  non-members  of  the  League,  are  con- 
cerned. One  point  in  this  connection  is  important :  the 
League  has  no  power  to  dictate  to  its  members  the  size  of 
their  armaments,  though  the  Council  may  make  suggestions. 
No  member  of  the  League  may,  however,  make  war  upon 
another  member  without  submitting  the  dispute  either 
to  arbitration  or  to  the  Council,  or  without  waiting  for 

21 


322  EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 

three  months  after  the  award,  or  in  defiance  of  the  award, 
provided  all  the  members  of  the  Council  not  parties  to  the 
dispute  assent  to  it.  Should  any  State  break  this  most 
essential  article  of  the  Covenant  all  the  other  members  are 
pledged  to  break  ofi  all  relations,  including  trade  and 
financial  relations,  with  the  offending  State,  and  resort,  if 
necessary,  to  armed  force.  How  precisely  that  force  is  to 
be  supplied  remains  one  of  the  problems  to  be  solved. 
Treaties  All  treaties  are  henceforward  to  be  (1)  public ;  (2)  liable 
anei  Agree-  ^  recousideration  at  the  instance  of  the  Assembly  ;  and 
(3)  consonant  with  the  terms  of  the  Covenant.  The 
members  of  the  League  further  pledge  themselves  to  secure, 
both  in  their  own  coimtries  and  in  all  countries  with  whom 
they  have  dealings,  "  fair  and  humane  conditions  of  labour 
for  men,  women,  and  children  "  ;  and  also  just  treatment 
of  the  native  inhabitants  of  territories  under  their  control ; 
to  entrust  the  League  with  the  supervision  over  the  execu- 
tion of  agreements  in  regard  to  the  traffic  in  women  and 
children,  in  opium  and  other  dangerous  drugs,  and  in 
arms  and  ammunition ;  and,  finally,  to  take  steps  in  the 
matter  of  international  hygiene,  to  maintain  equitable 
treatment  for  the  commerce  of  aU  members,  and  to  secure 
freedom  of  communications  and  transit. 

With  most  of  these  matters  a  beginning  has  already  been 
made.  Mandates,  too,  have  already,  as  we  have  seen, 
been  drafted  applicable  to  the  different  types  of  dependent 
communities  as  contemplated  by  Article  XXII.  of  the 
Covenant ;  but  as  to  the  precise  terms  of  these  mandates 
some  disquietude  prevails. 
Projects  Such,  in  rough  outline,  are  the  main  provisions  of  a 

of  Peace  Covenant  designed  to  initiate  an  experiment  in  the  organisa- 
tion of  peace.  The  experiment,  though  not  the  first  of  its 
kind,  is  incomparably  the  most  important.  Ever  since 
the  final  dissolution  of  the  unified  system,  in  Church  and 
State,  bequeathed  to  the  world  by  the  Roman  Empire, 
ever  since  the  emergence  of  the  nation-State,  and  the 
evolution  of  a  European  polity  based  upon  the  recognition 
of  the  independence  and  equal  rights  of  a  number  of 
separate  States,  men  have  been  feeling  after  the  discovery 


THE  WORLD  SETTLEMENT  323 

of  some  principle  or  device  which  should  redeem  Europe 
from  the  condition  of  international  anarchy  to  which  it 
seemed  to  be  committed  by  the  predominance  of  the 
nation-State.  Le  nouveau  Cynee  of  Emeric  Crucee ;  the 
Great  Design  of  Henri  IV.,  or  of  his  Minister,  Sully  ; 
the  De  Jure  'Belli  et  Pacis  of  Hugo  Grotius  (1625) ; 
William  Penn's  Essay  towards  the  Present  and  Future 
Peace  of  Europe  (1693) ;  the  famous  Projet  de  traits  pour 
rendre  la  paix  perpetuelle  of  Charles  Irenee  Castel,  Abbe  de 
Saint-Pierre  (1713)  ;  Immanuel  Kant's  essay  on  Perpetual 
Peace  (1795) — all  these  contain  one  or  more  anticipations 
of  the  ideas  which  have  taken  shape  in  the  Covenant  of 
the  League  of  Nations  ;  they  all  represent  attempts — 
mostly  made  after  periods  of  prolonged  war — to  escape 
from  a  state  of  chaos  and  war  and  to  discover  some  basis 
for  a  social  compact  among  the  nations  which  should 
restore  to  the  world  the  supreme  blessing  of  peace  ;  they 
all  sought  to  substitute  for  the  rude  arbitrament  of  war  the 
procedure  of  an  international  court  and  the  sanctions  of 
international  law.  To  not  one  of  these  schemes  was  there 
given  a  chance  of  practical  application. 

The  first  practical  attempt  to  organise  peace  was  made  The  Holy 
by  the  Czar  Alexander  I.,  and  took  shape  in  the  Holy  ^w*«^« 
Alliaiice  of  1815.  That  attempt  failed  not  because  it  was 
not  made  in  good  faith,  nor  because  it  was  a  "  league  of 
autocrats,"  but  partly  because  the  settlement  which  the 
Alliance  was  designed  to  perpetuate  was  based  upon  effete 
and  outworn  principles,  and  still  more  because  the  august 
allies  felt  constraiued,  in  order  to  maintain  international 
peace,  to  intervene  in  the  domestic  politics  of  the  allied 
States.  In  brief,  the  Alliance  foundered  upon  the  rock  of 
intervention  and  by  reason  of  the  difficulty  of  discerning 
between  external  and  internal  affairs. 

Is  this  difficulty  inherent  in  every  attempt  to  organise 
international  peace  1  Can  a  League  of  Free  Nations 
avoid  the  pitfall  in  which  the  Alliance  of  Autocrats  was 
engulfed  ?  Is  it  possible  to  reconcile  the  idea  of  an  inter- 
national Polity  with  the  adequate  recognition  of  the 
rights  of  individual  nationhood  ?     Upon  what  sanction 


324  EUROPE  AND  BEYOND 

can  a  court  of  international  justice  rely  without  risk  of 
offence  to  the  legitimate  susceptibilities  of  the  constituent 
States  ? 

These  are  obstinate  questions.  Upon  the  finding  of 
satisfactory  answers  the  whole  fabric  of  civilisation  would 
seem  to  depend.  "If,"  said  Lord  Grey  of  Fallodon,  "  the 
world  cannot  organise  against  war,  if  war  must  go  on, 
then  the  nations  can  protect  themselves  henceforth  only 
by  using  whatever  destructive  agencies  they  can  invent, 
till  the  resources  and  inventions  of  science  end  by  destroying 
the  Humanity  they  were  meant  to  serve." 

The  League  of  Nations  represents  an  attempt  to  organise 
the  world  against  war.  The  task  it  essays  is  obviously 
one  of  supreme  difficulty ;  the  machinery  of  the  League 
is  at  present  embryonic  ;  its  members  are  painfully  feeling 
their  way  ;  the  ideals  it  professes  offer  an  easy  butt  to 
the  cynic  and  the  pessimist.  Yet  who  but  a  cynic  would 
deny  to  the  experiment,  admittedly  doubtful,  a  chance 
of  demonstrating,  if  not  its  success  at  least  its  failure  ? 
And  even  the  cynic  may  be  invited  to  formulate  his  alter- 
native. Is  there  indeed  any  alternative  save  that  the 
nations  should  be  crushed  under  the  burden  of  armaments, 
and  when  that  burden  can  no  longer  be  endured  that 
civiUsation  itself  should  perish  under  the  shock  of  the 
inevitable  explosion  ?  The  League  of  Nations  may  be  the 
imsubstantial  dream  of  the  doctrinaire,  but  the  prospect 
opened  by  the  only  practical  alternative  is  far  from  alluring. 

The  Treaties  of  Versailles,  St.  Germain,  Neuilly,  Sevres, 
and  Rapallo  have  closed  a  distinct  epoch  in  world- 
history  ;  the  future  alone  can  tell  whether  they  have 
opened  another. 

AUTHORITIES 

Text  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  between  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  and 

Germany,  1919.     (Cmd.  153.)     Price  48. 
Index  to  the  above,  1920.     (Cmd.  516.)     Price  6d. 
Text  of  Peace  Treaty  with  Austria,  1919.     (Cmd.  400.)     Price  Is.  6d. 
Text  of  Peace,  Treaty  with  Turkey,  1920.     (Cmd.  964. )     Price  3s. 


THE   WORLD  SETTLEMENT  325 

Text  of  Peace  Treaty  with  the  Serb-Croat- Slovene  State,  1919.     (Cmd.  461.) 

Price  Id. 
Text  of  Peace  Treaty  with  Bulgaria,  1920.     (Cmd.  522. )     Price  Is.  3d. 
Text  of  Peace  Treaty  ivith  Roumania,  1920.     (Cmd.  588.)     Price  Id. 
Text  of  Peace  Treaty  with  Hungary,  1920.     (Cmd.  896. )     Price  2s. 
Text  of  Treaty  of  Rapallo,  1920.     (Cmd.  1238.)     Price  Id. 
Convention  of  United  Kingdom  and  Belgium,  1920.     (Cmd.  517.)     Price 

4s. 
Convention  of  Greece  and  Bulgaria,  1920.     (Cmd.  589.)     Price  Id. 
Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations.     (Cmd.  151.)     Price  2d. 
International  Labour  Conference  (League  of  Nations).     (Cmd.  1174.) 

Price  3d. 
(ed,  H.  W.  V.  Temperley)  :    The  Peace  Conference  of  Paris  (3  vols. 

thus  far  published),  1920. 
E.  J.  Dillon  :   The  Peace  Conference,  1919. 
R.Lansing:  The  Pecuce  Negotiations.     (1921.) 
The  Covenant  Explained.     (League  of  Nations  Union.)     Price  Is. 
Sir  Geoffrey  Butler  :  Handbook  of  the  League  of  Nations  :  The  First 

Assembly.     (League  of  Nations  Union.) 
C.B.Fletcher:  The N ew Pacific.     (1918.) 


INDEX 


Abbas  II.,  282. 
Abdul  Aziz,  Sultan,  53. 
Abdul  Hamid,  Sultan,  217,  219. 
Abdur  Rahman,  118,  119. 
Aberdeen,  Fourth  Earl  of,  129. 
Adriatic,  problem  of,  309. 
Aerenthal,  Baron  von,  225. 
Afghanistan,  114,  116,  117,  209. 
Africa,  Europe  in,  75. 

—  exploration  of,  82. 

—  German  East,  292,  315. 

—  German     South  -  West,    292, 
314. 

—  North,  75. 

—  partition  of,  85,  88. 

and    the   Treaty  of    Ver- 

saiUes,  313. 

—  South,  4. 

—  West,  200,  291,  315. 
Agadir,  211. 
Alabama,  the,  141. 
Albania,  236,  240,  252. 
Alexander  I.,  Czar  of  Russia,  10. 
Alexander  II.,  Czar,  72,  185. 
Alexander  III.,  Czar,  64,  73,  77, 

105,  107,  110. 
Alexander,  King  of  Serbia,  221. 
Alexander,  Prince  of  Battenberg, 

64,  65,  66. 
Alexander,    Prince    of     Bulgaria, 

105. 
Alexandria,  bombardment  of,  95. 
Algeciras,  Conference  of,  21,  29, 

204. 
Allenby.  Sir  Edmund  (Lord),  283. 
Alliance,  the  Holy,  323. 
Alsace-Lorraine,  26,  258,  267,  302. 

—  and  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
302. 

American  Civil  War,  140. 


Amherst,  Earl,  mission  to  China, 

165. 
Andrassy,  Count,  52,  72. 

—  Note,  the,  52. 
Anglo-American   relations  (1783- 

1898),  139. 
Anglo  -  Congolese  Convention 

(1894),  100. 
Anglo-French  Convention  (1904), 

200. 

—  Entente,  197. 

—  relations,  192. 

Anglo -German  Agreement  (1890), 
87,  88,  100. 

—  Agreement  (1893),  192. 

—  Treaties    (1890     and     1898), 
192. 

,  Anglo- Japanese     Treaty     (1902), 
I  179,  181. 

I  Anglo-Russian  Agreement  (1907), 
119,  208. 

Annam,  172. 

Antwerp,  268. 

Aquinaldo,  134,  135. 

Armed  Peace,  the  (1908),  12,  21. 

Armenia,  253. 

Arrow,  the,  169. 

Asia,  Central,  115. 

Asquith,  Right  Hon.  H.  H.,  284. 

Atbara,  battle  of,  100. 

Ausgleich,  the  (1867),  222. 

Australia,  4. 

—  and  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
317. 

Austria,  6. 

—  and  Hungary,  222. 

—  and  Serbia,  22,  226,  262. 

—  and  the  Slavs,  222. 
Austria -Hungary  and  the  Balkans, 

220. 


327 


328 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


Austria- Hungary  and  Serbia,  255. 

—  and  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
306. 

Baghdad  Railway,  211,  218. 
Bakunin,  184. 

Balfour,  Right  Hon.  A.  J.,  213. 
Balkan  Insurrection  (1875),  51. 

—  League,  War  of,  22,  237. 
the  (1911),  233. 

—  War  of  Partition  (1913),  245. 

—  ■ —  the  second,  22. 

Baring,  Sir  Evelyn  (see  Cromer),  97. 
Basutos,  the,  146. 
Bavaria,  27. 

Beaconsfield,  Earl  of,  59,  61,  63, 
95. 

—  (see  Disraeli). 

Beatty,  Admiral  Sir  David  (Earl), 

297. 
Belfort,  26. 
Belgium,  3,  265. 
—  and  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 

303. 
Berlin  Conference  (1884-5),  87. 

—  Conference  of  (1890),  192. 

—  Memorandum,  53. 

—  Treaty  of  1878,  226. 
Bessarabia,  61,  278. 
Bismarck,  Otto  von  (Count),  31, 

32,  36,  60-72,   76-81,  89-90, 
106,  137,  196,  258. 

—  and  the  Balkans,  216. 

—  and  France  (1875),  43. 

—  and  Protection,  34. 

—  rule  of,  19. 

—  and  Russia,  108. 

—  and  State  Socialism,  34. 
Bloemfontein     Convention,     the 

(1854),  146. 
Boer  Republics,  the,  142. 

—  Trek,  the  great,  145. 

—  War,  the  (1880),  152. 

(1889-1902),  143,  157. 

Bosnia,  220,  226. 

—  and  Herzegovina,  52,  55,  61. 
Botha,  General  Louis,  159,  291. 
Boulanger,  General,  104. 
Bowring,  Sir  John,  169. 

Boxer  Rising,  178. 
Brest-Litovsk,  Treaty  of    (1917), 
288. 


Brussels,  267. 

—  International  Conference 
(1876),  83. 

Bucharest,  Peace  of  (1913),  22. 

—  Treaty  of  (1913),  246. 
(1918),  279. 

Bukovina,  278. 

Bulgaria,  3,  62,  63,  71,  250. 

—  independence  of,  220. 

—  Prince  Ferdinand  of,  216. 
Bulgarian  atrocities,  55. 
BuUer,  Sir  Redvers,  157,  158. 
Biilow,  Prince  B.  von,  193. 
Bund,  the  (1815),  25. 
Bundesrath,  the,  28,  29. 
Burnes,  Captain  Alexander,  114, 

115. 
Butler,  Dr.  Nicholas  Murray,  140. 

Cambodia,    French    Protectorate 

in,  172. 
Cambon,  Monsieur  Jules,  255. 

—  Monsieur  Paul,  197,  255. 
Cameroons,  the,  192. 
Canada,  4. 

Canning,  George,  129. 
Cape  Colony,  143,  147,  148. 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  the,  144. 
Caporetto,  battle  of,  286. 
Carnarvon,  Lord,  148,  160. 
Carol,  Prince  of  Roumania,  65,  78. 
Catherine  11. ,  Empress  of  Russia, 

48. 
Cavagnari,  Sir  Louis,  117. 
Cetewayo,  150. 
Chartered  Company  of  East  Africa, 

154. 

—  —  of  South  Africa,  154. 
Chamberlain,  Right  Hon.  Joseph, 

156,  157,  193. 
Chelmsford,  Lord,  151. 
China,  120,  121,  122. 

—  Boxer  Rising, -i  78. 

—  English  in,  165. 

—  first  war  witli,  167. 

—  second  war  with,  169. 

—  Treaty  Ports,  168. 

Chino -Japanese    War    (1894-95), 

174. 
Clemenceau,  Monsieur,  302. 
Cleveland,    President,    129,    130, 

131. 


INDEX 


329 


Cochin-China,  172. 
Colenso,  158. 
Colley,  Sir  George,  152. 
Commune,  the,  38,  40. 
Condominium,  the,  137. 
Congo,  214. 

—  Free  State,  84. 
Conscription  in  Great  Britain,  284. 
Constantine,  King  of  Greece,  275, 

280. 
Constantinople,  47,  256,  273,  309. 

—  Conference  of  (1876),  55. 
Convention  of  London  (1884),  153. 
Conrbet,  Admiral,  172. 

Cretan  Insurrection,  66. 

Crete,  66,  68,  220,  249. 

Crimea,  48. 

Crimean  War,  50,  114,  120. 

Cromer,  Earl  of,  93,  95,  99. 

Cuba,  132,  133. 

Cyprus,  13,  272,  282. 

—  Convention  of,  61,  216. 
Czecho -Slovakia  and  the  Treaty  of 

Versailles,  307. 

Danish  Duchies,  25. 

D'Annunzio,  Signor,  311. 

Dante,  11. 

Danubian  Principalities  (see  Rou- 
mania),  3. 

Danzig  and  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, 305. 

Dardanelles  Expedition,  273. 

Delarey,  General,  159. 

Delbriick,  Dr.  Hans,  14. 

Delcasse,  Monsieur,  195,  203. 

Denmark,  207. 

Derby,  Earl  of,  55,  58,  93. 

De  Tocqueville  quoted,  140. 

De  Wet,  General,  159. 

DisraeU,  Benjamin,  Earl  of  Bea- 
consfield,  53,  59-63,  92. 

Doctrine  of  Power,  17. 

Dodecanese  Archipelago,  232. 

Dogger  Bank  incident,  183. 

"Dover  Patrol,"  tlie,  298. 

Draga,  Queen,  221. 

Drakensberg,  the,  145. 

Drang  nach  Osten,  the,  70,  71. 

Dreikaiserbund,  19,  36,  60,  71. 

Dual  AUiance  (1879),  72. 

Dufferin,  Marquis  of,  97,  119. 


Duma,  first  Russian,  186. 

—  second,  187. 

—  third,  188. 

Dutch  East  India  Company,  the, 
144. 

Edward  VII.,  King,  197, 199,  201, 

207,  225,  227. 
Egerton,  Professor,  quoted,  159. 
Eg5T)t,  92,  143,  200,  216,  272,  282. 

—  England  and,  92. 

—  France  and,  91. 

Empress   Frederick  of  Germany, 

106. 
England   and    Eastern    Question, 

53,  58. 

—  and  Russia,  192. 

in  Central  Asia,  208. 

—-  and  Turkev,  216. 

Enver  Bey,  241,  272. 
Elgin,  Earl  of,  in  China,  169. 
ElUot,  Captain,  in  China,  167. 
Europe,  expansion  of,  74. 

Falkenhayn,  General  von,  278. 
Falkland  Isles,  battle  of,  293. 
Fashoda,  100,  198. 
Faure,  President,  111. 
Ferdinand,  Prince  of  Saxe-Coburg- 

Gotha,  66,  106. 
Ferry,  Jules,  76,  94,  104,  172. 
Fiume,  311. 
Foch,  Marshal,  290. 
France  and  Italv,  196. 

—  and  Turkey,  216. 

—  in  Far  East,  171. 

—  unification  of,  5. 

Francis  Joseph,  Emperor,  71,  220 
Franco-Chinese  War  (1882),  172. 
Franco-German  Agreement  (1909), 
210. 

—  Treaty  (1911),  213. 

—  War,  25. 
Franco-Russian  Alliance,  109. 
Franco-Spanish     Treaty     (1904), 

200. 
Frankfort  Parliament,  25. 
Franz-Ferdinand,    Archduke,    22, 

224,  258,  260. 
Frederick,  Emperor,  89. 
Frederick  William  IV.  of  Prussia, 

25. 


330 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


Free  Trade,  14. 

French  Constitution  of  1875,  41, 

42. 
French,  Sir  John  (Earl),  267. 
Frere,  Sir  Bartle,  150,  152. 
Friedjung,  Dr.,  225. 
Froude,  J.  A.,  149. 

Gallepoli  Expedition,  273. 
Gambetta,  94,  95. 
Gatacre,  General,  157. 
Geneva  Arbitration,  the,  141. 
German  Colonial  Empire,  86. 

—  Colonial  School,  16,  17. 

—  East  Africa,  85,  86. 

—  Emperor  the,  (see  William). 

—  Empire,  the,  24,  161. 
Germany,  136-7. 

—  and  the  Balkans,  241. 

—  and  Boers,  156. 

—  Colonial  ambitions  of,  79,  81. 

—  Colonies  of,  15,  192. 

—  and  England,  191. 

—  foreign  trade  of,  80. 

—  industrial  revolution  in,    14, 
79. 

—  and  Mesopotamia,  218. 

—  and  Morocco,  203. 

—  Sea  Power  of,  194. 

—  and  South  Africa,  84. 

—  and  Turkey,  216. 
Gladstone,    Right    Hon.    W.    E., 

119,  141,  152,  216. 

—  quoted,  87. 

Goltz,  Baron  von  der,  217. 
Gordon,  General,  97,  99. 
Gortchakoff,  Prince,  19,  37,  216. 
Groschen,  Mr.  (Viscount),  93. 
Graeco-Bulgarian    Treaty    (1912), 

235. 
Graham,   Sir  James,   and   China, 

168. 
Granville,  Earl,  96. 
Great  Britain  (see  also  England), 
139,  142. 

and  War  of  1914,  264. 

Great  War,  the — 

British  Marine  and,  298. 

Bulgaria  and,  275. 

German  Colonies  and,  291. 

Greece  and,  274,  277. 

Ireland  and,  284. 


Great  War,  the — 
Roumania  and,  278. 

—  —  Russia  and,  279,  287. 
Serbia  and,  276. 

Submarine      War       and, 

293-5. 

United  States  and,  288. 

Greece,  3,  61,  220,  248,  309. 

—  and  Bulgaria,  239. 

—  and  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
309. 

Greek  Insurection  of  1821,  49. 
Grey,  Sir  Edward  (Viscount),  101, 
208. 

—  Sir  George,  147,  160. 
Griqualand  West,  148. 
Grotius,  Hugo,  8. 
GueshofE,  Monsieur,  234. 

Haakon  VII.,  King,  207. 
Hague  Conference  (1898),  20. 
Haig,  Earl,  267. 
Hart,  Sir  Robert,  173. 
Heligoland,  13,  87,  192. 
Henri  IV.,  his  Great  Design,  9. 
Herat,  116,  119. 
Herzegovina,  220. 
Hesse-Darmstadt,  Alice,  Princess 

of,  110. 
Hicks  Pasha,  97. 
Hindenburg,  Marshal  von,  269. 
Hobbes,  Thomas,  8. 
Holland  (see  United  Provinces). 
Holy  AUiance,  10,  129. 

—  Roman  Empire,  24. 
Hughes,  Right  Hon.  W.  M.,  317. 
Humbert,  Kmg,  77,  197. 
Hungary     and     the     Treatv     of 

Versailles,  307. 

ToNATiEFP,  General,  55. 
International  Law,  8. 
Ireland,  Rebellion  in  (1916),  283. 
Isandhlwana,  151. 
Italia  Irridenta,  285. 
Italo-Turkish  War  (1911),  215. 
Italy,  77,  285. 

—  and  France,  196, 

—  and  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
309. 

—  and  Turkey,  230. 

—  Colonies  of,  196. 


INDEX 


381 


Jameson,  Dr.,  155. 
Jameson  Raid,  the,  155. 
Japan  and  United  States,  171. 

—  English  in,  165. 

—  transformation  of,  175. 
Jefiferson  quoted,  128. 

Jellicoe,  Admiral  Sir  John  (Vis- 
count), 294. 

Jerusalem,  capture  of,  283. 

Joffre,  Marshal,  267. 

Joubert,  152. 

Jugo-Slavia,  310. 
and   the   Treaty   of   Ver- 
sailles, 308. 

Jutland,  battle  of,  294. 

Kabul,  115. 
Kaffirs,  the,  146. 
Kaiser,  position  of,  28. 

—  title  of,  27. 

Kaiser  Wilhehn  Canal,  195. 
Kandahar,  118. 
Kant,  Immanuel,  9. 
Kassala,  100. 
Kavala,  248. 
Khartoum,  98. 
Khedive  Ismail,  92,  93. 
Khedive  Tewfik,  94,  95. 
Khiva,  115. 
Kiaochow,  123. 

—  Germany  and,  170. 
Kiel  Canal,  262. 
Kimberley,  148,  158. 
Kirk  Kilisse,  battle  of,  237. 
Kitchener,    P.M.    Earl,    99,    158, 

267. 

death  of,  284. 

Kluck,  General  von,  268. 

Korea,  173,  183. 

Kossovo,  battle  of  (1389),  47. 

Kronstadt,  109,  111. 

Kruger,  President  Paul,  85,   152, 

155,  192. 
Kulturkampf,  the,  30,  32,  34. 
Kumanovo,  battle  of,  238. 
Kut,  282. 

Ladysmith,  157,  158. 
Lansdowne,  Marquis  of,  197. 
Lausanne,  Treaty  of,  22,  232. 
Lawrence,  Lord,  115. 
Leibnitz  quoted,  2. 


Leo  XIIL,  Pope,  34. 

Leopold   of   the    Belgians,    King, 

83 
Li^ge,  267. 

Lin,  Commissioner,  167. 
List,  Friedrich,  15. 
Lloyd    George,    Right    Hon.    D., 

212,  284,  302,  311. 
Lobengula,  150,  154. 
London,    Conferences    of    (1912), 

240. 

—  Pact  of  (1915),  310. 

—  Treaty  of  (1913),  243. 
Loubet,  President,  199. 
Lule  Burgas,  battle  of,  237. 
Lusitania,  the,  288,  294. 
Luxemburg    and    the    Treaty   of 

Versailles,  304. 
LyaU,  Sir  Alfred,  quoted,  120. 
Lytton,  Earl  of ,  116,  117. 

Maoahtney,    Lord,     mission    to 

China,  165. 
Macedonia,  233. 

Mackensen,  General  von,  276,  278. 
MacMahon,  Marshal,  40. 
Magersfontein,  158. 
Majuba  Hill,  battle  of  (1881),  153. 
Manchuria,  122,  176. 

—  Russia  in,  177. 
Mandates,  League  of  Nations  and, 

314. 
Manila,  134. 
Marchand,  Major,  101. 
Mame,  battle  of  the,  268. 
Marx,  Karl,  19. 
Massowah,  196. 
Maude,  Sir  Stanley,  282. 
"  May  Laws,"  the,  33. 
McKinley,  President,  134. 
Mehemet  Ali,  49,  93. 
Merv,  118. 

Mesopotamia,  281,  309,  318. 
Methuen,  Lord,  158. 
Metz,  26. 

Milan,  King,  of  Serbia,  65,  221. 
Milner,  Sir  Alfred,  (Viscount),  97, 

156-7,  160. 
Mirabeau  quoted,  258. 
Moldavia  (see  Roumania),  3. 
Monroe  Doctrine,  the,  127-30. 
Mons,  battle  of,  267. 


332 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


Montenegro,  236. 

Moore,  Professor  J.   B.,  quoted, 

125. 
Morier,  Sir  R.,  quoted,  257. 
Morocco,  197,  198,  200,  211,  214, 

258. 
Muhammad  Ahmed,  97. 
Muir,  Professor,  quoted,  126. 
Mukden,  battle  of,  182. 
Muraviev,  General,  120. 
Miirzteg  Agreement,  224. 

Namur,  267. 

Napier,  Lord,  in  China,  166. 
Napoleon,  3,  49. 
Napoleon  III.,  25. 

and  the  Far  East,  172. 

Nationality,  principle  of,  4-5. 

Nations,  League  of,  319. 

New  Hebrides,  200. 

Newfoundland,  200. 

Nicholas  I.,  Czar  of  Russia,  50, 

92,  113. 
Nicholas  II.,  Czar,  110,  211,  228, 

245. 
Nicholas,   Prince  of  Montenegro, 

54. 
Nigeria,  192. 
North  German  Confederation,  4, 

25,  27. 
Constitution  of,  28,  29, 

30. 
Norway,  13. 

—  Kingdom  of,  207. 

—  separated  from  Sweden,  206- 
7. 

Olney  dispatch,  the,  129,  130. 

—  Mr.,  138. 
Omdurman,  battle  of,  101. 
Opium  Trade,  166. 
Orange  Free  State,  the,  143. 
Ottoman  Empire,  the,  3,  22,  63. 

Pacific  and  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, 317. 

—  Germany  in,  86. 
Palestine,  283,  309,  318. 
Panama  Canal,  the,  137. 
Pan-Germanism,  266,  273. 
Paris,  Peace  Conference  of  (1919), 

301. 


Penjdeh  incident,  71,  119. 

Perry,  Commander,  U.S.A.,  171. 

Persia,  209,  211. 

Peter  I.,  King,  of  Serbia,  222. 

Peter  the  Great,  48. 

Philippines,  the,  133-4,  139. 

Pius  IX.,  Pope,  34. 

Plevna,  siege  of,  57. 

Poland  and  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles  304. 

Port  Arthur,  122,  123,  174,  176, 
182,  183. 

Port  Natal,  145. 

Port  Said,  96. 

Portugal,  5. 

—  in  Far  East,  165. 
Pretoria,  158. 

—  Convention  (1881),  153. 
Pretorius,  152. 

Prince  Imperial,  151. 
Prussia,  5,  90. 

—  and  Austria,  36. 
Prussian  spirit,  the,  258. 

Rapallo,  Treaty  of  (1920),  312. 
Rebellion  of  Arabi  Bey  (1881),  94. 
Reichsgericht,  the  German,  30. 
Reinsurance  Treaty  of  1884,  73, 

105. 
Rhodes,  Cecil,  155. 

—  Island  of,  232,  249. 
Rhodesia,  154. 
Riebeck,  Antony  Van,  144. 
Roberts,  Sir  Frederick  (Earl),  118, 

153,  158. 
Robinson,  Sir  Hercules,  156. 
Rodjestvensky,  Admiral,  182. 
Roon  and  Moltke,  25. 
Roosevelt,  President,  131,  135. 
Rorke's  Drift,  151. 
Rosebery,  Earl  of,  193. 
Roumania,  3,  62,  249. 

—  and  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
308. 

—  King  Carol  of,  216. 
Roumelia,  Eastern,  63,  64,  71. 
Russia,  61,  162,  264. 

—  and  China,  121,  170. 

—  and  England,  192. 

—  and  Germany,  103. 

—  and  Serbia,  228. 

—  and  the  Great  War,  269,  270. 


INDEX 


333 


Russia,  expansion  of,  111-3- 

—  first  Duma,  186. 

—  foreign  policy  of,  1 1 1-3. 

—  in  Central  Asia,  113. 

—  industrial  revolution  in,  184. 

—  railway  expansion  of,  108. 

—  reform  in,  184. 

—  revolution  in,  287. 

—  second  Duma,  187. 

—  third  Duma,  188. 
Russo-Grerman  Agreement  (1910), 

211. 
Russo-Japanese     War     (1904-5), 

181. 
Russo-Turkish  War  (1877),  56. 

»Sadowa,  258. 

Salisbury,  Marquis  of,  60,  64,  76, 
101,  130,  192. 

—  —    quoted,  258. 
Salonika,  248,  256,  276,  281. 
Samoa,  136,  192. 

San  Remo,  Conference  of  (1920), 

312. 
Sand  River  Convention,  the  (1852), 

146. 
Sandwich  Islands,  135,  136. 
Santiago,  132. 

Schnaebele  incident  (1887),  104. 
Schleswig-Holstein  and  the  Treaty 

of  Versailles,  304. 
Saint-Pierre,  Abbe  de,  9. 
Schuvaloff,  Count,  60,  115. 
Sedan,  25,  258. 
Sekukuni,  150,  152. 
Serajevo,  22,  260. 
Serbia,  3,  57,  221,  250,  238,  269. 

—  and  Austria-Hungary,  255. 

—  attack  on  (1914),  263. 
Serbo-Bulgarian    Treaty     (1912), 

235. 
War  65. 

Sevres,  Treaty  of  (1920),  308. 

Seymour,  Sir  Michael,  169. 

Shepstone,    Sir   Theophilus,    149, 
151. 

Sher  AH,  116,  117. 

Siberia,  120. 

SUesia   and   the   Treaty   of   Ver- 
sailles, 305. 

Sims,  Admiral,  292. 

Smith,  Sir  Harry,  146. 


Smuts,  General,  292. 

quoted,  14. 

Social  Democracy  in  Germany,  35. 
Sofia,  65. 

Somme,  battle  of  the,  271, 
Soudan,  97,  143. 

South  Africa,  attempted  Federa- 
tion of,  149. 

Union  Act,  161. 

Union  of,  159,  160,  161. 

South   African   War,   the   (1899- 

1902),  143,  157. 
Southern  Slavs,  the,  62. 
Spain,  132,  133. 

—  unification  of,  5. 
Spanish-American     War      (1898) 

132   139. 
Stambuiofl",  65,  66,  233. 
Sturdee,    Admiral    Sir    Doveton, 

293. 
Suez  Canal,  the,  76,  92,  138,  282. 
Sweden,  13. 

—  separated  from  Norway,  206- 
7. 

Syria,  309,  318. 
Strassburg,  25. 

Taft,  Judge,  135. 
Tannenberg,  battle  of,  269. 
Tel-el-Kebir,  96. 
Thiers,  Monsieur,  26,  37-9. 
"  Thirty  Days  War,"  the,  67. 
Tirpitz,  Admiral  von,  195,  260. 
Togo,  Admiral,  182. 
Tonquin,  172. 

Trans-Siberian  Railway,  108. 
Transvaal,  the,  143,  154. 

—  annexation  of,  151. 
Transvaal  Republic,  the,  146,  152. 
Transylvania,  278. 
Treaties— 

Anglo-Japanese  (1902),  179. 

Bardo,orKassarSaid(1881),91. 

Belgrade  (1739),  48. 

Berlin  (1878),  3,  60,  63,  72,  103, 

226. 
Bjorko  (1905),  205. 
Brest-Litovsk  (1917),  288. 
Bucharest  (1913),  246. 

—  (1918),  279. 
Franco-German  (1911),  213. 
Frankfort  (1871),  26,  38. 


334 


EUROPE   AND   BEYOND 


Treaties — 

Gandamak  (1879),  117. 
Grseco-Bulgarian  (1912),  235. 
Jacobabad  (1876),  116. 
Kutschuk-Kainardji  (1774),  48. 
Lausanne  (1912),  22,  232. 
London  (1832),  3. 

—  (1839),  3. 

—  (1913),  22,  243. 

—  Protocol  (1877),  56. 
Nankin  (1842),  168. 
Paris  (1856),  3,  24,  70. 
Pekin  Convention  (1860),  170. 
Portsmouth,    New    Hampshire 

(1905),  21,  183,  206. 
RapaUo  (1920),  312. 
8an  Stephauo  (1878),  59,  62. 
Serbo- Bulgarian  (1912),  235. 
Sevres  (1920),  308. 
Shimonseki  (1895),  121,  174. 
Skierniewice  (1884),  73. 
Tientsin  (1858),  169. 

—  Convention  (1885),  174. 
Unkiar-Skelessi  (1833),  50. 
Vereeniging  (1902),  159. 
VersaiUes  (1919),  23,  302. 
Washington  (1871),  141. 
Westphalia  (1648),  7. 

Treitschke  quoted,  258. 
Trent  a&siir,  the,  141. 
Tricoupis,  Monsieur,  233. 
Triple  Alliance,  the,  77,  254. 
Triple  Entente,  20,  21,  210. 
TripoU,  197,  231. 

—  War  in,  21. 
Tsushima,  battle  of,  183. 
Tunis,  75,  76,  196,  230. 
Turco-Italian  War  (1911),  231. 
Turco-Serb  War,  54. 

Turgot  quoted,  1. 
Turk,  the  Ottoman,  47. 
Turkestan,  114. 
Turkey,  247,  248,  308. 

—  and  the  Great  War,  272. 

—  revolution  in,  219. 

—  (see  Ottoman  Empire). 
Turks,  Young,  218. 

United  Provinces,  5. 

United   States  of  America,    124, 

126,  126,  129,  130,  133,  134, 

138. 


United    States    of    America,   ex- 
pansion of,  125, 
Navy  in  war,  296. 

Vatican  Decree  (1870),  32. 

Venezuela,  129. 

Venizelos,   Eleutherios,    68,    235, 

248,  274,  276,  280. 
Verdun,  battle  of,  271. 
Vereeniging  (1902),  159. 
Victor  Emmanuel  III.,  197. 
Victoria,  Queen,  44,  158. 

death  of,  158. 

Versailles,  the  Treaty  of  (1919)— 

Alsace-Lorraine  and,  302. 

Australia  and,  317. 

Austria -Hungary  and,  306. 

Belgium  and,  303. 

Czecho -Slovakia  and,  307. 

Danzig  and,  305. 

Greece  and,  309. 

Hungary  and,  307. 

Ttnly  and,  309. 

J;igo-Slavia  and,  308. 

Luxemburg  and,  304. 

Poland  and,  304. 

Roumania  and,  308. 

Schleswig-Holstein  and,  304. 

Silesia  and,  305. 
Vladivostok,  120. 

Wade,  Sir  Thomas,  and  China, 

170. 
Wallachia  (see  Roumania),  3. 
War,  Great,    of  1914,  causes  of, 

258. 
Washington,  George,  144,  127. 
Webster- Ash  burton  Treaty,  140. 
Wei-Hai-Wei,  123,  175,  177. 
Welt-Politik,  12,  15. 
White,  General,  157. 
William  I.,  Emperor,  72,  80. 
William      II.,      Kaiser,     89-103, 
107,     155,     162,     190,     201, 
254,  260. 

at  Constantinople,  217. 

in  Palestine,  217. 

and  Russia,  205. 

at  Tangiers,  202. 

"  Willy-Nicky    Correspondence," 
205. 


INDEX 


335 


Wilson,  President  Woodrow,  271, 

288,301,311. 
Witte,  Count,  121,  186,  206. 
Wolseley,  Sir  Garnet  (Viscount), 

96,  97,  98,  152. 
Wiirtemberg,  27. 
Weyler,  General,  132, 


Ypres,  first  battle  of,  269. 
—  second  battle  of,  270. 

Zeebrugge,  raid  on,  298. 
Zeinstva,  Russian,  185. 
Zulu  War  of  1879,  151. 


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